P. VISHWANATHA SHETTY, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner, who was one of the unsuccessful candidates for 165-Sagar Assembly Constituency has, in this petition, called in question the correctness of the order dated 7th of December 1998 passed by the Election Commission of India (hereinafter referred to as "the Commission") declaring that the petitioner is disqualified for being chosen as and for being a member of either House of the Parliament or the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State for a period of three years from the date of the order i. e. , from 7th of December 1998. A copy of the said order has been produced by the respondents along with the statement of objections, as Annexure-R5. ( 2 ) THE facts that will have bearing for the disposal of this petition, are few and may be stated as hereunder : ( 3 ) THE second respondent-Election Officer has, by means of report dated 19th of January 1995, as required under Rule 89 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules"), informed the Commission that the petitioner has not lodged his accounts as required under S. 78 of the Representation of the People Act. 1951 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" ). After the receipt of the report from the second respondent, the Commission, in terms of sub-rule (5) of Rule 89 of the Rules, issued a show cause notice dated 10th of November 1995 calling upon the petitioner to show cause within 20 days from the date of its receipt, as to why he should not be disqualified under S. 10-A of the Act for his failure to lodge the accounts relating to his election expenses as required under S. 78 of the Act. He was also directed to submit the accounts relating to his election expenses. Though the said notice was served on the petitioner on 2nd of December 1995, the petitioner did not respond to the said notice. The second respondent sent his report dated 29th of October 1998 informing the Commission that the petitioner has failed to submit the accounts relating to his election expenses in spite of service of show cause notice. Thereafter, the Commission has passed the impugned order Annexure-R5 dated 7th of December 1998. The second respondent sent his report dated 29th of October 1998 informing the Commission that the petitioner has failed to submit the accounts relating to his election expenses in spite of service of show cause notice. Thereafter, the Commission has passed the impugned order Annexure-R5 dated 7th of December 1998. After receipt of the order Annexure-R5, the petitioner sent a representation dated 3rd of February 1999 to the Commission praying to review the order passed by it disqualifying him from contesting the election and to remove the disqualification imposed on the petitioner in exercise of the power conferred on it under S. 11 of the Act. But, even before an order was made on the said representation, the petitioner has filed this petition on 8th of February, 1999. However, the Commission, by means of its order dated 10th of February 1999, rejected the representation sent by the petitioner. A copy of the said order has been produced by the respondents as Annexure-R6. ( 4 ) THE petitioner appeared in person. He challenged the order of disqualification Annexure-R5 dated 7th of December 1998 and also the order Annexure-R6 dated 10th of February 1999 mainly on three grounds. Firstly, he submitted that since the order Annexure-R5 was not passed within a month after the expiry of the time granted to the petitioner to submit his explanation to the show cause notice dated 10th of November 1995, the orders impugned are illegal and void in law. Elaborating this contention, the petitioner pointed out that even according to the respondents, the show cause notice dated 2nd of December 1995, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure-R3, was served on 2nd of December 1995 and in the said notice, the petitioner was given 20 days' time to file his objections, if any. Therefore, the petitioner submitted that since he did not submit his representation or show any cause to the show cause notice issued to him, the Commission should have passed the order, if any, adverse to the interest of the petitioner within 30 days after the expiry of 20 days' time given to him from 2nd of December 1995. Therefore, the petitioner submitted that since he did not submit his representation or show any cause to the show cause notice issued to him, the Commission should have passed the order, if any, adverse to the interest of the petitioner within 30 days after the expiry of 20 days' time given to him from 2nd of December 1995. In this connection, he drew my attention to clause (v) of Direction No. 76/81 dated 18th of September 1981 given by the Election Commission in exercise of the power conferred on it under Art. 324 of the Constitution of India and also the Rules. The said clause (v) of Direction No. 76/81 reads as hereunder :" (v) When a notice is issued by Registered A. D. post, unless the communication is received undelivered within a reasonable period, say a month, it shall be presumed that the notice has been served on the candidate. On the expiry of one month after the date of issue of the notice, the case shall be disposed of. " (Emphasis supplied)Secondly, he submitted that since the petitioner had filed his returns within 30 days from the date of the declaration of the results of the election, the Commission was not justified in passing the impugned order disqualifying him from contesting the election for a period of three years from the date of passing of the order. Thirdly, he submitted that even according to the communication dated 28th of December 1998, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure-A, the order disqualifying the petitioner from contesting the election came to be passed only on the ground that he did not file his returns within the time prescribed under law and, therefore, since it is not in dispute that the petitioner had filed his returns, the Commission should have allowed the representation given by the petitioner subsequent to the order passed disqualifying him and removed the disqualification in exercise of the power conferred on it under S. 11 of the Act. Elaborating this submission, he submitted that in the instant case, the Commission has failed to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it under S. 11 of the Act; and order Annexure-R6 passed by the Commission is totally illegal as no reasons have been given to reject the prayer made in the representation given by the petitioner. Elaborating this submission, he submitted that in the instant case, the Commission has failed to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it under S. 11 of the Act; and order Annexure-R6 passed by the Commission is totally illegal as no reasons have been given to reject the prayer made in the representation given by the petitioner. ( 5 ) HOWEVER, Sri Ashok Haranahalli, learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents, strongly supported the impugned order. Firstly, he pointed out that the conduct of the petitioner totally disentitles him for any equitable relief at the hands of this Court. He submitted that the petitioner who had not bothered to submit his explanation to the show cause notice issued to him, cannot be permitted to contend before this Court invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, that the impugned order is liable to be quashed on the ground that the said order was not passed either within 30 days after the expiry of the time allowed to file his explanation or within a