JUDGMENT Lokeshwar Singh Panta, J.—The above second appeal has been filed by the plaintiff in Civil Suit No. 34 of 1987 on the file of Senior Sub-Judge, Lahaul Spiti District at Kullu exercising the powers of Sub-Judge, 1st Class, Kullu, having lost before both the courts below. 2. The appellant-plaintiff filed the suit for possession of the land comprised in Khasra No. 5082/52 Khatauni No. 731/1549 admeasuring 1-13 biswas and 1/10 share of Khata No. 732 Khatauni No. 1550 Khasra No. 44 min measuring 31 bighas 5 biswas i.e. 3 bighas 3 biswas, total land being 4 bighas 16 biswas situate in Phati Nathan, Kothi Naggar, Tehsil and District Kullu, with further prayer of recovery of Rs. 970/- as mesne profits. The suit was filed against two defendants, namely, Smt. Lachhi Devi respondent-plaintiff and Smt. Devku. 3. It was the case of the plaintiff that her father Gehru was deaf and dumb from his childhood and was also possessing very slow intelligence, thus, due to the disability he was unable to manage his property and to enter into contract. Gehru used to live with his mother, who managed his property, but after her death, Smt. Sobhi, the wife of Gehru started squandering away his landed property. Smt. Sobhi was able to get a general power of attorney in her name from Gehru in the year 1962 and at that time, the plaintiff was aged about 5/6 years. It was also alleged in the plaint that under the power of attorney Smt. Sobhi sold or gifted major portion of the property of Gehru. The suit land to the extent of 4.16 bighas was also sold for small consideration of Rs. 3,360/- to defendant No.1 Smt. Lachhi Devi on 21.3.1963 vide registered sale-deed and the said sale was void, illegal and also unauthorised act. Gehru died on 22.2.1984 and the plaintiff being his daughter was entitled for possession of suit land and also prayed for recovery of Rs. 970/- as mesne profits. 4. The first defendant filed a separate written statement disputing the claims of the plaintiff. Under preliminary objection, defendant No.1 denied that the plaintiff was the daughter of Gehru and questioned her locus standi to file the suit, alternatively she prayed that in the presence of defendant No. 2, the plaintiff was not entitled to inherit and seek the possession of the suit land. Under preliminary objection, defendant No.1 denied that the plaintiff was the daughter of Gehru and questioned her locus standi to file the suit, alternatively she prayed that in the presence of defendant No. 2, the plaintiff was not entitled to inherit and seek the possession of the suit land. She also raised pleas of estoppel, limitation and valuation of the suit land and, inter alia, pleaded that Gehru became little dumb due to illness prior to 1962 but this disability did not affect his speech and power to execute the power of attorney. It was also pleaded that Smt. Sobhi was de facto guardian of Gehru and she transferred the suit land for consideration, thus supported the sale in question. She further alleged that she was a bona fide purchase and the suit land was sold to her by Smt. Sobhi for legal necessity. The defendant prayed for the dismissal of the suit on the above grounds. 5. In her replication, the plaintiff denied the preliminary objections and reiterated and reaffirmed the allegations made in the plaint. On the above claims and counter-claims, the suit came to be tried and the learned trial Judge framed eight issues of which seven pertain to the points raised in dispute between the parties. The issues so framed read as under:— 1. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to file this suit. OPD. 2. Whether the plaintiff is barred by her act or conduct from filing this suit? OPD. 3. Whether the suit is within limitation? OPP. 4. Whether Gehru deceased was not competent to execute any valid power of attorney as alleged? OPP. 5. If issue No. 4 is proved, whether Smt. Sobhi sold the suit property for the benefit and legal necessity of deceased Gehru as alleged? OPD. 6. Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purpose of court-fee and jurisdiction? If so, what is its value for this purpose? OP Parties. 7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover mesne profits from the defendant No. 1 ? If so, at what amount? OPP. 8. Relief. 6. The learned trial Judge after considering the material on record, answered issues No. 2, 5 and 6 in affirmative and all other issues were decided against the plaintiff, consequent upon these findings, the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. 7. If so, at what amount? OPP. 8. Relief. 