Judgment 1. In this habeas corpus petition the petitioner has impugned the order of detention passed against him on 7.1.1999 by the District Magistrate, Bhojpur under Sec. 12(2) of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981. He has also challenged the order of approval of the said order of detention dated 18.1.1999. 2. The facts of the case are that the petitioner was in judicial custody in connection with a criminal case pending against him on 26.8.1998. However, on the report of the Superintendent of Police, the impugned order of detention dated 7.1.1999 under the Bihar Control of Crimes Act was passed by the detaining authority on being satisfied that it was necessary so to do with a view to preventing the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order and security of life and property of people of that area. It is not disputed before us that the order of detention was served on the same day i.e. 7.1.1999 and the order of detention was also approved by the Government within the prescribed period on 18.1.1999. 3. From the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the detaining authority it appears that the petitioner had submitted a representation to the State Government against his order of detention dated 25.1.1999/27.1.1999. The same was rejected by the Government as is evident from Annexure D dated 26th February, 1999 though the order appears to have been signed on 25.2.1999. 4. Several grounds have been taken against the detention of the petitioner, but it is necessary to refer to only two of them. It is firstly urged on behalf of the petitioner, that the petitioner was already in judicial custody and there was no apprehension of his being released on bail, yet the order of detention was passed. He submitted that neither the order of detention nor the ground of detention nor the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the detaining authority shows that there was any material on the basis of which the detaining authority could be satisfied that the petitioner was likely to be released on bail and on his being so released, was likely, to act in a manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order, etc. 5. 5. On the other hand, Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that in the order of detention itself, the detaining authority has stated that the petitioner was in judicial custody and is trying to come out on bail. This according to him, is sufficient compliance of the law. 6. In our view, the plea of the petitioner is justified. The position in law is well settled and covered by binding precedents of the Supreme Court. We may only refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Binod Singh V/s. District Magistrate, Dhanbad -- . After noticing the earlier decisions of the Court in Rameshwar Shaw V/s. District Magistrate, Burdwan -- and in Ramesh Yadav V/s. District Magistrate, Etah -- , their Lordships have observed that in that case though there was a statement to the effect that the petitioner was in jail and was likely to be enlarged on bail, but on what consideration the opinion was expressed was not indicated. Their Lordships while quashing the order of detention observed thus: It is well settled in our Constitutional frame-work that the power of directing preventive detention given to the appropriate authorities must be exercised in exceptional cases as contemplated by the various provisions of the different statutes dealing with preventive detention and should be used with great deal of circumspection. There must be awareness of the facts necessitating preventive custody of a person for social defence. If a man is in custody and there is no imminent possibility of his being released, the power of preventive detention should not be exercised. In the instant case, when the actual order of detention was served upon the detenu, the detenu was in jail. There is no indication that this factor or the question that the said detenu might be released or that there was such a possibility of his release, was taken into consideration, by the detaining authority properly and seriously before the service of the order. A bald statement is merely an ipso dixit of the officer. If there were cogent materials for thinking that the detenu might be released then these should have been made apparent. A bald statement is merely an ipso dixit of the officer. If there were cogent materials for thinking that the detenu might be released then these should have been made apparent. Eternal vigilance on the part of the authority charged with both law and order and public order is the price which the democracy in this country extracts from the public officials in order to protect the fundamental freedoms of out citizens. In the affidavits on behalf of the detaining authority though there are indications that transfer of the detenu from one prison to another was considered but the need to serve the detention order while he was in custody was not properly considered by the detaining authority in the light of the relevant factors. At least the records of the case do not indicate that. If that is the position, then however disreputable the antecedents of a person might have been, without consideration of all the aforesaid relevant factors, the detenu could not have been put into preventive custody. Therefore, though the order of preventive detention when it was passed was not invalid and on relevant considerations the service of the order was not on proper consideration. 7. We find that in the instant case as well, apart from stating that the petitioner was trying to come out on bail, there is no reference to any cogent material for thinking that the detenu might be released, and in any event such material has not been made apparent. On this ground alone, the detention order has to be quashed. 8. There is yet another ground why further detention of the petitioner cannot be permitted. It is not disputed before us that the petitioner had submitted a representation dated 25.1.1999/27.1.1999. The said representation was rejected on 26th February, 1999 by order (Annexure-D). It thus appears that the State Government took almost one month to dispose of the representation. No explanation whatsoever has been offered for such delay in disposal of his representation. It has been emphasized by the Supreme Court in a number of cases that the right of the detenu to make a representation under Article 22 of the Constitution of India at the earliest enjoins upon the Government the obligation to dispose of the representation without delay. See -- . It has been emphasized by the Supreme Court in a number of cases that the right of the detenu to make a representation under Article 22 of the Constitution of India at the earliest enjoins upon the Government the obligation to dispose of the representation without delay. See -- . So far as the State of Bihar is concerned, it appears to us that all representations are kept pending till the opinion of the Advisory Board is obtained and thereafter, orders are passed on the representation. This has been noticed in some earlier writ petitions disposed of by this Court. 9. In the instant case, we find that the Advisory Board gave its opinion that there was sufficient ground for the detention of the petitioner. Thereafter on the 25th February, 1999 the detention of the petitioner was confirmed under Sec. 21(1) read with Sec. 22 of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981. On the following day, the order rejecting the representation was passed. 10. The Supreme Court in a catena of decisions has emphasized the seriousness and promptitude with which such a representation has to be disposed of. Those decisions also notice that the safeguards provided under the law authorising detention are distinct and separate from the constitutional right of the petitioner to prefer a representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. If the State fails to disclose a satisfactory reason for the delay in disposal of the representation, the further detention of the detenu cannot be permitted. We have considered the decisions of the Supreme Court on this question in a recent decision of this Court in Cr.W.J.C. No. 105 of 1999, disposed of on 15.4.1999. This is the second ground on which the further detention of the petitioner is impermissible. 11. Under these circumstances, the writ petition is allowed and the order of detention dated 7.1.1999, the order of approval of detention dated 18.1.1999 as also the order of confirmation of detention dated 25th February, 1999 are quashed. The petitioner is directed to be set at liberty forthwith, unless required to be detained in any other case.