JUDGMENT : L. Mohapatra, J. - In both the revisions, Petitioners have challenged the judgment and order dtd. 15.3.1986 passed by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Berhampur in Criminal Appeal No. 29 of 1986 and 30 of 1986 allowing the appeals and acquitting the accused persons of the charge u/s 307/34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter called as the 'Code') 2. The case of the prosecution is that on 5.3.1983 in the evening the accused persons i.e. Opposite Parties in Criminal Revision No. 355 of 1986 and Opposite Party No. 1 in Criminal Revision No. 525 of 1986 attempted to kill Somanath Bisoi (Petitioner No. 1) by means of an axe. The further case as stated by the prosecution is that on 5.3.1983 the injured Somanath Bisoi along with the two of his sons, namely, Charan Bisoi and Narayan Bisoi had gone to their Padar land. While they were coming back in the evening by two bicycles on the Bhanjanagar Daha road, injured Somanath Bisoi was coming ahead of his two sons and the distance between the two bicycles was about 200-300 cubits. Near the village Khamaridi it is alleged that the accused persons came out of a nearly mill being armed with weapons and assaulted the injured, Petitioner No. 1. 3. On the basis of the evidence adduced before the Court learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Bhanjanagar found all the accused persons guilty of the charge and convicted them u/s 307/34, I.P.C. Against the said judgment two criminal appeals were filed and the learned 1st Addl. Sessions Judge, Ganjam disposed of both the criminal appeals in a common judgment and allowed the appeals. Before entering into the merits of the,case, it is worthwhile to refer to a decision reported in Vimal Singh Vs. Khuman Singh and Another, Their Lordships in the said decision have laid down the limits of the powers of the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal. In Paragraph-7 of the said judgment their Lordships have held that the High Court in its revisional power does not ordinarily interfere with the judgments of acquittal passed by the trial Court unless there has been any manifest error of law or procedure. In Paragraph-7 of the said judgment their Lordships have held that the High Court in its revisional power does not ordinarily interfere with the judgments of acquittal passed by the trial Court unless there has been any manifest error of law or procedure. The interference with the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court is limited only to exceptional cases when it is found that the order under revision suffers from glaring illegality or has caused miscarriage of justice or it is found that the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case or where trial court has illegally shut out the evidence which otherwise ought to have been considered or when the material evidence that clinches the issue have been overlooked. The relevant observations are quoted below: 7. Coming to the ambit of power of High Court u/s 401 of the Code, the High Court in its revisional power does not ordinarily interfere with judgements of acquittal passed by the trial Court unless there has been manifest error of law or procedure. The interference with the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court is limited only to exceptional cases when it is found that the order under revision suffers from glaring illegality or has caused miscarriage of justice or when it is found that the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case or where the trial Court has illegally shut out the evidence which otherwise ought to have been considered or where the material evidence which clinches the issue have been overlooked. These are the instances where the High Court would be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal. Sub-section (3) of Section 401 mandates that the High Court shall not convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. Thus, the High Court would not be justified in substituting an order of acquittal into one of conviction even if it is convinced that the accused deserves conviction. No doubt, the High Court in exercise of its revisional power can set aside an order of acquittal if it comes within the ambit of exceptional cases enumerated above, but it cannot convert an order of acquittal into an order of conviction. The only course left to the High Court in such exceptional cases is to order retrial. No doubt, the High Court in exercise of its revisional power can set aside an order of acquittal if it comes within the ambit of exceptional cases enumerated above, but it cannot convert an order of acquittal into an order of conviction. The only course left to the High Court in such exceptional cases is to order retrial. In fact, Sub-section (3) of Section 401 of the Code forbids the High Court in converting the order of acquittal into one of conviction. Keeping the aforesaid principle of law, in mind the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners are to be examined. The learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in both the revisions has filed a written note of argument wherein he has contended as follows: (a) considering the age of P. Ws. 5 & 6 who are eye-witnesses to the occurrence it can be safely said that they were able to see the occurrence from a distance; (b) since the aforesaid witnesses had acquaintance with the accused persons earlier, there may not have been any difficulty for them to identify the accused persons from a distance; and (c) the occurrence took place when there was light and had not become dark and therefore, it was possible on the part of the eye witnesses to see the occurrence. 