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1999 DIGILAW 395 (ORI)

SARASWATI PANDA v. BANABIHARI MALIA

1999-11-10

P.K.MISRA

body1999
JUDGMENT : P.K. Misra, J. - Plaintiff is the Appellant against a reversing decree. The, suit was filed for declaration of title, confirmation of possession or, in the alternative, recovery of possession and for permanent injunction. The Plaintiff is the sister of the Defendant. It is claimed that the disputed property was purchased by the father of the parties in the year 1935. According to the Plaintiff it was the.self-acquired property of her father, who has been examined as p. w. 2. Subsequently, the disputed property was sold to the Plaintiff by registered sale deed dated 8-1-1982. As the Defendant threatened to dispossess the Plaintiff, the suit had to be filed. 2. The Defendant in his written statement pleaded that the disputed property was the, joint family property of the Defendant and his father and as such his father had no exclusive right to sell the 'property to the Plaintiff. It was claimed that the disputed property had been purchased by the father of the parties by selling away the ancestral homestead land. It is further claimed that the father of the parties did not have sufficient income to acquire any property. It was further claimed that the sale deed executed in favour of the Plaintiff was a nominal transaction without any consideration. 3. The trial court found that the disputed property had been purchased by the father of the parties from his own earnings and not by selling the ancestral homestead. It was further held that the father had every right to sell his self-acquired property to the Plaintiff. On these findings, the suit was decreed. 4. In appeal, the lower appellate court found that the disputed property was the joint family property having been purchased by the father of the parties after selling ancestral homestead. It was also found that even assuming that it was self acquired property, the property was treated as a joint family property by the parties including p. w. 2. The sale deed in favour of the Plaintiff was found to be a nominal sale deed not supported by payment of consideration. On these findings, the decision of the trial court was reversed. 5. The sale deed in favour of the Plaintiff was found to be a nominal sale deed not supported by payment of consideration. On these findings, the decision of the trial court was reversed. 5. In this Second Appeal, at the time of admission, the following substantial question of law was indicated by order dated 4-4-1991: The substantial question involved in this Second Appeal is that when there is no evidence that the father of the Appellant had any ancestral property excepting the house which was sold since long and there is no evidence that the income out of this ancestral property was sufficient for purchase of the property in question, no presumption in law could be drawn that the suit property was acquired out of the joint family property. Though it was not exclusively taken as a ground under ground No. 7, it was argued by Mr. Swamy at the time of admission. Apart from the question of law indicated, an alternative question arises as to. Whether, assuming that Plaintiff's right on the basis of sale deed from the father is not established, the Plaintiff's right on the basis of Deed of Settlement (Ext. B) can be recognised ? This question arises as an alternative question, as, if the Plaintiff succeeds on the main question raised, there may not be any necessity to answer this additional question. 6. The learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant submitted that the evidence of p. w. 2, the father of the parties, indicates that the ancestral homestead belonging to p. w. 2 and his ancestors had been sold away long back prior to the acquisition of the disputed property in the year 1935 and as such, the finding of the lower appellate court that the disputed property had been purchased by utilising the sale proceeds of the sale of ancestral homestead land cannot be sustained. In this connection, the learned Counsel for the Appellant has placed reliance upon the decisions reported in Madan Lal Vs. Mst. Gopi and Another, ; Budhwanti and Another Vs. Gulab Chand Prasad, and A.I.R 1988 SC 1958 (Dilbagrai Punjabi v. Sharad Chandra) to contend that when the lower appellate court has not considered the effect of important evidence on record, the finding of the lower appellate court cannot be sustained. 7. Mst. Gopi and Another, ; Budhwanti and Another Vs. Gulab Chand Prasad, and A.I.R 1988 SC 1958 (Dilbagrai Punjabi v. Sharad Chandra) to contend that when the lower appellate court has not considered the effect of important evidence on record, the finding of the lower appellate court cannot be sustained. 