Research › Browse › Judgment

Bombay High Court · body

1999 DIGILAW 395 (BOM)

Forum for Fairness in Education Western Suburbs, Mumbai and others v. State of Maharashtra and others

1999-06-28

S.H.KAPADIA, Y.K.SABHARWAL

body1999
JUDGMENT - Y.K. SABHARWAL, C.J.:---Rule, returnable forthwith. Respondents waive service. 2. The main point, which falls for determination in this petition, is about the validity of collection of certain amounts by respondent Nos. 4 and 5 Schools at the time of granting admission to students. The challenge is also to the validity of collection of computer fee by respondent No. 4 School from students of primary section. 3. The petition has been filed as a Public Interest Litigation by a Non-Governmental organisation and its officers, besides some of the petitioners whose children are, studying in the respondent Schools. Respondent No. 1 is the State of Maharashtra and respondent No. 2 is the Deputy Director of Education. The Additional Municipal Commissioner in charge of primary education is respondent N. 3. St. Mary English School, Malad, Mumbai, and New Era School, Tardeo, Mumbai, are respondent Nos. 4 and 5. 4. Respondent No. 4 School is said to be charging Rs. 4,000/- to Rs. 5,000/- towards advertisements in Souvenirs which are never published. It is claimed that two children of petitioner No. 3 were studying in respondent No. 4 School, one in Senior K. G. and the other in Standard III. According to petitioner No. 3, who claims to be a Computer Technocrat, respondent No. 4 School, with a view to collect large funds through fees of computer education, has unauthorisedly imposed the said subject from standard I, even when the child has not learnt words, numericals and arithmetics required for computer learning. He alleges that since July 1998 his daughter, who studies in standard III, was not permitted to attend the classes for non-payment of computer fee. The computer fee and charging Rs. 4,000/- to Rs. 5,000/- for souvenir publication are stated to be in violation of Maharashtra Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). Petitioner No. 3 says that current rate per seat is Rs. 7,000/-. Some of the letters written by petitioner No. 3 to the school and to the Authorities have been placed on record. He further alleged that for fear of victimisation from respondent No. 4 School, he also withdrew his son from senior K.G., with the result that both his children are at home. 5. In respect of respondent No. 5 New Era School, allegation is that the said School grants admission to students only on compulsory deposit of Rs. He further alleged that for fear of victimisation from respondent No. 4 School, he also withdrew his son from senior K.G., with the result that both his children are at home. 5. In respect of respondent No. 5 New Era School, allegation is that the said School grants admission to students only on compulsory deposit of Rs. 20,000/-. Further, in the petition a grievance has also been made about respondent No. 5 having changed the medium of education from Gujarati to English, but learned Counsel for the petitioners did not press this aspect and submits that he would agitate it in separate proceedings in accordance with law. 6. It is not in serious dispute that parents pay charges at the time of admission of their wards in schools. The stand of respondent No. 4 School, however, is that the payment is voluntary and there is no compulsion for making such payment. The payment of computer fee from standard I is also not in dispute. Denying the allegation of the petitioners, Counsel for respondent No. 4 School submits that computer education is only optional, and was commenced on the insistence of the parents. Similarly, respondent No. 5 School does not dispute the payment of Rs. 20,000/- at the time of admission of the child, and claims that it is a without interest refundable deposit and is not 'capitation fee'. The claim is that the amount paid as interest free deposit is refundable when the child leaves the School. It is further claimed that there is no compulsion, but parents are persuaded to give such deposit and by and large parents deposit the same with very few exceptions. Further claim of respondent No. 5 School is that there is no quid pro quo between admission and deposit and it is only after the admission process is complete, and admission is given on merit alone, that such deposit is asked for. The deposit initially was in the sum of Rs. 5,000/- in the year 1986 and gradually it has been increased to Rs. 20,000/- from the year 1997. According to respondent No. 5, interest on such deposits is utilised for incurring expenses in connection with the running of the School. The deposit initially was in the sum of Rs. 5,000/- in the year 1986 and gradually it has been increased to Rs. 20,000/- from the year 1997. According to respondent No. 5, interest on such deposits is utilised for incurring expenses in connection with the running of the School. It has also been contended that in absence of approval by the Authorities for increase in the rate of fees, no objection can be taken to such deposit as in law self-financing of education is permissible. Before we examine the nature of the amounts collected by the respondent Schools, it would be useful to notice certain provisions of the Act. 7. One of the main objects to enact the Act was to prohibit collection of capitation fee for admission of students in educational institutions in the State of Maharashtra and to curb such undesirable practice. This practice was contributing to large-scale commercialisation of education which was not conducive to the maintenance of educational standards and with a view to effectively curb this evil practice, the Act was enacted. 