reasonable time from that date. He submitted that if the petitioner had felt that the Commission was not taking action pursuant to the show cause notice issued to him within a reasonable time, he should have moved this Court for appropriate relief. Secondly, he submitted that S. 10a of the Act, in terms, provides that if the Commission is satisfied that a candidate, who had contested the election, has failed to lodge the accounts of election expenses within the time, such candidate would suffer the disqualification for a period of three years from the date of the order; and there is no provision either in the Act or in the Rules which compels the Commission to pass an order within a specific period from the date of the show cause notice or initiation of the proceedings for disqualification. According to him, since the Commission received the report from the second respondent to the show cause notice issued to the petitioner, only on 29th of October 1998 impugned order Annexure-R5 came to be passed within a reasonable time from the said date. Therefore, he submitted that there is absolutely no default on the part of the Commission in passing the impugned order. Therefore, he submitted that there is absolutely no default on the part of the Commission in passing the impugned order. He also submitted that the direction given by the Commission relied upon by the petitioner, does not support the contention of the petitioner that the Commission is required to pass an order under S. 10a of the Act within 30 days after the expiry of the time given to the candidate to submit his explanation for not filing the accounts. It is his submission that the rights of the parties in the matter of contesting the elections, are governed by the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder and, therefore, the alleged delay in passing the order will not vitiate the same. He further pointed out that in the instant case, the petitioner had not been prejudiced in any manner on account of the delay caused in passing the order. He pointed out that on account of the delay caused in passing the order, the petitioner could contest in the bye-election to one of the Assembly Constituencies in the State and as a matter of fact, the disqualification did not prejudice the petitioner. It is his submission that unless the prejudice is shown to have been caused to the petitioner account of the delay in passing the order, mere delay in passing the order will not be a ground to quash the order. ( 6 ) SINCE the first question raised by the petitioner, I felt, is of some importance, I requested Sri Jayakumar S. Patil, learned counsel, to appear in this petition as an Amicus Curiae and assist the Court. Accordingly, he has assisted the Court. ( 7 ) SRI Patil supported the first contention of the petitioner and submitted that from the scheme of the Act and Rule 89 of the Rules, it is clear that the Commission is required to pass an order under S. 10-A of the Act within a reasonable time after the expiry of the time granted to the candidate to show cause to the notice issued to him as to why an order of disqualification should not be passed against him; and since, in the instant case, such an order has not been passed within a reasonable time, the order impugned is liable to be quashed. In support of the plea that the order is required to be passed by a statutory Authority within a reasonable time, he relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Chand v. Union of India (1994) 1 SCC 44 : (1993 AIR SCW 3479) and the Government of India v. The Citedal Fine Pharmaceuticals, Madras, AIR 1989 SC 1771 . ( 8 ) IT is useful to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder before I proceed to consider the contentions urged. (a) Part-II of the Act provides for qualification and disqualification for being chosen and continuing as a member of the Parliament, Legislative Assembly and Legislative Counsel. Section 10-A of the Act confers power on the Commission to disqualify a person for his failure to lodge an account of his election expenses. The said Section reads as follows :"10a. Disqualification for failure to lodge account of election expenses.- If the Election Commission is satisfied that a person - (a) has failed to lodge an account of election expenses within the time and in the manner required by or under this Act, and (b) has no good reason or justification for the failure,the Election Commission, shall, by order publish in the Official Gazette, declare him to be disqualified and any such person shall be disqualified for a period of three years from the date of the order. " (b) Section 11 of the Act confers power on the Commission to modify the order made under S. 10-A either removing the disqualification or reducing the period of disqualification. The said Section reads as follows :"11. Removal or reduction of period of disqualification.- The Election Commission may, for reasons to be recorded, remove any disqualification under this Act except under S. 8a or reduce the period of any such disqualification. " (c) Section 77 of the Act provides for maintenance of account relating to the election expenses by a candidate. Section 78 of the Act provides for lodging of account relating to the election expenses maintained by the candidate, with the District Election Officer. The said Section reads as follows : "78. Lodging of account with the district election officer. " (c) Section 77 of the Act provides for maintenance of account relating to the election expenses by a candidate. Section 78 of the Act provides for lodging of account relating to the election expenses maintained by the candidate, with the District Election Officer. The said Section reads as follows : "78. Lodging of account with the district election officer. (1) Every contesting candidate at an election shall, within thirty days from the date of election of the returned candidate or, if there are more than one returned candidate at the election and the dates of their election are different, the later of those two dates, lodge with the district election officer on account of his election expenses which shall be a true copy of the account kept by him or by his election agent under S. 77. (2 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " (d) Section 7 (b) of the Act defines the word "disqualified" as hereunder :"7 (B) "disqualified" means disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of either House of Parliament or of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State. " (e) Rule 86 of the Rules provides for the particulars to be contained in an account to be maintained by the candidate. Rule 87 of the Rules makes it incumbent on the District Election Officer to notify on the Notice Board in the Office of the District Election Officer within two days from the date on which the account of the election expenses of candidate has been lodged under S. 78 of the Act, notifying the name of the candidate, the date of filing of the account and the place at which such account can be inspected by the public. Rule 88 of the Rules provides for giving of the copies of the accounts filed, to any member of the public. Rule 89 of the Rules, which provides for the procedure to be followed by the District Election Officer and also the Commission, before passing an order as contemplated under S. 10-A of the Act, reads as follows :"89. Rule 88 of the Rules provides for giving of the copies of the accounts filed, to any member of the public. Rule 89 of the Rules, which provides for the procedure to be followed by the District Election Officer and also the Commission, before passing an order as contemplated under S. 10-A of the Act, reads as follows :"89. Report by the district election officer as to the lodging of the account of election expenses and the decision of the Election Commission thereon.