Nakul Deo Singh v. Deputy Commandant — 1999 DIGILAW 379 (KER)

Judgment :- P.K. Balasubramanyan, J. These Original Petitions were referred to a Division Bench by the Seamed Single Judge in view of the apparent conflict in the views expressed in the decisions of this Court and in view of the importance of the question involved. The Division Bench in its turn felt that there was an apparent conflict between the views in the decisions of two Division Bench of this Court, one in Union of India v. Kunhabdulla (1985(1) LLJ 331) and the other in Thomas Kutty v. Union of India (1994 (2) KLT 258) and that the conflict requires to be resolved. That is how these Original Petitions have come up before the Full Bench. 2. Brief facts in O.P. 11321 of 1995 are: The petitioner therein while working as a Head Constable in the Central Industrial Security Force Unit at Bokkaro Steel Plant was issued a charge memo and after the conduct of a due enquiry was imposed a punishment of reduction in rank to the lower post of Naik till he was found fit by the competent authority to be restored to the higher post of Head Constable. This order was admittedly served on the petitioner at Bokkaro. The petitioner filed an appeal before the Deputy Inspector General, Central Industrial Security Force Unit, Bokkaro Steel Plant, Bokkaro. That appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Authority by order dated 4.3.1995. Copy of the order of the original authority imposing punishment on the petitioner is marked as Ext. P5 and the copy of the order of the Appellate Authority is marked as Ext. P1 in the Original Petition. The order Ext. P1 was served on the petitioner while he was working as a Naik in the Central Industrial Security Force Unit at HNL Kottyam. On receipt of the appellate order Ext. P1 the petitioner approached this Court with the Original Petition invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India seeking the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the original order Ext. P5 and the appellate order Ext. P1. In the Original Petition the petitioner has not put forward any specific plea regarding the jurisdiction to entertain the Original Petition. In other words there is no plea in the Original Petition regarding the basis on which the Original Petition was filed by the petitioner in this Court. P5 and the appellate order Ext. P1. In the Original Petition the petitioner has not put forward any specific plea regarding the jurisdiction to entertain the Original Petition. In other words there is no plea in the Original Petition regarding the basis on which the Original Petition was filed by the petitioner in this Court. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents a specific plea was raised that the cause of action arose outside the territorial jurisdiction of this High Court and since no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court, the Original Petition under Art.226 of the Constitution was not maintainable. Thus one of the questions that fell for decision in the Original Petition was whether this Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the Original Petition filed under Art.226 of the Constitution if the light of Art.226(2) of the Constitution. 3. The brief facts in O.P. 12019 of 1995 are: While the petitioner was working as a constable in the 125 Battalion of Central Reserve Police Force (Independent Group) under the Commandant 125 Battalion Central Reserve Police Force Antheria More, New Delhi action was initiated against the petitioner for his failing to report for duty on expiry of the sanctioned leave. After a due enquiry the petitioner was dismissed from service by the disciplinary authority. The order was received by the petitioner while i n New Delhi. After receipt of the order, the petitioner returned to his native place at Trivandrum. Thereafter the petitioner submitted an appeal before the Deputy Inspector General, Central Reserve Police Force, New Delhi. That appeal was dismissed on the ground that it was belated. The order of the appellate authority was communicated to the petitioner at Trivandrum. The petitioner has filed the Original Petition seeking to quash the order of the original authority dismissing him from service and that of the Appellate Authority (what is described as Ext. P4 order in the Original Petition, which is sought to be quashed is only a Memorandum of Appeal but the prayer apparently relates to Ext. P5 order by which the appeal was rejected). Here also, there is no specific plea in the Original Petition as to how the jurisdiction of this Court was attracted. Here also the question of jurisdiction was raised on behalf of the respondents. 4. P5 order by which the appeal was rejected). Here also, there is no specific plea in the Original Petition as to how the jurisdiction of this Court was attracted. Here also the question of jurisdiction was raised on behalf of the respondents. 4. The question thus to be considered in these Original Petitions is whether on the facts stated above, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the Original Petitions filed under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. 5. Art.226 of the Constitution of India prior to the 15th amendment did not give any indication regarding the territorial jurisdiction of the High Courts to entertain Writ Petitions under that Article. In Election Commission v. Saka Venkata Rao (AIR 1953 SC 210) the Supreme Court held that the High Court of Madras could not issue any writ under Art.226 of the Constitution to the Election Commission having its office permanently located at New Delhi. This view was reiterated by their Lordships in K.S. Rashid & son v. I.T.L Commission (AIR 1954 SC 207) wherein their Lordships held that: "While Art.225 of the Constitution preserves to the existing High Courts the powers and jurisdictions which they had previously, Art.226 confers, on all the High Courts new and very wide powers in the matter of issuing writs which they never possessed before. There are only two limitations placed upon the exercise of these powers by a High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution: one is that the power is to be exercised "throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction", that is to say, the writs issued by the Court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction. The other limitation is that the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue writs "must be within those territories" and this implies that they must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories. It is with reference to these two conditions thus mentioned that the jurisdiction of the High Courts to issue writs under Art.226 of the Constitution is to be determined". It is with reference to these two conditions thus mentioned that the jurisdiction of the High Courts to issue writs under Art.226 of the Constitution is to be determined". In U. Col Khajoor Singh v. Union of India (AIR 1961 SC 532) a seven member Bench of the Supreme Court stated the law thus: "It is not permissible to read in Art.226 the residence or location