8. 'Capitation fee' means any amount, by whatever name called, whether in cash or kind, in excess of the prescribed or, as the case may be, approved, rates of fees regulated under section 4 [section 2(a)] Kindergarten, Pre-Primary, Balwadi or Nursery Schools are included in the definition of the term "educational institution". Section 3(1), inter alia, stipulates that notwithstanding anything contained in any law, for the time being in force, no capitation fee shall be demanded or collected by or on behalf of any educational institution in consideration of admission to any course of study. Section 3(2), inter alia, provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the management may, in good faith, demand or collect or accept donations in cash or kind in the prescribed manner from benevolent persons etc., for development or expansion of educational facilities in the existing educational institutions, but while collecting or accepting such donations the management shall not reserve any seat in any educational institution run by it in consideration of such donations. Proviso to this sub-section stipulates that where, in consideration of accepting such donation, any seat is reserved for admission to any student in such institution, such acceptance of donation shall be deemed to be collection of capitation fee. Proviso to this sub-section stipulates that where, in consideration of accepting such donation, any seat is reserved for admission to any student in such institution, such acceptance of donation shall be deemed to be collection of capitation fee. Section 3(3), inter alia, stipulates the steps which the State Government is empowered to take on receipt of complaint or otherwise about the contravention of the provisions of the Act, in addition to any prosecution that may be instituted under the Act. In the case of unaided educational institutions, with which we are concerned, the amount collected by the school as capitation fee can be recovered as arrears of land revenue and when so recovered, the same is required to be paid to the person from whom such capitation fee was collected. The Act also postulates for prosecution and punishment of the offenders. The offence of demanding capitation fee has been made cognizable and non-bailable in terms of 1996 Amending Act. 9. Section 4(1) of the Act, inter alia, provides for regulation of fees. It stipulates that the State Government shall be competent to regulate the tuition fee or any other fee that may be received or collected by any educational institutions for admission to, and prosecution of study in any class. Section 4(2), inter alia, stipulates that the fee to be regulated in case of unaided educational institutions shall, having regard to the usual expenditure, exclude any expenditure on lands and buildings or on any such other item as the State Government may notify. Section 4(3) sets out various items which can be included while prescribing or approving fee. Under section 4(4), fee to be regulated under section 4 shall ordinarily remain in force for a period of three years and the State Government shall appoint a Committee of persons who, in the opinion of the State Government, are experts in educational field, for taking the review of the fee structure and may, after considering the report of the Committee, revise the fee if it considers it expedient to do so. Section 4 gives power to the State Government to make inquiries where it has reason to believe that there has been contravention of the provisions of the Act and direct any Officer, not below the rank of a Gazetted Officer, to hold inquiry and submit his report in that behalf. Section 4 gives power to the State Government to make inquiries where it has reason to believe that there has been contravention of the provisions of the Act and direct any Officer, not below the rank of a Gazetted Officer, to hold inquiry and submit his report in that behalf. Section 6 empowers certain class of Officers to enter and inspect the records of such educational institutions. For violation of the provisions of the Act, the punishment provided for is imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to three years and with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees. 10. Reference may also be made to Maharashtra Educational Institutions (Transfer of Management) Act, 1971. The object of this Act is to provide for transfer of management of the undertaking of certain educational institutions which are managed in a manner detrimental to public interest and to provide for other matters connected therewith. Section 3 of this Act empowers the State Government to cause investigation to be made into the affairs of educational institutions. Section 4 empowers issue of appropriate directions to such institutions. It also provides for issue of directions