JUDGMENT S.C. Pandey, J. This appeal u/s 100 of the CPC is directed against the judgment and decree dated 22-10-1997, passed by the Eighth Additional District Judge, Bilaspur, in Civil Appeal No. 54 of 1997, affirming the judgment and decree dated 24-10-1996 passed by the Sixth Civil Judge, Class-II, Bilaspur, in Civil Suit No. 147A of 1996. The judgment and decree passed in this appeal shall govern the disposal of second appeal No. 975 of 1998, because it is based on common questions of the facts and law. The appellants executed a sale-deed dated 12-4-1972 in favour of the respondent No. 1, who is their son-in-law. The property covered by the sale-deed consisted of a house and compound wall as detailed in the schedule attached with the plaint. The appellants claimed that the aforesaid sale-deed dated 12-4-1972 was merely a nominal sale-deed purportedly executed with view to avoiding the possible impact of the law of ceiling on urban properties projected to be passed in future by the legislature according to talks in the political circles. Since the nominal sale-deed was without consideration executed with the desire to defeat the projected law, the appellants did not part with possession of the suit property in favour of the respondent No. 1. No attempt was made by the respondent No. 1 to get his name mutated in his favour in respect of the suit property described in the schedule-A in the plaint. The original sale-deed was retained by the appellants and even after the execution of the sale-deed the appellants exercised their rights of ownership by selling two plots marked by letters and in the Schedule-B of the plaint. They claimed that the rest of the plot marked by letters belonged to the appellants and accordingly it be declared that the appellants are the owners of that property. It was claimed by the appellants that the purpose of filing of the suit was that now that they want to be recognised as owners of the suit property. The respondent No. 1 admitted the claim of the appellants. The Trial Court dismissed the suit holding that it was of collusive nature and was filed with a purpose avoiding the stamp duty involved in executing a deed of reconveyance. The appellants preferred an appeal. The respondent No. 1 admitted the claim of the appellants. The Trial Court dismissed the suit holding that it was of collusive nature and was filed with a purpose avoiding the stamp duty involved in executing a deed of reconveyance. The appellants preferred an appeal. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellants and the respondent No. 1 filed a compromise application, praying that a decree as prayed for by the appellants be passed. The Lower Appellate Court confirmed the finding of trial that the suit was collusive and was filed with a view to avoid stamp duty. In doing so, it held: (i) That the claim for bare declaration was not maintainable. (ii) That the suit property was valued at more than Rs. 100/- and these rights could not be passed without a registered sale-deed and, therefore, no decree could be passed and (iii) The suit was collusive in nature as was held by the Trial Court because it was filed with a view to avoid payment of stamp duty as the property could be reconveyed by a deed of conveyance. (iv) The making of a compromise application at the appellate stage would not change the nature of collusion which was made with the view to defeat the stamp duty. This appeal and the connected appeal was admitted by this Court on the following substantial questions of law by order dated 19-3-1998 passed by this Court. (i) Whether the Court below was right in dismissing the suit on the ground that it was collusive? (ii) Whether the Court below rightly refused to record compromise on the same ground? (iii) Whether the Court below could have considered the fact that the appellants wanted to avoid stamp duty for holding that the suit is of collusive nature? Both the appeals are having finally disposed of by this common judgment as the parties agreed that the case be finally decided after hearing the arguments. During the course of arguments it appeared to this Court that trial Court had applied the principles of estoppel and certain other points arose on which the Appellate Court did not base its conclusion. However the question is so much mixed up that it would be safe to frame the following question No. 4 which would also meet the reasoning of the Lower Appellate Court. However the question is so much mixed up that it would be safe to frame the following question No. 4 which would also meet the reasoning of the Lower Appellate Court. (4) Whether the suit was liable to be dismissed on any of the principles estoppel or on the ground that the appellant was required to claim further relief or because the property was worth more than Rs. 100/-. Before embarking upon the exercise of answering the other questions, it would be convenient to decide the question No. 4 first. The appellants had claimed that sale-deed was nominal and without consideration, such a sale-deed did not exist in the eye of law. It need not be set aside and, therefore, question of claiming further relief u/s 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 did not arise. One fails to understand how the principles of Law of estoppel were attracted. Neither the appellant, nor the respondent No. 1 was