of the person affected by the order passed in order to determine the jurisdiction of the High Court. That jurisdiction depends on the person or authority passing the order being within those territories and the residence or location of the person affected can have no relevance on the question of the High Court's jurisdiction. It would be wrong to introduce in Art.226 the concept of the place where the order passed has effect in order to determine the jurisdiction of the High Court which can give relief under Art.226. The introduction of such a concept may give rise to confusion and conflict of jurisdictions. Functioning of a Government is really nothing other than giving effect to the orders passed by it. Therefore it would not be right to introduce in Art.226 the concept of the functioning of Government when determining the meaning of the words "any" person or authority within those territories. These words in Art.226 refer not to the place where the Government may be functioning but only to the place where the person or authority is either resident or is located. So far therefore as a natural person is concerned, he is within those territories if he resides there permanantly or temporarily. So far as an authority (other .than a Government) is concerned, it is within the territories if its office is located there. So far as a Government is concerned it is within the territories only if its seat is within those territories. What Art.226 requires is residence or location as a fact and if therefore there is a seat from which the Government functions as a fact even though that seat is not mentioned in the Constitution the High Court within whose territories that seat is located will be the High Court having jurisdiction under Art.226 so far as the orders of the Government as such are concerned. The seat of the Govt. of India is in New Delhi and the Government as such is located in New Delhi. The seat of the Govt. of India is in New Delhi and the Government as such is located in New Delhi. The absence of a provision in the Constitution can make no difference to this fact. Therefore, the view taken in AIR 1953 SC 210 and AIR 1954 SC 207 that there is twofold limitation on the power of the High Court to issue writs etc. under Art.226, namely, (i) the power is to be exercised 'throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction', that is to say, the writs issued by the Court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction, and (ii) the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue such writs must be 'within those territories' which clearly implies that they must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories, is the correct one." Their Lordships also pointed out that the concept of cause of action cannot be introduced into Art, 226, for by doing so, the court would be doing away with the express provision contained therein which requires that the person or authority to whom the writ is to be issued should be resident in or located within the territory over which the High Court has jurisdiction. 6. The position was reconsidered by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Collector of Customs v. East India Commercial Company (AIR 1963 SC 1124). In that decision, their Lordships held that on the principle that when once an order of an original authority is taken in appeal to the appellate authority which is located beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, it is the order of the appellate authority which is the effective order, after the appeal is disposed of and as the High Court cannot issue a writ against the appellate authority for want of territorial jurisdiction, it would not be open to the High Court to issue a writ to the original authority which may be within its territorial jurisdiction. Once the appeal is disposed of, though it may be that the appellate authority has merely confirmed the order of the original authority and dismissed the appeal, if the appellate authority was beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, it was difficult to hold even in a case where the appellate authority has confirmed the order of the original authority, that the High Court can issue a writ to the original authority since it may have the effect of setting aside the order of the Appellate authority when it cannot issue a writ to the appellate authority which was located outside the jurisdiction of the High Court. The earlier decision in State of U.P. v.Mohammed Nooh (AIR 1958 SC 86) was distinguished on the ground that the said decision was peculiar to the facts of the case therein. The effect of the said decision was to hold that even if the cause of action originally arose within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court, if the appeal lay to an authority beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the person could not challenge the order of the appellate authority in that proceeding in the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the original cause of action arose. In this situation the Law Commission recommended that an amendment to Art.226 of the Constitution was necessary to avoid undue hardship caused to the litigants. On the basis of the recommendation of the Law Commission by the 15th amendment to the Constitution Art.(1A) was introduced in Art.226 of the Constitution. Art.1A provided that the power conferred by clause (1) of Art.226 to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power notwithstanding that the seat of any such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. Thus the concept of the arising of the cause of action wholly or in part to determine the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution was introduced. By the 42nd amendment to the Constitution Art.(1A) introduced by the 15th amendment was designated as sub clause 2 to Art.226 of the Constitution. Thus the concept of the arising of the cause of action wholly or in part to determine the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution was introduced. By the 42nd amendment to the Constitution Art.(1A) introduced by the 15th amendment was designated as sub clause 2 to Art.226 of the Constitution. Thus the jurisdiction of the High Court could be exercised even in a case where the cause of action wholly or in part arose within the territory of the High Court notwithstanding the fact that the seat of the authority that passed the order lay outside the territory. The effect of the amendment was considered by the Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu ((1994)4 SCC 711). Their Lordships after referring to the amendment brought about by the 15th amendment to the Constitution and the subsequent renumbering of clause 1A as clause 2 of Art.226 stated that on a plain reading of clause 2 of Art.226 it is clear that the power conferred by clause (1) can be exercised by the High Court provided the cause of action wholly or in part had arisen within its territorial limits. Dealing with the question as to when the cause of action arises relating to a service dispute and after referring to the prior decisions on the subject, a seven member Bench of the Supreme Court in S S. Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1990 SC 10) held that in the case of a service dispute cause of action must be taken to arise not from the date of the original adverse order but on the date when the order of the higher authority where a statutory remedy is provided for entertaining an appeal or a representation is made by the higher authority and that there was no distinction as regards the application of the principle of merger in the case of a court and that of a Tribunal as sought to be made out in the decision in State of U.P v.Mohammed Nooh (AIR 1958 SC 86). Their Lordship also clarified that the principle was not applicable if the statute does not provide for an appeal or a representation to a higher authority. Their Lordship also clarified that the principle was not applicable if the statute does not provide for an appeal or a representation to a higher authority. The decision mainly related to the question when the right to relief arose in that case and it was not a case where the question of territorial jurisdiction was involved. But all the same, the doctrine of merger was clearly recognised even in disputes relating to service matters and it was also recognised that in a case of merger right to action was based on the appellate decision and not on the basis of the original decision. 7. The expression 'cause of action' is not defined in the Constitution. Nor is it defined in the Code of Civil Procedure when S.20 provided for the exercise of jurisdiction when a cause of action wholly or in part arose within the jurisdiction of a court. Mulla in Code of Civil Procedure, 15th Edn., Vol. I at page 251 has stated: "'Cause of action' means every fact, which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the court. In other words it is bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendent since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded". The scope of the expression as understood in English law was recently summed up by Millet LJ in the Court of Appeal in Paragon Finance v. D.B. Thakerar & Co. (1999) 1 All ER 400 at 405 thus: "The classic definition of a cause of action was given by Brett J. in Cooke v. Gill (1873) LIZ 8 CP107 at 116: "Cause of action "has been held from the earliest time to mean every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, -every fact which the defendant would have a right to traverse'. (My emphasis). (My emphasis). In the Thakerar case Chadwick J. cited the more recent definition offered by Diplock LJ in Letang v. Cooper (1964) 2 All ER 929 at 934, (1965) 1 QB232 at 242-243, and approved in Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association Lid. v. Trollope & CollsUd. (1986)6 Con LIZ 11 at 30: 'A cause of action is simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person'. I do not think that Diplock LJ was intending a different definition from that of Brett J. However it is formulated, only those facts which are material to be proved are to be taken into account. The pleading of unnecessary allegations or the addition of further instances or better particulars do not amount to a distinct cause of action. The selection of the material facts to define the cause of action must be made at the highest level of abstraction." In South East Asia Shipping Company Ltd. v. Nav Bharat Enterprise (1996) 3 SCC 443 the Supreme Court stated: "It is settled law that cause of action consists of bundle of facts which can cause to enforce the legal injury for reliefs in a court of law. Cause of action means, therefore, every fact which if traversed it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the court. In other words it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the plaintiff a right to claim relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise". The question in the present case i s whether it could be said that any part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this High Court. 8. In both the cases, the disciplinary proceeding was initiated and the punishment imposed by the original authority outside the territorial jurisdiction of this High Court. The offices of the appellate authority in both the cases were also situate outside the territorial jurisdiction of this High Court. 8. In both the cases, the disciplinary proceeding was initiated and the punishment imposed by the original authority outside the territorial jurisdiction of this High Court. The offices of the appellate authority in both the cases were also situate outside the territorial jurisdiction of this High Court. The fact relied on for conferring jurisdiction on this High Court in O.P. 11321 of 1995 is that the appellate order was communicated by the appellate authority to the petitioner while he was working within the territorial jurisdiction of this High Court and O.P. 12019 of 1995, the transmission of the appeal to the Appellate Authority was while he was residing within the jurisdiction of this Court and the receipt of the order of the Appellate Authority was also at that place. The petitioner had returned to his native P1 ace before the appeal was filed and was disposed of. In the other case, after reverting him as a Naik the petitioner had been transferred to this State and when he received the order of the Appellate Authority dismissing his appeal, he was working within the jurisdiction of this Court The question is whether the factum of receipt of the Appellate orders by the petitioners while they are within the territory of this High Court would enable the petitioners to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court and whether that fact would confer jurisdiction on this Court to entertain the Original Petitions challenging the appellate orders passed by an authority located outside its jurisdiction. 9. The question that would arise for decision is whether the fact that the order of the appellate authority, which by the application of doctrine of merger becomes the operative order, was served on the petitioners while they were within the territory over which this High Court has jurisdiction, is a fact that will go into computation of the bundle of facts that gives rise to a cause of action. Admittedly the action that led to the disciplinary action and the imposition of penalty by the original authority, occurred outside the territory of this High Court. Appeals were filed to Appellate Authorities was again were outside the jurisdiction of this High Court. Appeals were disposed of by the appellate authorities confirming the decision of the original authority outside the jurisdiction of this High Court. Appeals were filed to Appellate Authorities was again were outside the jurisdiction of this High Court. Appeals were disposed of by the appellate authorities confirming the decision of the original authority outside the jurisdiction of this High Court. If the dismissal brings about the marger of the order of the original authority in that of the appellate authority, what constitute the cause of action is the decision rendered by the appellate authority. But what is sought to be contended by the petitioners is that for that d vision of the appellate authority to become effects veit has to be communicated to the appellant' and since such communication was addressed to them and received by them within the State, the said fact would also be a fact which will make up the bundle of facts constituting the cause of action and hence this Court would have the jurisdiction to entertain the Original Petition. The essential question therefore is whether the fact that the appellate order was communicated while the petitioner was within the State would give rise to a cause of action for approaching this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. 