requiring the institution not to demand, either directly or indirectly, any contribution, donation or payment of any kind, either in cash or kind, from or on behalf of any pupil as a condition for granting him admission to the institution. Section 6, inter alia, empowers the State Government to transfer management and control on contravention of the directions issued under the Act. 11. Thus it can be seen that there is complete prohibition against collection of capitation fee under the Act and the offence has been made cognizable. The definition is very wide and comprehensive. The amount, by whatever name it may be called, when in excess of prescribed or approved rates, would be 'capitation fee' within the meaning of the Act. The label given to the amounts collected by the Schools, in our view, is immaterial. The real question is the substance of the collection so as to find out whether it is prohibited under the Act or not and, if prohibited, what directions may be issued in respect of the amounts collected by the Schools during last many years. 12. The label given to the amounts collected by the Schools, in our view, is immaterial. The real question is the substance of the collection so as to find out whether it is prohibited under the Act or not and, if prohibited, what directions may be issued in respect of the amounts collected by the Schools during last many years. 12. Regarding commercialisation in private unaided schools, it may be useful to notice a Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in (Re. : Delhi Abibhavak Mahasangh v. Union of India others)1, C.W.Ps. No. 3723 of 1997 (with other C.W.Ps.) decided on 30th October, 1998. One of us (Sabharwal, C.J.) was a member of the Bench which decided the batch of Delhi cases. 13. In the aforesaid case, the main question which came up for consideration was whether unaided schools were indulging in commercialisation of education and are the students and their parents being exploited. If so, has the Government power to control and check the menace of such commercialisation and exploitation. It was held that there has to be an element of public benefit or philanthropy in the running of the schools; that the schools are to be run for public good and not for private gain; that the object has to be service to the society and not to earn profit; the public benefit and not private benefit to a favoured section of the society has to be the aim. It was noticed that examination of the accounts, returns and documents of the schools had never been done by the Directorate of Education, though permissible. It was said that the Director of Education and Central Board of Secondary Education have to be ever vigilant so that any act which may show commercialisation or exploitation may at once be checked and requisite remedial action taken. While examining the provisions of the Delhi School Education Act it was said that there were various provisions in the Act and the Rules to enable the authorities to keep proper check on the working and running of the schools and to take remedial steps. While examining the provisions of the Delhi School Education Act it was said that there were various provisions in the Act and the Rules to enable the authorities to keep proper check on the working and running of the schools and to take remedial steps. Relying upon and quoting from the decision of the Supreme Court in (J.P. Unnikrishnan v. State of A.P.))2, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2178 it was said that the right to free education upto the age of 14 years is a fundamental right; the educational institutions discharge a public duty and have, therefore, a duty to act fairly and would be subject to Article 14 of the Constitution of India; the absence of receipt by educational institutions of any aid from the Government would not detract such institutions from discharge of their public duty. While endorsing the need to encourage private sector to augment the much needed resources in the filed of education, it was held that did not mean that one should tolerate private institutions which are run as financial adventures without morals or scruples with the sole aim to make money. It was also noticed that there are some institutions in private sector which have attained great reputation and have surpassed the institutions run by the Government in many respects and such institutions, of course, required encouragement. It was also pointed out that Government's controls have to be continued and strengthened if commercialisation of education and racketeering have to be prevented. The State should strive its utmost in this direction. The regulatory measures should ensure that the private educational institutions maintain minimum standards and facilities; admissions should be based only on merit; that norms of admission should be pre-determined and should be transparent. An unaided institution cannot be compelled to charge the same fee as charged in Government institution as they have to meet cost of imparting education from their own resources and the main source can only be the funds collected from the students and that is the concept of "self financing of the educational institutions" and "cost based educational institutions" come in. It was further noticed that