Judgment :- K.K. Usha, J. The question that has been referred for consideration of this Bench is whether Civil Revision Petitions are maintainable against orders passed by the appellate court in Election Petitions under the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 and Kerala Municipalities Act, 1994. A learned judge of this Court, mSaraswati v. Kamala, 1997 (1) KLT 855, has taken the view that a revision petition under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is maintainable from the decision of the District Court in an appeal filed under S.113 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act against an order passed by the Munsiff s Court in the Election Petition. C.R.P. Nos. 227/98, 619/98, 843/98,1190/97,1942/97 & 815/98 arise out of orders passed by the District Court in appeals from orders of the Munsiff s Court in Election Petitions filed under the Kerala Municipalities Act, 1994. Petitioner in C.R.P. 1942/97 originally filed O.P. 6074/97 challenging the very same appellate order, but, apprehending that an Original Petition may not be maintainable, later, he filed the revision petition. C.R.P.Nos.756/98,1910/97,2233/97,1263/97,1864/98&2243/98 are petitions filed challenging the orders passed by the District Court in appeals against orders passed by the Munsiff's Court in Election Petitions filed under the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994. A learned Single Judge, before whom C.R.P. Nos. 619/98,227/98,843/98,756/98,1910/97 & 2233/97 came up for hearing referred the matter under a common order dated 14.7.1998 for consideration of the question of maintainability of the revision petition under S.115 of C.P.C. by aLarger Bench. Learned Single Judge doubted the correctness of the decision reported in 1997 (1) KLT 855 supra and took the view that the decision requires reconsideration. In the reference order, the learned judge has referred to another decision of this Court in Leelav. Pushpam, 1996 (2) KLT 350. The question which arose in that case was whether Civil Revision Petitions are maintainable against interim orders passed in Election Petitions filed under S.87 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994. The learned Single Judge took the view that the Munsiff s Court, while deciding the case under Ss.87 and 88 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act is not acting as a civil court and therefore no revision will lie under S.115 of Code of Civil Procedure from the interim orders passed in Election Petitions from which no appeal is provided under the act. referance was also made to several provisions of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 and Kerala Municipalities Act, 1994 and also the relevant constitutional provisions, in the reference order. It is under these circumstances, the question regarding maintainability of these revision petitions under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, challenging appellate orders in Election Petitions filed under the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 and Kerala Municipalities Act, 1994 came up for consideration before this Bench. Since the question referred is only a question of law, we are not referring to the factual details in any one of the cases. 3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the revision-petitioners, except in C.R.P. 2243/98 contended for the position that Civil Revision Petition is maintainable. Learned counsel for the petitioner in C.R.P. 224 3/98 contended that the petitioner was compelled to file the revision petition only for the reason that the Original Petition filed by him as O.P. 7077/97 was dismissed by a learned Single Judge by judgment dated. 9.10.1998 holding that the Original Petition is not maintainable. It was pursuant thereto, he filed the revision petition. Learned counsel submits that still the revision petitioner would like to contend that the remedy is not under S.115 of the C.P.C., but an Original Petition under Arts.226 & 227 of the Constitution. Learned counsel for the respondents in all other revision petitions, supported the above contention. 4. O.P. 7077/97 was dismissed by a learned Single Judge holding that the remedy is a revision petition and not Original Petition, after the common reference order was passed by another learned Single Judge in C.R.P. 619/98 and connected cases. But, in the above judgment, no reference is seen made to 1997 (1) KLT 855 supra or to the fact of a learned Single Judge having referred the matter for consideration by a Larger Bench. All revision petitions, except those which were referred under the common order dt. 14.7.1998 are referred to Larger Bench under separate orders, in view of the reference already made. 5. We will first refer to the provisions of the Constitution of India which are relevant for consideration of the question referred. All revision petitions, except those which were referred under the common order dt. 14.7.1998 are referred to Larger Bench under separate orders, in view of the reference already