misled by the execution of sale deed dated 12-4-1972. Both the parties knew that the title did not pass. No consideration was paid or accepted. The possession remained with the appellant. The tenants purchased from the appellants. The respondent No. 1 did not lay any claim to the rent or raised an objection that the appellants could not execute a sale deed in favour of the tenants. Under such circumstances one fails to understand how the estoppel became operative. There is no question of estoppel by execution of a sham sale deed under a mis-apprehension that a projected law on ceiling on urban properties in future is likely to affect the property of the appellants. The misapprehension was not correct. It is implied in the plaint that the appellants were not affected by the passing of The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. For this reason also the question of estoppel could not crop in. It is difficult to comprehend, why the Court below held that the suit for declaration of a property more than Rs. 100/- would not lie. In this case, no consequential relief was involved. The appellants claimed to be in possession and this fact was not disputed by the respondent No. 1. No issue was framed. In view of this matter the Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court had no option but to hold that the possession was with the appellants. In this case, no consequential relief was involved. The appellants claimed to be in possession and this fact was not disputed by the respondent No. 1. No issue was framed. In view of this matter the Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court had no option but to hold that the possession was with the appellants. The Court, therefore, fails to understand how any further relief was involved. The suit for declaration was maintainable. It is well established that a fixed Court fee is payable, in such a suit without regard to the value of the property. This takes us to questions of law Nos. 1, 2 and 3. The 'Crux' of the matter is: whether the suit filed by the appellants in any way 'collusive'? We must, therefore, begin at the beginning, by asking the question: What is the real difference between decree obtained by a plaintiff on admission, consent or compromise as opposed to collusion? It may be noted that the CPC gives power of passing a decree on admission as per Order 12, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The provision of Order 9, Rule 8 gives power to Court to pass a decree in favour of plaintiff to the extent the defendant admits the claim of the plaintiff even in his absence. The Scheme of the CPC provides for recording admission under Order 10, Order 8, Rule 5 and Orders 11 and 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Apart from that Order 15, Rule 1 of the CPC also points in the direction of passing of a decree on admissions. Thus the scheme of the CPC provides a decree on admission. It also provides for passing a decree in favour of the plaintiff on filing of a compromise application under Order 23, Rule 3 provided the Court comes to the conclusion that compromise agreement is lawful i.e. that it is not void or voidable under the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 and further that the Court satisfied itself that such compromise is actually arrived. Order 23, Rule 3 of the CPC permits adjustment of the suit wholly. Such an agreement of compromise may also amount to the admission of the claim of the plaintiff. The purpose of the parties can be achieved by the acceptance of the claim of the plaintiff in the compromise application. Order 23, Rule 3 of the CPC permits adjustment of the suit wholly. Such an agreement of compromise may also amount to the admission of the claim of the plaintiff. The purpose of the parties can be achieved by the acceptance of the claim of the plaintiff in the compromise application. The above resume of some of the provisions of the CPC would show that it encourages passing of a decree on admission or compromise. The Court must, therefore, be slow in denying the plaintiff his right to get a decree under a compromise or on admission. Early disposal of litigation is in the interest of the Republic. Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium: It is in the interest of the State there should be limit to law suits. (Latin for Lawyers). However the general rule permitting the Court to grant decree on compromise or admission or consent is relaxed when the Court sees in it the makings of a collusion. The admission of compromise is not entered into simply for resolving in the differences between the parties, but for giving some secret advantage, which may not appear on the face of admission or compromise. The purpose may be ulterior or even sinister. Here the agreement for admission or compromise gives out different picture than it purports to be. A collusion is a secret agreement between the parties to the agreement to do a thing to get an object which may not be otherwise obtainable by way of straight forward legal means. In collusion compromise consent or admission there is a meeting of minds. To that extent they are similar. But the purpose of compromise consent or admission may be to obtain straight forward result of settling the disputes; Whereas collusion takes up a sinister path of gaining advantage in an oblique way. The ulterior motive is to get some thing which is prohibited by the law in the garb of apparently legal agreement. A careful lifting of the legal apparel and a look beneath may reveal the sinister motive of getting the 'forbidden fruit'. In short collusion is also a compromise with a rider that its purpose is oblique or sinister. 