Judgment R.N.SAHAYAND and D.P.S.CHOUDHARY JJ. 1. This is an appeal under Section 378 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the judgment and order of the 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Arrah dated 1st September, 1987 in Sessins Trial No. 63/84, whereby the seven respondents in this appeal who were charged and tried for murder of Ram Ayodhya Singh were acquitted disbelieving all the eye-witnesses examined in this case. 2. Ram Ayodhya Singh was native of village Bhagwatpur P.S. Chandi in the district of Bhojpur. He was employed in a Post Office at Arrah. Ram Chhabila Singh, the prime witness and Informant of this case is own brother of Ram Ayodhya Singh but lived in a separate house. On 4-4-1983 Ram Chhabila Singh went to the house of Ram Ayodhya Singh at about 6.00 a.m. Both of them took tea and started at about 6.30 a.m. for going to Arrah. Ram Ayodhya Singh had to attend his duty at the Post Office. He had with him a cycle loaded with domestic articles. His brother Ram Chhabila Singh was going on foot. They reached the road in front of Upper Primary School, Bhagwatpur. According to the version of Ram Chhabila Singh, respondents before us came from west variously armed and they fell upon Ram Ayodhya Singh and started assaulting him with their respective weapons. 3. Respondent Sheo Kumar Singh was allegedly instigating other accused-persons to kill him Ram Chhabila Singh, managed to escape since he was free-handed. Ram Ayodhya Singh was left behind since he was carrying his bicycle. He could not run away. Ram Ayodhya Singh fell down on the road after being brutally assaulted by the accused-persons. He died on the spot. 4. Basudeo Singh, who was of the same village, was washing his hand and mouth at a hand pump near the school. He saw the entire occurrence. Ram Naresh Singh, who was easing himself in the baswain in the village saw the two brothers going towards east of the village. He too saw the respondents assaulting the deceased. 5. It appears that the deceased had purchased certain land from Janki Devi and Banarsi Devi d/o Kishundeo Singh, who was full brother of Jai Bahadur Singh. Respondents Shiwadhar Singh, Baliraj Singh, Jairam Singh and Sishupal Singh are sons of Jai Bhadur Singh. He too saw the respondents assaulting the deceased. 5. It appears that the deceased had purchased certain land from Janki Devi and Banarsi Devi d/o Kishundeo Singh, who was full brother of Jai Bahadur Singh. Respondents Shiwadhar Singh, Baliraj Singh, Jairam Singh and Sishupal Singh are sons of Jai Bhadur Singh. Kishundeo Singh lived jointly with these accused till his death and during his life time he had executed a Will regarding his share in the joint family property in favour of respondent Baliraj Singh. Ram Ayodhya Singh had purchased share of Kishundeo Singh after the Will, hence a dispute arose. Baliraj Singh filed, a case being Probate Case No. 38/79 for grant of probate to the Will in question. 6. According to the defence case, accused-persons-respondents have been falsely implicated on account of prevailing enmity. According to the defence, Ram Ayodhya Singh was murdered not in the morning but some time in the night by some of his enemies. Respondent Sheo Kumar Singh and his son Surendra Singh had no concern with the remaining accused. This fact is admitted by the Informant and other witnesses. Sheo Kumar Singh was doing pairvi on behalf of other accused-persons. Specific defence of Sheo Kumar Singh is that he was a teacher of Akhagaon Middle School and was present there from 7.00 a.m. to 11.30 a.m. Teachers Attendance Register was produced in support of his defence. Surendra Singhs plea was that he was working on his thrasher at the mill of Gobardhan close to the place of occurrence. He was arrested while he was working there at 3.00 p.m. 7. Learned Additional Sessions Judge on evaluation of the evidence of the eye-witnesses did not accept the prosecution case for the following reasons : (i) According to the medical evidence all the injuries found on the person of the deceased had been caused by hard and blunt substance whereas according to the eye-witnesses the deceased had been assaulted with farsa, tangi, bhala etc. The Informant changed his version in Court and stated that the accused-persons had assaulted the deceased Ram Ayodhya Singh from the reverse side of their respective weapons. (ii) It was not believable that the accused-persons who were armed with deadly weapons would have assaulted the deceased with the blunt portion of their weapons. The Informant changed his version in Court and stated that the accused-persons had assaulted the deceased Ram Ayodhya Singh from the reverse side of their respective weapons. (ii) It was not believable that the accused-persons who were armed with deadly weapons would have assaulted the deceased with the blunt portion of their weapons. (iii) Ram Chhabila Singh was involved in a proceeding under Section 107 Cr PC with the accused Sheo Kumar Singh, who had purchased the same land. There was no earthly reason why Ram Chhabila Singh was spared who was standing at a close distance from the place where Ram Ayodhya Singh was assaulted. (iv) There was Upper Primary School in front of the place of occurrence and there were houses about 100 yards away from the place of the occurrence. The evidence is that he raised alarm. The school was running in morning session. It is highly improbable that the accused-persons would have