made. 5. We will first refer to the provisions of the Constitution of India which are relevant for consideration of the question referred. Art.243-0 provides for restriction of interference by Courts in electoral matters relating to Panchayaths in the following manner: "243-0:- Bar to interference by Courts in electoral matters:- Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, (a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, made or purporting to be made under Art.243-K, shall not be called in question in any Court; (b) no election to any Panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State." Parallel provision in relation to election to the Corporations and Municipalities as contained in Art.243-ZG reads as follows: "243-ZG. Bar to interference by Courts in electoral matters:- Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, (a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, made or purporting to be made under Art.243-ZA shall not be called in question in any Court; (b) no election to any Municipality shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by the legislature of a State." The above provisions are more or less similar to those contained in Art.329 in relation to election to the House of Parliament or to the House of Legislature of a State. Art.329 reads as follows: "329. Art.329 reads as follows: "329. Bar to interference by Courts in electoral matters:- Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, (a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, made or purporting to be made under Art.327 or Art.328, shaft not be called in question in any Court; (b) no election to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the Legislature of a State shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature." 6. A reading of Arts.243-0 and 243-ZG would show that the jurisdiction of Court is taken away in toto in relation to matters coming under cl. (a) of Art.243-0 and 243-ZG. Restriction imposed by cl.(b)is only to the effect that election to the Panchayat can be called in question only before an authority and in such manner provided for by or under a law made by the Legislature of a State. We are unable to give an interpretation as sought to be given by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents in these revision petitions, including learned counsel for the petitioner in C.R.P. 2243/98 that the provisions under cl. (b) of Art.243-0 has to be understood as a total prohibition for any civil court to entertain an appeal from an order in Election Petition. The procedure and the authority to decide an Election Petition are to be provided by law made by the Legislature of the State. Similar is the scope of cl.(b) in Art.243-ZG. It may be open to the Legislature of the State to bring a law by which a civil court is not permitted to entertain an appeal from an order in an election petition at all. There is no contention raised in these cases that there is any such specific prohibition provided under the provisions of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 or Kerala Municipalities Act, 1994. There is no contention raised in these cases that there is any such specific prohibition provided under the provisions of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 or Kerala Municipalities Act, 1994. The contention raised is that the District Court to which appeals are provided from the order passed by the Munsiff s Court under S.113 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 and Kerala Municipalities Act, 1994, are not civil courts and therefore orders passed by District Court on an appeal under Ss.113 & 189 of the respective Acts are not revisable under S.115 of C.P.C. before the High Court. Therefore, we are of the view that the question whether the District Courts, while functioning as an appellate authority under these enactment's, are functioning as civil courts or not has to be examined in the light of the provisions of the Kerala Panchay at Raj Act, 1994 and Kerala Municipalities Act, 1994. 7. Dehors the provisions contained under these enactments, there is no constitutional prohibition for a civil court to entertain an appeal from an order in an Election Petition as contended by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the revision petitioner in C.R.P. 2243/98. 