6. The learned trial Judge after considering the material on record, answered issues No. 2, 5 and 6 in affirmative and all other issues were decided against the plaintiff, consequent upon these findings, the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. 7. Feeling aggrieved against the judgment and decree of the learned trial Judge, plaintiff filed Civil Appeal No. 24/89 before the first Appellate Court and the first Appellate Court also concurred with the findings of the learned trial Judge, hence this second appeal. The second appeal directed to be admitted on the basis and for the purpose of substantial questions No. 1 and 2 filed along with grounds of appeal which read as under:— "1. Whether once a person is held to be an idiot or lunatic, can he be allowed to deal with his property by himself or through appointment of any Agent? 2. Whether in view of Section 6 of the Indian Limitation Act, limitation can start running against an idiot or lunatic before he becomes sane and in case he dies as an idiot or lunatic, the suit can be said to be barred by limitation if the same is filed within three years of his death by his successors?" During the pendency of the appeal, defendant No. 2 Smt. Devku had died and her name was ordered to be deleted from the array of respondents vide order dated 2.11.1994. The name of respondent No. 2 Om Prakash was ordered to be impleaded vide order dated 4.10.1996 passed in CMP No. 397 of 1995 on the ground that after the decision on appeal by the first appellate Court, defendant No.1 Smt. Lachhi Devi had alienated suit land by a registered sale-deed executed in favour of respondent Om Prakash on 15.7.1993. 8. The learned Counsel for the appellant-plaintiff while elaborating the substantial questions of law formulated in the case contended that Gehru was a lunatic, therefore, permanently incapable from managing his property and the General Power of Attorney said to have executed by him in favour of his wife Smt. Sobhi is void ab initio and the sale of the land in dispute by Smt. Sobhi in favour of defendant No.1 is illegal and not binding either on Gehru or his heirs. He also contended that the plaintiff who is the daughter of Gehru attained majority some time in 1980 and after attaining her majority, she filed the present suit within the period of limitation challenging the sale by Smt. Sobhi in favour of defendant No.1. He next contended that Smt. Devku was already litigating on behalf of Gehru in the High Court where she filed two suits against Sh. Charan Dass, Advocate and one against Sh. Madan Lal. 9. Per contra Ms. Devyani Sharma, learned Counsel for respondent No.1-defendant, while adopting the reasoning of the courts below contended that defendant No.1 is a bonafide purchaser of the suit land who purchased the same from Smt. Sobhi, General Power of Attorney of Gehru for legal necessity and the plaintiff has failed to establish on record that Gehru was insane and incapable of making the sale. She next contended that the transfer of the suit land for consideration was made by ostensible owner in favour of defendant No.1, the sale as held by the courts below is valid and the reasonings given by the courts below are proper and sound and should not be interfered with in this appeal. She also contended that in the plaint, there were no allegations made by the plaintiff that the sale of the suit land by Smt. Sobhi in favour of defendant No.1 was either by fraud or collusion or Gehru was deprived of his property by such sale and without consideration. She next contended that the plaintiff is estopped from filing the present suit as the suit was filed sifter the plaintiff attained the majority and she knew it that the suit land was sold to defendant No.1 by Smt. Sobhi General Power of Attorney of Gehru. In the last, she contended that after purchase of the suit land by defendant No.1 she made improvements on the property after spending considerable amount for construction of house and raising apple plants thereon and, therefore, the defendant No.1 is entitled for protection of the provisions contained in Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. The learned Counsel has also relied upon Mahomed Yakub and others v. Abdul Quddus and others (1923 Patna 187); Mohanlal Madangopal Marwadi v. Vinayak Sadasheo Sonak and others (AIR 1941 Nagpur 251); Kanhcdycdal v. Horsing Laxman Wanjari (MR 1944 Nagpur 232). The learned Counsel has also relied upon Mahomed Yakub and others v. Abdul Quddus and others (1923 Patna 187); Mohanlal Madangopal Marwadi v. Vinayak Sadasheo Sonak and others (AIR 1941 Nagpur 251); Kanhcdycdal v. Horsing Laxman Wanjari (MR 1944 Nagpur 232). Krishnqji Pandharinath v. Anusayabai and another (AIR 1959 Bombay 475); Indar Singh and others v. Parmeshwardhari and another (AIR 1957 Patna 491); Sha Karamshi Vershi v. Sha Ratanshi Nenshi and another (AIR 1952 Kutch 55); Gurbaksh Singh v. Nikka Singh and another (AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1917) and B. Sitaram Rao and others v. Bibhisano Pradhan (AIR 1978 Orissa 222). The newly, added respondent in whose favour the suit land was subsequently transferred by defendant No.1 has adopted the arguments raised by learned Counsel for defendant No.1 and has not made any further submissions. 