10. There has been some conflict in this Court on this question. In Asm Security Officer v. Kullinga Gounder (1976 KLT 673) the order of dismissal of a railway employee by an authority located outside the State but whose jurisdiction extended to the State of Kerala also was challenged in the Kerala High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution. Dealing with the question whether any part of the cause of action could be said to have arisen within this State, the Division Bench held: "It is evident from the description of the authorities in this case that they were not functioning inside the Kerala State nor were there any allegations that the employees dismissed were functioning within the Kerala State or that any act had been done inside the Kerala State which provided in whole or in part the cause of action which could support the petitions under Art.226 of the Constitution. The only submission made by the respondents in support of jurisdiction was that the 1st appellant in these appeals must be taken to have been functioning inside the Kerala State as well though his office is situate outside the State because his jurisdiction extended to areas within the Kerala State. The only submission made by the respondents in support of jurisdiction was that the 1st appellant in these appeals must be taken to have been functioning inside the Kerala State as well though his office is situate outside the State because his jurisdiction extended to areas within the Kerala State. If the first appellant had done any act inside the Kerala State affecting persons functioning inside the State this Court would have had jurisdiction. There was no such act and his action had not affected anyone functioning within the State. Here, we are not able to spell out any such cause of action which had arisen inside the State". In a subsequent decision though reported earlier in M. G. George v. Asst. Director, S.I.B. (1976 KLT 397), a learned single judge held: "In this case the seat of the authority who issued the order is not wit him the territory over which this court has jurisdiction. But then if the cause of action has arisen at least in part in this territory over which this court has jurisdiction, then certainly the writ petition would be maintainable. One cannot say that the effect of the order really fell on the petitioner in Kerala. The order took effect in Nagaland itself and on the basis of the order the petitioner received the amount in Kerala. By the receipt of the amount it cannot be said that part of the cause of action had arisen in Kerala. The order of termination became complete with the service of the order on the petitioner in Nagaland. In questioning that order of termination the petitioner's receipt of the amount based on the order of termination cannot be said to be an ingredient in the cause of action". The learned judge distinguished the two decisions of the Bombay High Court and a decision of the Madras High Court on the ground that the order impugned in those cases though passed outside the jurisdiction of the particular court concerned was served on the petitioners in those cases in a place within the jurisdiction of the court in which the Writ Petitions had been filed. Therefore the effect of the order by the authority fell on the petitioners at places where the court had jurisdiction. Therefore the effect of the order by the authority fell on the petitioners at places where the court had jurisdiction. Referring to these observations and the decisions of the Bombay High Court referred to therein, it was inKunhabdulla v. Union of India (1983 KLT 1017) that: "When an order of dismissal or removal form service is sent out, it is effective on the authority concerned, but so far as the Government servant is concerned, it becomes effective only when he is apprised of it either by oral communication or by actual service of it upon him. This court can entertain the writ petition to challenge the impugned order which the petitioner received through post while he was residing within the territorial jurisdiction of this court". This decision of the learned judge was affirmed in appeal by Union of India v. Kunhandulla (1985 (1) LLJ 331). The Division Bench held that the order of removal became effective only on acceptance of the order communicated by registered post and since receipt of the order by the party was while he was within the territorial jurisdiction of this High Court, it must be held that part of the cause of action to challenge the order of removal from service arose in the State of Kerala where the order became effective by service on the employee. According to their Lordships where an impugned order is made by an authority in one State but it becomes effective on service in another State High Court in the latter State will also will have jurisdiction as part of the cause of action arose therein. Two decisions of the Bombay High Court and the decision of the Madras High Court referred to in M.G. George's case were also referred to. In addition the Division Bench also noticed the observations of the Calcutta High Court in Umasanker Chatterjee v. Union of India (1982)LIC 1361) to the effect that: "When an order of dismissal or removal from service is sent out, it is effective on the authority concerned, but so far as the Government servant is concerned, it becomes effective only when he is apprised of it either by oral communication or by actual service of it upon him". In P.P. Gopalan v. D.I.G. (1986 LIC 980) a learned single judge after referring to the earlier decisions stated that when an appellate order is served on delinquent officer within the area of the jurisdiction of the Kerala High Court, Kerala High Court can issue a writ to quash the impugned proceedings. 