the cost of education may vary from institution to institution and in this respect many variable factors may have to be taken into account. It was further noticed that the cost of education may vary from institution to institution and in this respect many variable factors may have to be taken into account. But one thing is clear that commercialisation of education cannot and should not be permitted, which intention has clearly expressed by the Parliament as well State Legislatures in unmistakable terms. Further, both in the light of our tradition and from the standpoint of interest of general public, commercialisation is positively harmful; it is opposed to public policy, which is one of the reasons for the conclusion that imparting of education cannot be trade, business or profession. Education has never been commerce in this country. Making it one is opposed to the ethos, tradition and sensibilities of this nation. Imparting education has always been treated as a religious duty. It is treated as a charitable activity and never a trade or business. In its true aspect it is more a mission and a vocation. 14. Dealing with recognition of the schools it was held that grant of recognition and/or affiliation to an educational institution is not a matter of course nor a formality. Ordinarily speaking, no educational institution can run or survive unless it is recognised by the Government or the appropriate Authority and/or is affiliated to one or the other Board. The affiliated private educational institutions supplement the function performed by the institutions of the State. It is not an independent activity but one closely allied to and supplementary to the activity of the State. Thus, it is obligatory in the interest of general public - upon the authority granting affiliation or recognition to insist upon such conditions as are appropriate to ensure not only education of requisite standard but also fairness in other spheres since the recognising/affiliating authority is the State which is under an obligation to impose such conditions as part of its duty enjoined upon it by Article 14 of the Constitution. It cannot allow itself or its power and privilege to be used unfairly. It follows from the above that if the Government finds any educational institution indulging in commercialisation and/or exploitation, the Government would be abdicating its obligations to keep quiet and not to take appropriate remedial measures. An instance of a school accepting loans from the parents of students at the time of admission was noticed, though the loans were returned with interest. An instance of a school accepting loans from the parents of students at the time of admission was noticed, though the loans were returned with interest. The inspection team found that payment of donation/loan was a pre-condition for admission to Nursery classes which was in violation of the Rules. While accepting the concept of self-financing, the contention urged on behalf of the schools that the real question is the end use of the money received as fee and charges from the students was not accepted entirely. It was held that it is difficult to accept the contention of the schools that assuming higher admission fee is charged, it results in increase of revenue of the school resulting in levy of lesser tuition fee. It was said that ordinarily admission fee amount is to be used for expenses in regard to the admission and it is only incidental surplus which can be utilised for other educational purposes. It was further held that the contention that revenue of the school as a whole matches with the entire expenditure of the school cannot be accepted. 15. The position is somewhat similar in the case before us. Though in Delhi there is a specific rule which prohibits use of money collected for one purpose to be expended for other purpose and there is no such rule herein, but in substance the provisions are more stringent in Maharashtra in view of prohibition against collection of any amount other than the amount prescribed under section 4 of the Act. In Delhi, unlike in Maharashtra, there is no provision requiring the schools to seek approval from Director of Education for enhancement of fee or prohibition from collection of any amount. Here, the demand or collection of capitation fee is not only prohibited but it is a cognizable offence with imprisonment upto a term of three years. Even in respect of minority institutions, while recognising the right of the said institutions to establish and administer educational institutions as provided under Article 30(1) of the Constitution, it was held in aforesaid case that the said protection does not permit the minority institutions to indulge in commercialisation of education in the garb of the constitutional protection and that on the aspect of commercialisation and exploitation the minority institutions would be similarly placed as other institutions. 