8. We will no w refer to the relevant provisions under the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act and Kerala Municipalities Act, 1994. S.87 in Chap. X of the the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 provides that no election shall be called in question except by an Election Petition presented in accordance with the provisions of Chap. X. S.88 deals with the Court competent to try Election Petitions. It reads as follows: "88. The Court competent to try Election Petitions:- The Court having jurisdiction to try an Election Petition shall be, (a) in the case of a village panchayat, the Munsiff s Court having jurisdiction over the place in which the headquarters of the panchayat is located, and (b) in the case of a block panchayat or District panchayat, the District Court having jurisdiction over the place in which the headquarters of the panchayat is located. (2) The Government shall, in consultation with the High Court, notify the appropriate Courts in the Gazette." If Section 113 deals with Appeals. It reads as follows : "113. (2) The Government shall, in consultation with the High Court, notify the appropriate Courts in the Gazette." If Section 113 deals with Appeals. It reads as follows : "113. Appeals: (1) Any person aggrieved by an order made by the Court under S.100 or S.101, may prefer an appeal, on any question of law or of fact, (a) before the District Court on the decision of the Munsiff s Court; and (b) before the High Court on the decision of the District Court; (c) the Government shall, in consultation with the High Court, notify the appropriate courts in the Gazette. (2) Every appeal under this Section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the order of the Court under S.100 or S.101: Provided that the Appellate Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days, if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period. 9. Ss.94 and 114 provide that subject to the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder, every election petition shall be tried by the Court and appeal may be disposed of by the District Court or the High Court in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure. S.114 further provides that decision of the Court in appeal shall be final. 10. As far as Kerala Municipalities Act, 1994 is concerned, S.163 in Chap.X provides that no election shall be called in question except by an Election Petition presented in accordance with the provisions of Chap. X. S.164 mandates that the Munsiff s Court having jurisdiction over the place in which the office of the Municipality is located shall have jurisdiction to try an election petition. S.189 provides for appeals. It reads as follows: "189. Appeals : (1) Any person aggrieved by an order made by the Court under S.176 or S.177, may prefer an appeal to the District Court on any question whether of law or of fact. S.189 provides for appeals. It reads as follows: "189. Appeals : (1) Any person aggrieved by an order made by the Court under S.176 or S.177, may prefer an appeal to the District Court on any question whether of law or of fact. (2) Every appeal under this Section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the order of the Court under S.176 or S.177: Provided that the District Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days, if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period." 11. Ss.170 and 190 contain provisions regarding the procedure to be followed by the Munsiff s Court and the District Court respectively. It is stated that subject to the provisions of this Act and or any Rules made thereunder, every Election Petition shall be tried by the Court and appeal may be disposed of by the District Court in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure. S.190 further provides that the decision of the District Court in appeal shall be final. 12. Now we will consider the contentions raised by the revision petitioners except the revision petitioner in C.R.P. 2243/98. According to the revision petitioners, the provision in S.114 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act and S.190 of the Kerala Municipalities Act that the decision of the District Court in appeal shall be final, cannot stand in the way of maintaining a revision before the High Court under S.115 of the CPC. They contend that the District Court while hearing an appeal, is functioning as a civil court and not as a persona designata and therefore its judgments are subject to revision by this Court. Reference was made to Ss.22 and 24 of the Kerala Panchayat Act, 1960 and R.4 of the Kerala Panchayats (decision of Election Disputes) Rules, 1963 issued under the above Act. S.22 provided that an application challenging the validity of election can be filed before the Munsiff. S.22(6) states that the term 'Munsiff' for the purpose of Ss.22 and 24 shall mean Munsiff having jurisdiction over the area in the Panchayat and in the case of a Panchayat area comprised within the jurisdiction of more than one Munsiff, such Munsiff as may be authorised by the District Judge having jurisdiction over the area. S.22(6) states that the term 'Munsiff' for the purpose of Ss.22 and 24 shall mean Munsiff having jurisdiction over the area in the Panchayat and in the case of a Panchayat area comprised within the jurisdiction of more than one Munsiff, such Munsiff as may be authorised by the District Judge having jurisdiction over the area. S.24(1)(d) states that in the event of a dispute arising as to the validity of the election of the President or Vice-President, the dispute shall, in the prescribed manner, be referred to the Munsiff for decision and such decision shall be final. R.4 provides that a Munsiff exercising jurisdiction under Ss.22 and 24 of the Act and the Rules, shall be deemed to exercise such jurisdiction as persona designata and not in his capacity as a Munsiff of the Court over which he presides. It is pointed out by learned counsel for the revision petitioners that a similar provision is significantly absent both in the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act and Kerala Municipalities Act, 1994. 