assaulted the deceased near the school when boys and teachere were in the school and they were expected to reach there. Further Ram Ayodhya Singh had started on cycle. The Informant was not expected to accompany him on foot. Therefore the evidence of the Informant was not found to be natural and acceptable. (v) Witness Pradip Singh has admitted in his cross-examination that he had not seen who had assaulted the deceased and on what part of the body of the deceased. This witness had purchased land in the name of his wife from Janki Devi and Banarsi Devi daughter of Kishundeo Singh. There was enmity between Pradip Singh and accused-persons. Accused-persons would not have spared him when they had killed Ram Ayodhya Singh on account of same enmity in respect of the purchase of the aforesaid land. This witness was going to the Post Officer where he was employed but he had sent an application for leave on account of being late due to alleged occurrence. There was no sufficient cause not to attend the Post Office when the working hour of Post Office is from 10.00 a.m. He was a chance witness. His presence at the place of occurrence is doubtful. (vi) Permanand Singh is the 3rd witness on behalf of the prosecution He is admittedly close relation of the Informant and as such is an interested witness. Much reliance cannot be placed on his testimony. His presence at the place of occurrence is doubtful. (vi) Permanand Singh is the 3rd witness on behalf of the prosecution He is admittedly close relation of the Informant and as such is an interested witness. Much reliance cannot be placed on his testimony. (vii) Basudeo Singh PW-4 admittedly purchased land from the daughters of Kishundeo Singh. He is not named in the fardbeyan and he is inimical to the appellants and is a chance witness. (viii) Ram Naresh Singh PW-6 claims to have seen the occurrence while he was easing out in the bamboo clumps. Father of this witness and father of the Informant are full brothers. This witness is also a chance witness. In the above circumstance, his evidence does not inspire much confidence. Revisional survey Khatian shows that the Informant Ram Chhabila Singh, Ram Naresh Singh, Parmanand Singh and Prabhu Singh are closely related to each other. (ix) The evidence of the doctor, who performed autopsy on the dead body of the deceased is not consistent with the prosecution case in respect of the alleged occurrence. The doctor in his evidence has stated that the time elapsed since death was 18 hours. He found rigor mortis present in the neck and all the four extrimity. Rigor mortis generally develops on the whole body after 12 hours of death. According to the prosecution, the alleged ocurrence had taken place before six hours of post-mortem examination. Hence, this manifests that the death had occurred much earlier to the alleged occurrence. It appears that the defence version that the deceased was killed by unknown persons in the night appears to be probable. Appellant Sheo Kumar Singh proved his plea of alibi by producing Teachers, Attendance Register. Appellant Surendra Singh was arrested by the Police while he was working on the Thrasher. It was held that the conduct of the appellant Sheo Kumar Singh and Surendera Singh is consistent with their defence. In the above background, the trial Court gave verdict of clearn acquittal in favour of the accused-persons. 8. Appellant Surendra Singh was arrested by the Police while he was working on the Thrasher. It was held that the conduct of the appellant Sheo Kumar Singh and Surendera Singh is consistent with their defence. In the above background, the trial Court gave verdict of clearn acquittal in favour of the accused-persons. 8. Lord Russel of Killowen in Sheo Swarup V/s. King Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227, which is a leading case on the power of the High Court, in dealing with the order of acquittal on a matter of fact held as follows : "It will be observed that upon the express terms of the Code (1) an appeal lies from any order of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court : (2) such an appeal (the trial not being by jury) will lie upon a matter of fact; (3) on such an appeal the Court may reverse the order of acquittal, find the accused guilty and pass sentence on him. There is no indication in the Code of any limitation or restriction on the High Court in exercise of its powers as an appellate tribunal. Further, it is to be observed that no distinction is drawn as regards the powers of the High Court in dealing with an appeal, between an appal from an order of acquittal and an appeal from a conviction. Many authorities were cited to their Lordships which undoubtedly reveal difference of views as to the powers of the High Court in dealing with an appeal from an order of acquittal on a matter of fact. No. useful purpose will be served by examining this long list of decisions. It will suffice if their Lordships state the conclusion which they have reached as the result of careful consideration of the full arguments which were addressed to them. No. useful purpose will be served by examining this long list of decisions. It will suffice if their Lordships state the conclusion which they have reached as the result of careful consideration of the full arguments which were addressed to them. There is in their opinion no foundation for the view, apparently supported by the judgments of some courts in India, that the High Court has no power or jurisdiction to reverse an order of acquittal on the matter of fact, except in case in which the Lower Court has "obstinately blundered", or has "through incompetence, stupidity or perversity" reached such "distorted conclusion as to produce a positive miscarriage of justice", or has in some other way so conducted itself as to produce a glaring miscarriage of justice, or has been tricked by the defence so as to produce a similar result. Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the code. But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibiliy of the witnesses : (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognised in the administration of justice. To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognised in the administration of justice. Their Lordships only desire to add that while the judgment of the High Court does not state in express terms that these principles have been acted upon, they have no reason to think that the High Court failed to take all proper matters into consideration in arriving at their conclusions of fact. In the result, this appeal should be dismissed and their Lordships will humbly advise. Him Majesty accordingly." 9. In Sanwat Singh V/s. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 715 , after exhauscive review of the cases decided by the Privy Council as well as by the Supreme Court, the apex Court considered the principle laid down in Sheo Swarups case (supra) and held that they aforded correct guide for the Appellate Courts approach to a case against an order of acquittal. It was again pointed out by Das Gupta, J. delivering the judgment in Court in Harbans Singh V/s. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 439 as under : "In many cases, especially the earlier ones the Court has in laying down such principles emphasised the necessity of interference with an order of acquittal being based only on compelling and sustantial reasons and has expressed the view that unless such reasons are present an appeal Court should not interfere with an oreder of acquittal (ide Suraj Pal Singh V/s. The State, 1952 SCR 194; Ajmer Singh V/s. State of Punjab, 1953 SCR 418 ; Puran V/s. State of Punjab, AIR 1953 SC 459 ). The use of the words compelling reasons embarrassed some of the High Courts in exercising their jurisdiction in appeals against acquittals and difficulties occasionally arose as to what this Court had meant by the words compelling reasons. The use of the words compelling reasons embarrassed some of the High Courts in exercising their jurisdiction in appeals against acquittals and difficulties occasionally arose as to what this Court had meant by the words compelling reasons. In later years the Court has often avoided emphasis on compelling reasons but nontheless adhered to the view expressed earlier that before interfering in appeal with an order of acquittal a Court must examine not only questions of law and fact in all their aspects but must also closely and carefully examine the reasons which impelled the Lower Courts to acquit the accused and should interfere only if satisfied after such examination that the conclusion reached by the Lower Court that the guilt of the person has not been proved is unreasonable. (Vide Chinta V/s. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal App. No. 178 of 1959 decided on November 18, 1960; Ashrfkha Haibakha Pathan V/s. State of Bombay, Criminal Appeal No. 38 of 1960 decided on December 14, 1960). On close analysis, it is clear that the principles laid down by the Court in this matter have remained the same. What may be called the golden thread running through all these decisions is the rule that in deciding appeals against acquittal the Court of appeal must examine the evidence with particular care, must examine also the reason on which the order of acquittal was based and should interfere with the order only when satisfied that the view taken by the acquitting Judge is clearly unreasonable. Once the appellate Court comes to the conclusion that the view taken by the lower Court is clearly an unreasonable one that itself is a compelling reason for interference. For, it is a Courts duty to convict a guilty person when the guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt, no less than it is its duty to acquit the accused when such guilt is not so established." 10. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade V/s. State of Maharashtra, 1973 SCC (Cr.) 1033, Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for the Court upheld the judgment of Bombay High Court setting aside the judgment and order of acquittal by the Sessions Court in a murder case. Learned Judge observed: "...An appellant aggrieved by the overturning of his acquittal deserves the final Courts deeper concern on fundamental principles of criminal justice. Learned Judge observed: "...An appellant aggrieved by the overturning of his acquittal deserves the final Courts deeper concern on fundamental principles of criminal justice. The present accused, who have suffered such a fate, have hopefully appealed to us for a loaded approach against guilt in consonance with the initial innocence presumed in their favour fortified by the acquittal that followed. We are clearly in agreement with this noble proposition, stated in American Jurisprudence at one time (not now, though) as implied in the rule against double jeopardy, in the British system as a branch of the benefit of reasonable doubt doctrine