7. It is true that p. w. 2 has stated that the ancestral homestead had been sold away by his mother at a time when p. w. 2 was about 4 to 5 years old. The learned Counsel for the Appellant submits that since p. w. 2 was aged about 80 years at the time of deposition, it must be taken that such sale must have taken place in the year 1909 or 1910 and the disputed property having been purchased by p. w. 2 in the year 1935, the finding of the lower appellate court that the property was acquired by p.w. 2 by selling the ancestral homestead cannot be Sustained. The lower appellate court has also considered the evidence of p. w. 2, but came to a different conclusion on the basis of evidence of p. ws. 2 and 3. Moreover, p. w. 2 has stated that he heard about the sale of ancestral land from his mother. It was claimed by p. w. 2 that after sale of ancestral land. p. w. 2 and his mother were staying with maternal aunt (MAUSI). However, as observed by the lower appellate court, there is no such material to hold that, in fact, p. w. 2 and his mother were staying in some other place. Considering the various evidence' on record and the facts and circumstances of the case, the lower appellate court has come to a conclusion that the disputed property was purchased after selling away the ancestral homestead. This apparently is a finding of fact and by no stretch of imagination it can be said that this finding is based on no evidence. Apart from the above finding, the lower appellate court has come to an alternative finding that even assuming that the property was the self-acquired property of p. w. 2, it had been treated as joint family property by p. w. 2 and other family members. This finding is again based on discussion of evidence and other circumstances appearing from the record. This finding is again based on discussion of evidence and other circumstances appearing from the record. So, in either view of the matter, the finding of the lower appellate court that the disputed property was joint family property is to be confirmed. 8. Once it is found that the disputed property was joint family property, the question would arise as to whether p. W. 2 had the right to sell away the property without legal necessity. The person who purchases a joint family property must plead and prove that there is legal necessity for such alienation. In the present case, except the bald statement of Plaintiff, there is no material to hold that there was any legal necessity. Moreover, the lower appellate court has found that the sale deed itself was a nominal sale deed not being supported by payment of consideration. This finding of the lower appellate court that the sale deed was not supported by payment of consideration is also not successfully challenged in the present appeal. The finding is based on discussion of relevant evidence oh record and being apparently a finding of fact is biniding on the second appellate court. 9. In view of such conclusion, the Appellant cannot succeed on the ground indicated at the time of admission of the second appeal. However, the alternative question is required to be considered. Defendant has been examined as d. w. 1. He has stated in paragraph-6 of his examination-in-chief: 6. In 1972 father (p. w. 2) executed a registered deed of settlement granting life interest to p. w. 1 over the northern Ac.0.08 decimals out of the suit land. This was done only to prevent the chance of my negligence towards p. w. 1 in future. I agreed to such proposa1. Ext. B is the certified copy of the registered deed of settlement. While p. w. 2, the father, was being examined, it was elicited in cross-examination: 12. Prior to sale I bad given Ac.0.08 dec. of land to the Plaintiff giving her life interest therein. This was done in 1972. That settlement deed was written to my instruction and I had executed it after knowing its contents. The settlement deed was executed at the instance of the Defendant... Prior to sale I bad given Ac.0.08 dec. of land to the Plaintiff giving her life interest therein. This was done in 1972. That settlement deed was written to my instruction and I had executed it after knowing its contents. The settlement deed was executed at the instance of the Defendant... Thus from the categorical statement of Defendant himself as well as of father of the parties, it is apparent that a registered deed of settlement was executed with the consent of Defendant giving Ac.0.08 decimals of land from the northern side of the disputed land. No doubt, this alternative plea has not been taken by the Plaintiff in the plaint. However, since the Plaintiff had filed the suit for declaration in respect of the entire disputed land, and the alternative plea which could have been taken by the Plaintiff has been admitted by the Defendant himself, in the 15. First Appeal No. 338 of 1986Crl Appeal partly allowed.interest of justice, the right of Plaintiff in respect of such part of the property is required to be recognised. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, the Second Appeal is allowed in part. The right of the Plaintiff in respect of Ac..0.08 decimals of land as described in Ext. B is declared in accordance with the terms contained in Ext. B and she is entitled to recover possession of the same if she is dispossessed in the meantime. It is made clear that the balance Ac.0.12 decimals of land shall be considered to be the joint family property of Defendant and his father both of them having right of joint possession over the same. There would be no order as to costs. Second Appeal partly allowed. Final Result : Allowed