13. The District Court is a civil court subordinate to the High Court and therefore a revision under S.115 of the C.P.C. will be maintainable from the order in appeal before the District Court, since there is no specific provision in the above-mentioned two enactments barring the remedy of revision. Is the contention of the petitioners. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the revision petitioners and the respondents on a number of decisions of this Court as well as the Supreme Court. 14. S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears to have exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law or to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested or to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity and the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit. In Major S.S. Khanna v. Brig. F.J. Dillon, AIR 1964 SC 497, Supreme Court had occasion to consider the scope of the expression 'case' used in the above mentioned Section. In Major S.S. Khanna v. Brig. F.J. Dillon, AIR 1964 SC 497, Supreme Court had occasion to consider the scope of the expression 'case' used in the above mentioned Section. It was observed that the expression 'case' is undoubtedly not restricted to a litigation in the nature of a suit in a civil court. It includes a proceeding in a civil court in which the jurisdiction of the civil court is invoked for the determination of some claim or right legally enforceable. In Chhagan Laly. The Municipal Corporation, Indore, AIR 1977 SC 1555, the question that came up for consideration was whether the decision of the District Court under S.149 of the M.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, when a dispute arose as to the liability of any land or building to assessment, can be challenged in a revision under S.115 of C.P.C. before the High Court in view of sub-s.(1) of S.149 which provides that the decision of the District Court shall be final. The Original order was that of the Commissioner. Supreme Court took the view that under S.115 of CPC, High Court has got a power to revise the order passed by Courts subordinate to it. Since it cannot be disputed that District Court is a subordinate Court, its order is subject to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. 15. In Shyam Sunder Agarwal & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 1321, Supreme Court had occasion to consider the question regarding re visional jurisdiction of the High Court, viz-a-viz the pro visions of Arbitration Act, (10of 1940). It was held that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the Code or under any other statute shall not stand superseded under the Arbitration Act, if the Act does not contain any express bar against exercise of revisional power by the High Court provided exercise of such revisional power does not mitigate against giving effect to the provisions of the Arbitration Act. Even if a special statute expressly attaches finality to an appellate order passed under that statute, it was held by the Supreme Court that such provision of finality will not take away revisional powers of the High Court under S.115 of the C.P.C. Reference was made in this decision to AIR 1977 SC 1555 supra. 16. Even if a special statute expressly attaches finality to an appellate order passed under that statute, it was held by the Supreme Court that such provision of finality will not take away revisional powers of the High Court under S.115 of the C.P.C. Reference was made in this decision to AIR 1977 SC 1555 supra. 16. In Surendranathan Nair v. Senior Divisional Personnel Officer, 1987 (2) KLT 476, a learned Single judge of this Court considered the question whether a decision of an appellate authority under S.17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1939 is revisable under S.115 of CPC by this Court. S.17 provided for an appeal from the order passed by the payment of wages authority under S.15 of the Payment of Wages Act. Appellate authority is the Court of Small Causes in a Presidency town and the District Court in other areas. S.17(2) states that subject to appeal under S.17(1), the decision of Payment of Wages authority under S.15 shall be final. The question that arose for consideration was whether, in spite of the finality provided under S.17(2), a revision will lie u/S.115 of CPC before the High Court from an order passed by the Appellate authority u/S.17(1). Learned Judge, following a Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Hindustan Journals v. Govindan, 1962 (2) LLJ 242 and an earlier decision of this Court in Varghese & Ors. v. Carmal Coir Works (1964 KLT 616) took the view that a District Court is not functioning as a persona designata under S.17(1) and therefore revision would lie u/S.115 of the Code from its order in the appeal. 