FAIZAN UDDIN, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal has been preferred by the claimants against an order dated 10-3-1998, passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Gwalior (Third Additional District Judge, Gwalior (for short, the 'tribunal'), whereby the Tribunal has rejected their application under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the 'act' ). ( 2 ) THE facts are that Indu Khan was driver of vehicle No. CIH 7681. While he was driving the truck, it met with an accident in which Indu Khan died. The claimants who are the legal representatives of deceased Indu Khan made a claim for compensation under Section 166 of the Act. Along with this claim an application for compensation under Section 140 of the Act was also made before the Tribunal. While considering this application, the Tribunal has arrived at the findings that the deceased himself was driving the vehicle and it was due to his rash and negligent driving that the accident took place in which he died. On these findings, the Tribunal rejected the application under S. 140 of the Act. ( 3 ) SMT. Purnima Nigam, learned counsel for the appellants, contended that in this case the Tribunal has found that the accident had taken place arising out of the vehicle; the deceased was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident, and he died in the accident. The counsel contended that in rejecting the application the Tribunal has totally misconstrued the provisions of Section 140 of the Act. ( 4 ) SECTION 140 of the Act is quoted below :"140. Liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle of no fault.- (1) Where death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle, or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicle shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of this section. (2) The amount of compensation which shall be payable under sub-section (1) in respect of the death of any person shall be a fixed sum of fifty thousand rupees and the amount of compensation payable under that sub-section in respect of the permanent disablement of any person shall be a fixed sum of twenty-five thousand rupees. (3) In any claim for compensation under sub-section (1), the claimants shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. (4) A claim for compensation under sub-section (1) shall not be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim has been made nor shall the quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of such death or permanent disablement be reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such death or permanent disablement. " ( 5 ) IT is settled law that in a claim based on the principle of no fault liability the claimants shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made, was due to any wrongful act of the owner nor such a claim shall be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim has been made. In this case due to the accident involving the vehicle in question the driver himself was dead. ( 6 ) IN Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More, AIR 1991 SC 1769 : 1991 ACJ 777 the Supreme Court, while interpreting the scope of Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 (corresponding to Section 140 of the Act) quoted with approval the law enunciated by it in an earlier decision in the case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, AIR 1987 SC 1690 : 1987 ACJ 561 (SC) and observed in paras 11 and 12 as under :"11. ************it is thus seen that to a limited extent relief has been granted under Section 92-A of the Act to the legal representatives of the victims who have died on account of motor vehicle accidents. Now they can claim Rs. 15,000/- without proof of any negligence on the part of the owner of the vehicle or of any other person. This part of the Act is clearly a departure from the usual common law principle that a claimant should establish negligence on the part of the owner or driver of the motor vehicle before claiming any compensation for the death or permanent disablement caused on account of a motor vehicle accident. To that extent the substantive law of the country stands modified. 