10. I have given my best consideration to the respective contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the judgment cited for defendant No.1. In Mahomed Yakubs case (supra), the learned Judges while dealing with the provisions of Section 12 of Contract Act said that the test of soundness of mind is that the person is capable of undertaking the business and of forming a rational judgment as to its effect upon his interest. There being a presumption in favour of sanity, the person who relies on the unsoundness of mind must prove it sufficiently to satisfy this test. Mere weakness of mind is not sufficient. Although it is not necessary to prove utter mental darkness or congenital idiocy, the party alleging must establish that the person was incapable of understanding business and forming rational judgment as to its effect. In Mohalal Madangopal Marwadis case (supra), the learned Judges held that onus to prove insanity under Section 12 of Contract Act, 1872 squarely lies of person alleging insanity. In Kanhaiyalal case (supra), it was held that for the purpose of Section 12, the test of unsoundness of mind is whether the person is incapable of understanding the business concerned and its implications and mere weakness of mind is not sufficient. In Kanhaiyalal case (supra), it was held that for the purpose of Section 12, the test of unsoundness of mind is whether the person is incapable of understanding the business concerned and its implications and mere weakness of mind is not sufficient. In Indar Singhs case (supra), the learned Judges of Patna High Court while dealing with the test of soundness of mind of a person said that the crucial point is to find out whether the person entering into the contract must be a person who understands what he is doing and is able to form a rational judgment as to whether what he is about to do is to his interest or not. The judgment went on to say that it did not necessarily mean that the man must be suffering from lunacy for entering into a contract. In Sha Karamshi Vershs case (supra), it has been held that an ostensible owner is a person who has got indicia of ownership such as title, possession or entries in records made to show ownership under Section 41 of Transfer of Property Act. In Gurbaksh Singhs case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the import of Transfer of Property Act held that Section 41 is an exception to the general rule that a person cannot confer a better title than he has. Being an exception, the onus certainly is on the transferee to show that the transferor was the ostensible owner of the property and that he had, after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer, acted in good faith. The judgment proceeded to hold further that where the facts establish beyond doubt that the purchaser had the knowledge was in dispute and he had taken a risk in purchasing the same it is not possible to hold that he had purchased the property in good faith. In B. Sitaram Raos case (supra), the learned Judges of the Orissa High Court held that under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, equitable estoppel cannot affect minors interest. In B. Sitaram Raos case (supra), the learned Judges of the Orissa High Court held that under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, equitable estoppel cannot affect minors interest. In Krishnaji Pandharinaths case (supra), the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court while dealing with the provision of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act held that the expression "active prosecution of any suit or proceedings" was used and that expression has now been omitted, and the Explanation makes it abundantly clear that the Us continues so long as final decree or order has not been obtained and complete satisfaction thereof has not been rendered. If after the dismissal of a suit and before an appeal is presented, the Us continues so as to prevent the defendant from transferring the property to the prejudice of the plaintiff, there is no reason for holding that between the date of dismissal of the suit under Order IX, Rule 2, of the Civil Procedure Code and the date of its restoration, the Us does not continue. 