- (1) As soon as may be after the expiration of the time specified in S. 78 for the lodging of the accounts of election expenses at any election, the district election officer shall report to the Election Commission - (a) the name of each contesting candidate; (b) whether such candidate has lodged his account of election expenses and if so, the date on which such account has been lodged; and (c) whether in his opinion such account has been lodged within the time and in the manner required by the Act and these rules. (2) Where the district election officer is of the opinion that the account of election expenses of any candidate has not been lodged in the manner required by the Act and these rules, he shall with every such report forward to the Election Commission the account of election expenses of that candidate and the vouchers lodged along with it. (3) Immediately after the submission of the report referred to in sub-rule (1) the district election officer shall publish a copy thereof by affixing the same to his notice board. (4) As soon as may be after the receipt of the report referred to in sub-rule (1) the Election Commission shall consider the same and decide whether any contesting candidate has failed to lodge the account of election expenses within the time and in the manner required by the Act and these rules. (5) Where the Election Commission decides that a contesting candidate has failed to lodge his account of election expenses within the time and in the manner required by the Act and these rules it shall by notice in writing call upon the candidate to show cause why he should not be disqualified under S. 10a for the failure. (5) Where the Election Commission decides that a contesting candidate has failed to lodge his account of election expenses within the time and in the manner required by the Act and these rules it shall by notice in writing call upon the candidate to show cause why he should not be disqualified under S. 10a for the failure. (6) Any contesting candidate who has been called upon to show cause under sub-rule (5) may within twenty days of the receipt of such notice submit in respect of the matter a representation in writing to the Election Commission, and shall at the same time send to the district election officer a copy of his representation together with a complete account of his election expenses if he had not already furnished such an account. (7) The district election officer shall, within five days of the receipt thereof, forward to the Election Commission the copy of the representation and the account if any with such comments as he wishes to make thereon. (8) If, after considering the representation submitted by the candidate and the comments made by the district election officer and after such inquiry as it thinks fit, the Election Commission is satisfied that the candidate has no good reason or justification for the failure to lodge his account, it shall declare him to be disqualified under S. 10a for a period of three years from the date of the order, and cause the order to be published in the Official Gazette. " ( 9 ) NOW, let me examine each of the contentions advanced by the parties. ( 10 ) THE first question is whether the order impugned is liable to be quashed on the ground that it is not passed either within 30 days after the expiry of the time granted to the petitioner to submit his explanation to the show cause notice dated 10th of November 1995 issued to the petitioner or within a reasonable period from the said period. The undisputed facts narrated above, would show that the show cause notice Annexure-R3 dated 10th of November 1995 directing the petitioner to show cause as to why he should not be disqualified for his failure to lodge the account was issued to him and the same was served on him on 2nd of December 1995. The undisputed facts narrated above, would show that the show cause notice Annexure-R3 dated 10th of November 1995 directing the petitioner to show cause as to why he should not be disqualified for his failure to lodge the account was issued to him and the same was served on him on 2nd of December 1995. In the said show cause notice, the petitioner was given 20 days' time to show cause to the notice issued and also to file the statement of accounts. Admittedly, he has neither shown cause nor filed the statement of accounts as directed. Twenty days' time was given to the petitioner in the show cause notice Annexure-R2, as provided under sub-rule (6) of Rule 89 of the Rules, which mandates that the contesting candidate, who has failed to lodge the accounts relating to election expenses, must be given an opportunity to submit his representation within 20 days from the date of receipt of such notice to the Commission as well as the District Election Officer together with the complete account of his election expenses, if he has not already furnished such account. Sub-rule (7) of Rule 89 shows that the District Election Officer should, within five days of the receipt of the explanation, if any, forward to the Commission a copy of the representation and the account, if any, with his comments. Sub-rule (8) of Rule 89 mandates the Commission to pass an order in terms of S. 10-A of the Act, on consideration of the representation submitted by the candidate and the comments, if any, made by the District Election Officer, and after such enquiry as it deems fit. As noticed by me earlier, S. 78 of the Act makes it imperative on a candidate to file an account relating to his election expenses within 30 days from the date of declaration of the results. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 89 of the Rules contemplates a report being forwarded by the District Election Officer to the Commission as soon as after the expiry of 30 days' period allowed for lodging of the accounts by a candidate to the election. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 89 of the Rules contemplates a report being forwarded by the District Election Officer to the Commission as soon as after the expiry of 30 days' period allowed for lodging of the accounts by a candidate to the election. The words "as soon as may be" employed under sub-rule (1) of Rule 89 of the Rules, in the scheme of the Election Law and the provision made for disqualification of a candidate, mandate the District Election Officer to immediately forward his report regarding lodging or non-lodging of accounts of expenses incurred by a candidate relating to his election held immediately after the expiry of the time allowed under S. 78 of the Act i. e. immediately after 30 days from the date of declaration of the results of the election. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 89 again provides that after the receipt of the report from the District Election Officer, the Commission should consider the same and decide whether any contesting candidate had failed to lodge the accounts of his election expenses within the time and in the manner required by the Act and the Rules. Here again, the language employed is that the Commission should do so "as soon as may be after the receipt of the report". In this context, the words used "as soon as may be", in my view, must be understood as with utmost expedition and subject to the minimum reasonable time allowable for administrative reasons and convenience. Again, the provision contained in sub-rule (6) of Rule 89 of the Rules makes it clear that the concerned candidate is given an outer limit of 20 days' time to file his objections to the show cause notice issued; and only five days' time is given to the District Election Officer to forward the copy of the representation of the candidate, if any, given to the show cause notice from the date of receipt of the representation with his comments to the Commission. The direction dated 18th of September 1981 issued by the Commission, in my view, though does not support the contention of the petitioner that the Commission is required to pass an order within 30 days from the date of the show cause notice, mandates the Commission to pass an order disposing of the proceedings without further delay. The direction dated 18th of September 1981 issued by the Commission, in my view, though does not support the contention of the petitioner that the Commission is required to pass an order within 30 days from the date of the show cause notice, mandates the Commission to pass an order disposing of the proceedings without further delay. This is clear from the words "on the expiry of one month after the date of issue of the notice, the case shall be disposed of". Further, S. 10a of the Act provides for disqualification for a period of three years from the date of the order. There is no discretion left to the Commission with regard to the period regarding disqualification. Therefore, the timing of passing of the order will have serious consequences on the right of a citizen who is entitled to participate in the democratic polity of the country. This Court, while considering the contentions raised by the parties, cannot ignore the fact that the election to the Parliament and to the Legislative Assemblies and also to the Legislative Councils, are generally held once in five years and term of a member of the Lok Sabha and a member of the Legislative Assembly is for five years; and the term of a member of the Legislative Council is for a period of six years. In this background, if the disqualification provided is for a period of three years from the date of the order, can it be said that the Commission could pass an order at any time subject to its convenience and disqualify the person from contesting the election or continuing as a member? In my view, such an arbitrary or uncontrolled power cannot be read into the provisions of the Act and the Rules and consequently, be conferred on the Commission. No doubt, the Commission is a very high constitutional functionary, which is entrusted with the heavy responsibility of conducting the election to one of the biggest democracies of the world. The provisions in the Constitution provide for the Constitution of the Parliament and State Legislatures. In a country which has accepted the democratic form of Government, the importance to contest the election to the Parliament and the State Legislature and to allow a citizen to continue to be a member of such bodies, does not require to be emphasised or over stated as it is well recognised. In a country which has accepted the democratic form of Government, the importance to contest the election to the Parliament and the State Legislature and to allow a citizen to continue to be a member of such bodies, does not require to be emphasised or over stated as it is well recognised. Therefore, from the scheme of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, I am of the view that the Commission is required to make an order under S. 10a of the Act within a reasonable time after the expiry of the time given to the candidate to submit his explanation to the show cause notice issued to him. What is the reasonable time, depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It depends upon the question whether a candidate has sought for time to make his further representation or for being heard in the matter or he has made any attempt in any manner to delay an order being passed by the Commission under S. 10a of the Act. It also may depend upon the number of other matters/proceedings that were pending consideration before the Commission where the Commission is required to pass an order within the time available at the disposal of the Commission. In my view, the nature of the power in a matter like this, the Commission is exercising, is quasi-judicial in nature. This is clear from a reading of various provisions contained in Rule 89 of the Rules read with S. 10-A of the Act. When a candidate is required to submit his representation within 20 days from the date of the receipt of the show cause notice and the District Election Officer is required to forward the representation with his comments within five days from the date of receipt of the representation, the enquiry contemplated under sub-rule (8) of Rule 89 of the Rules with regard to the default stated to have been committed by the candidate, cannot be postponed for an indefinite period and on that account, there cannot be undue delay in passing an order under S. 10a of the Act. Further, when such an order seriously affects the rights of a citizen to participate in the governance of this country, the order passed, if judged from any aspect of the matter, should be reasonable and must be in conformity with the provisions of the Act and the Rules. Further, when such an order seriously affects the rights of a citizen to participate in the governance of this country, the order passed, if judged from any aspect of the matter, should be reasonable and must be in conformity with the provisions of the Act and the Rules. The reasonableness of the nature of the order in it implies, in my view, that such an order should be passed within a reasonable time. ( 11 ) THE Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha, AIR 1989 SC 1297, while considering the question whether a power conferred on the Commissioner under S. 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code in the absence of any limitation provided to revise the order passed by the subordinate Officer, should be exercised within a reasonable time, at paragraph-11 of its decision, has observed as follows :"11. The question arises whether the Commissioner can revise an order made under S. 65 at any time. It is true that there is no period of limitation prescribed under S. 211, but it seems to us plain that this power must be exercised in reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised. " ( 12 ) IN the case of Government of India v. The Citedal Fine Pharmaceuticals, Madras, ( AIR 1989 SC 1771 ) (supra), while considering the challenge made to the validity of Rule 12 of the Medicinal and Toilet Preparations (Excise Duties) Rules, on the ground that the said Rule is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India as the Rule does not provide for any period of limitation for recovery of the duty, the Supreme Court repelling the said contention, has, at paragraph 6 of the judgment, observed as under :"6. . . . . . While it is true that Rule 12 does not prescribe any period within which recovery of any duty as contemplated by the Rule is to be made, but that by itself does not render the Rule unreasonable or violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. In the absence of any period of limitation it is settled that every authority is to exercise the power within a reasonable period. What would be reasonable period would depend upon the facts of each case. In the absence of any period of limitation it is settled that every authority is to exercise the power within a reasonable period. What would be reasonable period would depend upon the facts of each case. Whenever a