12 It is thus evident that Section 92-A was in the nature of a beneficial legislation enacted with a view to confer the benefit of expeditious payment of a limited amount by way of compensation to thevictims of an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle on the basis of no fault liability. In the matter of interpretation of a beneficial legislation the approach of the Court is to adopt a construction which advances the beneficent purpose underlying the enactment in preference to a construction which tends to defeat that purpose. The same approach has been adopted by this Court while construing the provisions of the Act. (See Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Limited v. Judavji Keshavji Modi, 1981 ACJ 507 ( AIR 1981 SC 2059 ) (SC) and Skandia Insurance Co. Limited v. Kokilaben Chandravadan, 1987 ACJ 411 (SC) : AIR 1987 SC 1184 . " ( 7 ) FOR awarding compensation under Section 140 of the Act, the Tribunal is required to satisfy itself in respect of the following matters : (i) An accident has arisen out of the use of a motor vehicle; (ii) the said accident has resulted in the death of the person whose Legal Representatives are making the claim or in permanent disablement of the person who is making the claim. (iii) the claim is made against the owner and the insurer of the motor vehicle involved in the accident. The documents referred to in the relevant Motor Vehicles Rules enable the Tribunal to ascertain the necessary facts in regard to these matters. (iii) the claim is made against the owner and the insurer of the motor vehicle involved in the accident. The documents referred to in the relevant Motor Vehicles Rules enable the Tribunal to ascertain the necessary facts in regard to these matters. For example the 'panchnama' and the first information report will show whether the accident had arisen out of the use of the motor vehicle in question. The post-mortem report or the injury report will show the cause of death and the nature of the injuries. In case the Tribunal feels any doubt about the correctness or genuineness of any of these documents or if it considers it necessary to obtain further information or documents the relevant Motor Vehicle Rules empower the Tribunal to obtain such further information or documents from the police, medical or other authorities, as the case may be. This would enable the Tribunal to satisfy itself in respect of the matters necessary for awarding compensation under Section 140 of the Act. ( 8 ) THUS, it is very clear that the object underlying the enactment of Section 140 of the Act as amended in 1994, is to make available to the claimants compensation amount to the extent of Rs. 50,000/- in case of death, and Rs. 25,000/- in case of permanent disablement, as expeditiously as possible and the said award has to be made before adjudicating the claim under Section 166 of the Act. ( 9 ) THE Claims Tribunal in this case recorded a categorical finding that the deceased died in the accident involving the vehicle. The claim is made by the legal representatives against owner and insurance Company but the Tribunal rejected the claim holding as under :"is DURGHATNA MAIN MRITAK SWAYAN VAHAN CHALA RAHA THA. USI MAIN ASANTULAN KAR TRUCK KO PALAT DIYA. ARTHAT MRITAK KI LAPARWAHI SE HE TRUCK PALTI AUR CHALAK KE MRITYU HUYI. AISA BHI NAHIN HAI KI KOYI SAMNE SE ANYA WAHAN AA RAHA THA AUR USE BACHANE MAIN YAH TRUCK PALTI HO. ATAH : DOSH RAHIT NAHIN HAI. AWEDEK GAN NE AISA NAHIN BATAYA HAI KI AISI STHITI MAIN BHI ANTARIM KSHATIPURTI DILAYI JA SAKTI HAI. " ( 10 ) IN this case the deceased died due to the accident involving the motor vehicle in question. ATAH : DOSH RAHIT NAHIN HAI. AWEDEK GAN NE AISA NAHIN BATAYA HAI KI AISI STHITI MAIN BHI ANTARIM KSHATIPURTI DILAYI JA SAKTI HAI. " ( 10 ) IN this case the deceased died due to the accident involving the motor vehicle in question. This Court is of the opinion that in rejecting the application of the appellants/legal representatives under Section 140 of the Act, the Tribunal has ignored the basic concept of the principle of the no fault liability. The Tribunal has adopted an approach tending to defeat the purpose rather than advancing the beneficent purpose underlying the enactment contained in Section 140 of the Act. The Claims Tribunal is well advised to read at least the provisions of Section 140 of the Act. The road mishaps and accidents are increasing day by day and so claims are arising therefrom. The accident occurred on 29-8-1996 in which the person died. The claim petition with application under Section 140 was filed on 2-11-1996. The order sheet dated 5-11-96 shows that the presiding Judge had already been transferred and the Tribunal was vacant and, as such, the case was adjourned to 18-12-1996. In the order sheet dated 18-12-96 it was recorded that the post of Presiding Officer was vacant, and it was adjourned to 17-2-1997, on which date it was adjourned to 18-3-1997, then to 11-4-1997, 8-5-1997, when it was adjourned to 13-8-1997. It was on 13-8-1997 that the Presiding Judge had directed registration of the claim case. One fails to understand as to why the case was transferred and allotted to a Court which was vacant and there was no presiding Judge. The Court remained vacant from 5-11-1996 to 13-8-1997. Even when the case was registered on 13-8-1997 it was adjourned to 14-8-97. On 14-8-97 notice was directed to be issued to the respondents, and 8-9-1997 was given for their appearance. On 8-9-97 though the respondent No. 1 was served with the notice, neither he nor any one appeared on his behalf; hence, he was proceeded ex parte. Notice on respondent