16. Reverting now to the present case, the receipt of donation of Rs. 16. Reverting now to the present case, the receipt of donation of Rs. 4,000/- to Rs. 5,000/- for advertisement in Souvenir has not been disputed by respondent No. 4. It has been stated in the affidavit of the Secretary of the Managing Committee of the Church which runs and manages the School that after receipt of the amount necessary advertisement is published and Souvenir released. It has also been stated that petitioner No. 3 never raised any grievance or made any complaint. Regarding computer education the affidavit states that the subject was introduced at the request of the parents in order to keep pace with the changing world, right from the beginning and it has been denied that computer education has been unauthorisedly imposed upon the students for monetary gain. The allegation of petitioner No. 3 that his daughter was not permitted to attend classes has been denied and it has been pleaded that petitioner No. 3 was directed to send his daughter to school and pay the arrears of fee. Regarding computer subject for the daughter of petitioner No. 3, it has been stated that when 95-98% of the students in the class desire to opt for computer science classes, how can it be feasible and practicable to keep one solitary student out or made to sit idle, is a matter to be thought over. 17. From the averments made in the aforesaid affidavit, it does not appear computer subject was an optional subject for the students upto Standard IX. The aforesaid affidavit shows that it is not even the case of the school that it is an optional subject. The State of Maharashtra has issued a Circular directing that computer education has to be optional even for Standards IX and X. Contrary to the stand in the affidavit, in oral submission it was contended that the subject was optional though it was not disputed that petitioner No. 3's daughter was the only child who had not opted for computer education. According to the Government Circular, if computer education for Standards lower than Standard IX is introduced, there cannot be levy of any fee or charge. Under these circumstances, we direct that henceforth, no computer fee would be charged for the students from Standard I to Standard VIII. 18. According to the Government Circular, if computer education for Standards lower than Standard IX is introduced, there cannot be levy of any fee or charge. Under these circumstances, we direct that henceforth, no computer fee would be charged for the students from Standard I to Standard VIII. 18. We need not go into the reasons for all name of petitioner No. 3's child having been deleted from the School since the School has taken the stand that if petitioner No. 3 so wants he can even now send both his children to the School and on payment of arrears of fee etc., they will be so admitted. Under these circumstances, it is for petitioner No. 3 now to make up his mind and if he wants his children to be re-admitted in respondent No. 4 School, he should make payment of arrears of fee within two weeks and his children shall be admitted in the School. 19. Dealing now with the payment of Rs. 4,000/- to Rs. 5,000/- for publication of advertisements in Souvenir, we may note that the Souvenirs produced before us by Respondent No. 4 show that the same contain only advertisements and no other material. Many advertisements are also in personal individual names. It was submitted by Counsel for the petitioners that these advertisements were from those who may be self-employed or in service. It has not been disputed. The School, despite grant of opportunity by us, did not give any details about the expenses which may have been incurred on publication of such souvenirs. The only stand taken by Respondent No. 4 School is that it is for the Authorities under Act to take appropriate action. A perusal of the Souvenirs shows that they are published not by the School but by the society which runs and manages the School. It seems evident that most of the parents are made to pay the aforesaid amount towards the Souvenir. The School did not place any material before us to demonstrate why it was necessary to charge these amounts and what amounts were spent on publication and how the surplus amounts were dealt with. Respondent No. 4 has completely suppressed these material facts. The Management of the School under the guise or mask of charges for advertisements, cannot be allowed to amass such sums at or about the time of admission of the children in the School. Respondent No. 4 has completely suppressed these material facts. The Management of the School under the guise or mask of charges for advertisements, cannot be allowed to amass such sums at or about the time of admission of the children in the School. Collection of such amount is clearly in violation of the afore-noticed provisions of the Act. It is in nature of capitation fee. It is no one's case that any approval under section 4 of the Act was obtained. We may also observe that the Authorities under the Act have not been vigilant. Had the Authorities been vigilant they would have noticed collection of such amounts by the Society. They ought to have resorted to appropriate action against the School under the provisions of the Act. 20. Turning now to the case of Respondent No. 5 School, from the facts and circumstances of the case it is not possible to accept the contention that the deposit has no co-relation with the admission of the student and there is no quid pro quo. It may be correct that the deposits are refundable at the time when the students leave the school but that is of no much