11. In Raveendran v. D. I. G. of Police (1991 (2) KLT 764) another learned judge of this Court relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. M/s Swaika Properties (AIR 1985 SC 1289) and referring to the decision nKunhabdulla's case held that only if it is established that the cause of action arose at least partly within the jurisdiction of this court, it could beheld that this court had jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition challenging the order of dismissal passed by officers outside the State of Kerala and that the mere residence of the petitioners in the State of Kerala would not give rise to a cause of action to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court of Kerala. In Abdul Kareem v. Commr. & Secretary to Government (1994(1) KLT 834) Division Bench held that the allegation of mere residence of the petitioner within the jurisdiction of this court would not confer any jurisdiction on the High Court of Kerala when all the authorities concerned who are arrayed as respondents were located outside the jurisdiction of the High Court of Kerala. In Thomaskutty v. Union of India (1994(2) KLT 258) another Division Bench of this court held that mere service of notice cannot give rise to a cause of action unless the service of such notice is an integral part of the cause of action. Since the appeal was rejected by the authority located beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Kerala High Court merely because intimation of the rejection of the appeal was communicated to the petitioner who was then within the jurisdiction of this High Court would not confer on this court jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution of India to entertain a writ petition challenging the dismissal. In the judgment in O.P. 14343 of 1993 a learned Single Judge Mlowing Thomas Kutty's case held that by mere service of the appellate order within the territory of this High Court, this High Court cannot exercise jurisdiction under Art 226 of the Constitution. In the judgment in O.P. 14343 of 1993 a learned Single Judge Mlowing Thomas Kutty's case held that by mere service of the appellate order within the territory of this High Court, this High Court cannot exercise jurisdiction under Art 226 of the Constitution. In Pitcheiyan v. Co-opetex (1999(2) KLT 565) Division Bench held that the position under Art.226(2) of the Constitution of India was no way different from the filing of a suit and the jurisdiction therefore conferred by S.20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure and the result was that where the impugned order was made by an authority in another State it had become effective on service in State 'A' the High Court in State 'A' shall also have jurisdiction as part of the cause of action arose therein. That was a case where the disciplinary action was initiated in Ernakulam within the jurisdiction of the Kerala High Court and the petitioners were the employee of the respondent in Ernakulam. The action for which the disciplinary proceeding was taken also took place in Ernakulam. The enquiry was held in Ernakulam. The notices of demand were served based on the enquiry at Ernakulam and under such circumstances part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this court. 12. What is seen from the conflict as reflected above is that the question for consideration would be whether the fact that a decision rendered by an authority located outside the jurisdiction of this court is communicated to the party while he is within the jurisdiction of this court is a fact in the bundle of facts constituting the cause of action. The view that the receipt of the copy of the order would constitute a fact giving rise to the cause of action is founded on the theory that an order becomes effective as regards the party when it is communicated to the party and since what he is aggrieved by is an effective order it has to be held that the receipt of communication would also be part of the cause of action enabling the party to approach the High Court within the jurisdiction of which he was residing or working at the relevant time. The other view is founded on the fact that mere service of the order is not a fact which is part of the bundle of facts constituting the cause of action and the cause of action arises when the appeal is dismissed by the appellate authority from the seat of the appellate authority. This difference in view point requires to be considered now. 13. The leading decision in support of the theory (hat since only on communication of the order it becomes effective as against the person aggrieved and hence the act of communication and receipt of the copy of the order also forms a fact in the bundle of facts giving rise to the cause of action appears to be the decision in IV. W. Joshi v. State of Bombay (AIR 1959 bom.363 ). According to the said decision for a Government servant to challenge an order against him, it was not sufficient to establish that an order of termination of his service has been made. That Government servant must further prove mat the consequences of that order fell on him. The factum of the passing of the order by itself cannot afford him a ground to claim relief at the hands of the court. Therefore, for a claimant of that kind cause of action would arise at the place where the order of termination of service was made and also at the place where its consequence fell on the servant. This decision was followed by that court in Damamal v. Union of India (AIR 1967 Bom. 355). The Division Bench in that case said that even if the order were one made by the authority in New Delhi, there could hardly be any doubt that the effect of the order fell on the petitioner in that case at Ullas Nagar where he resided. It was also stated that it was not in dispute that the proceedings that would be taken against the petitioner in consequence of the impugned order would be by officers located within the territory in relation to which that court exercised jurisdiction. It was also stated that it was not in dispute that the proceedings that would be taken against the petitioner in consequence of the impugned order would be by officers located within the territory in relation to which that court exercised jurisdiction. It may have to be noted here straightaway that this particular limb is missing in the present cases since both the petitioners have already suffered the consequence of the decision outside the territorial jurisdiction of this High Court though one of them came to this State as a consequence of the orders made against him and the other after he had already suffered the consequences outside the territory. 14. The other decision that has been relied on in support of the theory of service of the order also forming part of the cause of action is the decision of the Madras High Court in Veeri Chattiar v. S.T. Officer, Bombay (AIR 1971 Mad. 155). Therein the Madras High Court held that, cause of action is the bundle of facts enabling a party to maintain a legal proceeding. The impact on the addressee caused by a notice of the taxing authority and his proposal to assess relate to that bundle and is thus cause of action in part for the issue of a writ against the taxing authority. A Writ Petition will therefore lie in the High Court of the place of the addressee even if the authority is situate outside that High Court's territorial limits. Their Lordships did not refer to any precedent in support of their conclusion. Along the same lines is the view expressed in M/s. Jeferee and Karim v. A.I.T.O. (1998 (2) KLT 39) by a learned Single Judge who said that an order of assessment comes into force only when it is communicated. Of course that was not a case relating to jurisdiction. 