No. 2 was not received back. It is surprising that the notice could not be served on the Insurance Company. The case was adjourned to 29-9-1997. On that date the Insurance Company was served and Shri S. S. Bansal, Advocate, appeared who prayed for time to file reply to the application under Section 140 case was adjourned to 20-10-1997. It is surprising that the notice could not be served on the Insurance Company. The case was adjourned to 29-9-1997. On that date the Insurance Company was served and Shri S. S. Bansal, Advocate, appeared who prayed for time to file reply to the application under Section 140 case was adjourned to 20-10-1997. On that date he counsel for respondent No. 2 again sought time, which was granted and the case was adjourned to 27-11-1997. There is no order sheet of 27-11-1997. The order sheet dated 12-1-1998 shows that as no reply was filed, so arguments on the application u/s. 140 were heard, but, later on, it was recorded in the order sheet that Shri Bansal appeared and stated that copies of documents be supplied to him, and the case was adjourned to 15-1-1998. On 15-1-1998 copy of insurance cover note was given to the counsel, and copies of other documents were already given earlier. The Insurance Company was given time to verify. The order sheet dated 15-1-1998, however, further shows that respondent No. 2 was again given time to file reply to the application u/s. 140. It is quite astonishing, as though arguments were heard on 12-1-98, yet further opportunity to file reply was granted. The matter does not rest here. On 15-1-98 the case was adjourned to 18-2-1998. On 18-2-98 reply was not filed. The order sheet shows that in the interest of justice last opportunity is given and the case was adjourned to 26-2-98, on which date also reply was not filed, and that last opportunity was prayed and granted, adjourning the case to 3-3-1998. On 3-3-98 the reply was filed by the Insurance Company. ( 11 ) THE reply filed by the Insurance Company raised only two contentions : (i) The owner of the vehicle did not inform about the accident and (ii) it is not traceable that the vehicle has been insured with the Insurance Company and in view of this it is not admitted that the vehicle is insured with respondent No. 2. Arguments were heard on 5-3-1998 and the case was adjourned to 10-3-1998. On 10-3-1998 the impugned order was passed rejecting the application. The case was adjourned to 13-5-1998, then to 17-7-1998 for reply to the petition. On 17-7-1998 it was again adjourned to 7-8-1998, then to 4-9-98 subject to costs. It was again adjourned to 17-9-1998 and then to 22-9-98. Arguments were heard on 5-3-1998 and the case was adjourned to 10-3-1998. On 10-3-1998 the impugned order was passed rejecting the application. The case was adjourned to 13-5-1998, then to 17-7-1998 for reply to the petition. On 17-7-1998 it was again adjourned to 7-8-1998, then to 4-9-98 subject to costs. It was again adjourned to 17-9-1998 and then to 22-9-98. ( 12 ) THE written statement/reply has not so far been filed. One fails to understand as to why when initially the notice was issued, the Insurance Company was not called upon to file the written statement. For no fault of the claimants from 2-11-1996 to 13-7-1997 the case remained pending. The matter remained pending from 29-9-1997 to 5-3-1998 for want of reply of the Insurance Company to the application under Section 140, despite so many opportunities being granted to it. It is further astonishing that in spite of the fact that the Insurance Company was supplied with the copy of the Cover Note, the reply was filed to the effect that the owner had not intimated about the accident and that the Insurance Company has not been able to find out whether the vehicle in question was insured or not. ( 13 ) THE learned Tribunal while rejecting the application u/s. 140, recorded the finding to the effect that the person has died as a result of the accident. The claim u/s. 140 has been rejected on the ground that the accident occurred due to the fault of the driver. The Tribunal has not cared to read the averments made in the claim application (para 4) in which it has been averred that while the truck was proceeding to its destination and was being driven properly, suddenly because of a dangerous turn and a pit on the way the vehicle met with the accident. To quote :"jab DINANK 29-8-1996 KO INDU KHAN UKT TRUCK KO RATRI SAMAY KHANGAON SE (MAHARASHTRA) MAAL BHAR KAR DELHI LE JA RAHA THA TAB KHANGAON KE PAS BYEPASS T POINT PAR ACHANAK MOD WA GADHHA AA JANE KE KARAN MRITAK INDU KHAN UKTA TRUCK KO SANTULIT NAHIN KAR SAKA THE AUR UKTA TRUCK PALAT GAYA JISKE NEECHE DAB KAR INDU KHAN KA MRITYU HO GAYI. "this fact was not denied by the Insurance Company. ( 14 ) THE Kerala High Court in New India Assurance Co. "this fact was not denied by the Insurance Company. ( 14 ) THE Kerala High Court in New India Assurance