17. InVarkeyAbrahamv. District Judge,1994(1)KLT580,thisCourtconsidered the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the District Judge u/S.61D of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961. It was held that the.District Judge functions as a civil court while considering an appeal u/S.61D and therefore, the judgment rendered in the appeal by the District Court cannot be challenged under Art.226 of the Constitution. There is an elaborate consideration of the effect 6f provision giving finality of the order of the District Court on maintainability of a revision petition before this Court u/S.115 of CPC in K.S.E.B. v. Cheriyan Varghese, 1989 (1) KLT 451. The question arose under the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. There is an elaborate consideration of the effect 6f provision giving finality of the order of the District Court on maintainability of a revision petition before this Court u/S.115 of CPC in K.S.E.B. v. Cheriyan Varghese, 1989 (1) KLT 451. The question arose under the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. Orders were passed by the District Court under S.16(3)of the above Act, determining compensation payable to the claimants on applications made by them u/S.16(3) of the above Act read with S.51 of the Electricity Act, 1910. The applications were allowed. Aggrieved by the above, Kerala State Electricity Board filed revision petitions before this Court. A preliminary objection was raised as to the maintainability of the revision petition. After considering elaborately the case law on the revisional power of the High Court under S.115 of CPC from orders passed by District Court pursuant to provisions contained under the special statutes, the Division Bench took the view that revision u/S.115 is maintainable against the decision of the District judge under sub-ss.(3) or (4) of S.16 of the Telegraph Act. There is a useful discussion on the two decisions of the Supreme Court arising from the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act and the third one from the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961. We are in full agreement with the view taken by the learned judges in their separate judgments on the scope of the above three decisions. 18. In Abdal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai,1987(1) KLT 53, the question that came up for consideration was whether a second revision before this Court is maintainable in view of the provisions contained u/S.18(5) of the Act. It was provided u/S.18(5) that the decision of the Appellate Authority and subject to such decision, order of the Rent Control Court shall be final and shall not be liable to the called in question in any Court of law, except as provided in S.20. Under S.20, revisional authority is the District Court where the Appellate Authority is a Subordinate Judge and the High Court in all other cases. Under S.20, revisional authority is the District Court where the Appellate Authority is a Subordinate Judge and the High Court in all other cases. Supreme Court held that from an order passed by the District Court as a revisional authority, no further revision would lie to the High Court u/S.115 of the CPC In Shyamaraju Hedge v. Venkatesha Bhat,1987 (2) KLT 977, Supreme Court had to consider the question whether a revision application is maintainable u/S.115 of CPC read with S.50(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, when a District Judge has made an order in his revisional jurisdiction u/S.50(2) of the Act. The relevant pro visions of Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 are as follows: "S.48(6). An order of the Court or the Controller shall, subject to the decision of the District Judge or the High Court under S.50 or of the relevant appellate authority under this Act, be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law whether in a suit or other proceeding or by way of appeal or revision. S.50(2). The District Judge may, at any time, call for and examine any order passed or proceeding taken by the Court of Munsiff referred to in sub-cl. (Hi) of Cl. (d) of S.3 for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or correctness of such order in reference thereto as he thinks fit. The order of the District Judge shall be final." A Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court, in Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar v. Gurupad Shivram Kavalekar,EJR (1978) 2 Kant. 1585 had taken the view that a revision u/S.115 of CPC would lie to the High Court. Later, another Full Bench of the same High Court took a contra view in MM. Yaragatti v. Vasant, AIR 1987 Kar 186. According to the later Full Bench, after Supreme Court rendered Visesh Kumar's case (Visesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, (AIR 1980 SC 892) and Aundal Animal's case (1987 (1) KLT 5 3) the earlier Full Bench cannot be