relevance. It is not disputed that deposit is given on behalf of almost every student with very few exceptions. The contention that such a deposit would not come within the meaning of prohibition under the Act is merely stated to be rejected in view of the clear and unambiguous language of section 3 and 4 of the Act. The further contention that admissions are first finalised and thereafter deposit is asked for and as such it is not in contravention of section 3 or section 4 of the Act is also without any merit. The letter which Respondent No. 5 School has issued to the parents clearly shows that the deposit is not voluntary and the plea of everyone being persuaded and not pressurised to pay the same is only a camouflage. Similarly, the plea that the parents have not objected is again of no substance, for there may be variety of reasons for most of the parents not objecting to it, but that does not lead to the conclusion that the provisions of the Act can be violated with immunity. Similarly, the plea that the parents have not objected is again of no substance, for there may be variety of reasons for most of the parents not objecting to it, but that does not lead to the conclusion that the provisions of the Act can be violated with immunity. The letter placed on record by Respondent No. 5 school shows that when parents are informed about admission of their children in the school in the Nursery class they are asked to pay the fees for the first Term i.e. Class Fee, Admission Fee, Term Fee and Tuition Fee. The letter asking for deposit of the fee also states: "further, the refundable deposit (interest free) of Rs. 20,000/- will also have to be paid together with the fees". With such a letter being issued and when admittedly almost all parents make the deposit, it is not open to the school to contend that the deposit has no co-relation with the admissions of the students. It is evident that whoever wants admission of his ward in the school has to pay the demanded sum to be kept as an interest-free deposit by the school. 21. The further contention that section 4(1) of the Act will come into play on the Authorities prescribing the fee and since the same has not been prescribed, the bar contained therein will not be applicable is also without any substance. It is evident that Respondent No. 5 school has been asking the Authorities, from time to time, to approve the increase in the fees. Such increase for certain Standards in the school was last approved in the year 1990. Respondent No. 5 school has been making requests for increase during the subsequent years as well. It appears that without getting the requisite approval Respondent No. 5 has been unilaterally increasing the fees. The further contention that for Primary and Pre-Primary Classes in the school, no bench mark of fee having been fixed by the Authorities. Sections 3 and 4 will not apply is without any merit. In this respect, reference can also be made to Grants-in-Aid Code for Approved Private Bombay Schools in Greater Bombay, including the provisions laying down conditions of recognition. Under Rule 5 BB of the said Code, the schools have been prohibited from taking any such deposit. However, a lot deserves to be said against the Authorities as well. In this respect, reference can also be made to Grants-in-Aid Code for Approved Private Bombay Schools in Greater Bombay, including the provisions laying down conditions of recognition. Under Rule 5 BB of the said Code, the schools have been prohibited from taking any such deposit. However, a lot deserves to be said against the Authorities as well. They have been sitting over the requests for enhancement of the fees for years together. Learned Advocate General submits that enhancement with retrospective has been granted now during pendency of writ petition. The Authorities have also not taken any action against the school for having taken the deposits in question. The Authorities have to be ever vigilant. Had it been so, the factum of such deposits would have come to their notice. It also seems that even before sending letter seeking approval for enhancement of fee, the fee was in fact enhanced. In none of the letters respondent No. 5 has disclosed that it is required to take deposits as it cannot meet the expenses from the amount of fee. At no stage permission was sought to take deposits. It is only now that a contention has been put forth that without the deposits the school will not be able to meet the expenses to be incurred in connection with the running of the school. If it was so, the schools should have taken up the matter with the Authorities for permission to enhance the fee structure. Learned Advocate-General very fairly conceded inaction of the Authorities on this count. We may further notice that a perusal of Secondary School Code also clearly shows that there is no substance in the contention that the fee has not been prescribed. Rule 3.2 of the said Code provides for the conditions which are required to be complied with by a school seeking recognition. The recognition granted can be withdrawn under Rule 7.1 if the school does not comply with those conditions. Sub-rule (9) of Rule 3.2 provides for rates of fee, which should be according to the instructions issued by the Department from time to