question regarding the inordinate delay in issuance of notice of demand is raised, it would be open to the assessee to contend that it is bad on the ground of delay and it will be for the relevant officer to consider the question whether in the facts and circumstances of the case notice or demand for recovery was made within reasonable period. No hard and fast rules can be laid down in this regard as the determination of the question will depend upon the facts of each case. " ( 13 ) IN the case of Mansaram v. S. P. Pathak (1984) 1 SCC 125 : ( AIR 1983 SC 1239 ), while considering the question whether the House Allotment Officer can initiate proceedings for eviction of a person, who had an unauthorised entry of a premises, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraph 12 of the judgment, has held that when a power is conferred to effectuate a purpose, the said power has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and exercise of power in a reasonable manner inheres the concept of its exercise within a reasonable time. It is useful to refer to the said observations made by the Supreme Court, which read as follows :"12. . . . . . . Could he be at this distance of time, thrown out on the ground that his initial entry was unauthorised. To slightly differently formulate the proposition, could the initial unauthorised entry, if there be any, permit a House Allotment Officer, 22 years after the entry, to evict the appellant on the short ground that he entered the premises in contravention of Clause 22 (2)? Undoubtedly, power is conferred on the Collector to see that the provisions of the Rent Control Order which disclosed a public policy are effectively implemented and if the Collec-tor therefore, comes across information that there is a contravention, he is clothed with adequate power to set right the contravention by ejecting anyone who comes into the premises in contravention of the provisions. But when the power is conferred to effectuate a purpose, it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. But when the power is conferred to effectuate a purpose, it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. Exercise of power in a reasonable manner inheres the concept of its exercise within a reasonable time. Undoubtedly, no limitation is prescribed in this behalf but one would stand against that a landlord to some extent in pari delicto could turn the tables against the person who was in possession for 22 years as a tenant. In such a situation, even though the House Allotment Officer was to reach an affirmative conclusion that the initial entry 22 years back was an unauthorised entry and that failure to vacate the premises till 9 years after retirement was not proper, yet it was not obligatory upon him to pass a peremptory order of eviction in the manner in which he has done. In such a situation, it would be open to him not to evict the appellant. In this connection, we may refer to Murlidhar Agarwal v. State of U. P. , AIR 1974 SC 1924 , wherein one Ram Agyan Singh who came into possession of premises without an order of allotment in his favour as required by S. 7 (2) of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, was permitted to retain the premises by treating his occupation lawful and this Court declined to interfere with that order. No doubt it must be confessed that S. 7-A conferred power on the District Magistrate to take action against unauthorised occupation in contravention of the provisions of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, but there was proviso to the section which enabled the District Magistrate not to evict a person found to be in unauthorised occupation, if the District Magistrate was satisfied that there has been undue delay or otherwise it is inexpedient to do so. There is no such proviso to clause 28 which confers power on the Collector to take necessary action for the purpose of securing compliance with the Rent Control Order. But, as stated earlier, where power is conferred to effectuate a purpose, it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and the reasonable exercise of power inheres its exercise within a reasonable time. This is too well established to need buttressing by a precedent. But, as stated earlier, where power is conferred to effectuate a purpose, it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and the reasonable exercise of power inheres its exercise within a reasonable time. This is too well established to need buttressing by a precedent. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 14 ) IN the case of Ram Chand v. Union of India (1994) 1 SCC 44 : (1993 AIR SCW 3479), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering the effect of not passing an award within a reasonable time from the date of issue of final notification, in the absence of any provision in the Land Acquisition Act, prior to the incorporation of S. 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, took the view that though there is no provision in the Land Acquisition Act compelling the Land Acquisition Officer to pass an order within a time frame, the Land Acquisition Officer is required to pass an order within a reasonable time. It is useful to refer to the observations made by the Supreme Court at Paragraph-14 of the judgment, which reads as hereunder :"14. The Parliament has recognised and taken note of the inaction and non-exercise of the statutory power on the part of the authorities, enjoined by the provisions of the Act to complete the acquisition proceedings within a reasonable time and because of that now a time-limit has been fixed for making of the award, failing which the entire proceedings for acquisition shall lapse. But, can it be said that before the introduction of the aforesaid amendment in the Act, the authorities were at liberty to proceed with the acquisition proceedings, irrespective of any schedule or time-frame and to complete the same as and when they desired? It is settled that in a statute where for exercise of power no time-limit is fixed, it has to be exercised within a time which can be held to be reasonable. This aspect of the matter can be examined in the light of second proviso to Art. 31-A of the Constitution, which in clear and unambiguous terms prohibits making of any law which does not contain a provision for payment of compensation at a rate, which shall not be less than the market value thereof. The Act is consistent with the second proviso to Art. 31-A, because it provides for payment of compensation at the market value of the land acquired. The Act is consistent with the second proviso to Art. 31-A, because it provides for payment of compensation at the market value of the land acquired. But, whether the constitutional and statutory requirement of the payment of the market value to the persons, whose lands have been compulsorily acquired, is not being circumvented and violated by keeping the land acquisition proceedings pending for more than a decade and half, without making the awards and paying the compensation, which has been pegged to the dates of notifications under sub-sec. (1) of S. 4 of the Act, which in the present cases had been issued 14 to 21 years before the making of the award. If a person is paid compensation in the year 1980/1981 at the market rate, prevailing twenty years before, will that be compliance of the constitutional and statutory mandate? Ignoring the escalation of the market value of the lands, especially near the urban agglomeration or metropolitan cities, will amount to ignoring an earthquake and Courts can certainly take judicial notice of the