KALYAN JYOTI SENGUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THE Court : This is an application for stay of trial of the suit No. 349 of 1999 and also for hearing of all other proceedings pending thereunder and operation of the interim order dated 25th June, 1999 passed in an application being Tender No. 1230 of 1999. The stay has been prayed for on the ground that the instant suit is a later one in order of time than the applicant's suit being suit No. 286 of 1999. ( 2 ) MR. P. C. Sen, learned senior Advocate, appearing with Mr. A. K. Panja, Miss Tapati Ghosh, Mr. A. P. Ghosh and Mr. S. N. Mukherjee, Advocates, submits that admittedly his client's suit was instituted earlier and the matter in issue therein is also directly and substantially in issue in the later suit. It is submitted that though there are other defendants in later suit ,viz. , defendant Nos. 2,3 and 4 and they are not parties to the earlier suit but no relief has been claimed against them, so in essence the later suit has been filed against the plaintiff in suit No. 286 of 1999. In substance the contesting parties in both the suits are same. ( 3 ) MR. Sen with effective assistance of Mr. S. N. Mukherjee argues that the pivotal issue in both the suits is whether the letter of transfer of advance licence amounting to 6,05,000 US dollar is valid or not. He argues that the plaintiff herein in order to have decree in a later suit is to establish the aforesaid issue in his favour. Similarly, his client's suit being earlier one the plaintiff therein is to establish that the aforesaid letter of transfer is forged one. Mr. Sen contends therefore having regard to the averment made in both the plaints and the reliefs claimed thereunder bone of contention certainly centres round the aforesaid common and identical issue. He also argues that in the event the aforesaid issue is decided in the earlier suit such decision will non-suit the later suit. Therefore, the statutory rigour which is a mandatory one, under section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to be applied. He also argues that in the event the aforesaid issue is decided in the earlier suit such decision will non-suit the later suit. Therefore, the statutory rigour which is a mandatory one, under section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to be applied. He submits not only the suit but also the pending interlocutory application in connection therewith and operation of the interim order passed therein shall be stayed and this has precisely been decided by a Bench decision of this court in an appeal being No. 28 of 1995 (Hanuman Trading Corporation-vs-Galaxy Manufacturing Trading Co. and Ors.) while affirming the judgment of the learned single Judge on this point. ( 4 ) MR. Jayanta Mitra, learned senior Advocate led by Mr. P. K. Mullick, learned senior Advocate and assisted by Mr. Samit Talukdar, Advocate , submits fairly that his client's suit is later one. He argues that not all the issues are common in both the suits. Moreover, the later suit is not necessarily to be stayed in certain circumstances and for the interest of justice the Court shall pass an order of consolidation of both the suits in case where there is identity of issues involving both the suits. He submits that the Division Bench judgment as referred to by Mr. Sen is no longer a good law in view of the later decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1998 SC 1952 in its paragraph 8. He argues that the theory of consolidation of both the suits in certain situation has been reaffirmed and reiterated while examining the scope and purview of section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code by the apex court in the said decision. He also argues that the Division Bench judgment as referred to in any event, is factually distinguishable as the suits mentioned therein were instituted in two different Courts situate at two different places,i. e. , one in Calcutta and another in Thane. So there was bright possibility of having conflicting of judicial decision therein. In this case both the suits are pending before the same Court. So there was bright possibility of having conflicting of judicial decision therein. In this case both the suits are pending before the same Court. He also argues that in the event the hearing of the interlocutory application, as well as, the operation of the interim order passed therein is stayed then substantial injustice will be rendered as plaintiff in the earlier suit would sit tight over in the matter and will not be taking any step and in fact the plaintiff in earlier suit would have undue advantage over the defendant, and eventually his client