Judgment G. S. Chaube, J. 1. This application under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is directed against the judgment and order dated 7.8.1991 of acquittal of opposite party No, 2 recorded in Sessions Trial No.76 of 1990 by the 4th Additional Sessions Judge of Hazaribagh. 2. According to the prosecution story leading to the trial of opposite party No.2 Sheo Shankar Keshari, the daughter of the petitioner, named Kiran Devi, was married to the said opposite party some time in 1981. She got burnt inside her matrimonial home at Kuju in the district of Hazaribagh on 22.3.1989, that is, after more than 8 years of the marriage. At first, she was taken to the local hospital at Kuju and therefrom she was referred to R. M. C. H. at Ranchi, by P. W.2, the doctor, who attended her at Kuju. In the night of the same day, the parents of the victim of burns Kiran Devi, were informed of the incident. They went to the hospital and found Kiran Devi in a state of unconsciousness. On 29.3.1989 she died of the burns she had received on her person on 22.3.1989. It was thereafter that on 31.3.1989 the present petitioner being the father of the deceased lodged a First Information Report with Kuju police alleging that his daughter Kiran Devi was set ablaze by her husband Sheo Shankar Keshari after dousing her with kerosene. According to him, opposite party No.2 used to torture and assault the deceased. On getting information of such torture, he went to her matrimonial home and took her with him. However, on 23.1.1989 she was sent back to the matrimonial home. In the First Information Report, he further alleged that after getting information of torture of his daughter,he went to Kuju on the next day and there he learnt that in the morning of 22.3.1989 opposite party No.2 assaulted the deceased and at about 8 in the night, he sprinkled kerosene on her person and set ablaze with intention to kill her. He further stated that on 28.3.1989 when Kiran Devi regained her senses, on enquiry by him she also disclosed that it was opposite party No.2 who set her ablaze after sprinkling kerosene on her person. 3. He further stated that on 28.3.1989 when Kiran Devi regained her senses, on enquiry by him she also disclosed that it was opposite party No.2 who set her ablaze after sprinkling kerosene on her person. 3. On completion of investigation, opposite party No.2 was put on trial, on a charge under Sec.302, I. P. C. for intentionally killing his wife Kiran Devi. In course of trial, prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses including the doctor (P. W.2) who had given the deceased first aid soon after the burn incident and the Investigating Officer (P. W.13 ). In his evidence, P. W.2 stated only this much that the deceased was brought to him in burnt condition; she was having extensive burns on her lower limbs, that is, below the waist. He could not know how she got burnt. Therefore, the evidence of P. W.2 was in no way helpful to the prosecution for proving the guilt of the accused. Similarly, nothing material against the opposite party No.2 would come in the evidence of P. W.13, the I. O. The remaining witnesses, except the first informant who was examined as P. W.1, were either the brothers of opposite party No.2 of local people, All of them stated in the Trial Court that the deceased got burnt while cooking. P. W.10 Baldeo Prasad, one of the brothers of opposite party No.2, stated that he tried to extinguish the fire which the garment of the deceased had caught and in the process he burnt his palms. This fact was also corroborated by P. W.2. Consequently, the witnesses other than P. Ws.1, 2 and 13 were declared hostile and cross-examined by the prosecution drawing their attention to their previous statements made to the Investigating Officer (P. W.13 ). When the I. O. came to the witness box, no attempt was made to contradict the prosecution witnesses who had not supported the prosecution story. In course of his evidence, P. W.13 stated this much that those witnesses had stated to him that on the day of Holi, the accused and Kiran Devi had quarrelled inter se. 4. On perusal of the evidence of those witnesses, I find that they have stated nothing in their statements on oath which can be used by the prosecution for fastening the guilt to the accused (opposite party No.2 ). 4. On perusal of the evidence of those witnesses, I find that they have stated nothing in their statements on oath which can be used by the prosecution for fastening the guilt to the accused (opposite party No.2 ). Therefore, rightly the Trial Court has not discussed their evidence threadbare in the impugned judgment. 5. As regards P. W.1, he has stated that on 23.3.1989 when he went to Kuju he came to learn that the accused (opposite party No.2) had sprinkled kerosene on the person of Kiran Devi and set her ablaze. He has not disclosed the source either in course of his evidence in Court or even in the First Information Report lodged by him on 31.3.1989. He has admitted that even though he came to learn at Kuju that opposite party No.2 had set his wife ablaze, he did not choose to inform the police even though the police station was situated in the same village. He has further stated that he also came to learn from his grand son, namely, the son of the deceased, that opposite party No.2 had set the deceased ablaze. Incidentally, this fact was not stated by him in the F. I. R. Naturally his statement in Court that even the son of the deceased had disclosed to him that she was set ablaze by opposite party No.2 is nothing but an after-thought. P. W.1 also stated in the Trial Court that on 28.3.1989 when his daughter Kiran Devi regained her senses, she disclosed to him that it was her husband Sheo Shankar Keshari who had doused her with kerosene and set ablaze. He has admitted that inspite of such information which becomes a dying declaration, he did not care to inform the police or any other authority until 31.3.1989. Because of such omission on the part of P. W.1 who was non else than the father of the deceased, the learned trial Judge has shown his disinclination to accept his testimony. As there was no other evidence either direct, circumstantial or corroborative, the learned trial Judge found the accused not guilty and acquitted him of the charge under Sec.302, I. P. C. 6. Mr. As there was no other evidence either direct, circumstantial or corroborative, the learned trial Judge found the accused not guilty and acquitted him of the charge under Sec.302, I. P. C. 6. Mr. Prakash, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, has submitted that the learned Trial Court should not have discarded the testimony of the father of the deceased (P. W.1), specially when the brothers of the accused were found making inconsistent statements respecting the incident of burning. According to him, at the earliest they disclosed to the first informant that opposite party No.2 had set himself ablaze and when the deceased tried to extinguish the fire, she got burnt. However, in Court they stated that the deceased caught fire while cooking. In my opinion, what the brothers of opposite party No.2 allegedly stated to P. W.1 on the day the deceased got burnt is not a substantive evidence when in Court they denied to have made such a statement. On the other hand, on oath they have stated that the deceased caught fire while cooking. Be that as it may, the law is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that in a revision preferred by a private complainant, the High Court is not entitled to reappraise the evidence as if sitting in appeal against the judgment and order of acquittal. It is equally a settled law that the revisional jurisdiction when invoked by a private complainant against the order of acquittal ought not to be exercised lightly by the Court. It can be exercised only in exceptional cases when the interest of justice requires to prevent manifest illegality or prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. In the present case, learned Counsel for the petitioner has failed to point out any illegality, much less on the face of the record, which the learned trial Judge committed in disbelieving the testimony of P. W.1 and acquitting the accused. 7. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned trial Judge has rightly disbelieved the testimony of P. W.1. Once his testimony was disbelieved, there was nothing on the record to come to the conclusion that the burns due to which the deceased died, was homicidal in nature and that too at the hands of her husband (opposite party No.2 ). 8. Once his testimony was disbelieved, there was nothing on the record to come to the conclusion that the burns due to which the deceased died, was homicidal in nature and that too at the hands of her husband (opposite party No.2 ). 8. In the result, I find no merit in this revision application and the same is accordingly dismissed.