11. In the teeth of the decisions of the Courts referred to hereinabove, I propose to examine the material placed on record in this case. Both the courts below have held that the plaintiff attained the age of majority about 17 years prior to filing of the suit and she had the knowledge since the year 1957 that Gehru was not possessing a disposing mind and if this was the position, she could have filed a suit in the year 1975 when she obtained the permission from the learned District Judge, Mandi under Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, challenging the sale of the suit land to defendant No.1 by Smt. Sobhi. Both the courts below came to the conclusion that defendant No.1 cannot be asked to deliver the possession of the suit land to the plaintiff as defendant No.1 has planted 200 fruit bearing trees in this land and on the basis of these findings, the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed on the ground that she has no locus standi to file it. On the basis of the evidence produced by the plaintiff, both the courts below have come to the conclusion that Gehru was only deaf and dumb and could not be considered idiot of insane person. The plaintiff or her witnesses Sh. On the basis of the evidence produced by the plaintiff, both the courts below have come to the conclusion that Gehru was only deaf and dumb and could not be considered idiot of insane person. The plaintiff or her witnesses Sh. Lai Chand could not establish on record that Gehru was an idiot or insane person and incapable of understanding and making sale of his property or to execute a valid power of attorney in favour of his wife Smt. Sobhi. Further both the courts below have held that Smt. Sobhi used to render service to Gehru and it was not proved by the plaintiff that she distributed money obtained from the sale of the property of Gehru to her own relatives or she misused the sale proceeds of the suit property in any manner. The learned first Appellate Court also held that the plaintiff did not assail the sale in favour of defendant No. 1 within three years of attaining the age of majority and, therefore, no relief could be granted to her in the suit. Concedingly, Gehru executed General Power of Attorney Ex. DW3/A in favour of his wife Smt. Sobhi on 28.8.1962 and on the basis of such attorney Smt. Sobhi started selling the property of Gehru in favour of several persons including Sh. Charan Dass Dogra, Advocate Kullu and Smt. Lachhi Devi the present defendant No.1. The suit land was sold in favour of defendant No.1 by sale-deed in the year 1963. Gehru died on 22.2.1984 and after his death, the right of succession was opened to the plaintiff in the year 1984 and, therefore, the plaintiff could assail the execution of the sale-deed in favour of defendant No.1 which was made on 21.3.1963 within three years from the date of death of Gehru. The suit was admittedly presented in the Court of Senior Sub-Judge, Kullu on 18.2.1987 which date is mentioned at the bottom of the plaintiff and order passed by the Senior Sub-Judge, Kullu and signed by him. It appears that on the heading of the judgment, the date of institution of the suit has been wrongly mentioned as 28.2.1987. Civil Suit No. 31/81 was filed by Gehru as forma pauper is through Smt. Devku as next friend in this Court against the legal representatives of Sh. Charan Dass Dogra, Advocate, in whose favour some portion of land of Gehru was sold. Civil Suit No. 31/81 was filed by Gehru as forma pauper is through Smt. Devku as next friend in this Court against the legal representatives of Sh. Charan Dass Dogra, Advocate, in whose favour some portion of land of Gehru was sold. The allegations in that suit were that Gehru was deaf and dumb person possessing low intelligence and Devku having no interest adverse to Gehru and, therefore, a fit person to act as his next friend. Gehru died during the pendency of the said suit and his daughter Smt. Kimtu and Smt. Devku were brought on record as Gehrus legal representatives. Plaintiff Smt. Kimtu filed an application under Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act in the Court of District Judge praying for permission to sell certain properties belonging to her father Gehru and that application was allowed on 31.5.1975 and barely sixteen days thereafter i.e. 16.6.1975 Smt. Kimtu sold portion of land of Gehru in favour of Sh. Charan Dass Dogra, Advocate Kullu who was representing her in the application filed under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. The