JUDGMENT Singh J. – 1. This L.P.A, is directed against the judgment passed by learned Single Judge on 28.11.97 in F.A.No. 190/96 whereby the judgment and decree dated 7.8.96 passed by 9th Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge in Hindu Marriage Case No. 833/91, was confirmed. 2. It is not in dispute that on 29. 4.56 the appellant married the respondent at Indore according to Hindu rites and a son named Apurva was born as a result of this wedlock. Since 1963 the spouses are living separately. The respondent wife was living with her son Apurva aged about 39 years at her parents' house. 3. On 11.10.91, the appellant filed petition u/s 13(1)(1-B) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (For short 'the Act') for grant of decree of divorce on the ground that the respondent wife had deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of more than two years. The respondent resisted the case and averred that she never deserted the appellant, on the contrary she was ever willing to cohabit with him. The learned Trial Judge after appreciation of evidence held that the respondent had deserted the appellant but refused decree of divorce under Section 23(1)(d) of the Act on the ground that there has been unnecessary and improper delay in instituting the proceeding. The appellant filed F.A.No. 190/96. It was dismissed by learned Single Juage of this Court. However, he did not agree with the Trial Judge that the respondent had deserted the appellant. He held that it was the appellant who had deserted the respondent in the year 1963. He confirmed the finding of the trial Court that the petition was filed with unnecessary and improper delay. The appellant is challenging this judgment in this L.P.A. 4. Shri Dixit, LC for the appellant, submitted that the first appellate Court committed error in holding that the appellant had deserted the respondent. From the evidence of the appellant it has been proved that the respondent deserted the appellant in the year 1963 and never returned back though the appellant made all efforts to bring her to her matrimonial home, therefore, the appellant is entitled to decree of divorce against the respondent. He further submitted that the learned Single Judge fell in error in holding that the divorce petition was filed with unnecessary and improper delay. He further submitted that the learned Single Judge fell in error in holding that the divorce petition was filed with unnecessary and improper delay. He submitted that when all hopes of returning the respondent to the house of the appellant were lost, he had to file the petition. He, therefore, prays for setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the Courts. On the other hand, Shri Yadav, LC for the respondent, submitted that the appellant himself drove out the respondent from his house in the year 1963. She was ever prepared and still prepared to go to the house of the appellant. 5. We considered the arguments advanced by counsel for both sides and perused the record. As stated above, the Trial Court decided the issue of desertion against the respondent and she did not challenge this finding of the Trial Court by filing cross-objections under order 41 Rule 22, C.P.C. But due to non-filing of cross-objections the appellate Court was not debarred from giving relief to the respondent under Order 41 Rule 33 C.P,C. in appropriate cases. It is quoted below: "R 33. Power of Court of Appeal--The appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection (and may, where there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees): Provided that the Appellate Court shall not make any order under Section 35A, in pursuance of any objection on which the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order." The plain reading of the above provision makes it clear that discretionary powers have been conferred on the appellate Court by this rule to pass such decree or order as ought to have been passed. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in case of Pannalal v. State of Bombay and others, AIR 1963 SC 1516 observed: "The wide wording of O.41 R.33 was intended to empower the appellate Court to make whatever order it thinks fit, not only as between the appellant and the respondent but also as between a respondent and a respondent. It empowers the appellate Court not only to give or refuse relief to the appellant by allowing or dismissing the appeal but also to give such other relief to any of the respondents as "the case may require". If there was no impediment in law the High Court in appeal could, therefore, though allowing the appeal of the defendant-appellant by dismissing the plaintiff s suits against it, give the plaintiff respondent a decree against any or all the other defendants who were parties to the appeal as respondents. While the very words of the rule make this position abundantly clear the illustration puts the position beyond argument. If a party who could have filed a cross-objection under O. 41 R. 22 has not done so it cannot be said that the Appeal Court can under no circumstances give him relief under the provisions of O.41 R. 33." It is settled that the first appellate Court is the final Court of facts and, therefore, it was duty bound to analyse the evidence afresh and give its own conclusion independently. In view of above, the learned Single Judge committed no error in examining evidence and giving finding on the issue of desertion. The argument of Shri Dixit, that the learned Single Judge fell in wrong in not accepting the views of the trial Court and relied the evidence of the respondent and held that the appellant drove out the respondent from their house and deserted her, is without substance. It is true that Trial Court has the benefit of seeing the witnesses, therefore. the appellate Court ought to attach due weight to the assessment of evidence by the trial Court and should not disturb the finding of facts unless it was wrong and not borne out by the evidence and perverse. It is true that Trial Court has the benefit of seeing the witnesses, therefore. the appellate Court ought to attach due weight to the assessment of evidence by the trial Court and should not disturb the finding of facts unless it was wrong and not borne out by the evidence and perverse. In our view, the learned Single Judge kept in mind the above principle and considered the evidence adduced by both parties and found that the learned trial Judge had not taken into consideration the evidence of Dhuliranl (NA W 2) who had supported the statement of respondent Rukmanibai. No doubt, the appellant Rajesh Joshi deposed that when he was transferred to Indore from Ratlam in the year 1961, the respondent came under the influence of her brothers and sisters and left him and went to Kushal Garh with their son. However, on her request she came to Indore in January, 1963 and lived within him for 15-20 days and thereafter again left their house with her brother Kamla Prasad without his permission. His evidence has not been supported by any other witnesses. On the contrary, it stands. falsified by the suggestion given to the