time. Section VI of the Code, inter alia, makes provision for fees. Rule 7 provides for withdrawal of recognition if the school has ceased to fulfil the conditions of recognition. Sub-rule (9) of Rule 3.2 provides for rates of fee, which should be according to the instructions issued by the Department from time to time. Section VI of the Code, inter alia, makes provision for fees. Rule 7 provides for withdrawal of recognition if the school has ceased to fulfil the conditions of recognition. We have no manner of doubt that collection of the deposits, though interest-free, amounts to capitation fee within the meaning of the Act. It is clearly illegal. The contention that refundable deposit is not capitation fee is without any merit. It is not the label of the deposit but the substance which is material. On the aforesaid facts there can be no doubt that in substance and for all intents and purposes, the deposit, is in the nature of capitation fee. 22. Elaborate submissions were made on behalf of Respondent No. 5 school to show how these amounts were being invested and how the interest amount was being spent for meeting the expenditure in connection with the running of the school. On the other hand, it was contended with equal vehemence on behalf of the petitioners that the expenses were inflated besides the same being bogus and doubtful. It was contended that the account being produced by the school were nothing but jugglery of accounts. According to the petitioners, the amounts are being misappropriated by the Trustees. The thrust of the allegation of the petitioners is that it is a clear case of commercialisation and profiteering from education. 23. As, in our view, the amount of deposit is in the nature of capitation fee, henceforth the acceptance of any such deposit except with the prior approval of the authorities cannot be permitted. 24. Mr. Sawant submits that now government has appointed a Committee to look into the matter when the schools ask for increase in the fee. As already observed, in past there has been total inaction on the part of the authorities. 25. In view of aforesaid discussion, our conclusions are: (a) Demand or collection of any amount either as interest free deposit or charges for advertisement or in any other name at or about the time of admission of a ward in a school without approval of the authorities is illegal. 25. In view of aforesaid discussion, our conclusions are: (a) Demand or collection of any amount either as interest free deposit or charges for advertisement or in any other name at or about the time of admission of a ward in a school without approval of the authorities is illegal. (b) No computer fee is chargeable from Standard I to Standard VIII, except with the approval of the State Government; (c) The State Government/Authorities are required to remain vigilant and under obligation to take appropriate steps when violation of the Act comes to light. 26. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, including inaction on the part of the Authorities as also the plea that the amounts collected by Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 or income derived therefrom were utilized towards incurring expenses of the school, at this stage, instead of straightaway issuing directions for refund of the amounts collected during the last so many years, we direct the State Government to examine the matter and submit a report to this Court within three months. For this purpose, the State Government is directed to appoint a Committee of experts which shall go into the aspect of the amounts collected by the schools as aforesaid and income derived or derivable therefrom and report whether the said amounts were used for incurring genuine expenses of the school or it was otherwise. The Committee will give opportunity of hearing to representatives of the petitioners and also to School Management. The School Management are directed to produce before the Committee such record as may be demanded from them. On examination of the said report, this Court would consider as to what directions should be issued, including refund of amounts to the parents and/or transfer of the amounts collected or income derived by the school therefrom to a welfare fund for development of education. 27. Before concluding, we direct that Authorities to issue to schools within one month a Circular prescribing the time schedule upto which request for increase in the fee or other similar requests may be made by the school managements. Such requests shall not remain pending for more than three months. It would be appropriate if the Authorities also frame broad guidelines and factors to be kept in view while considering requests for enhancement of fee or demand for other charges or deposits. 28. Such requests shall not remain pending for more than three months. It would be appropriate if the Authorities also frame broad guidelines and factors to be kept in view while considering requests for enhancement of fee or demand for other charges or deposits. 28. The case to stand over for three months for directions. 29. Rule is made absolute in aforesaid terms. 30. In view of the order on the writ petition, nothing survives in the Notice of Motion and the same stands disposed of accordingly. Petition allowed. -----