said fact. The interest and the solatium, which have to be paid under the provisions of the Act, are linked with the market value of the land with reference to the date of the notification under sub-sec. (1) of S. 4 of the Act. If a decision had been taken as early as in the year 1966, by issuance of declarations under S. 6, that the lands belonging to the different cultivators, who held those lands within the ceiling limit for cultivation, were needed for public purpose, respondents should have taken compensation at an early date. In the present cases, unless a justification is furnished on behalf of the respondents, can it be said that the statutory power of making an award under S. 11 has been exercised within a reasonable time from the date of the declaration under S. 6? Due to escalation in prices of land, more so in this area, during the preceding two decades, in reality, the market rate, on the date of the notification under S. 4 (1) is a mere fraction, of the rate prevailing at the time of its determination in the Award. Due to escalation in prices of land, more so in this area, during the preceding two decades, in reality, the market rate, on the date of the notification under S. 4 (1) is a mere fraction, of the rate prevailing at the time of its determination in the Award. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 15 ) AGAIN, in the case of Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin v. Fatmabai Ibrahim, (1997) 6 SCC 71 , at paragraph 2 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows :"2. Although Mr. Bhasme, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant took a stand that under S. 63 of the Act aforesaid, there should not be any discrimination amongst the agriculturists with reference to the State to which such agriculturists belong. But according to him even without going into that question the impugned order can be set aside on the ground that suo motu power has not been exercised within a reasonable time. Section 84-C of the Act does not prescribe any time for initiation of the proceeding. But in view of the settled position by several judgments of this Court that wherever a power is vested in a statutory authority without prescribing any time-limit, such power should be exercised which a reasonable time. In the present case, the transfer took place as early as in the year 1972 and suo motu enquiry was started by the Mamlatdar in September 1973. If sale deeds are declared to be invalid the appellant is likely to suffer irreparable injury, because he has made investments after the aforesaid purchase. In this connection, on behalf of the appellant reliance was placed on a judgment of justice S. B. Majmudar (as then was in the High Court of Gujarat) in State of Gujarat v. Jethmal Bhagwandas Shah (W. A. No. 2770 of 1979) disposed of on 1-3-1990, where in connection with S. 84-C itself it was said that the power under the aforesaid Section should be exercised within a reasonable time. This Court in connection with other statutory provisions, in the case of State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha, (1970) 1 SCR 335 : ( AIR 1969 SC 1297 ) and in the case of Ram Chand v. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44 : (1993 AIR SCW 3479) has impressed that where no time-limit is prescribed for exercise of a power under a statute it does not mean that it can be exercised at any time; such power has to be exercised within a reasonable time. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the suo motu power under S. 84-C of the Act was not exercised by the Mamlatdar within a reasonable time. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 16 ) FROM the law enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, referred to above, it is clear that when a power is conferred on an authority to effectuate a purpose, it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and exercise of power in a reasonable manner inheres the concept of its exercise within a reasonable time. In the instant case, though the show cause notice was served on the petitioner on 2nd of December 1995 giving him 20 days' time to submit his explanation, if any, the order impugned came to be passed only on 7th of December 1998 i. e. , after three years. The 20 days' time granted to the petitioner to submit his explanation expired on 22nd of December 1995. In terms of sub-rule (7) of Rule 89 of the Rules, the District Election Officer, the second respondent, was required to forward the representation of the petitioner, if any, with his comments within five days from the date of receipt of the representation. In the instant case, admittedly, the petitioner did not send any representation. Under those circumstances, the second respondent was required to send a communication with his comments, if any, to the Commission informing the Commission that he had not received any representation pursuant to the show cause notice issued to the petitioner within five days after the expiry of the time granted to the petitioner to submit his representation. In the normal circumstances, such communication should have been sent by the District Election Officer on or before 28th of December 1995 to the Commission. In the normal circumstances, such communication should have been sent by the District Election Officer on or before 28th of December 1995 to the Commission. Even if some reasonable margin of another four or five days is given on account of any administrative problem, at least during the first week of January 1996, the second respondent should have sent the communication to the Commission. It is the case of the Commission that it received the communication from the second respondent only on 29th of October 1998 as per Annexure-R4. The said report appears to have been received by the Commission on 5th of November 1998 and, thereafter, the Commission passed the impugned order Annexure-R5 on 7th of December 1998. Therefore, it is clear that the Commission took only 32 days from the date of communication sent by the District Election Officer, to conduct an enquiry and pass the impugned order. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Commission was required only about two months' time to pass the impugned order. The delay on the part of the second respondent in sending his report to the Commission is not a ground for the Commission not to pass the order within a reasonable time. The Commission which has the direct control and supervisory power over the second respondent, should have got the report from the second respondent with utmost expedition. ( 17 ) ONE other matter which is required to be dealt with is the time taken by the Commission to issue the show cause notice to the petitioner as provided under sub-rule (5) of Rule 89 of the Rules. The reading of sub-rule (4) of Rule 89, referred to above, makes it clear that the Commission must take a decision with regard to the default, if any, committed by the candidate in not filing the accounts relating to the election expenses on the basis of the report submitted by the District Election Officer with utmost expedition. The said view of mine is also supported by the direction given by the Commission on which strong reliance is placed by the petitioner, extracted above. In the instant case, though the report was sent by the District Election Officer on 19th of January 1995, it is only on 10th of November 1995, a show cause notice came to be issued to the petitioner. In the instant case, though the report was sent by the District Election Officer on 19th of January 1995, it is only on 10th of November 1995, a show