respondent that she had left their house in the year 1963 and went with her brother Kamla Prasad. On the other hand, Rukmanibai stated that they lived happily for 5-6 years and thereafter the appellant started beating her and on 1.2.63, he drove her out of their house. She wrote letters to the appellant to take her back. She also sent informations through Dhuliram that she wanted to come to matrimonial home. But he did not come to her parental house nor he sent anyone to take her. She went to him and requested to allow her to live in their house but all was in vain. Dhuliram (NAW 2) supported her evidence. He stated that Rukmanibai told him that the appellant beat her and drove her out of his house. He stated that atleast 15 times he went to the house of the appellant and requested him to keep Rukmanibai with him. Her sister Pushpabai also went to the appellant and made the same request. The appellant admitted that he did not go to the parental house of the respondent to bring her to his house. He stated that atleast 15 times he went to the house of the appellant and requested him to keep Rukmanibai with him. Her sister Pushpabai also went to the appellant and made the same request. The appellant admitted that he did not go to the parental house of the respondent to bring her to his house. He stated that his father had gone there but his statement has not been corroborated by any other evidence nor any suggestion was given to the respondent in this regard. The learned Single Judge after minutely examining the evidence of both the parties disbelieved the statement of the appellant and held the finding of the trial Judge that the respondent had deserted the appellant was perverse as he had completely ignored the evidence of Dhuliram and we agree with him. In view of above, the learned Single Judge rightly held that the appellant drove out the respondent from their house. Her statement could not be disbelieved on the ground that she did not complain about illtreatment given to her by the appellant to her parents or police. She told this fact to Dhuliram who fully supported her statement. It is common knowledge that normally in Indian society women and their parents do not lodge reports to police against their husbands. Also no adverse inference can be drawn against the respondent on the ground that she did not proceed under Section 125 Cr. P.C. for maintenance allowance as she was living with her parents and son Apurva, who is now 39 years of age and must be an earning member. The respondent always showed her willingness to cohabit with him. She made it clear in her written-statement that she wanted to live with him. She also made the same offer before the trial Judge and thereafter before the learned Single Judge. In this Court also she expressed her willingness to go to the appellant and cohabit with him. It is thus clear that the appellant himself drove out the respondent from their house and the learned Judge rightly held that the appellant cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong and dismissed his appeal. 6. Now we shall consider the arguments advanced on the provisions of Section 23 (1)(d) It is quoted below: "23. Decree in proceedings -- (1) In any proceeding under this Act. 6. Now we shall consider the arguments advanced on the provisions of Section 23 (1)(d) It is quoted below: "23. Decree in proceedings -- (1) In any proceeding under this Act. whether defended or not if the Court is satisfied that- (b) where the ground of the petition is the ground speeified in clause (i) of sub-section (1) of Section 13, the petitioner has not in any manner been accessory to or connived at or condoned the act or acts complained of or w here the ground of the petition is cruelty the petitioner has not in any manner condoned the cruelty and (d) there has not be1:n any unnecessary or improper delay in instituting the proceeding and (c) there is no other legal ground why relief should not be granted. Shri Dixit, LC for the appellant, submitted that the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court erred in holding that there has been unnecessary and improper delay in filing the divorce petition. He submitted that the appellant was hoping that time could come when the respondent will realise her mistake and return to their house but when she did not return and all hopes were lost then he had to file this petition. He also submitted that the divorce petition could not be dismissed on the mere ground of delay. From the perusal of Section 23(1) (b)(d) Act. it is clear that unless Court is satisfied that there has not been any unnecessary or improper delay in instituting the proceeding, then and then alone relief can be decreed. There is no dispute as Punjab and Haryana High Court in case of Balvindar Kaur v. Avtar Singh (1985) II D.M.C.26 held that mere delay or long lapse of time in launching of the proceedings by itself is not a bar to the grant of decree under Hindu Marriage Act if it is explained properly. Admittedly, on the case in hand, both spouses are living separately since January, 1963, the appellant filed divorce petition on 8.10.1991, after about 28 years. The appellant did not offer any explanation for this enormous delay in his petition. The above explanation offered during arguments that the appellant waited in the hope that one day good sense would prevail on the respondent and she would return to her matrimonial home, is far from satisfaction and conduct of the appellant, does not support this contention. The appellant did not offer any explanation for this enormous delay in his petition. The above explanation offered during arguments that the appellant waited in the hope that one day good sense would prevail on the respondent and she would return to her matrimonial home, is far from satisfaction and conduct of the appellant, does not support this contention. Had he been waiting for return of the respondent, he would not have turned down the offer of the respondent to keep her in their house. A Division Bench of this Court in case of Gopibai v. Hukumchand (1977 (I) M.P.W.N. 480), held that u/s 23 (1) of the Act the Court should satisfy before proceeding to grant any relief under the Act, that there has not been unnecessary or improper delay in instituting the case and it was, therefore; necessary for the appellant to satisfactorily explain the delay which had taken place in coming to the Court for redressal. In this case there was delay of 6 years only and on this ground this Court refused to grant decree of restitution of conjugal rights. Therefore, in our opinion, both the Courts rightly dismissed the case of the appellant on the ground of unnecessary and improper delay in filing the petition. 7. The argument that there was no possibility of reunion and it is broken marriage, therefore, decree of divorce should be granted is not acceptable The appellant cannot take advantage of his own wrong. Even otherwise, the appellant has crossed the age of 63 years. In view of above, this appeal is without substance and deserves to be dismissed and it is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.