15. The decision of the Karnataka High Court in D.L Suresh v. Institute of Chartered Accountants (MR 1983 Karnataka 43) related to a case where the nomination papers sent by registered post by certain Chartered Accountants from Bangalore within the jurisdiction of the Karnataka High Court were rejected by the Regional Council for the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India at its office in Delhi. The orders rejecting the nominations were despatched from Delhi to the petitioners in Bangalore. The orders rejecting the nominations were despatched from Delhi to the petitioners in Bangalore. The Karnataka High Court stated that part of the cause of action if not whole had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Karnataka High Court and hence the Karnataka High Court could exercise jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution. The court followed an earlier decision in Dr. P.S. Rao v. Union Government (MR 1974 Mysore 39) in support of its conclusion. A similar view was taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Vruddhule Kalyanerama Rao v. NABARD, Bombay ((1994) 4 SLR 166). The learned judge referred to the decision of the Kerala High Court in P.P. Gopalan's case and also the decision of the Calcutta High Court in S.K. Chatterji v. Coalfields Ltd. (1986 Lab 1C 50). 16. In Union of India v. Oswal WoollenMills Ltd. (1984(2) SCC 646) the Supreme Court held that a Writ Petition under Art.226 of the Constitution should be filed either where the registered office of the company is situate or at the place where the particular respondents against whom primary relief was sought are located. Their Lordships pointed out that an inevitable result of filing of writ petitions elsewhere than at the place where the concerned office and the relevant records are located would be to delay prompt return and contest. This was followed by another decision of the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. M/s. Swaika Properties (AIR 1985 SC 1289). In that decision their Lordships held that the very service of notice in the State of West Bengal under S.55(2) of Rajasthan Urban Improvements Act on the owner of the land situate in the State of Rajasthan informing him-of the State Government's proposal to acquire the land for public purpose did not constitute an integral part of the cause of action necessary to invoke the Calcutta High Court's jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the notification for acquiring the laud. The cause of action was a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. The cause of action was a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. The Notification issued by the Government of the State of Rajasthan under S.52(1) of the Rajasthan Act became effective the moment it was published in the Official Gazette as thereupon the notified land became vested in the state Government free from all encumbrances. It was not necessary for the owner to plead the service of notice on him under S.52(2) for the grant of an appropriate writ, direction or order under Art.226 of the Constitution for quashing the Notification issued by the State Government under S.52(1) of the Act. 17. In Hindustan Sugars v. Union of India (AIR 1985 Cal. 17) the Calcutta High Court declined jurisdiction by holding that when respondents and the concerned authorities were outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court, the fact that the petitioner was a sugar mill having its selling centre at Calcutta wherefrom sugar was being sold, was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Calcutta High Court to entertain a challenge against the circular regarding exemption provided under the concerned circular by the Central Government. In S.1. Ahuja v. State of Rajasthan (1988(1) SLR 163) Delhi High Court took the view that a person who was employed in the Rajasthan Government service and who sought to raise a claim regarding his pensionary benefits while he was residing in Delhi could not maintain a writ petition in the Delhi High Court on the ground that after his retirement from service in the State of Rajasthan he had taken up residence in Delhi and had made a claim for his pension by ways of correspondence from Delhi and had received a reply in Delhi, not accepting his claim. Following the decision of the Supreme Court in Swaika Properties' case, the Calcutta High Court held in P.K. Mondal v. Union of India (1989(7) SLR 529) that when an order imposing punishment of dismissal was passed in Madras after a departmental enquiry held in Madras, and an appeal against that order filed before the appellate authority in Delhi was dismissed by an order passed from Delhi, the mere fact that that order dismissing the appeal was conveyed to the petitioner at Calcutta could not enable the aggrieved person to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court of Calcutta under Art.226 of the Constitution. The High Court held that it had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. After referring to the relevant decisions including the one in M/s. Swaika Properties and the one in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu (1994 (4) SCC 711) the Calcutta High Court again held in Kishori Prasad Sinha v. Union of India (1997(5) SLR 353) that a writ petition could not be maintained in the Calcutta High Court on the allegation that the consequence of non-selection of the petitioner to a post outside the State by the authority that held the selection procedure outside the State fell on the petitioner at Calcutta and hence Writ Petition could be maintained in the Calcutta High Court. In Oil and natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu (1994(4) SCC 711) after referring to QieSwaika. Properties'case and the passage from Mulla on Code of Civil procedure quoted therein the Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Calcutta High Court on the ground that the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the Writ Petition under Art.226 of the Constitution. The court observed that merely because the petitioner before the High Court was a Calcutta based firm it could not institute proceedings in the Calcutta High Court in a case where a contract was executed at Aligarh, construction work was to be carried out at Aligarh and Arbitrator was appointed at Aligarh and the contract provided that in the event of dispute the Aligarh court alone would have jurisdiction. The court also expressed its anguish at courts really not having jurisdiction assuming jurisdiction 18. The court also expressed its anguish at courts really not having jurisdiction assuming jurisdiction 18. Question had arisen whether the factum of issuance of a notice under S.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure preceding the institution of the suit could be a fact which constituted the bundle of facts giving rise to a cause of action. High Courts of Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and Patna took the view that a notice under S.