taken as good law. In Shyamaraju Hedge's case, 1987 (2) KLT 977, Supreme Court had to consider appeal from the judgment of a learned Single of Karnataka High Court dismissing a revision petition as not maintainable following AIR 1987 Kar.186 supra. After referring to its own decision in Krishnadas Bhatija v. A.S. Venkatachaia Shetty (dead) by LRs., (Special Leave Petn. In Shyamaraju Hedge's case, 1987 (2) KLT 977, Supreme Court had to consider appeal from the judgment of a learned Single of Karnataka High Court dismissing a revision petition as not maintainable following AIR 1987 Kar.186 supra. After referring to its own decision in Krishnadas Bhatija v. A.S. Venkatachaia Shetty (dead) by LRs., (Special Leave Petn. No. 913 of 1978 dated 13th February, 1978), which was relied on by the earlier Full Bench in Krishnaji's case .ILR. (1978) 2 Kant. 1585, Supreme Court held that the Full Bench decision in Krishna 'sense cannot be taken as over-ruled by the Supreme Court. InKrishnaji'sc&se, a three Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Chhagan Lalv. The Municipal Corporation, Indore, AIR 1977SC 1555 had been relied on. It was observed that in Aundal Ammal's case, if Supreme Court really intended to nullify the effect of the Full Bench decision in Krishnaji's case, one would have expected reference to AIR 1977 SC 1555 as also Krishnaji 's case. It was noted that Venkataramiah, J. , as he then was, was party to the Full Bench decision in Krishnaji' s case and he was also one of the members of the two Judges' Bench which rendered file judgment in Aundal Ammal's case. The effect of the judgment in Shyamaraju Hedge's case is that Awn dal Ammal 's case had to be understood in the light of the pro visions contained in the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act. So also, Visesh Kumar's case has to be understood in the facts of that case. 19. The question whether a second revision is maintainable under S.115 of CPC. against an order in revision passed under S.20 by the District Court, came up again for consideration in M/s. Jetha Bai 20. We find merit in the contention raised on behalf of the revision petitioners that in the nature of the pro visions contained under the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act and Kerala Municipalities Act, 1994, the dictum laid down in Aundal Animal's case or Visesh Kumar's case cannot be applied. On the other hand, the principle evolved in.MR 1977 SC 1555 and Krishnadas Bhatija's case (Special Leave Petition No. 913/78) by the Supreme Court is to be applied here. On the other hand, the principle evolved in.MR 1977 SC 1555 and Krishnadas Bhatija's case (Special Leave Petition No. 913/78) by the Supreme Court is to be applied here. In Ram Chandra Aggarwal & Ann v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ann, AIR 1966 SC 1888, it was held by the Supreme Court that the provisions of CPC would apply generally to a proceeding before a civil court arising out of a reference to it by a Magistrate under S.146(1) of the Criminal P.C. A proceeding before a civil court arising out of such reference can be transferred by the District Court u/S.24 of CPC. 21. In The Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivai; drum v, T. P. Kunhaliumma, AIR 1977 SC 282, Supreme Court considered the nature ; jurisdiction exercised by District Judge u/S.16(3) of the Telegraph Act. It was held that the provisions in the Telegraph Act which contemplated determination by the District judge on payment of compensation payable u/S.10 of the Act, indicate that the District Judge acts judicially as a court and that the District Judge under the Telegraph Act acts as a civil court in dealing with applications u/S.16 of the Telegraph Act. Where, by statutes, matters are referred for determination by a Court of Record with no further provision the necessary implication is that the Court will determine the matters as a court. 22. Relying on decisions of the Supreme Court in N.P. Ponnuswami v. The Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, Namakkal, Salem Dist., & Ors., AIR 1952 SC 64, Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh & Ors., AIR 1954 SC 520 and/fan Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque & Ors., AIR 1955 SC 233, it was contended by learned counsel for the respondents and also the petitioner in C.R.P. 2243/98 that the right to vote or to stand as a candidate for election is not a civil right, but creature of statute or special law and must be subject to the limitations imposed by it. Therefore, according to learned counsel, the remedy provided u/S.115 of CPC is not applicable to such proceedings. 23. We do not find any merit in this contention. Therefore, according to learned counsel, the remedy provided u/S.115 of CPC is not applicable to such proceedings. 