B. N. MALLIKARJUNA, J. ( 1 ) PLAINTIFFS in O. S. No. 4950 of 1987 on the file of the XX Additional city Civil Judge, Bangalore has filed this revision under Section 115 of the CPC challenging the legality and Correctness of the common order dated 21-1-1999 on I. As. 7 and 11. Respondents herein are the defendants. LA. 7 is an application under Order 23, Rule 3 of the CPC filed in court on 11-3-1994 signed by the plaintiff and the defendants other than defendants 1 and 2 reporting compromise in the matter. LA. 11 is the application filed by the defendants on 14-8-1995 under Order 23, Rule 9 (Proviso) read with Section 151 of the CPC requesting the Court not to record the compromise and to proceed with the trial of the suit. Learned trial Judge, after hearing both the parties, by the order impugned, has rejected LA. 7 and allowed LA. 11. This order is under challenge in this revision. ( 2 ) HEARD Sri Raghavan, learned Counsel for the petitioners. Sri Srinivasan, learned Counsel for respondents 1 and 2, Sri Ramesh for respondents 3 to 11 and Sri Ramaswamy Shastry for respondents 12 to 15. ( 3 ) BRIEFLY stated the facts are: plaintiff-Company described as M/s. Subramanyam and Company, a partnership firm represented by one N. A. Jayaram, filed the suit originally on 8-11-1987 against defendants 1 to 9 for specific performance of contract and to direct the defendants to execute the sale deed in respect of certain lands at Hongasandra Village, Begur Hobli, Bangalore South taluk, more fully prescribed in the plaint schedule. The other defendants are brought on record on 11-3-1994 in view of the orders on application la. VI. Plaintiffs' case is that the defendants entered into an agreement to sell dated 26-6-1981 agreeing to sell those properties subject to certain terms and conditions. Defendants appeared and resisted the suit and it is pending trial. In the meantime, on 11-3-1994, an application LA. 7 purported to be one under Order 23, Rule 3 of the CPC was filed in Court signed by the plaintiffs and defendants 3 to 8, defendants 8 and 12 to 14 were shown as minors and their respective guardians signed on their behalf. In the meantime, on 11-3-1994, an application LA. 7 purported to be one under Order 23, Rule 3 of the CPC was filed in Court signed by the plaintiffs and defendants 3 to 8, defendants 8 and 12 to 14 were shown as minors and their respective guardians signed on their behalf. How ever, no application was filed on behalf of defendants 8 and 12 to 14 as required under Order 32, Rule 7 (1) though they were shown as minors. Along with this LA. VII, two other applications LA. V, dated 9-3-1994 under Order 22, Rule 10 of the CPC to implead N. A. Jayaram as 2nd plaintiff and another application I. A. VI, dated 11-3-1994 under Order 1, rule 10 read with Section 151 of the CPC for impleading defendants 11 to 15, showing defendants 12 to 15 as minors, were filed. The suit was not for hearing either on 9-3-1994 or on 11-3-1994. An application under section 151 of the CPC (LA. IV) is filed on Court on 9-3-1994 for advancing the case and accordingly case is taken up on 11-3-1994, though original date of hearing was on 22-4-1994 (on 15-2-1994 it had been adjourned to 22-4-1994 ). ( 4 ) THE Court on receiving the application LA. VII, it is stated, recorded in the order sheet "they admit the execution of compromise petition" and adjourned the case to 16-3-1994. It is farther stated that on behalf of defendants 1 and 2, their Advocate signed the compromise petition LA. VII. On 21-3-1994, a certificate was filed signed by the advocate stating that the proposed compromise is beneficial to the minor defendants along with an affidavit sworn to by one Laxman for and on behalf of 11th defendant-Master Harish, another affidavit sworn to by Pillappa on behalf of 14th defendant-Master Venkatesh and another affidavit by Sumithra on behalf of defendant 7 (b), wherein they state that defendants 8 and 12 to 15 are minors and the compromise is also for the benefit of these minors. Matter adjourned and on 7-6-1994 another certificate to the same effect is filed. Subsequently, thereafter it would appear that the case for one reason or the other was adjourned from time to time and in the meantime something else has transpired which may not be very much necessary for the disposal of this revision. Matter adjourned and on 7-6-1994 another certificate to the same effect is filed. Subsequently, thereafter it would appear that the case for one reason or the other was adjourned from time to time and in the meantime something else has transpired which may not be very much necessary for the disposal of this revision. However, it may be stated that there is change of Advocate for the defendants and certain other Advocates have filed vakalat for them. Things as it stood, it is on 14-8-1995 application LA. II under proviso to rule 3 of Order 23 of the CPC is filed on behalf of defendants 3 to 8 requesting the Court to reject LA. 7. ( 5 ) IT may also be noted that there was another suit earlier by the plaintiff against some of these defendants for permanent injection and that is O. S. No. 2352 of 1984 and that was pending trial. On 19-7-1994, plaintiff madean application under Section 151 of the CPC requesting the Court to club these two suits and to record common evidence in both the matters. In