order dated 31.5.1975 passed by the District Judge, Kullu granting permission to Smt. Kimtu to alienate the properties belonging to Gehru was quashed being without jurisdiction. The learned Single Judge while dealing with Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act held that Smt. Kimtu was not competent to effect the impugned sale on behalf of Gehru in favour of Sh. Charan Dass Dogra and further that Smt. Kimtu was not estopped from filing the suit as alleged. The learned Judge also held that Smt. Devku could not be regarded as legally wedded wife of Gehru and therefore, she was not held to be legal representative of Gehru and could not maintain that suit in that capacity. Consequently, the suit on behalf of Smt. Kimtu, present plaintiff for possession of the land alleged to have been sold to Sh. Charan Dass Dogra was decreed with costs and the suit for the recovery of Rs. 51,000/- as mesneprofits was, however, dismissed. The learned Judge has concluded in that suit that the plaintiff Smt. Kimtu has locus standi to file a suit as she was the daughter of Gehru. Charan Dass Dogra was decreed with costs and the suit for the recovery of Rs. 51,000/- as mesneprofits was, however, dismissed. The learned Judge has concluded in that suit that the plaintiff Smt. Kimtu has locus standi to file a suit as she was the daughter of Gehru. On the basis of that judgment, the findings of the courts below in the present suit that the plaintiff Smt. Kimtu has no locus standi to file the suit is contrary to law and deserve to be set aside. 12. The suit land was sold by Smt. Sobhi in favour of defendant No. 1 in the year 1963 based upon the General Power of Attorney executed in her favour by Gehru. She has also sold some portion of land belonging to Gehru in favour of Sh. Charan Dass Dogra, Advocate, Kullu vide two separate registered sale-deeds on 4.10.1962 and 31.7.1971 on the basis of general power of attorney executed in her favour by Gehru. Those two sale-deeds were challenged by the present plaintiff in this Court by way of Civil Suit No. 62/83 which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 10.1.1992. That suit initially filed by Gehru, a deaf and dumb with low intelligence through his wife and next friend as forma pauperis and during the pendency of the suit Gehru died and plaintiff Smt. Kimtu being his daughter was recorded as legal representative who prosecuted the suit. The plaintiff in that suit averred that vendee had the knowledge that the alleged general power of attorney in favour of Smt. Sobhi was null and void on account of disability suffered by the deceased Gehru and also that no permission of the Court for the alienation of the land in suit was obtained. The plaintiff also prayed that the two sale-deeds were void ab initio and, therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to possession of the suit land. The defendants in that case averred that Gehru did not suffer from any legal disability and he was legally competent to enter into contracts. The judgment and decree dated 18.10.1985 passed in the Civil Suit No. 31/81 by the learned Single Judge of this Court has been affirmed by the Division Bench in RFA No. 108/86 and other connected appeals. The learned Judges in RFA No. 355/92 titled Smt Kimtu v. Rama Dogra and others (1997 (2) Sim. The judgment and decree dated 18.10.1985 passed in the Civil Suit No. 31/81 by the learned Single Judge of this Court has been affirmed by the Division Bench in RFA No. 108/86 and other connected appeals. The learned Judges in RFA No. 355/92 titled Smt Kimtu v. Rama Dogra and others (1997 (2) Sim. L.C. 409), in para 18 held as under: "There is no requirement under the law that a person must be related to the person for whom he/she is appointed as next friend. Admittedly, Smt. Devkoo, at the relevant time, was a major. She possessed a sound disposing mind. There is nothing on record to show that her interests were in any way adverse to that of the deceased Gehru. We, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that Smt. Devkoo was competent to act as next friend for the deceased Gehru and as such the suit filed by her in her capacity as next friend for and on behalf of Gehru was competent and legally constituted. Since the suit filed through next friend has been held to be legally constituted and competent, consequent upon the death of Gehru, the right to sue survived to his daughter Smt. Kimtu, who has been validly substituted as plaintiff in place of the original deceased plaintiff Gehru, being the sole legal representative. The findings of the learned Single Judge on the