JUDGMENT AR.Lakshmanan, J. 1. Heard Mr.Antony Dominic for appellant and Govt. Pleader for respondents. 2. Aggrieved by Ext.P4 order of the first respondent herein dated 24-11-1998 levying a penalty of Rs.58,61,041/- being double the amount of turnover tax imposed on the appellant under Sec.45A(d) of the KGST Act, 1963 for filing incomplete returns for the period 4/98 to 8/98, the appellant filed the original petition to quash Ext.P4 as violative of the principles of natural justice and for a direction to the respondents to grant reasonable opportunity to the appellant to file objection and a hearing before orders, if any are passed under Sec.45A of the Act. A learned Single Judge dismissed the original petition on the ground that the writ petitioner has an effective alternate remedy by way of revision before the Deputy Commissioner under Sec.45A(3) of the Act and that the petitioner had sufficient time and opportunity to respond to the notice and hence there is no violation of principles of natural justice. The learned Judge had also found that there is no error in the proposal and no ground is made out for quashing Ext. P5. Being aggrieved by the said judgment the appellant has filed the above appeal. In our opinion, the order impugned in the original petition cannot stand since the first respondent had passed the said order without affording a reasonable opportunity which was specifically asked for under Ext.P2 to extend the time till 10-12-1998 to give a reply to the show cause notice. The first respondent disposed of Ext.P2 on 23-11-1998 by a non speaking order under Ext.P3 and Ext. P4 order was issued on 24-11-1998 levying penalty of Rs. 58,61,041/- and served on the appellant both Exts.P3 and P4 together. The officer has also decided the matter on merits without hearing the appellant. Such procedure has been deprecated and frowned upon by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The case of the appellant is that it is engaged in manufacture and sale of Indian made Foreign Liquor. 58,61,041/- and served on the appellant both Exts.P3 and P4 together. The officer has also decided the matter on merits without hearing the appellant. Such procedure has been deprecated and frowned upon by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The case of the appellant is that it is engaged in manufacture and sale of Indian made Foreign Liquor. The entire sales are made by them to Kerala State Beverages Corporation Ltd. which is the monopoly of wholesale marketing agency for distribution of liquor in Kerala and by virtue of item 53 of the 1st Schedule of the KGST Act sales tax is payable on the sale of liquor only by Beverages Corporation at the point of sale by them and that the appellant is liable to pay turnover tax under Sec.5(2C)(l)(b) of the Act at the rate of 5% on the sales turnover. The appellant has been remitting turnover tax on the sales price issued by them. However, the first respondent issued provisional assessment orders for the period in question demanding turnover tax on the excise duty paid by Beverages Corporation also. The first respondent issued a notice proposing to levy penalty under Sec.45 A of the Act for non payment of turnover tax on excise duty. The notice was received by the appellant on 17-10-1998 under Ext. P1. The appellant applied for 30 days time to file objection on 23-10-1998. Since their General Manager was out of India, the appellant by their letter dated 16-11-1998, applied for time till 10-12-1998 to file objection to Ext. P1. According to the appellant, the letter dated 16-11-1998 was handed over to the first respondent personally. However, the first respondent, as already stated, issued a communication dated 23-11-1998 rejecting the request for time alongwith a copy of order dated 24-11-1998 levying penalty. In the writ appeal, the appellant questioned the correctness of Ext.P4. According to the appellant, the compliance of natural justice is mandatory because Sec.45A of the Act does not provide for imposition of penalty without giving an opportunity of hearing to the appellant. Therefore, the appellant approached the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this court having regard to the nature of grievance and the gross violation of natural justice. The learned Judge dismissed the writ petition on the grounds stated in his order. Therefore, the appellant approached the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this court having regard to the nature of grievance and the gross violation of natural justice. The learned Judge dismissed the writ petition on the grounds stated in his order. Learned counsel for the appellant cited a very recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1998 (8) SCC 1 (Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others). The Supreme Court in that case entertained a similar appeal which was filed against a show cause notice. The original petition was dismissed by the Mumbai High Court and the appeal has been filed before the Supreme Court against the said order. The Supreme Court in Para.15 of the judgment held thus: "15. Under Art.226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field." It is thus seen from the ruling of the Supreme Court that alternate remedy is not an absolute bar for the maintainability of a writ petition under Art.226 of the Constitution where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or where there has been violation of principles of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction. There is a plethora of case law on this point. The learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the appellant has an effective alternate remedy by way of revision. There is a plethora of case law on this point. The learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the appellant has an effective alternate remedy by way of revision. In the process, the learned judge has given a go-by to the fact that the statutory authority, while passing the impugned order under Ext. P4 has stopped the theory of fair hearing. It has been established before us that the writ petition has been filed by the appellant for enforcement of his fundamental rights. Secondly, it has been established before us that there has been violation of principles of natural justice. Therefore, the order passed by the first respondent without affording an opportunity of being heard is wholly without jurisdiction. The above judgment cited by the learned counsel for the appellant squarely applies to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Having regard to the nature of grievance expressed, we say that the appropriate remedy of the appellant in matters like this is to invoke the jurisdiction of this court under Art.226 of the Constitution and not to file a revision before revisional authority. We have, therefore, no hesitation in setting side the order of the learned Single Judge and also quashing Ext. P4 passed by the first respondent. We do so. Since the first respondent has failed to perform his statutory duty, we extend the time to the appellant for filing their objections by four weeks from today. The first respondent on receipt of the objections, shall give an opportunity of being heard either to the appellant or their counsel and decide the matter afresh and in accordance with law. The first respondent is directed to pass orders within eight weeks from the date of conclusion of the hearing. Writ Appeal is disposed of accordingly.