view of the application LA. II, matter was posted for enquiry, plaintiff examined himself and closed the case by producing the documents Exs. P. 1 to 3. On behalf of the defendants, defendants 1, 4, 8 and one Narayanappa were examined, documents Exs. D. 1 to 4 were marked. Learned Trial Judge, after hearing the arguments of the parties and considering the evidence both oral and documentary, by the order impugned dated 21-1-1999 dismissed the application LA. 7 and allowed la. 11. In making the said order, Court has taken into consideration the non-compliance of Order 32, Rule 7 of the CPC, application filed for clubbing the two suits for recording common evidence and all other attending circumstances and holds that the compromise alleged to have been entered into between plaintiff and defendants 3 to 8 and other defendants 11 to 14 is not lawful. ( 6 ) SRI Raghavan, learned Counsel submitted that defendants who have challenged the compromise have not given the details of fraud or misrepresentation. Application I. A. 11 is accompanied by an affidavit sworn to by defendant 6, but he is not examined and as such the pleading is one thing and the evidence is altogether different. ( 6 ) SRI Raghavan, learned Counsel submitted that defendants who have challenged the compromise have not given the details of fraud or misrepresentation. Application I. A. 11 is accompanied by an affidavit sworn to by defendant 6, but he is not examined and as such the pleading is one thing and the evidence is altogether different. But the Trial judge has ignored this aspect of the matter and there being no particulars of the alleged fraud or misrepresentation has made the order impugned and therefore it needs to be set aside. It is also contended that the application LA. 7 having been signed by the learned Advocate for all the defendants in the suit, the Court was not right in saying that the application not being signed by defendants 1 and 2, is not proper and in that view of the matter the Court should have considered the decision of the Apex Court in Byram Pestonji Gariwala v Union Bank of India and others. He also referred to certain variation and contradictions in the evidence of witnesses D. Ws. 1 to 4. Per Contra, Sri Srinivasan, learned Counsel for defendants 1 and 2 submits that defendants 1 and 2 heying not signed the compromise petition and having not authorised their Advocate to file a compromise on their behalf, Court was right in rejecting the compromise as not lawful. Sri Ramesh, learned Counsel for defendants 3 to 8 contends that the application LA. VII is devoid of merits, parties did not enter into any compromise, they were illiterate, they were misled and misrepresented and the application was filed by making an application for advancement of the case and this would in the facts and circumstances of the case clearly demonstrate that all was not well when the applications for compromise was filed in Court on 11-3-1994. Sri Ramaswamy Shastry, learned Counsel for respondents 12 to 15 contends that in fact according to the agreement some of them viz. , Harish-respondent 12, Anand-re-spondent 13, Rajanna-respondent 14 and Venkatesh-respondent 15 were parties to the alleged agreement dated 26-6-1981 and their ages is shown in the agreement and according to it they were majors on the day the application was filed. , Harish-respondent 12, Anand-re-spondent 13, Rajanna-respondent 14 and Venkatesh-respondent 15 were parties to the alleged agreement dated 26-6-1981 and their ages is shown in the agreement and according to it they were majors on the day the application was filed. But they have been shown as minors and this another circumstance would unmistakably demonstrate that the application is not the outcome of real compromise "between the parties but it was only a make believe story. There being no application on 11-3-1994 as required under Order 32, Rule 7 of the CPC, Court could not have acted on the compromise. Further, when the records show that they had attained majority, their guardians could not have entered into any compromise nor the Advocate without their authority could have signed the compromise. Further, it is their common arguments that the Court on 11-3-1994 having not recorded any compromise and proceeded to decree the suit accordingly, it was open to the Court at any time thereafter to reconsider its validity on the application of the defendants and to reject la. 7. Court has considered all these aspects of the matter and only then has rejected LA. 7 and allowed LA. 11. Order being proper and as there is no illegality nor irregularity in the procedure it is not amenable to revision under Section 115 of the CPC. ( 7 ) ON a careful scrutiny of the rival contentions, I find considerable merit in the arguments advanced on behalf of the defendants. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, it is necessary to bear in mind the dates on which the suit is instituted, dates of hearing in the suit, when the applications are filed and the other attending circumstances. ( 8 ) SUIT is filed in the year 1987 and it was pending. Parties have resisted the suit, issues are framed and the case was being adjourned from time to time for recording evidence. Case was posted for hearing on 15-2-1994 and on that day it was adjourned to 22-4-1994, it is on 9-3-1994 they have filed LA. IV under Section 151 of the CPC for advancement and on 11-3-1994 compromise petition LA. VII is filed. This application is not signed by defendants 1 and 2 and defendants 11 to 14 who had attained majority have also not signed. IV under Section 151 of the CPC for advancement and on 11-3-1994 compromise petition LA. VII is filed. This application is not signed by defendants 1 and 2 and defendants 11 to 14 who had attained majority have also not signed. It is the bone of contention on behalf of the other defendants that defendant 1 is the karta of the family, but he has not signed the applications. Moreover, on that date, Court has not accepted the compromise. It is only recorded: "they admit the execution of compromise petition" and adjourned the case. No other order is passed. Therefore, the question would be whether the court in the facts and circumstances of the case was bound to record the compromise and proceed to dispose of the suit accordingly even though the application LA. II was filed on 14-8-1995, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff has not insisted for decreeing the suit in terms of compromise petition (LA. VII) in between 11-3-1994 and 14-8-1995. It is needless to say that if the compromise is lawful, Court has a duty and not a discretion to record the said compromise and proceed to dispose of the suit accordingly. ( 9 ) PARTIES have filed two other applications on that day, one of them is under Order 22, Rule 10 of the CPC (LA. V ). Suit was by a partnership firm represented by one N. A. Jayaram. It is stated in LA. V that the rights of the firm are assigned in favour of N. A. Jayaram and he is entitled to prosecute the suit, he is brought on record on 11-3-1994 as 2nd plaintiff and he signs the application LA. 7 for compromise. It is pertinent to note certain terms and condition of the compromise. Conditions 3, 6, 7 and 8 which read as under:"3. The defendants acknowledge having received full consideration in terms of the said agreement dated 26-6-1981 and further defendants received a sum of Rs. 50,000/- as additional consideration amount by cash as per this compromise. 6. The defendants agree and undertake to execute a sale deed lawfully conveying the suit schedule property to the 2nd plaintiff within a period of 30 days from this date. 7. 50,000/- as additional consideration amount by cash as per this compromise. 6. The defendants agree and undertake to execute a sale deed lawfully conveying the suit schedule property to the 2nd plaintiff within a period of 30 days from this date. 7. If the defendants should fail to execute the sale deed within a period of 30 days hereof, 2nd plaintiff shall be entitled to apply to this Hon'ble Court for execution of the sale deed and the defendants have no objection whatsoever for the sale deed to be executed by this Hon'ble Court. 8. The defendants further agree and declare that they shall not disturb the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the 2nd plaintiff to the suit schedule property and in view of this, it is agree that the suit being O. S. No. 2352 of 1984 shall be dismissed as withdrawn". Condition No. 3 says that a sum of Rs. 50,000/- was paid on the date of agreement as additional consideration. Condition No. 6 requires the defendants to execute a sale deed within 30 days from 11-3-1994. Condition no. 7 stipulates that in the event of failure to execute the sale deed within 30 days, 2nd plaintiff would be entitled to apply to the Court for execution of the sale deed and in that event defendants will have no objection for the Court to execute the sale deed. Condition No. 8 states that in view of the agreement by the defendants that they would not disturb the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property by 2nd plaintiff, suit in O. S. No. 2352 of 1984 would be dismissed as withdrawn. ( 10 ) BEFORE adverting to the detail, I would like to mention that no action is taken either by the 2nd plaintiff or on behalf of the 1st plaintiff asking the defendants to execute the sale deed in terms of the compromise deed till 14-8-1995 nor the suit in O. S. No. 2352 of 1984 was got dismissed as withdrawn. On the other hand, as I have stated earlier, on 19-7-1994 an application is filed under Section 151 of the CPC not by any other person but by the plaintiff requesting the Court to club two suits O. S. No. 2352 of 1984 and O. S. No. 4950 of 1987 and to record common evidence. On the other hand, as I have stated earlier, on 19-7-1994 an application is filed under Section 151 of the CPC not by any other person but by the plaintiff requesting the Court to club two suits O. S. No. 2352 of 1984 and O. S. No. 4950 of 1987 and to record common evidence. The inaction on the part of the plaintiff between 11-3-1994 and 14-8-1995 concerning the terms of the compromise and an application for clubbing the two suits and to record common evidence without getting one of the suits dismissed as not pressed indicates in the absence of any other explanation that the parties did not desire a decree in the suit in terms of the compromise petition. When the plaintiffs contend that the learned Advocate signed that compromise petition on behalf of defendants 1 and 2 and also on behalf of assumed minor defendants (defendants 8 and 12 to 14), they could have asked the Court