will not have interlocutory reliefs. The inherent power of the Court is not affected either by section 10 of CPC nor the same can be affected by the Division Bench Judgement. ( 5 ) CONSIDERING the balance of convenience and inconvenience the later suit should not be stayed nor the interlocutory application pending thereunder shall also be stayed consequently interim order passed thereon should not be stayed from its operation. ( 6 ) I have considered submissions of the learned lawyers for the parties. Before I proceed to examine the scope of section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, I am to examine as to whether there is any identity of issues between the two suits or not. Therefore, I set out the reliefs claimed in both the suits. ( 7 ) PRAYER portion of suit No. 286 of 1999 is as follows :-" (A)DECREE for Rs. 31,71,526. 00 and Rs. 15,51,703. 00 on account of principal; (b) Decree for Rs. 84,64,310. 00 on account of interest as pleaded in paragraph 23 of the plaint; (c) Decree for Rs. 2 Crores as pleaded in paragraph 25 of the plaint; (d) Interim interest and interest on judgment ; (e)Declaration that the document forming annexure "v" hereto, is illegal, null and void and not binding on the plaintiff; (f) Decree for delivery of the document forming annexure "v" hereto and the same be cancelled and adjudged void; (g)Perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant from relying upon or giving any effect to the document Annexure "v" hereto and/or making any duty free imports of a value of US$ 6,05,000 on the basis of the document forming annexure "v" hereto in any manner whatsoever; (h)Perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from claiming any benefit of duty free imports of a value of US$ 10,05,238. 08 and US$ 4,91,823. 08 and US$ 4,91,823. 56 in any manner whatsoever; (i)Mandatory injunction directing the Defendant to forthwith make payment of duty on imports to the extent of US $ 10,05,238. 08 and US $ 4,91,823. 56 in respect whereof the defendant has obtained benefit without making payment of consideration to the Plaintiff; (j)Attachment; (k)Receiver; (l)Interlocutory injunction; (m)Costs; (n)Further or other relief. " ( 8 ) PRAYER portion of suit No. 349 of 1999 is as follows:-" (A)A declaration that the defendant No. 1 has transferred a portion of the said Advance Licence bearing No. P/l/1523922/g, dated 15th February, 1993 amounting to US $ 16,10,238. 08 on the basis of the transfer letters being annexure 'b' and 'c' hereof; (b)A declaration that the defendant No. 1 has duly transferred a portion of the said Advance Licence bearing No. P/l/1523922/g dated 15th February, 1993 amounting to US$ 16,10,238. 08 on the basis of transfer letter being annexure 'b' and 'c' hereof; (c)A declaration that the plaintiff has entitled to import Copper Wire Bars aggregating 959. 515 MT covered by the 6 Bills of Entry, particulars whereof are set out in the Schedule being annexure 'd' hereof on the basis of the two transfer letters being annexures 'b' and 'c' hereof showing transfer of a portion of the said advance licence amounting to US$ 16,10,238. 08 by the defendant No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff; (d)A decree for Rs. 70 lakhs against the defendant No. 1; (e)Receiver; (f)Injunction; (g)Costs; (h)Interest; (i) Further or other reliefs. " ( 9 ) IT would appear from the reliefs claimed therein and upon examining the averment made in both the suits I am of the view that one issue which is pivotal one and is common in both the suits, i. e. , whether the letter of transfer of advance import licence bearing No. P/l/1523922 dated 15th February, 1993 amounting to US dollar 6,05,000 is valid and genuine or not. ( 10 ) IN order to success the plaintiffs in their respective suits they are to succeed on the aforesaid common issue. In my view, if the aforesaid issue is decided on the earlier suit then it will non-suit the later suit because there would be no necessity for deciding the aforesaid issues twice over again in the later suit. ( 10 ) IN order to success the plaintiffs in their respective suits they are to succeed on the aforesaid common issue. In my view, if the aforesaid issue is decided on the earlier suit then it will non-suit the later suit because there would be no necessity for deciding the aforesaid issues twice over again in the later suit. So, I am of the view that matters in issue in Suit No. 286 of 1999 are directly and substantially are in issue in the later suit. ( 11 ) NOW question remains whether the parties are same in both the suits or not. ( 12 ) AS I have already indicated that the real contesting parties in both the suits are Galaxy Manufacturing