Co. Limited v. P. Leela, AIR 1996 Kerala 144 (DB) has held that interim compensation on no fault basis is to be paid where accident is caused due to negligence of driver-cum-owner of vehicle, and the claim for compensation by heirs of said owner is maintainable. Enquiry into question as to whose negligence caused accident is not contemplated by Section 140 of the Act or Rule. ( 15 ) IT is generally noted that where the vehicle is insured the driver and owner conveniently remain absent after service, leaving the entire matter to be contested by the Insurance Company with whom the vehicle is insured. The Tribunal in such circumstances may issue notice for personal appearance of the owner and/or the driver to ascertain at least the factum of insurance, as the owner is obliged to inform the Insurance Company regarding the accident, and may insist production of the document regarding insurance. It the owner of the driver does not furnish the required information inspite of direction, the Tribunal should deal firmly and in suitable cases may impose commensurate costs. ( 16 ) IN this case as has been noted in the foregoing paragraphs the National Insurance Company, prima facie appears that it has also not discharged its duty properly as required. The claimants had mentioned in para 3 of the claim petition the policy number. The Cover Note issued by the National Insurance Company was filed by the claimants, copy of which was also supplied. In spite of that, dates after dates were taken for filing reply, as reflected in the order sheets of the Tribunal from 29-9-1997, 20-10-1997, 12-1-1998, 15-1-1998, 18-2-1998, 26-2-1998 3-3-1998 and on 3-3-1998 the reply filed was to the effect that the owner had not informed the Insurance Company about the accident and the insurance of the vehicle is not traceable. If, inspite of the cover note being supplied, the Insurance Company cannot trace out the insurance who else will be in a position to trace it out? If, inspite of the cover note being supplied, the Insurance Company cannot trace out the insurance who else will be in a position to trace it out? It was only when this Court issued notice for personal appearance of the Divisional Manager/branch Manager on 9-3-1999 to appear in person and to produce the complete record regarding insurance of the vehicle and the claim, if any, preferred by the owner of the vehicle for the damage caused to the vehicle in the accident, that the counsel for the Insurance Company had to state that the vehicle is insured. ( 17 ) THE record of this case shows that the Insurance Company has taken the matter very casually. The Insurance Companies are governed under the Insurance Act. They are doing monopolistic business under the statute. ( 18 ) COUNSEL for the appellants/claimants stated at the bar that they have now received information that the owner had submitted claim for the damage caused to the vehicle long back which has been paid to him, and it is only about the claim by the claimants/appellants that this stand has been taken. If that be so, the matter is serious which may entail serious consequences. ( 19 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case it is directed that the Managing Director of the National Insurance Company would get a thorough probe made and submit a detailed report on all aspects regarding conduct of the Insurance Company in this case within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, keeping in view the provisions of Sections 3-A and 14 and other relevant provisions contained in the Insurance Act 1938. The report shall be submitted to the Registrar of this Court duly supported by an affidavit of the Managing Director of the Company. ( 20 ) SUBJECT to what has been stated above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the Claims Tribunal is set aside, and it is ordered that the respondents shall pay Rs. 50,000/- to the applicants/claimants as interim compensation towards no fault liability together with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum, to be calculated from the date of the application u/s. 140 till realisation. The payment shall be made within one month from today. 50,000/- to the applicants/claimants as interim compensation towards no fault liability together with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum, to be calculated from the date of the application u/s. 140 till realisation. The payment shall be made within one month from today. In case of default of payment of the amount as above, it shall carry penal interest at the rate of 15% per annum. Counsel's fee Rs. 2000/- if certified. ( 21 ) COPY of this order be sent to : (i) the District Judge, Gwalior; (ii) the Presiding Officer of the claims Tribunal, Gwalior, through the Registrar and (iii) the Managing Director, National Insurance Companylimited, 3, Middleton Street, Calcutta, 700 071. Certified copy as per rules. Appeal allowed. .