ORDER Rajendra Babu, J. 1. The plaintiffs filed O.S. 258 of 1997 before the Munsiff's Court, Kannur, for a decree of mandatory injunction directing the defendants to demolish the unauthorised construction made in the plaint 'B' schedule property to the extent of encroachment made into the drops space of plaint 'A' schedule and to demolish other construction made in the 'B' schedule without the approved plan and also for a prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from making any further constructions in the plaint B schedule. The plaint A schedule property belonged to the plaintiffs tarwad and the B schedule belonging to the defendants was situated just on the northern side of the plaint A schedule and the plaintiffs were having access to the northern road through the plaint B schedule. The defendants made constructions causing obstructions to the plaintiffs' right of way through the plaint B schedule property without obtaining permission from the Kannur Municipality and in violation of the Building Rules. The defendants in their written statement contended that they had not made any obstruction to the right of way of the plaintiffs through the plaint B schedule property and no constructions were made in violation of the Building Rules. In view of the rival contentions, the plaintiffs took out a commission to ascertain the lie of the property and the nature of the constructions made by the defendants and also the obstruction caused to the right of way. Dissatisfied with the commission report, the plaintiffs filed I. A. 4936/1998 for remitting the commission report to the Commissioner on the ground that the Commission Report was not sufficient to disclose the materials for resolving the dispute between the parties. The learned Munsiff dismissed I.A. 4936/1998. Aggrieved by the above Order, the 2nd plaintiff filed the present revision petition for setting aside the order passed by the learned Munsiff in IA. 4936/1998 in O.S. 258/1997. 2. Whether a revision under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the C.P.C.) will lie against the order rejecting the petition to remit the commission report for consideration of the Commissioner had been covered by a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Kanaran Nair v. Madhavan Nair ( 1996 (1) KLT 162 ). 2. Whether a revision under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the C.P.C.) will lie against the order rejecting the petition to remit the commission report for consideration of the Commissioner had been covered by a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Kanaran Nair v. Madhavan Nair ( 1996 (1) KLT 162 ). The learned Single Judge who heard the petition referred the matter to Division Bench for reconsideration of the above decision as per the following order: "Learned counsel for the revision petitioner submits that the decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in Kanaran Nair v. Madhavan Nair ( 1996 (1) KLT 162 ) that the order allowing or dismissing a request to set aside the Commissioner's report is not a case decided and, therefore, it cannot be revised under S.115 C.P.C., requires reconsideration. It is also submitted that notwithstanding the above decision, certain Courts were freely admitting and entertaining revision petitions for the above purposes. Therefore, the matter may be placed before the Honourable Chief Justice to consider whether the question should be referred to a larger bench." 3. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner was heard. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner argued that the Commissioner had not adverted to in the Commission Report the real facts necessary for the proper adjudication of the issues involved in the suit and it did not contain particulars relating to the bone of contentions raised by the parties, but disclosed only the bare idea of the nature and lie of the plaint schedule properties. Dissatisfied by the report of the Commissioner, the petitioner filed I.A. 4936/98 for remitting the Commission Report to the Commissioner and it was dismissed. It was argued that by the dismissal of I.A. 4936/98, the plaintiffs were denied of the opportunity or a right to let in proper evidence and the plaintiff's case could be established only through a Commission Report and hence the dismissal of I.A. 4936/98 would amount to dismissal of the suit itself. Hence such an order disallowing the prayer for remitting the Commission Report in an interlocutory application would also come within the expression "case which has been decided" under S.115 C.P.C. and would occasion failure of justice, and thus a revision under S.115 C.P.C. is fully maintainable. 4. Hence such an order disallowing the prayer for remitting the Commission Report in an interlocutory application would also come within the expression "case which has been decided" under S.115 C.P.C. and would occasion failure of justice, and thus a revision under S.115 C.P.C. is fully maintainable. 4. Sub-s. (1) of S.115 C.P.C confers jurisdiction on the High Court to call for the records of any "case which has been decided" by a subordinate Court against which no appeal lies and if the Court which passed the impugned order has (a) exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) failed to have exercised the jurisdiction so vested or (c) has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The proviso to sub-s. (1) of S.115 C.P.C. further stipulates that the High Court shall not vary or reverse any order made in the course of a suit or other proceeding except where (a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding or (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. The explanation to S.115 C.P.C. makes it clear that "any case which has been decided" includes any order made or any order deciding an issue in the course of a suit or other proceeding. The general powers given under sub-s. (1) of S.115 is restricted or limited by the proviso and it would apply only to those cases which fall within clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso. In Kanaran Nair v. Madhavan Nair ( 1996 (1) KLT 162 ) a Division Bench of this Court held that the order disallowing the prayer to remit the commission report would not come within the ambit of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of S.115 C.P.C. It was held that the reversal of the impugned order would not finally dispose of the suit and the order cannot be treated as having a potency to occasion failure of justice. 5. 5. In Mytheen Kunhu v. Azeez Kunhu ( 1992 (1) KLT 713 ) a learned Single Judge of this Court took the view that a revision under S.115 C.P.C. is not maintainable against an order rejecting a prayer to set aside the commission report or to remit the commission report to the Commissioner for making a further report. There it was held that the order rejecting the prayer to set aside the commission report or to remit the commission report to the Commissioner will not come within the meaning of the expression "case which has been decided" in S.115 C.P.C. It was further held that it was only those orders which decide or adjudicate upon rights or obligations of either party, that come within the meaning of "case which has been decided". The same view was reiterated by the same learned Judge in Ravindran v. Roja ( 1992 (2) KLT 102 ). 