points, which are to the contrary, are bad and liable to be set aside." The learned Judges further held that Smt. Devkoo was not the wife of Gehru and as such not his legal heir and representative. The learned Judges also held that there is no denying the fact that the deceased was deaf and dumb and could only communicate by means of signs. The original power of attorney dated 28.8.1962 (Ex. D-8) executed in that suit by deceased Gehru in favour of his wife Smt. Sobhi is the subject-matter of the present suit too. In order to prove the execution thereof, the defendants examined two attesting witnesses namely, Pritam and Saranpat in Civil Suit No. 63/83 to prove that the general power of attorney was validly executed by Gehru in favour of his wife Smt. Sobhi and on the basis of that General Power of Attorney the sale of the land was effected by Smt. Sobhi. The learned Judges in the case cited above in para 26 observed as under : "26. What is brought out in the evidence of the two attesting witnesses is that the power of attorney was read over and explained to Gehru both by the scribe and the Sub-Registrar. This part of the evidence has to be rejected straightaway in view of the fact that Gehru was absolutely deaf and dumb. Evidence is lacking to show that the deceased Gehru was made to understand by signs about the contents of Ex. D-8." Hardeep Singh, who at the relevant time was the Naib-Tehsildar-cum-Registrar, Kullu appeared as DW-11 in that suit and his evidence was scrutinized by the Division Bench and it is concluded that the endorsements Ex. D-8 were neither recorded in the presence of nor under the dictation of Hardeep Singh, therefore, even though such endorsements are per se admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Registration Act, on the failure of the defendants to examine the author thereof, the same cannot be relied upon for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that the contents of the document Ex. D-8 were properly explained to the deceased Gehru and that he understood the same. The learned Judges also said that there is yet another suspicious circumstance of the case as the original power of attorney Ex. D-8 has come on the record from the custody of the defendants. How they came to possess the same, has remained unexplained. The said document should have been in possession of Smt. Sobhi and/or her legal heir herein Smt. Kimtu. In para 31 of the judgment, it was held as under : "Considering the entire evidence coming on the record the only irresistible conclusion is that no valid and legal power of attorney was executed by the deceased Gehru in favour of Smt. Sobhi and as such, she was not competent to alienate the land in suit in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants. Resultantly, the two sale-deeds Ex. D-1 and D-2 having been executed by an unauthorized person are void ab initio and not binding on the rights of deceased Gehru. Since the two sales made by Smt. Sobhi vide Ex. Resultantly, the two sale-deeds Ex. D-1 and D-2 having been executed by an unauthorized person are void ab initio and not binding on the rights of deceased Gehru. Since the two sales made by Smt. Sobhi vide Ex. D-l and D-2 are void ah initio, the plaintiff is not obliged to seek a declaration in this regard and the suit cannot be said to be barred by time." Resultantly, the appeal was allowed and the impugned judgment and decree dated 10.1.1992 of the learned Single Judge was set aside and a decree for possession of land in suit was passed in favour of Smt. Kimtu and against the defendants with costs throughout. 13. Admittedly, on the basis of the same General Power of Attorney, Ex. DW 3/A in the present suit the sale of the suit land was effected by Smt. Sobhi in favour of defendant No.1 of the land belonging to Gehru who has been found deaf and dumb by Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid case and the said power of attorney already having been executed by unauthorized person as Smt. Sobhi was not competent to alienate the suit land in favour of defendant No.1. Relied upon the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Smt Kimtu v. Smt Rama Dogra and others (supra), I am of the view that the sale-deed having been executed by an unauthorized person, namely. Smt. Sobhi on the basis of General Power of Attorney Ex. DW 3/A in favour of defendant No. 1 is void ab initio and not binding on the rights of deceased Gehru. The suit of the plaintiff cannot be said to be barred by time based upon void sale-deed and that the provisions of Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act are not attracted in the present case. 