and Trading Company Pvt. Ltd. who is the plaintiff in Suit No. 286 of 1999 and Navneet Kumar Didwania who is the plaintiff in the later suit. The other defendants in Suit No. 349 of 1999, viz. , the Commissioner of Custom, Calcutta, Union of India and Kamdev Jha are admittedly proforma defendants and they cannot be termed as contesting parties as there would be no necessity for adjudicating any issue between the plaintiff and the aforesaid proforma defendants. Similarly, the defendant No. 4 in Suit No. 286 of 1999 has nothing to say in this suit. The other defendant, viz. defendant Nos. 2 and 3 have been made party who are shown to have been litigating under the same title through the defendant No. 1. Though apparently the parties are not same but in my view, substantially the aforesaid two parties are litigating parties. So, I am of the opinion that the later suit should not be heard before the earlier suit is heard. Now fact remains whether the hearing of the later suit should be stayed or not and further whether hearing of the interlocutory proceedings pending thereunder and operation of the interim order passed therein should be stayed or not. ( 13 ) THE Division Bench judgment of this Court in the aforesaid Appeal could have been a decisive factor in this matter. But I cannot apply the ratio laid down in the aforesaid Division Bench judgment while affirming the decision of the learned single Judge on this point for the following reasons. ( 13 ) THE Division Bench judgment of this Court in the aforesaid Appeal could have been a decisive factor in this matter. But I cannot apply the ratio laid down in the aforesaid Division Bench judgment while affirming the decision of the learned single Judge on this point for the following reasons. (I) The recent Supreme Court decision on this point reported in AIR 1998 SC 1952 in its paragraph 8 it has been made clear that the power of consolidation of hearing in both the suits have not been taken away. In no uncertain terms in the said judgment word 'trial' in section 10 has been given narrow meaning just opposite to meaning given in the said judgment which has given wider meaning. Therefore, in view of the recent decision of the Supreme Court on this point the earlier Division Bench judgment of this Court cannot be termed to be a good law. (ii) Moreover, the aforesaid Division Bench judgment was passed on a factually different context as one suit was filed in Calcutta and another suit was filed in Thane where there was a fair chance of having conflicting judicial decision. The whole object it seems to be is to avoid conflicting judicial decision while making provision of section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code. So if any measure is taken by the Court to prevent the conflicting judicial decision being rendered then object of section 10 would be fulfilled. In this case without granting order of stay of trial of suit and pending interlocutory application chances of conflicting judicial decision being rendered can be avoided. This can be ensured by consolidation of both the suits and application thereto. So for the ends of justice both the suits and all the interlocutory proceedings pending therein are consolidated and shall be heard analogously. This power of consolidation of suits and proceeding thereunder regardless of the time of institution of suit in exercise of inherent power had been elucidated by the Supreme Court judgment reported in AIR 1962 SC 527 . ( 14 ) THEREFORE, examining the prima facie cases of both the parties, I am of the view that hearing of the later suit shall not be stayed nor the same should be allowed to be heard before the earlier suit. Accordingly, I direct that both the suits should be heard one after another. ( 14 ) THEREFORE, examining the prima facie cases of both the parties, I am of the view that hearing of the later suit shall not be stayed nor the same should be allowed to be heard before the earlier suit. Accordingly, I direct that both the suits should be heard one after another. So Suit No. 349 of 1999 should be heard along with Suit No. 286 of 1999. Therefore, both the suits are consolidated for hearing. ( 15 ) THE defendants in respective suits shall be at liberty to file the written statement in accordance with law. ( 16 ) AS regard the interlocutory applications are concerned, I also consolidate both the interlocutory applications and the interlocutory application taken out by plaintiff in Suit No. 349 of 1999 should be heard along with the interlocutory application taken out by the plaintiff in Suit No. 286 of 1999. Thus, the application is disposed of without awarding any costs. Application disposed of of.