and in our own on the more logical, socially relevant and modern basis, that an acquitted accused should not be put in peril of conviction on appeal save where substantial and compelling grounds exist for such a course. In India it is not a jurisdictional limitation on the appellate Court but a Judge-made guideline of circumspection. But we hasten to add even here that although, the learned Judges of the High Court have not expressly stated so, they have been at pains to dwell at length on all the points relied on by the trial Court as favourable to the prisoners for the good reasons that they wanted to be satisfied in their conscience whether there was credible testimony warranting, on a fair consideration, a reversal of the acquittal registered by the Court below. In law there are no fetters on the plenary-power of the appellate Court to review the whole evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded and, indeed, it has a duty to scrutinise the probative material de novo, informed, however, by the weighty thought that the rebuttable innocence attributed to the accused having been converted into an acquittal the homage our jurisprudence owes to individual liberty constrains the higher Court not to upset the holding without very convincing reasons and comprehensive consideration. In our view the High Courts judgment survives this exacting standard." 11. In para 6 of the Report, learned Judge observed : "Even at this stage we may remind ourselves of a necessary social perspective in criminal cases which suffers from insufficient forensic appreciation. In our view the High Courts judgment survives this exacting standard." 11. In para 6 of the Report, learned Judge observed : "Even at this stage we may remind ourselves of a necessary social perspective in criminal cases which suffers from insufficient forensic appreciation. The dangers of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at the expenses of social defence and to the soothing sentiment that all acquittals are always good regardless of justice to the victim and the community, demand special emphasis in the contemporary context of escalating crime and escape. The judicial instrument has a public accountability. The cherished principles or golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs through the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The excessive solitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty men may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the accused. Otherwise any practical system of justice will then break down and lose credibility with the community. The Evil of acquitting a guilty person light heartedly as a learned author has saprently observed, goes much beyond the simple fact that just one guilty person has gone general, they tend to lead to a cynical disregard of the law, and this in turn leads to a public demand for harsher legal presumptions against indicted persons and more severe punishment of those who are found guilty. Thus, too frequent acquittals of the guilty may lead to a ferocious penal law, eventually eroding the judicial protection of the guiltless. For all these reasons it is true to say, with Viscount Simon, that "a miscarriage of justice may arise from the acquittal of the guilty no less than from the conviction of the innocent.... "In short, our jurisprudential enthusiasm for presumed innocence must be moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal justice potent and realistic. A balance has to be struck between chasing chance possibilities as good enough to set the delinquent free and chopping the logic of preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents. We have adopted these cautions in analysing the evidence and appraising the soundness of the contrary conclusions reached by the Courts below, Certainly, in the last analysis reasonable doubts must operate to the advantage of the appellant. We have adopted these cautions in analysing the evidence and appraising the soundness of the contrary conclusions reached by the Courts below, Certainly, in the last analysis reasonable doubts must operate to the advantage of the appellant. In India the law has been laid down on these lines long ago". 12. The Supreme Court minutely examined the evidence and came to the conclusion that the High Court was right in setting aside the order of acquittal. 13. In Dharam Das V/s. State of U.P., 1973 SCC Cr.J 765, The Supreme Court observed : "...If the Court on examining with care the evidence and the reasons for acquittal feels satisfied that the guilt of the accused is established beyond reasonable doubt then it may be considered as much its duty to convict as it would be its duty to acquit if it entertains reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused : Harbans Singh etc. V/s. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 439 . According to the decisions of this Court, the High Court has, of course, to bear in mind when sifting and appraising the evidence, the initial presumption in favour of the innocence of the accused and the fact that he was acquitted by the trial Court. The presumption of innocence has to be considered to be further strengthened to some extent by virtue of the order of acquittal. And then according to the obligation generally imposed on Courts of appeal, the High Court should dislodge the reasons on which the trial Court recorded the order of acquittal. This is the broad approach in such appeals." 