cause notice came to be issued to the petitioner. No explanation has been given in the statement of objections filed on behalf of the respondents for the inordinate delay in not taking any action in the matter of issuing show cause notice to the petitioner by the Commission subsequent to the report sent by the District Election Officer as per Annexure-R1 on 19th of January 1995, till 10th of November 1995. If there was no delay on the part of the Commission in taking action for the purpose of issuing show cause notice, the entire proceedings would have been over within a period of three to four months from January 1995. In that event, if an order were to be passed within about four months from January 1995, the petitioner would have been disqualified for a period of three years from the month of June 1995 i. e. , the disqualification would be only till the month of June/july 1998. At this stage, it is necessary to deal with the contention of Sri Haranahalli that the petitioner should be denied relief in this petition on the ground that the petitioner having failed to submit his explanation to the show cause notice issued to him, should not be permitted to move the equitable jurisdiction of this Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, I am unable to accede to the said submission of Sri Haranahalli. The Commission is a creature of the Constitution endowed with vast powers under Art. 324 of the Constitution in the matter of conducting elections and the provisions of Art. 324 vest in the Commission the power of superintendence, direction and control of elections. Whenever the power is conferred on an authority, the said power is correlated with an obligation or a duty. In the case of the Commission, while the power is conferred on it to disqualify a candidate for not filing the returns as required under S. 78 of the Act, the said power, from the scheme of S. 10-A of the Act and Rule 89 of the Rules, referred to above, is coupled with an obligation and a duty to act in a fair and reasonable manner. As noticed by me earlier, the observations made by me above show that there has been unreasonable delay on the part of the Commission in passing the impugned order. There is no obligation or duty cast on the petitioner to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court to compel the Commission to perform its statutory duty. Further, if the petitioner had no cause to be shown, there was no obligation on his part also to submit any explanation. Therefore, I am unable to accept the submission of Sri Haranahalli that the petitioner should be denied relief on the ground that his conduct disentitles him for any relief at the hands of this Court. ( 18 ) I am also unable to accept yet other submission of Sri Haranahalli that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner on account of the delay in passing the impugned order. As noticed by me earlier, generally elections are held either to the Parliament or to the State Legislatures once in five years, If the impugned order were to be passed in June 1995, the period of disqualification would have been over in the month of June/july 1998. But, on account of the impugned order, the petitioner is disqualified from contesting the election for a period of three years from December 1998, the effect of which is that the petitioner would lose his right to contest the ensuing Parliamentary and Assembly Elections slated during September 1999. Therefore, I do not find any merit in this submission of Sri Haranahalli. ( 19 ) NOW, the next question is whether the order Annexure-R6 dated 10th of February 1999 made by the Commission in exercise of the power under S. 11 of the Act, is also liable to be quashed in the light of the grounds made out by the petitioner in the representation sent by him seeking modification of the order passed disqualifying him. The petitioner has prayed for removal of the disqualification imposed on him on the ground that there has been inordinate delay in passing the order of disqualification and also on the ground that as a matter of fact, he had filed his accounts. Section 11 of the Act confers power on the Commission for the reasons to be recorded to remove or reduce any disqualification provided under Chapter-I of Part-II except the disqualification provided under S. 8a of the Act. Section 11 of the Act confers power on the Commission for the reasons to be recorded to remove or reduce any disqualification provided under Chapter-I of Part-II except the disqualification provided under S. 8a of the Act. Therefore, the period of disqualification provided under Section 10a from the date of the order could be reduced by the Commission for the reasons to be recorded in writing. The nature of the power to be exercised by the Commission for passing an order under S. 11, is a quasi-judicial power. Therefore, the Commission is required to objectively consider the case made out either to remove the disqualification or reduce the period of disqualification imposed in the order made under S. 10a of the Act. This order, the Commission is required to pass after hearing the parties, who send such a representation seeking removal of the disqualification or reduction of the period of disqualification imposed. In the Instant case, admittedly, the petitioner was not heard. On this ground alone, the said order is liable to be quashed. Further, as could be seen from the said order, the order is not a speaking order. It is useful to extract the said order, which reads as hereunder :"i am directed to refer to your representation dated 3rd February 1999 on the subject cited and to state that your representation has been carefully examined and the commission has not found any merit therein. It has accordingly been rejected. "from what is extracted above, it is clear that there is absolutely no application of mind by the Commission with regard to the grounds made out by the petitioner seeking removal of the disqualification. Therefore, I am of the view that the order Annexure-R6 dated 10th of February 1999 is also liable to be quashed on the ground that it is arbitrary and unreasonable and the same has been passed in a mechanical manner and without application of mind with regard to the grounds made out by the petitioner for removal of the disqualification. However, in view of my conclusion on the first contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, I find it unnecessary to remit the matter for fresh consideration to the Commission with regard to the representation made by the petitioner. However, in view of my conclusion on the first contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, I find it unnecessary to remit the matter for fresh consideration to the Commission with regard to the representation made by the petitioner. ( 20 ) LASTLY, the question that would arise for consideration is whether, as a matter of fact, the petitioner has filed his accounts relating to his election expenses as contended by him. At the very outset, I may state that there is absolutely no justification for me to interfere with the finding recorded by the Commission that the petitioner had failed to file the accounts, in exercise of my jurisdiction either under Art. 226 or under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. The conclusion reached by the Commission is supported by the report sent by the District Election Officer, wherein he had stated that the petitioner had failed to file the accounts. In the statement of objections filed on behalf of the second respondent, it is categorically asserted that the petitioner has not filed the statement