14. Ms. Devyani Sharma, learned Counsel for defendant No.1 contended that the judgment rendered in Smt Kimtu v. Smt Rama Dogra and others, referred to above, is not applicable in the present case since the facts in the present case are totally different than the facts of that case. She has tried to distinguish the facts on the ground that the sale-deeds in those cases were without consideration and as a result of collusion between Smt. Sobhi and Sh. She has tried to distinguish the facts on the ground that the sale-deeds in those cases were without consideration and as a result of collusion between Smt. Sobhi and Sh. Charan Dass Dogra and further that it was within the knowledge of the vendee that power of attorney in favour of Smt. Sobhi was null and void. Based upon such allegations, the suit of plaintiff Smt. Kimtu was decreed by the learned Judges in RFA No.355/92 whereas there are no such allegations made by the plaintiff in her plaint that the sale in favour of defendant No.1 was made by Smt. Sobhi, holder of general power of attorney of Gehru without consideration, as a result of collusion between Smt. Sobhi and defendant No.1 and that defendant No.1 had no knowledge that the alleged general power of attorney in favour of Smt. Sobhi was null and void. I am afraid that I cannot agree with the submissions of the learned Counsel on this count. Once the Division Bench has held that no valid and legal General power of attorney was executed by Gehru in favour of Smt. Sobhi and as such she was not competent to alienate the suit land in favour of any vendee and on the basis of that invalid and illegal general power of attorney the sale-deed executed in favour of defendant No.1 by Smt. Sobhi an unauthorized person is void ab initio and not binding on the rights of deceased Gehru. 15. After the dismissal of the suit by the triad court and decree affirmed in appeal by the first Appellate Court, the plaintiff could have filed appeal in this Court and before filing the appeal. Defendant No. 1 sold the suit land in favour of respondent No.2. The protection of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act is not available to defendant No.1 as the onus certainly is on her to show that the transferor was the ostensible owner of the property and that he had after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer, acted in good faith. In the present case, the plaintiff has brought on record a copy of the judgment and decree passed in Civil Suit No. 31/81 Ex. In the present case, the plaintiff has brought on record a copy of the judgment and decree passed in Civil Suit No. 31/81 Ex. P-l by learned Single Judge of this Court in Smt Devkoo and Smt Kimtu v. Smt Rama Dogra and others, whereunder the suit of Smt. Kimtu for possession of the land sold by her in favour of Sh. Charan Dass Dogra was decreed with costs. Knowing fully well about the inheritance of the property of deceased Gehru by Smt. Kimtu plaintiff, defendant No. 1 sold the suit land to respondent No. 2 before the expiry of the period of limitation for filing the appeal and it was within her knowledge that Us between the parties was not finally decided by a competent Court of law and the suit land was subject-matter of dispute and in spite of her knowledge it appears that she has sold the suit land to respondent No. 2 and respondent No. 2 also purchased it at his own risk and responsibility. The contention of the learned Counsel for defendant No. 1 that defendant No. 1 has spent huge amount for improvement of the suit land and planting apple orchard thereon besides constructing a house, and, therefore, no decree for possession may be passed in favour of the plaintiff is unsustainable for the reason that she has further sold the suit land to respondent No. 2 probably on much higher price after considering all these factors. Other contentions of the learned Counsel for defendant No. 1 and respondent No. 2 are also found unsustainable, for the above reasons. 16. No other point has been urged by the learned Counsel on either side. 17. Consequently, I am of the considered view that there is merit in the appeal and the same deserves to be allowed. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed and the impunged judgments and decree passed by the courts below are set aside and decree for possession of the suit land is passed in favour of the plaintiff Smt. Kimtu and against both the respondents with costs throughout. 18. The suit for recovery of Rs. 970/- as mesneprofits is, however, dismissed as there is no evidence on record to prove that the plaintiff was entitled to receive this amount on that count. Suit dismissed. -