14. In the light of the principles laid down in the above mentioned cases, our finst inquiry would be whether the reasoning given by the trial Court for a acquitting the respondents was a reasonable view which could have been taken on correct appreciation of evidence or the reasoning is totally perverse. If it is found that the verdict is based on perverse appraisal of evidence, then we shall have to assess the evidence whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, charges against the respondents can be said to be established. In our considered view, at least three findings of the trial Court must be held to be perverse. If it is found that the verdict is based on perverse appraisal of evidence, then we shall have to assess the evidence whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, charges against the respondents can be said to be established. In our considered view, at least three findings of the trial Court must be held to be perverse. The trial Court has rejected the evidence of Ram Chhabila Singh brother of the deceased since he was an interested witness; secondly his presence at the time of occurrence is highly doubtful since no harm was done to him. This reasoning is absolutely illogical. It is not necessary that the accused-persons should have murdered the brother of the deceased also who is inimical to the accused-persons. Similarly, the trial Court has disbelieved the evidence of the Informant because he was spared by the accused-persons because the motive for committing under of Ram Ayodhya Singh was equally operative in the case of Ram Chhabila Singh. It is absolutely a perverse finding. Basudeo Singh has been disbelieved because he was not named in the FIR. This can be a good ground for not accepting the evidence. He is also inimical to the accused-persons. The trial Court rejected the evidence of Ram Naresh Singh because he was related to the Informant. 15. We examined the evidence of the witnesses. They are absolutely untrustworthy and their testimony suffers from inherent defect. So far informant Ram Chhabila Singh is concerned, he is own brother of the deceased. In our opinion, the evidence of this witness does not appear to be very reliable. Ram Chhabila Singh had gone to the house of the deceased early in the morning. Then both started for going to Arrah which is at a distance of 15 Kms Ram Chhabila Singh was going on foot while his deceased brother was going on bicycle. It is difficult to believe that he would have travelled 15 Kms. on foot. It is also not stated for what purpose he was going to Arrah. Therefore we dont accept this witness as eye witness, more so, when he is own brother of the deceased. 16. The trial Judge has disbelieved the evidence of the eye-witnesses particularly the Informant on the ground that the njuries sustained by the deceased were all caused by hard and blunt susbstance. Therefore we dont accept this witness as eye witness, more so, when he is own brother of the deceased. 16. The trial Judge has disbelieved the evidence of the eye-witnesses particularly the Informant on the ground that the njuries sustained by the deceased were all caused by hard and blunt susbstance. It is definite case of the prosecution that the deceased was struck with sharp-cutting and pointed weapons such as garasa, farsa, etc. The Informant and other witnesses changed their version in Court when they stated that Ram Ayodhya Singh was assaulted by reverse portion of the weapons thereby causing lacerated wounds. 17. Learned trial Judge has doubted that the occurrence had taken place near the Upper Primary School since it is unlikely that the accused-persons had ventured to commit murder near the school where teachers and children were likely to be present in the school. According to the Investigating Officer, school was closed on that day. Learned Trial Judge has not taken into consideration the evidence of the Investigating Officer that the school was closed on that day. 18. No doubt, some confusion is caused by the evidence of the doctor, still we cannot hold for crtain that the occurrence had not taken place at the time and place as alleged by the prosecution. All eye-witnesses are related to the deceased. In the earlier version of the occurrence given by the Chowkidar, who was not examined by the Court, the appellants were not named. There is evidence that many houses were located near the place of occurrence, but no independant witness was examined. 19. In Bhola Singh V/s. State of Punjab, AIR 1999 SC 767 : 1999 (1) PCCR 151 (SC), the allegation against the accused was that they were armed with sharp weapons like gandasa and ghop. Post-mortem Report showed that the assault was made from blunt side of weapon. On this ground, the Supreme Court held that the person armed with sharp-edged weapon could only use its blunt side if the object was not to commit murder. It was held that the version of the witnesses that accused had used blunt side of weapon was set out to fit in with post-mortem report. The presence of the witnesses was held to be doubtful. This decision applies in the present case. It was held that the version of the witnesses that accused had used blunt side of weapon was set out to fit in with post-mortem report. The presence of the witnesses was held to be doubtful. This decision applies in the present case. The Supreme Court observed : "It is highly improbable and unlikely that when the accused armed with sharp weapons like gandasa and ghop had used only the blunt edged side and not the sharp-edged side of the said weapons. We are convinced that these two eye-witnesses had set out this version only to fit in what had been found in the post-mortem report. The normal way in which a gandasa and Ghop could be used was only from a sharp edged side and not from the blunt edged side. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the two eye-witnesses PW-1 and PW-2 could have seen the incident as had taken place. It gives rise to serious doubt as to their presence at the time of incident. The trial Court and the High Court did not duly appreciate this aspect of the matter and, therefore, we are of the view that there is an error in this regard. Hence, we accept the case as set forth on behalf of the appellant." 20. There is one more serious infirmity which the prosecution has not been able to explain. The prosecution case is that Ram Ayodhya Singh was murdered at about 6.30 a.m. The post-mortem was performed at 12.30 p.m. According to the post-mortem report Rigor mortis was present in the neck and all the four extremities and the time elapsed since death was 18 hours. The trial Court has opined that the death had caused much earlier to the alleged time of occurrence. 21. In India, rigor mortis commences in 1-2 hours after death, takes about 12 hours to develop from head to foot, persists for another 12 hours, and takes 12 hours to pass off. Thus, the presence and extent, or absence of rigor mortis helps to provide a rough estimate of the time since death. As for example, if rigor mortis has not set in, the time since death would be within 2 hours, and if it has affected the whole body, the time since death would be within about 12-24 hours. Dr. Thus, the presence and extent, or absence of rigor mortis helps to provide a rough estimate of the time since death. As for example, if rigor mortis has not set in, the time since death would be within 2 hours, and if it has affected the whole body, the time since death would be within about 12-24 hours. Dr. Parikh in Text Book of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology has given an excellent example of the valuable information that can be obtained from cooling of the body and rigor mortis: "The body of a woman stabbed to death was found at day break one morning in a public park. She had last been seen about 9.00 p.m. the previous night in the company of a young man. A slipper which was proved to be the property of this man was found not far from the body. The man was charged with murder. He admitted having accompanied the woman to the park and the ownership of the slipper but stated that he had left the woman in the park and had gone home. Several witnesses testified to his having been at home from 11.00 p.m. onwards. The body when examined at 7.00 a.m. was still quite warm to touch; rigor mortis was present in the jaw and neck, but the limbs were quite flaccid. Medical evidence was to the effect that the woman had not been dead more man about three hours. The murder could not, therefore, have been committed by the accused, who was then acquitted." 22. Dr. R.M. Jhala and V.B. Raju in Medical Jurisprudence (Sixth Edition, 1997) has explained rigor mortis as under : "Rigor mortisAfter death, after some time the muscles turn rigid. This phenomenon is Known as rigor mortis. This is one of the important changes which occur in muscles after death. It has high medico-legal importance as it throws light on the time elapsed since death, circumstance before death and some times even the nature of death. Rigor mortis is due to the rigidity of the muscles. It appears both in voluntary as well as involuntary muscles, its appearance and disappearance in various muscles follows a set pattern. It is apparent first in the region of head, face, neck, eye, lips and lower jaw. It last shows its appearance in the lower extrimities. Rigor mortis is due to the rigidity of the muscles. It appears both in voluntary as well as involuntary muscles, its appearance and disappearance in various muscles follows a set pattern. It is apparent first in the region of head, face, neck, eye, lips and lower jaw. It last shows its appearance in the lower extrimities. Hence if rigor mortis is present in lower extremities, it can safely be opined that it is present all over." 23. In Shivaji Sahbrao Bobades case (supra), the evidence was that the deceased was killed around 5.30 p.m. Information had been sent to the Police promptly. On the basis of the medical evidence, it was argued- that the death had taken place at about 2.00 p.m. and not 5.30 p.m. Krishna Iyer, J. observed: "...There are imponderables which make the digestive testimony inconclusive and, therefore, insufficient to contradict positive evidence, if any, about the time of death. To impute exactitude to a medical statement oblivious to the variables noticed by experts and changes in dietary habits is to be unfair to the science." 24. Lastly, the Respondents were acquitted in 1977. 12 years have elapsed by then. It would not be justified to interfere with the case even if some illegality was committed by the trial Court. On review of the entire evidence we are of the opinion that it cannot be said that in the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the nature of the evidence the trial Court was not justified in acquitting the respondents. 25. In the result, this appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.