of accounts. Under these circumstances, merely on the assertion made by the petitioner in the representation given by the petitioner seeking an order to be made under S. 11 of the Act and also before this Court, it is not possible to come to the conclusion that the petitioner had filed his accounts. If, as a matter of fact, he has filed the accounts, he would have obtained an acknowledgment for having filed the same. On the basis of the assertion made by him in the petition, it is clear that he is politically conscious and is keen in maintaining purity in conduct of elections. Further, even if he has not retained the acknowledgment, if the petitioner had filed his returns, he would have submitted his explanation stating so to the show cause notice issued to him. Under these circumstances, the statement made in Annexure-A given by the second respondent wherein it is stated that the petitioner did not file his accounts " (Vernacular matter omitted. . . . . ED)" is of no assistance to the petitioner. Obviously, what is conveyed in Annexure-A was that the petitioner had not filed the statement of accounts as provided under S. 78 of the Act. Ultimately, this Court is required to consider the order Annexure-R5. . . . . ED)" is of no assistance to the petitioner. Obviously, what is conveyed in Annexure-A was that the petitioner had not filed the statement of accounts as provided under S. 78 of the Act. Ultimately, this Court is required to consider the order Annexure-R5. In order Annexure-R5, it is stated that the petitioner has failed to lodge an account of his election expenses as required under the Act. Therefore, in the light of the discussion made above, I am unable to accept the submission of the petitioner that as a matter of fact, he had filed his accounts. . sent by him seeking modification of the order passed disqualifying him. The petitioner has prayed for removal of the disqualification imposed on him on the ground that there has been inordinate delay in passing the order of disqualification and also on the ground that as a matter of fact, he had filed his accounts. Section 11 of the Act confers power on the Commission for the reasons to be recorded to remove or reduce any disqualification provided under Chapter-I of Part-II except the disqualification provided under S. 8a of the Act. Therefore, the period of disqualification provided under Section 10a from the date of the order could be reduced by the Commission for the reasons to be recorded in writing. The nature of the power to be exercised by the Commission for passing an order under S. 11, is a quasi-judicial power. Therefore, the Commission is required to objectively consider the case made out either to remove the disqualification or reduce the period of disqualification imposed in the order made under S. 10a of the Act. This order, the Commission is required to pass after hearing the parties, who send such a representation seeking removal of the disqualification or reduction of the period of disqualification imposed. In the Instant case, admittedly, the petitioner was not heard. On this ground alone, the said order is liable to be quashed. Further, as could be seen from the said order, the order is not a speaking order. It is useful to extract the said order, which reads as hereunder :"i am directed to refer to your representation dated 3rd February 1999 on the subject cited and to state that your representation has been carefully examined and the commission has not found any merit therein. It has accordingly been rejected. It is useful to extract the said order, which reads as hereunder :"i am directed to refer to your representation dated 3rd February 1999 on the subject cited and to state that your representation has been carefully examined and the commission has not found any merit therein. It has accordingly been rejected. "from what is extracted above, it is clear that there is absolutely no application of mind by the Commission with regard to the grounds made out by the petitioner seeking removal of the disqualification. Therefore, I am of the view that the order Annexure-R6 dated 10th of February 1999 is also liable to be quashed on the ground that it is arbitrary and unreasonable and the same has been passed in a mechanical manner and without application of mind with regard to the grounds made out by the petitioner for removal of the disqualification. However, in view of my conclusion on the first contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, I find it unnecessary to remit the matter for fresh consideration to the Commission with regard to the representation made by the petitioner. ( 20 ) LASTLY, the question that would arise for consideration is whether, as a matter of fact, the petitioner has filed his accounts relating to his election expenses as contended by him. At the very outset, I may state that there is absolutely no justification for me to interfere with the finding recorded by the Commission that the petitioner had failed to file the accounts, in exercise of my jurisdiction either under Art. 226 or under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. The conclusion reached by the Commission is supported by the report sent by the District Election Officer, wherein he had stated that the petitioner had failed to file the accounts. In the statement of objections filed on behalf of the second respondent, it is categorically asserted that the petitioner has not filed the statement of accounts. Under these circumstances, merely on the assertion made by the petitioner in the representation given by the petitioner seeking an order to be made under S. 11 of the Act and also before this Court, it is not possible to come to the conclusion that the petitioner had filed his accounts. If, as a matter of fact, he has filed the accounts, he would have obtained an acknowledgment for having filed the same. If, as a matter of fact, he has filed the accounts, he would have obtained an acknowledgment for having filed the same. On the basis of the assertion made by him in the petition, it is clear that he is politically conscious and is keen in maintaining purity in conduct of elections. Further, even if he has not retained the acknowledgment, if the petitioner had filed his returns, he would have submitted his explanation stating so to the show cause notice issued to him. Under these circumstances, the statement made in Annexure-A given by the second respondent wherein it is stated that the petitioner did not file his accounts " (Vernacular matter omitted. . . . . ED)" is of no assistance to the petitioner. Obviously, what is conveyed in Annexure-A was that the petitioner had not filed the statement of accounts as provided under S. 78 of the Act. Ultimately, this Court is required to consider the order Annexure-R5. In order Annexure-R5, it is stated that the petitioner has failed to lodge an account of his election expenses as required under the Act. Therefore, in the light of the discussion made above, I am unable to accept the submission of the petitioner that as a matter of fact, he had filed his accounts. ( 21 ) IN the light of the discussion made above, I make the following :order (i) Impugned order Annexure-R5 dated 7th of December 1998 and also order Annexure-R6 dated 10th of February 1999 are hereby quashed. (ii) It is declared that there is no disqualification against the petitioner within the meaning of S. 7 (b) of the Act. ( 22 ) IN terms stated above, this petition is allowed and disposed of. Rule issued is made absolute. ( 23 ) HOWEVER, in the circumstances of the case, no order is made as to costs. --- *** --- .