13A. The question that props is: Why are the Courts chary of passing a decree or order when it appears to them that the parties are 'colluding'? In short collusion is also a compromise with a rider that its purpose is oblique or sinister. 13A. The question that props is: Why are the Courts chary of passing a decree or order when it appears to them that the parties are 'colluding'? The answer to such a question may be in the fact that Courts are meant to do genuine justice to parties and cannot be used for a purpose which appears to them to lend an opposite colour to their decrees or orders. In other words the Courts cannot permit the parties to stultify themselves and thereby pollute the fountain of justice. The section 23 of the Indian Contract Act provides that an object of an agreement would not be deemed to lawful (i) It is forbidden by law or made with the purpose to defeat any process of the law. (ii) If it is fraudulent, (iii) Or it involves injuries to person or property of another, (iv) Court regards it as immoral or opposed to public policy. We can find any of aforesaid elements in a collusive admission or compromise. The Courts have no option if they are prevented by passing a decree on collusion by some express provisions of Law. For example a decree of divorce on consent or admission could be granted in the matter of a marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 provided there is no collusion. It is well known that fraud vitiates most solemn of the proceedings and therefore fraudulent collusion would also vitiate the proceedings and decree shall not be granted. The collusion with intent to hurt a third person or his property would also come within the definition of playing fraud upon the Court. The last category collusion is for immoral purpose or for a purpose opposed to public policy. It is said that public policy is an 'unruly horse'. There is element of subjectivity in determining whether a contract is opposed to public policy and it is likely to vary from a Judge to Judge. However the Courts cannot permit something grossly immoral through their orders or decrees. Nor can they permit something they conceive it to be injurious to the health of the body politic. There is element of subjectivity in determining whether a contract is opposed to public policy and it is likely to vary from a Judge to Judge. However the Courts cannot permit something grossly immoral through their orders or decrees. Nor can they permit something they conceive it to be injurious to the health of the body politic. Despite of subjectivity in coming to the conclusion, nevertheless, broadly these are categories which are to be borne in the mind before granting a decree on admission consent or compromise as collusive. The question is: How should this Court view the attempt the appellant to obtain a consent decree. It obvious that the sale was in favour of the son-in-law in the year 1972. A look into the relation of the parties, reveals that there is more than preponderance of probability that the sale was without consideration and nominal. Moreover the respondent No. 1 does not dispute it. In such a situation, it would be difficult to hold otherwise even if an issue was raised. The respondent No. 1 would not dispute the assertion of the appellant in the witness box. There are further circumstances that support the case of appellants. There was no mutation. The appellants sold a part of the property to the tenants after the execution of the sale-deed dated 12-4-1972. The possession remained with the appellants. Therefore, on the admission of the respondent No. 1, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the sale-deed dated 12-4-1972 was nominal. If it was a nominal sale-deed, it need not be set aside. A decree of declaration would be sufficient for setting aside a sale-deed in names as distinguished from a real and substantial sale-deed having definite legal consequences. There can be hardly any dispute regarding the above preposition. Despite this fact the Courts below have refused to grant a decree on consent and admission presumably on the ground that the appellants were seeking to avoid the stamp duty. The question that should have been asked was if the appellants were required to pay stamp duty in order to get rid of the effect of the sale-deed dated 12-4-1972. The answer to this question lay in the fact if sale-deed dated 12-4-1972 was a real sale-deed or merely a sham sale deed a pretence for something else. The question that should have been asked was if the appellants were required to pay stamp duty in order to get rid of the effect of the sale-deed dated 12-4-1972. The answer to this question lay in the fact if sale-deed dated 12-4-1972 was a real sale-deed or merely a sham sale deed a pretence for something else. The appellants say that it was sham transaction and the respondent No. 1 admits it. Since no issue was framed on any of the admitted fact, it must be presumed that the trial Court was satisfied with admission or consent of