4. On careful examination of the order passed by the lower appellate court I find that in Paragraph-9 of the judgment lower appellate court has considered the evidence in details and came to a finding that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond all reasonable doubts that the accused persons have participated in the alleged occurrence at the alleged place and time. The lower appellate court has categorically held after discussing the evidence that in the absence of evidence of P.W. 4 regarding the time of occurrence, the evidence of P. Ws. 3, 5 and 6 are highly suspicious and it is difficult to hold that the occurrence took place prior to sun set or when there was sufficient day light. The lower appellate court has categorically held after discussing the evidence that in the absence of evidence of P.W. 4 regarding the time of occurrence, the evidence of P. Ws. 3, 5 and 6 are highly suspicious and it is difficult to hold that the occurrence took place prior to sun set or when there was sufficient day light. He has further held that even assuming that the occurrence took place at dusk time, the evidence of P.W. 4 goes to show that P.W. 6 was at a distance of 200 to 300 cubits from the spot of occurrence, when the occurrence took place and as such he could not have identified the assistant on his own nor could he have seen the dealing of blow. He has further held that in view of the evidence of P.W. 6 that P.W. 4 reached the spot along with him, it is natural that P.W. 4 reached the spot along with him, it is natural that P.W. 4 also was at a similar distance like P.W. 6 and could not have seen the occurrence from that distance. 5. It appears from the order dtd, 22,11.90 that while this matter was being heard, the Hon'ble Judge was of the view that the decision rendered in Patal Dungdung Vs. State of Orissa, which had been relied upon by the lower appellate court on the question of identification from a distance was required to be examined by a larger Bench since identification depends on several factors like proximity of the identifier with the person identified, visibility conditions, and several other factors, Pursuant to the said order passed by the Hon'ble Judge the matter was referred to Full Bench and their Lordships in the Full Bench decided that no hard and fast rule can be laid down regarding the distance from which it is either possible or not possible to identify a person. The Courts have always sounded a note of caution that no accurate and meticulous standard, scientific or otherwise, can be laid down in this regard, since it depends on several variable factors. Therefore, the matter was to be judged in the facts and circumstances of each case. The relevant paragraph of the said judgement is quoted below: 6. The Courts have always sounded a note of caution that no accurate and meticulous standard, scientific or otherwise, can be laid down in this regard, since it depends on several variable factors. Therefore, the matter was to be judged in the facts and circumstances of each case. The relevant paragraph of the said judgement is quoted below: 6. From the observations made and findings recorded in the decided cases noted above, the position is manifest that no hard and fast rule can be laid down regarding distance from which it is either possible or not possible to identify a person. The courts have always sounded a note of caution that no accurate and meticulous standard, scientific or otherwise, can be laid down in this regard, since it depends on several variable factors. Therefore, the matter has to be judged in the facts and circumstances of each case. The observations made and the principles stated in the decisions of this Court in Patel Dungdung v. State and Saudagar Nayak v. State (supra) should also be read in the context of the facts and circumstances; therein and should not be taken as laying down any general principle of universal application. The reference is answered accordingly. 6. From the reasons given by the learned lower appellate court, I do not find any infirmity in the finding that P. Ws. 4 & 6 who were at a distance of 200-300 cubits from the spot of occurrence could not have seen the occurrence in view of the fact that the occurrence might have taken place at dusk. The learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners also could not show any infirmity in other findings of the lower appellate court. From the reasonings and findings of the lower appellate court, I also do not find that they suffers from any glaring illegality or has caused miscarriage of justice. It is not a case which can be said to be coming within the ambit of exceptional cases. 7. I, therefore, held that there is no merit in the revisions and the same are accordingly dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed