S. N. Kapoor, J. ( 1 ) HEARD. In this case, undisputedly the accused V. R. Kittur appeared on 19th August, 1994. From the copies of the order sheets it appears that he regularly attended the proceedings before the learned Trial Court except once when he was exempted. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relies upon "common Cause", A Registered Society v. Union of India b Ors. , JT 1996 (4) SC 701. Paras 4 - 2 (f) and 5 of that judgment reads as under : "4-2 (F) Where the cases pending in Criminal Courts under Indian Penal Code or any other law for the time being in force are punishable with imprisonment upto three years, with or without fine, and if such pendency is for more than two -years and if in such cases trial liave still not commenced, the criminal Court shall disclurge or acquit the accused, as the case may be, and close such cases. 5. For the purpose of directions contained in Clauses (1) and (2) above, the period of pendency of criminal cases shall be calculated from the date the accused are summoned to appear in the Court. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 2 ) IN the second "common Cause" case reported as "common Cause", A Registered Society v. Union of India and Ors. , 1996 VIII AD SC 746=ll (1996) CCR 180 (SC), it was further clarified as under : I. I The time limit mentioned regarding the pendency of criminal cases in paragraphs from 2 (a) to 2 (f) of our judgment shall not apply to cases wherein such pendency of the criminal proceedings is wholly or partly attributable to the dilatory tactics adopted by t1ie concerned accused or on account of any other action of the accused which results in -prolonging t1ie trial. In other words it should be shown that the criminal proceedings have remained pending for the requisite period mentioned in the aforesaid clauses of paragraph 2 despite full cooperation by the concerned accused to get these proceedings disposed of and the delay in the disposal of these cases is not at all attributable to the concerned accused, nor such delay is caused on account of such accused getting stay of criminal proceedings from higher Courts. Accused concerned are not entitled to earn any discharge or acquittal as per paragraphs 2 (a) to 2 (f) of our judgment if it is demonstrated that the accused concerned seek to take advantage of their own wrong or any other action of their own resulting in protraction of trials against them. " ( 3 ) ON the basis of this judgment learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the accused appeared on 19th August, 1994. The accused was summoned to appear on 19th August, 1994 and he appeared. More than two years have passed. The offence under Section 379, Indian Penal Code is punishable by imprisonment for three years or fine or both and the offence under Section 39 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 is also punishable with imprisonment of the term of three years or fine, which shall not be less than Rs. 1,000. 00 , or both. Learned Counsel for the petitioner rightly submits that the matter is covered by paras 4-2 (f) and 5 of the first "common Cause" judgment mentioned above. He further submits that the second "common Cause" judgment insists that such a benefit should not be granted to an accused who himself is causing dilatory tactics by repeatedly using the word "accused concerned". Learned Counsel for the petitioner further submits that even the charge was framed on 7th September, 1996 and more than two years have passed since then. Consequently, the matter would also be rather covered by Rajdeo Sharma v. State of Bihar JT 1998 (7) SC 1=iv (1998) CCR 11 (SC)=viii (1998) SLT 194 (SC ). ( 4 ) MR. Akshay Bipin, learned Counsel for the State, is fair enough as he submits that the case appears to be covered by the Supreme Court judgment in the second "common Cause" case referred to above, for he finds himself in unenviable position in absence of any delay which can be attributed to the applicant. ( 5 ) HAVING heard the learned Counsels for the parties it is apparent that the accused applicant was summoned for offence under Section 379, Indian Penal Code and offence under Section 39 of the Indian Electricity Act on 19th August, 1994 and he appeared accordingly. Both offences are punishable by imprisonment extending upto three years and fine. ( 5 ) HAVING heard the learned Counsels for the parties it is apparent that the accused applicant was summoned for offence under Section 379, Indian Penal Code and offence under Section 39 of the Indian Electricity Act on 19th August, 1994 and he appeared accordingly. Both offences are punishable by imprisonment extending upto three years and fine. As such, since the matter is squarely covered by the two Common Cause judgments, the case is required to be closed against him and he is required to be discharged. Besides, the charge was framed on 7th September, 1996 and two years have passed since then. ( 6 ) FOR the aforementioned reasons I feel that the proceedings relating FIR No. 442/ 92, PS Ambedkar Nagar, New Delhi for offence under Section 379, Indian Penal Code and 39 of the Indian Electricity Act pending in the concerned Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi are hereby quashed and the petition is allowed qua petitioner V. R. Kittur only without any delay. A copy of the order be sent to the learned Trial Court for information and to proceed in accordance with law.