to proceed to pass a decree instead of filing an application for clubbing the suits and recording common evidence. These circumstances are required to be borne in mind in appreciating the oral evidence on record as has been done by the learned Trial Judge. ( 11 ) PLAINTIFFS' suit is based on the agreement dated 26-6-1981. In the document, age of respondent 12-Harish is shown as 6 years, respondent 13-Anand as 8 years, respondent 14-Rajanna is shown as 6 years and respondent 15-Venkatesh as 15 years and that is on 26-6-1981. Therefore, on 11-3-1994 their ages would be 18 plus, 20 plus, 18 plus and 27 years respectively, but they are shown as minors in the application LA. 7 and the respective guardians have signed on their behalf may be they have given the vakalat to their Advocate. Order 32, Rule 7 requires that in such a situation next friend or guardian as the case may be to file an affidavit seeking leave of the Court to compromise the matter on behalf of the minor. Rule 7 (1) (A) requires that such an application should be accompanied by an affidavit of the guardian or a certificate by an Advocate if he is represented by an Advocate. Rule 7 (1) (A) requires that such an application should be accompanied by an affidavit of the guardian or a certificate by an Advocate if he is represented by an Advocate. Order 32, Rule 7 (2) as amended by Karnataka requires the guardian to explain in the affidavit the manner in which the proposed agreement or other action is expected to be for the benefit of the minor. In the instant case, admittedly, no such application is filed either under Order 32, Rule 1 or Order 32, Rule 7 (2) of the cpc as required under law. There are no affidavits by the guardians to any one of these minors explaining as to how the proposed compromise would benefit the minors. One certificate is filed on 21-3-1994 and a similar certificate on 7-6-1994, at any rate not along with the application. So also no affidavits are filed on the day the compromise petition was filed, but they are filed on a subsequent date viz. , on 21-3-1994. Even in those affidavits the manner in which the proposed compromise would benefit the minors is not explained, except requesting the Court to admit the compromise on behalf of the minors. In these circumstances, i genuinely feel that if those guardians were explained or told about the contents of the application (LA. VII), they would not have signed the said application as guardians of those defendants 8 and 12 to 14. The Trial Court is therefore right in saying that the application LA. 7 not being accompanied by an application or other material as required under Order 32, Rule 7 of the CPC cannot be entertained. Therefore, it would be difficult to say that the order impugned suffers from any illegality. ( 12 ) SRI Raghavan, learned Counsel, argued that particulars of the fraud or misrepresentation are not pleaded and even if it is pleaded the person who has filed the affidavit viz. , defendant 6 is not examined. Therefore, in the circumstances, it would amount that the pleading is one thing and the evidence is another thing or there is evidence but there are no proper pleadings and therefore the Court was not right in rejecting LA. 7. I find no merit in this argument. , defendant 6 is not examined. Therefore, in the circumstances, it would amount that the pleading is one thing and the evidence is another thing or there is evidence but there are no proper pleadings and therefore the Court was not right in rejecting LA. 7. I find no merit in this argument. ( 13 ) IN view of legal infirmity noticed in the proceedings and the other attending circumstances herein above stated, I am of the considered view that it is not desirable or proper to enter into detail discussion about certain developments in the suit in between the two dates or about the letter Ex. D. 1 or Ex. P. 2 or about what transpired between the defendants and the learned Advocates, who appeared for them at the relevant time. The learned Advocate for the revision petitioner-plaintiff submitted that whole of the oral evidence bristles with contradictions and this has not been noticed by the learned Trial Judge. There may be certain contradictions or omissions in the evidence but in the circumstances of the case it would be difficult to say that the appreciation of evidence both oral and documentary is not proper. It is equally difficult to say that the understanding and appreciation is either perverse or unreasonable. ( 14 ) THE other grievance is that the Court has totally ignored the law laid down by the Apex Court in Byram Pestonji Gariwala's case, supra, in the matter of accepting an application for compromise signed by an advocate on behalf of the parties. In this context, he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Byram Pestonji Gariwala's case, supra. Suffice it to say that in a subsequent case in Banwari Lal v Smt. Chando Devi (through L. R.) and Another, the Apex Court referring to the earlier decisions in Gurpreet Singh v Chatur Bhuj Goel, and Byram pestonji Gariwals's case, supra, has said that the Court is required to record the compromise only after being satisfied that the agreement or the compromise entered into between the parties is lawful and not otherwise. It would be necessary to refer what the Apex Court has said in banwari Lai's case, supra, after referring to the decision in Byram pestonji Gariwala's case, supra. "10. . . . It would be necessary to refer what the Apex Court has said in banwari Lai's case, supra, after referring to the decision in Byram pestonji Gariwala's case, supra. "10. . . . THE requirement of the petition of compromise being signed by the parties concerned has been considered also in the case of byram Pestonji Gariwala, supra. It appears the attention of learned Judges was not drawn to the aforesaid case of this Court in Gurpreet Singh, supra. 