the respondent No. 1 otherwise it would have framed on issue in exercise of its powers under proviso to Order 8, Rule 5(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 58 of the Evidence Act also gives power to call for proof of a fact otherwise their admission. That apart there is hardly any chance of proving otherwise when both the parties to the contract allege that a particular contract was sham and without consideration. The oral evidence, if it were recorded was likely to bring for the same facts as pleaded by the parties. There would hardly any scope for verification, if the parties were speaking the truth. But lack of proof or possible misadventure would not make the case of the parties false. The Court cannot draw an inference without any material on record that consent of the respondent No. 1 is necessarily collusive. The inference of collusion must be backed by some positive circumstance. A Judge may be factsceptic but he cannot carry the scepticism to the other extreme for taking into consideration a negative circumstance, like lack of evidence as a positive circumstance of collusion. This approach would be cynical in the extreme degree. If there be sinister motive, it must appear from the circumstances. The circumstances point in the contrary direction. No delivery of possession. No mutation in the name of respondent No. 1. The respondent No. 1 does not object to execution of sale in favour of tenants by the appellants. No evidence that consideration was paid. The endorsement of the sale register does not show that consideration was paid before the Sub-registrar. The circumstances do indicate that sale-deed was executed in order to avoid the possible enforcement of Urban Land Ceiling Act in Bilaspur. No evidence that consideration was paid. The endorsement of the sale register does not show that consideration was paid before the Sub-registrar. The circumstances do indicate that sale-deed was executed in order to avoid the possible enforcement of Urban Land Ceiling Act in Bilaspur. But that law did not affect the appellants when it was passed. The appellants filed the suit so that they pay the nazul tax as real owners. What sinister motive could be fastened on the appellants? The Court below holds that obtaining a consent decree was a device for avoiding to pay stamp fee which was liable to be imposed on a sale-deed in favour of the appellants. Is there no assumption in this approach that the sale-deed dated 12-4-1972 was real, when both the parties have agreed to deny it? The very denial has been taken as collusion because both the parties have agreed. They may be agree to give a truthful version. The Court cannot play ducks and drakes with the parties without any foundation. In the case of Shree Meenakshi Mills vs. I.T. Commissioner, AIR 1955 SC 49, Venkatrama Ayyar J. pointed out that term 'Benami' was used to indicate transactions of two kinds:- (i) When the sale is for consideration but the purchaser mentioned in the sale-deed is merely a name tender as consideration did not flow from him, (ii) When transfer is without consideration indicating that sale deed was created for a purpose other than intention to transfer. The following observations bring out the meaning:- Page 66, Para : 30 (last line): But in the latter class of cases, when the question is whether the transfer is genuine or sham, the point for decision would be, not who paid the consideration but whether any consideration was paid. The appellants have placed on record a photocopy of the sale-deed dated 12-4-1972. The document indicates that consideration of Rs. 14,000/- was not paid to respondent No. 1 before the Sub-Registrar. It was indicated in the endorsement and the sale-deed that consideration was paid to the respondent No. 1 prior to execution of sale-deed. The Court below did not bear in mind the endorsement. Thus the fact that parties did not pay actual consideration before Sub-Registrar combined with other facts showed that no consideration was paid. It was indicated in the endorsement and the sale-deed that consideration was paid to the respondent No. 1 prior to execution of sale-deed. The Court below did not bear in mind the endorsement. Thus the fact that parties did not pay actual consideration before Sub-Registrar combined with other facts showed that no consideration was paid. This Court can determine essential facts which the Court below failed to determine for holding that the suit is collusive. Such power is vested in the Court by virtue of section 103(b) of Code of Civil Procedure. The Court after going through all the facts involved in the case comes to the conclusion that sale deed dated 12-4-1972 was nominal and therefore, it is of no legal value. There was no passing of property to respondent No. 1 and therefore, the question of re-conveying the property to appellants did not arise. The Suit for declaration was the correct remedy to show to the world-at-large that appellants are still owners of the suit land and were accordingly entitled to pay Nazul Tax. Since the question of executing a sale-deed in favour of the appellants did not arise, there was no collusion to evade the stamp duty. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, submitted in the alternative that even if it be held that the respondent No. 1 was required to reconvey the property to the appellants, the suit could be decreed. In short the argument was that the appellants were entitled to arrange their affairs in such manner so that they could avoid stamp duty. It was urged that they could get a decree on admission and compromise and the decree could give them a title. The law permitted such a course and, therefore, it could be followed. The applicants did not avoid to pay the Court fee suitable to the mode adopted by them. If it came to that the appellants could choose lessor of the two evils. It is argued that the purpose of registration of a document transferring title in the immovable property worth more than Rs. 100/- would be to keep the public record of private documents. Therefore, the private document has to be created requiring payment of stamp duty and then only registration can be done. This purpose can equally be served by getting a decree from the Court of law. 100/- would be to keep the public record of private documents. Therefore, the private document has to be created requiring payment of stamp duty and then only registration can be done. This purpose can equally be served by getting a decree from the Court of law. The law does not require any stamp duty be paid for obtaining a decree and, therefore, there was no question of its avoidance in this connection reference was made to the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in the case of A. Bapiraju and Others Vs. District Registrar, Registration and Stamps, Srikakulam, which apparently approved the decision of Special Bench of three Judges of that Court reported in the case of Bharpet Mohammad Hussain Saheb and Another Vs. District Registrar, Kurnool, to the effect that parties are entitled to take recourse to a legal strategy to minimise the Stamp Duty permissible under the Law. It was urged that if the law permits such a mode to be adopted, the Court should not see any sinister purpose or collusion. A reference was also made to Subhas Chandra Das Mushib Vs. Ganga Prosad Das Mushib and Others, , for defining collusion to mean a secret agreement or conspiracy to do something sinister or illegal designedly. The attention of the Court was also drawn in the case of Nagubai Ammal and Others Vs. B. Shama Rao and Others, for the purpose that collusion amounted to secret understanding between the parties to the suit to pursue the suit in manner so that the result of suit would serve some sinister purpose. It was urged that the attempt to avoid payment of stamp duty would not be said to be collusion with a sinister purpose. The appellants were legally entitled to adopt this method. The attention of the Court was drawn in the case of The Commissioner of Inland Revenue vs. G. Angus and Company reported in 23 Q.B.D. 579. In that case, Lord Esher M.R. at page 593 expressed the opinion that the crown must make out a case for payment of stamp duty and if a party can find legal means to evade the duty, it cannot be helped. In the opinion of this Court the answer to such a problem can be answered by looking into the nature of 'collusion'. In the opinion of this Court the answer to such a problem can be answered by looking into the nature of 'collusion'. A contract express or implied cannot be enforced if it is hit by section 23 of the contract. A similar approach is to be adopted in case of collusion. The real question is if by admission of claim of the appellants on the part of respondent No. 1, it was purported that parties wanted to do so for the sole purpose of avoiding stamp duty and such an agreement was forbidden by the Law or was made with the purpose of defeating the law. Assuming that the sale-deed dated 12-4-1974 was genuine document and parties in this appeal did not want to pay the stamp duty and therefore, they adopted this strategy of obtaining the consent decree in collusion, can it be said definitely that this action on the part of parties was prohibited. The answer to such a question will depend upon the imposition of stamp duty. The stamp duty is payable on the instrument amounting to reconveyance in shape of a sale deed executed by the respondent No. 1 in favour of the appellant. If the parties do not choose to execute such an instrument, they shall not be liable to pay stamp duty. The law did not compel the respondent No. 1 to execute a sale deed in favour of the appellants. The respondent No. 1 was free to employ other modes of transfer for conveying the property to the appellants. For example he could permit the appellants to claim the suit property by adverse possession and such a plea could be raised in the suit itself. The parties would not have committed an act prohibited by the law or defeated the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act when they did not execute a conveyance liable to stamp duty. It is clear from The Indian Stamp Act and the definition of "Instrument", "Chargeable" and conveyance that instrument whereby a conveyance is made is liable to duty. If the parties exercised their freedom not to execute a conveyance, it cannot be said that they tried to defeat the provisions of law. Any other view of the matter would restrict the freedom of the parties and may be violative of the Article 19(1) of the Constitution. If the parties exercised their freedom not to execute a conveyance, it cannot be said that they tried to defeat the provisions of