6. A Division Bench of this Court in Mathew v. Saramma ( 1995 (1) KLT 61 ) held that a revision will lie against interlocutory orders which affect the substantial rights of parties, as such orders would come within the expression "case which has been decided". That was a case where the demand of the defendant to let in evidence was rejected by the Trial Court. There it was held that the question as to whether evidence would be admissible or not is an order affecting the rights of parties and such an order would occasion failure of justice or irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made and hence a revision under S.115 C.P.C. would lie against that order. In Padmanabhan Nair v. Grasim Industries ( 1997 (1) KLT 924 ), a learned Single Judge of this Court held that a revision will lie against interlocutory orders passed in the course of a suit which affect the substantial right of parties and if the impugned order is allowed to stand, it would occasion failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it is made and if no appeal lies against such an order. 7. 7. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner, placing reliance on the decisions Ponnusamy v. Salem Vaiyappamalai Jangamar Sangam (AIR 1986 Madras 33), Chintapatla Arvind Babu v. K. Balakrishna ( AIR 1992 AP 300 ) and Bakhtawar Khan v. Noor Mohamad (AIR 1986 Rajasthan 167) argued that by rejecting the prayer to remit the commission report to the commissioner, a right conferred on the party has been denied and as there was an adjudication of a right of obligation, the above order would come within the ambit of a 'case which has been decided' under S.115 C.P.C. 8. In Ponnusamy's case (supra) an application for the issue of a commission for local inspection was dismissed by the Trial Court. There it was held that the right of a party to adduce evidence gets adjudicated in the interlocutory proceedings under O.26 R.9 and when the Court declines to issue the Commission asked for to make local investigation, that order certainly disposes of the right claimed by a party to place the requisite evidence on his behalf. Therefore, an order refusing to appoint a Commissioner under O.26 R.9 to make a local investigation was a 'case decided' and hence revisable under S.115 C.P.C. In AIR 1992 A.P. 300 (supra) it was held that by the refusal to allow a petition under O.26 R.9 C.P.C. for the issue of a Commission, the party is prevented from having clinching evidence in proving the said fact. Thus by declining to appoint a Commissioner, it would result in the perpetration of gross injustice and hence a revision is maintainable against an order refusing to issue a Commission for local inspection. Bakhtawar Khan's case (supra) was a case where an application for the examination of a witness on commission was dismissed. There it was held that there was valid reasons for the defendant for asking for a commission and the refusal of such a prayer would certainly have amounted to irreparable injury to the defendant because he could have failed to establish the sale of the mortgaged property in his favour by the witness sought to be examined. 9. In the cases cited supra, applications filed for the issue of commission under O.26 R.9 C.P.C. were disallowed. O.26 R.9 C.P.C. confers a right on the party for the issue of a commission for local investigation. 9. In the cases cited supra, applications filed for the issue of commission under O.26 R.9 C.P.C. were disallowed. O.26 R.9 C.P.C. confers a right on the party for the issue of a commission for local investigation. Sub-r. 2 of O.26 R.10 stipulates that the report of the Commissioner and evidence taken by him shall be evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record. The report of the Commissioner is an important piece of evidence that a party is entitled to be brought in evidence in the suit as of right. When once the party exercises his right to have that type of evidence to be let in, the denial to the exercise of such a right would result in the perpetration of gross injustice. In the present case, an application had already been filed under O.26 R.9 C.P.C. and it was allowed and the Commissioner appointed in the suit had filed the report. In fact the above right under O.26 R.9 was invoked and it was allowed and that stage of the suit was already over. The decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner have no application as in those cases applications for the issue of commission were dismissed. By disallowing the prayer for remitting the commission report to the Commissioner, no such right has been adjudicated and it is not the final adjudication on that matter. He gets further opportunity to challenge the propriety or acceptability of the Commission Report even after the rejection of the prayer for remission of the Commission Report to the Commissioner. Sub-r. (2) of O.26 R.10 C.P.C. confers the right on the party to examine the Commissioner touching any of the matters referred to him or mentioned in his report or as to his report or as to the manner in which he has made the investigation, if in case the party is dissatisfied with the report of the Commissioner. He has got an effective opportunity to challenge the Commission Report by examining the Commissioner and also by letting in other evidence even by examining witness too. Sub-r. (3) of O.26 R.10 C.P.C. provides that if the Court is dissatisfied with the proceedings adopted by the Commissioner, the Court can direct further enquiry to be made in the matter. 10. He has got an effective opportunity to challenge the Commission Report by examining the Commissioner and also by letting in other evidence even by examining witness too. Sub-r. (3) of O.26 R.10 C.P.C. provides that if the Court is dissatisfied with the proceedings adopted by the Commissioner, the Court can direct further enquiry to be made in the matter. 10. By rejecting the prayer for remitting the Commission Report to the Commissioner, there was no final adjudication of any right of the party. The party has a further right and opportunity to challenge the order in the same proceedings at a later stage as provided in sub-r. (2) and (3) of O.26 R.10. At a later stage after considering the entire evidence in the matter let in by the parties, the Court can have a different opinion regarding the Commission Report and there is no prohibition for entering a different finding at a later stage. If the petitioner can establish during trial that the Commission Report cannot be relied on and it has to be remitted to the Commissioner, then sub-r. (3) of O.26 R.10 permits the Court to do so. Thus the party has got a more effective remedy provided under the Code at a later stage in the same proceedings and the order being only interlocutory in nature without finally adjudicating the matter, it cannot be said that there was any failure of justice. 11. In the light of the above discussion, we come to the conclusion that only those interlocutory orders which would come within the scope of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of S.115 are revisable under S.115 C.P.C. We are of the view that an order rejecting the petition to remit the Commission Report would not come within the scope of the above mentioned proviso and therefore, not revisable under S.115 C.P.C. We fully agree with the view taken in 1996 (1) KLT 162 and we find no reason to reconsider the view expressed therein. The Civil Revision Petition therefore stands dismissed.