JUDGMENT - Dr. PARATIBHA UPASANI, J.:---This Chamber Summons is taken out by the applicants, namely, the State of Maharashtra, praying inter alia that the applicants be given priority over all other creditors of Konkan Chemicals Pvt. Ltd., a private limited Company which is arraigned as defendant No. 1 in the suit filed by the Bank of Maharashtra against defendant No. 1 and other defendants, and necessary direction in this regard be given to the Court Receiver, High Court. In the alternative, it is prayed that this Court be pleased to permit the applicants to lodge a claim with the Receiver in respect of the arrears of sales tax dues and the Receiver be directed by the Court to decide and consider the claim and the priority of the applicants over the claims of the plaintiff. It is also prayed that the Court Receiver appointed by this Court on 18th March, 1992 and 18th June, 1992 be directed to sell the property in his possession belonging to the 1st defendant viz., Konkan Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. with notice of the said auction sale to the applicants herein. 2. This suit is filed by the plaintiff Bank against the defendants for declaration that the defendants are jointly and severally liable to pay to the plaintiff, a sum of Rs. 71,64,549.63 as per particulars of claim Exhibit-I annexed to the plaint with interest thereon at the rate of 25% per annum with quarterly rests from the date of the filing of the suit till payment or realisation. Other consequential prayers are also sought. It appears from the proceedings that Court Receiver came to be appointed by Mr. Dhanuka, J., by his order dated 18th March, 1992 with respect to the mortgaged property described in Exhibit-D to the plaint and of the hypothecated goods mentioned in Exhibit-B to the plaint with all powers under Order 40, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, excluding the power of sale. Thereafter, it appears that decree on admission as against the 1st defendant, in terms of the Minutes by and between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant came to be passed on 18th June, 1992 (Coram : Mr. Jhunjhnuwala, J.,). Suit was kept pending as against other defendants. 3. Thereafter, it appears that decree on admission as against the 1st defendant, in terms of the Minutes by and between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant came to be passed on 18th June, 1992 (Coram : Mr. Jhunjhnuwala, J.,). Suit was kept pending as against other defendants. 3. In the affidavit in support of the present Chamber Summons, the applicants have stated that defendant No. 1 Company was registered under the Bombay Sales Tax Act and the Central Sales Tax Act and was assessed to Sales Tax for the period from 1-5-1986 to 30-4-1987, 1-4-1989 to 31-3-1990, 1-4-1990 to 31-3-1991 and 1-4-1991 to 31-3-1992 and the assessment Order pertaining to the said period was accordingly passed by the Sales Tax Officer, Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax Assessment. Exhibit-3 annexed to the affidavit in support of the Chamber Summons is the total outstanding dues in the case of defendant No. 1, in view of the assessment orders passed for the relevant period under the Bombay Sales Tax Act and Central Sales Tax Act. It is submitted that the total arrears of Sales Tax dues from defendant No. 1 for assessment for the above stated period is Rs. 69,58,171/-. It is further submitted that the demand notices were issued demanding the arrears of the Sales Tax dues for each of the assessment period and the said demand notices were duly served on defendant No. 1. Thereafter, the applicants tried to take action under section 39 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act and notice was issued under section 39 of the said Act to defendant No. 1 for recovery of the arrears of Sales Tax dues. Thereafter, notice under section 178 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code was also issued against defendant No. 1 for recovery of arrears of Sales Tax dues. Thereafter, order of attachment was also issued in respect of the office premises situated at G-1/Court, Chambers, New Marine Lines, Mumbai-400 020 and the said notice was served by the Inspector, who visited the office, of defendant No. 1 at those premises. In view of the appointment of Court Receiver, the factory of defendant No. 1 at Badlapur could not be attached. In view of the appointment of Court Receiver, the factory of defendant No. 1 at Badlapur could not be attached. The Sales Tax Department learnt that the plaintiff Bank viz., Bank of Maharashtra had filed suit against defendant No. 1 being Suit No. 782 of 1992 and had obtained orders dated 18th March, 1992 and 18th June, 1992, whereby Court Receiver was appointed Receiver of the factory premises at Badlapur of defendant No. 1. The applicants made an application to the Court Receiver for furnishing copies of the orders and other relevant documents. However, they were not furnished by the Court Receiver stating that, that could not be done since the applicants were not parties to the suit. Thereafter, the applicants made similar application to the Prothonotary Senior Master for taking inspection of the proceedings of the suit and thereafter the applicants came to know that the Court Receiver had fixed auction sale of the said factory premises on 16th September, 1998. The prayer of the applicants is that the Receiver be directed by this Court to sell the property of defendant No. 1, which is in his possession, after giving notice to the applicants and to distribute the sale proceeds realised from the sale after deciding and determining the priorities of claims of the applicants and the plaintiff. The applicants have prayed that they be permitted to lodge their claim of Sales Tax dues with the Receiver and the Receiver be directed to decide the same as per the provisions of law and if the Receiver has already sold the property, then he may be directed to pay to the plaintiff as secured creditor and to pay the remaining balance of the sale proceeds lying with the Receiver to the applicants towards the arrears of Sales Tax dues payable by defendant No. 1 Company. 4. Mr. Sawant, learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the applicants submitted that the Government of Maharashtra has issued Ordinance of 6th February, 1999, which was published in the Maharashtra Government Gazette dated 16th February, 1999, for the purpose of amending certain Tax Laws in operation in the State of Maharashtra. He drew attention of the Court to section 9, which can be reproduced as below: "9. Insertion of section 38-C in Bom. He drew attention of the Court to section 9, which can be reproduced as below: "9. Insertion of section 38-C in Bom. LI of 1959.---After section 38-B of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, the following section shall be inserted, namely:-- "38-C. Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract to the contrary but subject to any provision regarding first charge in any Central Act for the time being in force, any amount of tax, penalty, interest or any other sum, payable by a dealer or any other person under this Act, shall be the first charge on the property of the dealer, or, as the case may be, person." 5. Relying upon the above mentioned section 9 of the Maharashtra Ordinance No. II of 1999, the learned Advocate General argued that State has the first charge over the property of defendant No. 1. He submitted that section 9 creates a first charge on the property of defendant No. 1 which clearly gives priority to the statutory charge over all other charges on the property including a mortgage. He submitted that the charges operate on the entire property of defendant No. 1 including the interest of the mortgagee therein. The learned Advocate General heavily relied upon (State Bank of Bikaner Jaipur v. National Iron Steel Rolling Corporation and others)1, reported in 1996 Bank.J.(S.C.)36 to substantiate his arguments. 6. In the above mentioned Supreme Court case, the appellant, namely, State Bank of Bikaner Jaipur had given cash credit facilities to respondent No. 1, National Iron and Steel Rolling Corporation. Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 were the partners of respondent No. 1. As a security for repayment of the amounts advanced to respondent No. 1 by the appellant-bank, respondent No. 1 created a mortgage of their factory premises situated at Industrial Area, Bharatpur by a Deed of Mortgage dated 18-10-1997. They had also, by a Letter of Promise dated 10-6-1981, pledged the plant and machinery installed in the said premises to the bank as a security for the said advances. There was also an agreement for the pledge of movables dated 7-1-1980 executed by the first respondent in favour of the appellant-bank. While the suit filed by the appellant-bank against the respondents was pending, the Commercial Taxes Officer, Bharatpur got himself impleaded in the suit on the ground that he had a prior claim for the recovery of a sum of Rs. While the suit filed by the appellant-bank against the respondents was pending, the Commercial Taxes Officer, Bharatpur got himself impleaded in the suit on the ground that he had a prior claim for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 1,19,122/- as sales tax dues from respondent No. 1 and was entitled to realise it by sale of the mortgaged property. The said property which was the subject matter of the mortgage had been sold by auction under the orders of the Court for a sum of Rs. 4,02,000/- to one Smt. Kamlesh Goel. Under the orders of the Court, the sale proceeds were deposited in the Court. The claim of the Commercial Taxes Officer was accepted by the trial Court. The revision petition of the appellant-bank was dismissed by the High Court. The Bank, therefore, approached to the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition. 7. The claim of the Commercial Taxes Officer, Bharatpur in the above mentioned case rested on the provisions of section 11-AAAA of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954. The said section can be reproduced below for the sake of convenience: "11-AAAA. Liability under this Act to be the first charge- Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law for the time being in force, any amount of tax, penalty, interest and any other sum, if any, payable by a dealer or any other person under this Act, shall be the first charge on the property of the dealer, or such person." Under this section the amount of sales tax or any other sum due and payable by a dealer or any other person under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954, is a first charge on the property of the dealer or of such person. It is on account of the provisions of this section that the Commercial Taxes Officer claimed priority for the recovery of the sales tax dues from the sale proceeds of the mortgaged property. The appellant, however, contended that since the mortgage in their favour was prior in point of time, their claim will have precedence over the claim of the sales tax authorities. 8. The appellant, however, contended that since the mortgage in their favour was prior in point of time, their claim will have precedence over the claim of the sales tax authorities. 8. The Supreme Court, after considering the relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, relating to mortgage and after taking into consideration the distinction between the 'mortgage' and the 'charge', which was earlier discussed by the Supreme Court in the case of (Dattatreya Shanker Mote v. Anand Chintaman Datar)2, 1974(2) S.C.C. 799 , came to the conclusion that property, the charge will have precedence over an existing mortgage. He thus, submitted that in the present case at hand when there are sales tax arrears payable to the applicants Bank from defendant No. 1 company, those sales tax dues have the first charge and therefore, the applicants be permitted to put up their claim before the Court Receiver, who can decide and consider the applicants' case and priority of the applicants over the claim of the plaintiff in accordance with law. He also tenders for my perusal, various judgments passed by this Court on similar lines, who have also relied upon the ratio of the Supreme Court case of State Bank of Bikaner Jaipur. 9. After perusing the proceedings, the Supreme Court Judgment relied upon by the learned Advocate General and after hearing his arguments, I find that the controversy is fully covered against the plaintiff Bank and in favour of the applicants. Mr. Shroff appearing for the plaintiff Bank tried to argue in vain that the application is misconceived and has to be dismissed by the Court. In fact, in the affidavit in reply to the Chamber Summons, there is no specific point as, to why the Chamber Summons taken out by the applicants is being opposed by the plaintiffs. The averments are by way of general denial only. Across the bar, Mr. Shroff tried to submit that this application should have been by way of Notice of Motion and not by way of Chamber Summons. This argument of Mr. Shroff has to be rejected in view of Rule 121, Chapter IX of the Original Side Rules of the High Court which deals with matters which can be disposed of by the Judge, by way of Chamber Summons. Mr. This argument of Mr. Shroff has to be rejected in view of Rule 121, Chapter IX of the Original Side Rules of the High Court which deals with matters which can be disposed of by the Judge, by way of Chamber Summons. Mr. Shroff also tried to argue in vain that the notification has to be prospective in nature and not retrospective in effect. This argument also does not hold any water and I am rejecting the same. In fact, the Supreme Court Judgment State Bank of Bikaner Jaipur, (supra) is the complete answer as to why the application of the applicants has to be allowed. Hence the following order: Chamber Summons is made absolute in terms of prayer Clauses (b) and (c). Chamber Summons is accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.