23. We do not find any merit in this contention. In AIR 1952 SC 64, it was held by the Supreme Court that the word 'election' in Art.329(b) was used in a comprehensive sense as including the entire process of election commencing with the issue of a notification and terminating with the declaration of election of a candidate, and that an application under Art.226 challenging the validity of any of the acts forming part of that process could be barred. These are instances of original proceedings calling in question an election, and would be within the prohibition enacted in Art.329(b). 24. In AIR 1954 SC 520, the contention raised was that Supreme Court could not entertain an appeal against the decision of an Election Tribunal under Art.136 of the Constitution, as that would be a proceeding in which an election is called in question, and that it could be done only before a Tribunal as provided in Art.329(b). While overruling this contention, Mukherjee, J. observed: "The vnon-obstante' clause with which Art.329 of the Constitution begins and upon which the respondent's counsel lays so much stress, debars us, as it debars any other Court in the land, to entertain a suit or a proceeding calling in question any election to the Parliament or the State Legislature. It is the Election Tribunal alone that can decide such disputes and the proceeding has to be initiated by an election petition and in such manner as may be provided by a statute. But, once that Tribunal has made any determination or adjudication on the matter, the powers of this Court to interfere by way of special leave can always be exercised." 25. In AIR 1955 SC 233, the question that came up for consideration was whether High Courts have jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution to issue writs against decisions of Election Tribunals. Relying on the provisions contained in Art.329(b), it was contended that High Court's jurisdiction under Art.226 is also limited. Rejecting the above contention, Supreme Court held as follows: "Now, the question is whether a writ is a proceeding in which an election can properly be said to be called in question within the meaning of Art.329(b). Relying on the provisions contained in Art.329(b), it was contended that High Court's jurisdiction under Art.226 is also limited. Rejecting the above contention, Supreme Court held as follows: "Now, the question is whether a writ is a proceeding in which an election can properly be said to be called in question within the meaning of Art.329(b). On a plain reading of the Article, what is prohibited therein is the 'initiation' of proceedings for setting aside an election otherwise than by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as provided therein. A suit for setting aside an election would be barred under this provision But, when once proceedings have been instituted in accordance with Art.329(b) by presentation of an election petition, the requirements of that Article are fully satisfied. Thereafter, when the election petition is in due course heard by a Tribunal and decided, whether its decision is open to attack, and if so, where and to what extent, must be determined by the general law applicable to decisions of Tribunals." 26. Reliance was also placed on a later decision of the Supreme Court in The Election Commission of India v. Shivaji & Ors., AIR 1988 SC 61. It was a case where a challenge was made under Art.226 of the Constitution against the notification fixing the calendar of events for the purpose of holding elections to legislative council from certain local authorities constituency. Following its earlier decision in AIR 1952 SC 64 supra, Inderjit Barua v. Election Commission of India, AIR 1984 SC 1911 and Lakshmi Charan Sen v. A. KM. Hassan Uzzaman, AIR 1985 SC 1233, it was held that in view of the provisions contained under Art.329 of the Constitution, the High Court has no power to entertain such a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution. This decision is also of no help to the respondents, since, the facts of the present cases are different. 27. Therefore, we find no merit in the contention that a revision under S.115 of C.P.C. will be barred under Art.243(b) or Art.243-ZG of the Constitution. Once the District Court renders its judgment on the appeal, the aggrieved party can resort to the remedy under S.115 of CPC., which is a remedy available under general law applicable to the decisions of a Court subordinate to High Court. Once the District Court renders its judgment on the appeal, the aggrieved party can resort to the remedy under S.115 of CPC., which is a remedy available under general law applicable to the decisions of a Court subordinate to High Court. In the result, we hold that a civil revision petition under S.115 of CPC is maintainable before this Court against the order passed by the Appellate Authority, namely, the District Court on appeals filed under S.113 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 or under S.189 of the Kerala Municipalities Act, 1994. Since the question referred for consideration of the Division Bench was only the maintainability of the revision petitions, the revision petitions and Original Petition are sent back to the appropriate Court for being considered on merits.