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is only a requirement as a preliminary step for a legal and valid institution of the suit and that it does not really form or constitute part of the cause of action in the suit itself. After referring to this aspect and the concept of cause of action as accepted by the English courts and after referring to the decisions in S.R. Goyal v. Municipal Board, Kanpur (AIR 1958 SC 1Q36),State of Punjab v. Amar Singh (AIR 1966 SC 1313), Veeri Chattiar v. S.T. Officer, Bombay (MR 1971 Mad. 155) and Abdul Sattar v. Union of India (1983 KLT 681) this court in Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. v. Kanda Swami (1986 KLT 924) held that communication to an aggrieved person regarding the action taken against him affecting Ms right when he was within the boundaries of a particular court would give that court jurisdiction to entertain an action. That of course was a suit. It must be noted that in this decision the decision of the Supreme Court in Swai to Properties was not referred to and the decision in S.R. Goyal v. Muncipal Board (AIR 1958 SC 1036) relied on therein was overruled by the Supreme Court in 5.5. Rathore v. State of M.P. (AIR 1990 SC 10). The view expressed in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh (AIR 1963 SC 1313) was to the effect that an order become effective after it is communicated to the officer concerned or is otherwise published. 19. What really arise for decision is whether the fact that on communication of the order it becomes effective as far as a person is concerned and gives him the right to approach the court for relief is really a fact which is part of the bundle of facts that constitute a cause of action. It is well recognised that there is a distinction between cause of action and right of action. It is well recognised that there is a distinction between cause of action and right of action. In American Jurisprudence 2nd Edn. Vol. I at page 541 it is staled as follows:. "Although the courts sometimes contuse the term 'cause of action' and 'right of action' and state that right of action at law arises from the existence of a primary right in the plaintiff and the invasion of that right by some delict on the part of the defendant, in a legal sense, these terms are not synonymous or interchangeable. A right of action is the right to presently enforce a cause of action - a remedial right affording redress for the infringement of legal right belonging to some definite person, a cause of action is the operative facts which give rise to such right of action. Right of action does not arose until the performance of conditions precedent to the action and may be taken away by the running of the statute of limitation, through an estoppel, or by other circumstances which do not affect the cause of action. There may be several rights of action and one cause of action and rights may accrue at different times from the same cause". The above distinction was referred to by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Balbir Singh v. Atmaram (AIR 1977 All. 211). Their Lordships held that the terms 'cause of action' and 'right of action' are not synonymous and interchangeable. Right of action is a right to presently enforce a cause of action - a remedial right affording redress for the infringement of a legal right belonging to some definite person: a cause of action is the operative facts which give rise to such right of action. His Lordship Justice Padmanabhan in Raman Ittiathi v. Pappi Bhaskaran (1989 (2) KLJ 377) adopted the same approach and noticed the distinction between cause of action and right of action. In Dayasankar v. Chief of the Air Staff, New Delhi (AIR 1988 All. 36) a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that a right of action is a right to enforce a cause of action. In Dayasankar v. Chief of the Air Staff, New Delhi (AIR 1988 All. 36) a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that a right of action is a right to enforce a cause of action. A person residing elsewhere in the country being 7aggrieved by an order of Government, Central or State or authority or person may have a right of action at law but it can be enforced or the jurisdiction under Art.226 can be invoked of that High Court only within whose territorial limits the cause of action wholly or in part arises. Cause of action arises by action of the Government or authority and not by residence of the person aggrieved. In a case where an officer in the Indian Air Force was superseded when he was posted at Madras and he sought a direction by filing a Writ Petition in the High Court of Allahabad to command the appointing authority to decide a representation made by him, it was held that the High Court at Allahabad had no jurisdiction since no cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the High Court at Allahabad which would entitle that officer to approach the High Court at Allahabad, and the direction was sought to the authority whose office was situate in New Delhi. Following this decision and referring to the earlier decisions on the subject, another Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Brijblal Singh Gautam v. Union of India (AIR 1998 All. 132) held that illegality in the award of the contract at a station outside the jurisdiction of the High Court of Allahabad could not be entertained in the High Court of Allahabad merely on the ground that the station where the contract was to be performed fell within the jurisdiction of the High Court of Allahabad. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court inC.fi.7. Mianbai v. Narayan Diwakar (JT 1999(3) SC 635) the Supreme Court held that when a case was registered at Bombay a wireless message issued to the respondent at Ita Nagar Arunachal Pradesh to come and see the Inspector C.B.I, at Bombay on its receipt at Ita Nagar does not confer jurisdiction on the High Court at Gauhati under Art.226 of the Constitution to quash the First Information Report. The Court took the view that the receipt of information by the aggrieved person that he should meet the concerned Inspector at Bombay does not enable that person to approach the High Court which has jurisdiction over the place from where he received the communication. 20. It appears to us that the decisions in M/s. Swaika Properties case and the decision of the Supreme Court and that of the High Court subsequent thereto clearly establish that the receipt of communication by itself does not constitute a fact in the bundle of facts constituting the cause of action. At best receipt of the order or communication only gives the party a right of action based on the cause of action arising out of the action complained of. When that action complained of takes place outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court and an appeal therefore is dismissed by an authority located outside the jurisdiction of the High Court cause of action wholly arises outside the jurisdiction of the High Court and Art.226(2) of the Constitution cannot be invoked to sustain a Writ Petition in this High Court on the basis that a part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this court, merely because the appellate order communicated from the seat of the appellate authority was received while the petitioner was residing or working within the jurisdiction of this court. Acceptance of the argument that the situs of the receipt of the order will determine the jurisdiction can lead to a position where a litigant would be in a position to choose his own court for the purpose of redressal of his grievance. All that he need do is to move over to a particular place for receiving the communication from the appellate authority and then approach the High Court of that place with a plea that that court had jurisdiction because the order of the appellate authority was served on him while he was residing within the jurisdiction of that High Court. No litigant can have a right to choose the court for seeking relief and the mere introduction of clause 2 of Art.226 does not alter that position. 