11. The present case depicts as to how on 27-2-1991 the Court recorded the alleged agreement and compromise in a casual manner. It need not be impressed that Rule 3 of Order 23 does not require just a seal of approval from the Court to an alleged agreement or compromise said to have been entered into between the parties. The statute requires the Court to be first satisfied that the agreement or compromise which has been entered into between the parties is lawful, before accepting the same. Court is expected to apply its judicial mind while examining the terms of the settlement before the suit is disposed of in terms of the agreement arrived at between the parties. It need not be pointed out that once such a petition of compromise is accepted, it becomes the order of the Court and acquires the sanctity of a judicial order. 12. . . . . 13. . . . . 14. . . . . The Court before which it is alleged by one of the parties to the alleged compromise that no such compromise had been entered between the parties that the Court has to decide whether the agreement or compromise in question was lawful and not void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act. If the agreement or the compromise, itself is fraudulent then it shall be deemed to be void within the meaning of the explanation to the proviso to Rule 3 and as such not lawful. The learned subordinate Judge was perfectly justified in entertaining the application filed on behalf of the appellant and considering the question as to whether there had been a lawful agreement or compromise on the basis of which the court could have recorded such agreement or compromise on 27-2-1991. The learned subordinate Judge was perfectly justified in entertaining the application filed on behalf of the appellant and considering the question as to whether there had been a lawful agreement or compromise on the basis of which the court could have recorded such agreement or compromise on 27-2-1991. Having come to the conclusion on the material produced that the compromise was not lawful within the meaning of Rule 3, there was no option left except to recall that order". Here the one circumstance i. e. , showing some of the defendants as minors who were in fact not minors on 11-3-1994 by itself reduces the credibility of the alleged compromise. Therefore, guardians signing the application on their behalf or the Advocate filing power for the minors represented by their guardians will not improve the case of the plaintiff nor the Court was bound to act on such compromise petition. ( 15 ) IT is needless to say that minors are incompetent to enter into an agreement in view of Section 11 of the Contract Act. Suppose, we accept the case of the plaintiff that some of them were minors, they would not have entered into a compromise in the absence of proper guardians and an application under Order 32, Rule 7 of the CPC or a certificate. But no such application or certificate is filed on 11-3-1994 along with LA. VII, the compromise petition. The certificate and the affidavits of the guardians on subsequent dates are not in accordance with the requirement of law. On the other hand, ages shown in the agreement dated 26-6-1981 upon which the suit is based demonstrates that those defendants had attained majority on 11-3-1994. It is unfortunate that this is not noticed by the concerned even though the affidavits and the certificates are filed in Court long after the application for compromise is filed. LA. VII is filed on 11-3-1994, certificates and affidavits are filed on 21-3-1994 and on 7-6-1994. Defendants 1 and 2 have not signed the compromise petition, advocate appears to have signed on behalf of the minors who were in fact not minors on 11-3-1994, they are brought on record only on that day and the compromise petition is filed on a day in between the two regular hearing dates by filing an application to advance the case. These circumstances, in the absence of any other satisfactory explanation would only indicate that the application for compromise (LA. VII) is filed in a hurry and haste. I do not wish to elaborate any further in the matter. However, in view of the reasons hereinabove stated, I am totally convinced that the order impugned neither suffers from any illegality nor irregularity warranting interference by this Court in exercise of revisional power under Section 115 of the CPC. Revision petition therefore fails. ( 16 ) ACCORDINGLY, this revision petition is dismissed with costs. Before concluding, I would like to observe that the suits are of the years 1984 and 1987. Having regard to the circumstances, it would be just and appropriate to direct the Trial Court to expedite the disposal of the two suits as expeditiously as possible and at any rate on or before 31-12-1999. --- *** --- .