law. Any other view of the matter would restrict the freedom of the parties and may be violative of the Article 19(1) of the Constitution. It would be an unreasonable restriction on the rights of the citizens of India. The citizens of the State can, if the law so permits, arrange their affairs to pay the tax to the minimum. It would not amount to fraud or cause injury to the property of another. Nor can we say it is immoral or opposed to public policy. This is view of the Court is supported by the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of The Commissioner of Inland Revenue vs. G. Angus and Company reported in 23 Q.B.D. 579, Lord Esher, M.R. construing a similar Stamp Act observed as follows at page 589:- The first thing to be noticed is, that the thing which is made liable to the duty is an "instrument". If a contract of purchase and sale, or a conveyance by way of purchase and sale, can be or is, carried out without an instrument, the case is not within the section, and no tax is imposed. It is not the transaction of purchase and sale which is struck at; it is the instrument whereby the purchase and sale are effected which is struck at. And if anyone can carry through a purchase and sale without an instrument, then the legislature have not reached that transaction. And further at page 593:- If a vendor can convey the property sold to the purchaser without the execution of any instrument, he can convey it without paying any stamp duty u/s 70. The subject may have the good fortune to escape the stamp duty, if he can get a conveyance of property sold to him without the execution of any instrument. But it is said that if the appeal be decided against the Commissioners purchasers will rest satisfied with an agreement of which specific performance would be decreed, and will not go on to execute a conveyance, and so the Crown will lose the stamp duty, and it is rather suggested that this would be cheating the Crown and committing a fraud. The Crown, however, must make out its right to the duty, and if there be a means of evading the stamp duty, so much the better for those who can evade it. It is no fraud upon the Crown, it is a thing which they are perfectly entitled to do. The Crown cannot have the stamp duty unless the parties to the sale choose to effectuate the transaction by an instrument which of itself conveys the property, and, if they choose to be satisfied with something less, the matter is not brought within section 70. The legal position is well settled. The Indian Stamp Act is a fiscal statute. It is liable to be construed strictly. There is no room for intendment. There is no room equity. So the Special Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Bharpet Mohammad Hussain Saheb and Another Vs. District Registrar, Kurnool, , quoted the following from the decision of Shri Nivas Ayyangar, J., reported in AIR 1928 Mad 543 (FB): There can be no question also in this case of the motive of the assessee in bringing about a particular arrangement, because, as has been pointed out by the House of Lords in more than one case, it is not proper to take such motives or objects into consideration, and a subject is entitled, if he can in any legal manner, to circumvent the incidents of a particular taxing or financing Act........... This case of Bharpet Mohammad Hussain Saheb and Another Vs. District Registrar, Kurnool, was approved by another Full Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case of A. Bapiraju and Others Vs. District Registrar, Registration and Stamps, Srikakulam, . Similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in number of cases while interpreting Taxing statutes. From the study of various decisions of the Supreme Court certain principles have emerged regarding the interpretation of taxing statutes. It is now well established that on taxing statute must be strictly construed. In cases of doubt it should be interpreted in favour of the tax payer. The Court has no discretion in face of the literal words of the statute. The letter of the law is of greater importance than supposed spirit of the law. The literal, though pedestrian, interpretation must prevail. The Supreme Court in the case of The Madras Refineries Ltd. Vs. The Court has no discretion in face of the literal words of the statute. The letter of the law is of greater importance than supposed spirit of the law. The literal, though pedestrian, interpretation must prevail. The Supreme Court in the case of The Madras Refineries Ltd. Vs. The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Board of Revenue, Madras, has held that in order to determine chargeability and its extent the instrument has to be read for ascertaining its meaning. After ascertaining the meaning, the Stamp Act is to be applied to it. The interpretation has to be made on the basis of the words of the instrument and not on the basis how the parties understood it to be. The question of so called "evasion" had been dealt with by Supreme Court. In number of cases the opinion in England that there could be no evasion in law has been adhered to. It has been held in number of cases in England that legal evasion is a misnomer. Either a person is within an Act of Parliament or not within it. If a person could arrange his affairs in such manner that he was out of net cast by the taxing statute, the matter