21. It is now settled after the decision of the Supreme Court in S.5. No litigant can have a right to choose the court for seeking relief and the mere introduction of clause 2 of Art.226 does not alter that position. 21. It is now settled after the decision of the Supreme Court in S.5. Rathore v. State of M.P. (AIR 1990 SC 10) that when there is an appeal against the original order even in a sendee dispute, there is a merger of the original order in the appellate order and the decision rendered by the appellate authority whether it be of dismissal, reduction, allowance or modification of the order of the original authority, a cause of action accrues to the aggrieved person to challenge the appellate order since the order of the original authority merges in the order of the appellate authority. What furnishes the cause of action is the rejection of the appeal by the appellate authority. Communication of that order though the order become effective only on such communication to the aggrieved person only furnishes the aggrieved person with a right of action. Receipt of the communication is not a fact in the bundle of facts constituting the cause of action. Even though only on receipt of the order the aggrieved person may be able to challenge that order, receipt of the order cannot be said to be a fact forming the cause of action. For, the cause of action arises on the appeal being dismissed by the authority outside the jurisdiction of the court. The fact that until an order is published or made known, the order does not became effective since it will be open to the authority to change his mind before releasing the order, is not a ground to hold that the communication of the order also forms part of the cause of action to the aggrieved person. The fact that a person who was dismissed from sense while he was in service outside the State would have to suffer the consequence of that dismissal when he is in his native place by being rendered jobless, is not a fact which constitutes the bundle of facts giving rise to a cause of action in his favour to challenge his dismissal. That right accrued to him earlier when he was dismissed from service outside the State and he lost his employment. That right accrued to him earlier when he was dismissed from service outside the State and he lost his employment. Similarly, when an appeal is filed by him to an appellate authority who is outside the jurisdiction of this High Court and that appeal is dismissed by the appellate authority, the merger in the decision of the Appellate Authority takes place when the appeal is dismissed and not when the appellant receives the order. What a writ petitioner need plead as a part of his cause of action is the fact that his appeal was dismissed wholly or in part and not the fact that the order was communicated to him. That plea is relevant only to show when the right of action arose in his favour. The receipt of the order only gives him a right of action on the already accrued cause of action and enables him to meet a plea of laches or limitation raised in opposition. That the consequences of a proceeding in the larger sense are suffered by a person in his native place is not a ground to hold that the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the native place is situate is also competent to entertain a Writ Petition under Art.226 of the Constitution. When a person is dismissed or reduced in rank, he suffers the consequences where he was employed at the relevant time and not in his native place to which he might have retired on his dismissal. 22. In the cases before us, consequences of the order of the original authority were suffered by the respective petitioners out side the State. One was dismissed and the other was reduced in rank. Thereafter they filed appeals before the appellate authority whose offices are in Delhi. One of the petitioners had come back to his native place in Trivandrum on his losing the job and from there, he received the copy of the order dismissing his appeal. In the other, after suffering reduction in rank from outside the State, the petitioner had obtained a transfer to the State within the jurisdiction of this court. He had also suffered the punishment while he was outside the territory of this High Court. In the other, after suffering reduction in rank from outside the State, the petitioner had obtained a transfer to the State within the jurisdiction of this court. He had also suffered the punishment while he was outside the territory of this High Court. Mearly because he was working in Kerala at the time when he received the copy of the appellate order dismissing his appeal cannot be said to be part of the cause of action to challenge the appellate order. In both these cases therefore we have no hesitation in holding that no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this High Court. The objection raised in that behalf by the respondents is well founded. 23. One additional fact to be noticed in O.P. 12019 of 1995 is that the petitioner therein transmitted his appeal to the Appellate Authority after he had come back to his native place which is located within the jurisdiction of this High Court. On our conclusion that the merger takes place when the appeal is dismissed and that happens at the seat of the appellate authority, the fact that the appeal was filed after the petitioner had come back to his native place would not make any difference. This is so, also because of our conclusion that the consequences of a dismissal or reduction in rank is suffered by the person concerned at the place where he was working when the action was initiated and completed and not in his native place to which he might have returned on losing employment. In that view, nothing turns on the fact that the appeal was transmitted to the Appellate Authority located outside the jurisdiction of this court when the petitioner in O.P. 12019 of 1995 was within the jurisdiction of this High Court. We therefore dismiss these Original Petitions on the ground that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain these Original Petitions. In the light of that conclusion we do not think it necessary to go into the merits of the contentions sought to be raised.