ended. No question of morality was involved. In similar vein was the remark of Subbarao J., in the case of Punjab Distilling Industries Ltd. vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, mentioned in AIR 1965 SC 1862 at page 1866:- Tax can be evaded by breaking the Law, or avoided in terms of the Law. However the recent trend is to examine the method or the mode whereby a person claims exemption from payment of tax very strictly so that the "Camouflage" applied has real legal sheath and not merely an artificial device. So in a recent case the Supreme Court observed in the case of Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Playworld Electronics Pvt. Ltd. and Another, at page 208 para 11 it has been observed: It is true that tax planning may be legitimate provided it is within the framework of the law. Colourable devices cannot be part of tax planning and it is wrong to encourage or entertain the belief that it is honourable to avoid the payment of tax by dubious methods. It is the obligation of every citizen to pay the taxes honestly without resorting to subterfuges. Colourable devices cannot be part of tax planning and it is wrong to encourage or entertain the belief that it is honourable to avoid the payment of tax by dubious methods. It is the obligation of every citizen to pay the taxes honestly without resorting to subterfuges. Similar sentiments were expressed by Chinnappa Reddy J., in McDowell and Co. Ltd. Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, . These and similar observations are limited to the schemes made by parties in the name of tax-planning. This would be clear from the decision of House of Lords in the case of Craven (Inspector of Taxes) vs. White, 1988 (3) ALL ER 495 (H.L.). If the schemes of tax planning are not under consideration normal principles would apply. See Carver vs. Duncan (Inspector of Taxes), 1985 (2) All ER 645 (H.L.) 648. This follows from the case of Union of India vs. Playworld Electronics Pvt. Ltd., (supra). In the case of Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Gujarat-II, Ahmedabad Vs. Arvind Narottam (Individual), , the Court construed the trust deed following the principles of strict construction. In separate judgment Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji, agreed but lamented the tendency to avoid tax. It must be observed, however, that whatever be the complications of modern tax planning the test applied by Venkatarama Aiyar, J., in the case of Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax and Excess Profits Tax, Bombay, at page 274 appears to be good:- Mr. Kolah argues that there is nothing wrong in business being done in such a way as to escape taxation. No exception can be taken to that statement. Every person is entitled so to arrange his affairs as to avoid taxation, but the arrangement must be real and genuine and not a sham or make believe. Even after considering the effect of filing the suit as alternative to execution a reconveyance this Court is of the view that appellants were entitled not to pursue the path of reconveyance if they could get the decree of the Court in respect of suit land and obtain relief by an alternative mode. The admission of title or attempt to compromise could not be said to be solely geared to avoidance of stamp duty. In other words there was compromise in the larger sense but not collusion which is sham compromise with a sinister motive or oblique purpose. The admission of title or attempt to compromise could not be said to be solely geared to avoidance of stamp duty. In other words there was compromise in the larger sense but not collusion which is sham compromise with a sinister motive or oblique purpose. The question of avoiding stamp duty did not arise as no instrument was executed which required payment of the duty. The compromise was accepted by both the parties and their statements were recorded. Thus there is every reason to hold that the matter was compromised. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that this Court has come to the conclusion that the Sale-deed dated 12-4-1972 was without consideration and nominal. It was not necessary to get it set aside. Alternatively the Civil Suit of the appellants and the consent of the respondent No. 1 to suffer the decree by admitting the allegations in the plaint cannot be said to be collusion to suffer a decree in order to avoid stamp duty. The parties were free to take recourse to law. The purpose of getting a decree cannot be solely connected to an attempt to evade stamp duty which is chargeable only on creation of an instrument. Accordingly all the first these questions are answered in favour of the appellants and against the respondent formally. The suit could be decreed on admission of the respondent No. 1. Alternatively the parties had compromised the suit by filing the application under Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The decree on compromise can also be passed. Accordingly the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree of the Courts below are hereby set aside. The suit filed by the appellants is hereby decreed and it is declared that appellant/plaintiff are the owners of the suit plot as shown in the schedule 'B' of the plaint marked by letters . There shall no orders as to costs throughout. Appeal allowed. Final Result : Allowed