Judgment :- Challenging the award of Rs. 1,26,000/- as against the total claim of compensation of Rs. 2,00,000/-, the present appeal has been filed by the Thiruvallur Transport Corporation on the ground of quantum. 2. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant-Corporation would submit that the multiplier of 15 is on the higher side and that though there is documentary evidence to show that the deceased was earning about Rs. 700/- per month, the Tribunal found that the monthly income of the deceased was Rs. 1,000/- even without any documentary evidence for the balance of Rs. 300/-. 3. Heard the counsel for the respondents. 4. This is a case where the accident took place due to the collision of two vehicles. The Tribunal, on consideration of the materials placed before it, concluded that the drivers of both the vehicles had conjoint and composite negligence and as such, both are equally liable to pay the compensation. 5. Regarding the negligence or the percentage of negligence, there is no appeal by either of the parties. However, it is urged in this appeal preferred by the Transport Corporation that the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal is highly excessive. 6. On a perusal of the documents, the, depositions and the impugned award, I am of the view that fixing the monthly income of the deceased at Rs. 1,000/- by the Tribunal is based upon the evidence of P.W.4., the daughter of the deceased. Though there is document available to show that the deceased was earning about Rs. 700/- per month. P.W.4 would specifically state that her deceased father would get Rs. 300/- more by writing accounts in other shops. There is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of P.W.4, especially when the claim was made in the petition on the basis of the monthly income of Rs. 1,000/-.. 7. Regarding the multiplier, the counsel for the appellant would submit that adopting the multiplier of 15 years is not proper. The Tribunal fixed the age of the deceased as 45, even though the evidence of the witnesses would show that the age of the deceased at the time of death was 40, in view of the fact that the medical evidence through the post-mortem report would reveal that the age of the deceased at the time of death was 45. Therefore, there is no difficulty in confirming the finding regarding age. 8. Therefore, there is no difficulty in confirming the finding regarding age. 8. Moreover, according to the Schedule, a multiplier of 15 can be adopted for a person who was aged about 45 years. Therefore, I do not find any merit in the submission made by the counsel appearing for the appellant that the quantum of compensation is on a higher side. 9. At the end, it is pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/claimants, in the impugned award, there is no reference for providing the amounts towards loss of consortium for the wife and loss of love and affection for the children and for funeral expenses. 10. There is no dispute that at the time of death of the deceased, the wife of the deceased was aged about 35 years. Totally, there are four children and out of them, three persons were minors. The deceased in this case was an Accountant working in Muniyandi Commission Shop at Dindigul. The entire family of the deceased consisting of his wife and four children were living only on his income. 11. On the date of accident, the deceased Srinivasan was travelling in a bus belonging to the appellant-Corporation from Madras to Trichy. The accident took place near Siruvatchanur. While the bus in which the deceased was travelling was trying to overtake the lorry going ahead of the bus in the same direction, both the vehicles got collided, since no sufficient space was given by the lorry driver. The deceased Srinivasan, a passenger in the bus, due to the accident, died on the spot itself. Therefore, the dependants/claimants claimed total compensation of Rs. 2,00,000/- under various heads. 12. As already indicated, the Tribunal correctly fixed the age of the deceased as 45 and correctly calculated the compensation on the basis of the multiplier theory adopting the multiplier of 15, instead of following the theory of longevity. But, in my view, the Tribunal ought to have awarded some more amount towards the other important heads, such as loss of consortium for wife and loss of love and affection for children and for funeral expenses. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 1,26,000/- only towards loss of income, though the total claim of compensation was Rs. 2,00,000/-. But, in my view, the Tribunal ought to have awarded some more amount towards the other important heads, such as loss of consortium for wife and loss of love and affection for children and for funeral expenses. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 1,26,000/- only towards loss of income, though the total claim of compensation was Rs. 2,00,000/-. In the light of these facts, the learned counsel for the claimants would request this Court to award suitable amount by adding some more amount towards the other important heads: 13. However, this is objected to by the learned Counsel for the appellant-Corporation that this Court cannot enhance the award of compensation without filing any cross-objection by the claimants. In order to substantiate this, the learned counsel for the appellant would cite the following decisions:— (1) Cheran Transport Corporation Ltd v. Mamdhammal (1998-3-L.W. 112); (2) Padmadevi Shankarrao & others v. Kabalsing & others (II (1985) A.C.C. 99); (3) Adikanda Sethi v. Palani Swami Saran Transports (1997 5 S.C.C. 435); (4) National Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Ramachandran & others (II (1992)A.C.C. 448); and (5) State of Punjab v. Bakshish Singh (1998 8 S.C.C. 222). 14. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the claimants/respondents, would cite the decisions in Dangir v. Madhan Mohan ( AIR 1988 S.C. 54 ) and M.D., Pallavan Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Kalavathy (1998 IACJ 151) and would contend that even though the respondents have not filed any cross objection against the award passed by the Tribunal seeking for higher compensation, this Court has got power to enhance the compensation, if this Court finds that the amount awarded by the Tribunal is not just and adequate. 15. Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 confers on this Court the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against the award passed by the Claims Tribunal. The reading of the provision would reveal that the High Court has to deal with the said appeal presented before it under the Civil Procedure Code. 16. Since the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 empowers the High Court to hear the appeals, by virtue of Section 17 of the Act, the Civil Procedure Code is applicable to the High Court. Therefore, Order 41 of Civil Procedure Code is attracted when the High Court hears the appeal preferred to before it against the award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. Therefore, Order 41 of Civil Procedure Code is attracted when the High Court hears the appeal preferred to before it against the award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. This is the view taken by a Bench of this Court in Marker Naidu v. S. Dharman (1986 A.C.J. 178). 17. In National Insurance Co Ltd. v. Ramachandran and others (supra), a Division Bench of this Court has also held that Order 41, Rule 33 Civil Procedure Code is applicable to the Claims Tribunal Cases and that once the matter comes before this Court in appeal against the award of the Tribunal, the said provision is applicable just like any other first appeal which comes before this Court. 18. Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as under-33. Power of Court of Appeal:— The appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and made any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further Or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection and may, where there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees. 19. As pointed out by the Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Bakshish Singh (supra), the reading of the provision would make it clear that the appellate court has got wide power to do complete justice between the parties and which enables this Court to pass such decree or order as ought to have been passed or as the nature of the case may require notwithstanding that the party in whose favour the power is sought to be exercised has not filed any appeal or cross-objection. 20. “In view of the clear wordings of this provision, there is no substance in the submission made by the counsel for-the appellant that this Court has no power to enhance the quantum of compensation in the absence of any appeal or cross-objection. 21. 20. “In view of the clear wordings of this provision, there is no substance in the submission made by the counsel for-the appellant that this Court has no power to enhance the quantum of compensation in the absence of any appeal or cross-objection. 21. Of course, it is true that this discretion has to be exercised with care and caution and that too, in rare cases where the order has been passed which is wholly uncalled for in the circumstances of the case. In other words, though this Court under the garb of Order 41, Rule 33 cannot enlarge the scope of the appeal, the appeal powers can certainly be exercised in a given ease and such an exercise depends upon the nature and facts of each case. 22. The Apex Court in Dhangir v. Madhan Mohan (supra), by referring O. 41, R. 33, would make the following observation:— “The appellate Court could exercise the power under R. 33 even if the appeal is only against a part of the decree of the lower Court. The appellate Court could exercise that power in favour of all or any of the” respondents although such respondent may not have filed any appeal or objection. The weep of the power under R. 33 is wide enough to determine any question not only between the appellant and respondent, but also between respondent and co-respondents. The appellate Court could pass any decree or order which ought to have been passed in the circumstances of the case. The words ‘as the case may require’ used in R. 33 of O. 41 have been put in wide terms to enable the appellate Court to pass any order or decree to meet the ends of justice. What then should be the constraint? We do not find many. We are giving any liberal interpretation. The rule itself is liberal enough. The only constraints that we could see may be these: That the parties before the lower Court should be there before the appellate Court. The question raised must properly arise out of judgment of the lower Court. If these two requirements are there, the appellate Court could consider any objection against any part of the judgment or decree of the lower Court. It is true that the power of the appellate Court under R. 33 is discretionary. The question raised must properly arise out of judgment of the lower Court. If these two requirements are there, the appellate Court could consider any objection against any part of the judgment or decree of the lower Court. It is true that the power of the appellate Court under R. 33 is discretionary. But, it is a proper exercise of judicial discretion to determine all questions urged in order to render complete justice between the parties. The Court should not refuse to exercise that discretion on mere technicalities.” 23. So, in the light of the above observation of the Apex Court, I have no hesitation to hold that the Tribunal ought to have awarded compensation towards otherr important heads also. Raising mere technical objection by the counsel appearing for the appellants that those things cannot be considered in the absence of any appeal or cross-objection would amount to asking this Court to shut its eye over the infirmity found in the award by not apportioning suitable damages towards loss of consortium for young wife and loss of love and affection for minor children. 24. Moreover, the two requirements, as indicated by the Apex Court in the decisions referred to above are very much available here in the instant appeal so as to entitle this Court make a suitable amendment with regard to the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal. 25. Even the decision cited by the counsel for the appellant would not state that this Court has no power for enhancing the compensation in the absence of any appeal. 26. In such circumstances, I am at a loss to understand as to how the learned counsel appearing for the appellant would make before this Court such preposterous plea that this Court cannot enhance the compensation in the absence of any cross-objection, more particularly when Rule 33 itself closely spell out the power of this Court to go into the quantum of award of the Tribunal, even in the absence of any appeal by the respondent. 27. In view of the above discussion, I am of the considered opinion that the award of compensation passed by the Tribunal shall be suitably modified as follows: The claimants are entitled to an amount of compensation of Rs. 1,26,000/- towards loss of income, as already awarded by the Tribunal. 27. In view of the above discussion, I am of the considered opinion that the award of compensation passed by the Tribunal shall be suitably modified as follows: The claimants are entitled to an amount of compensation of Rs. 1,26,000/- towards loss of income, as already awarded by the Tribunal. In addition to the said amount, the claimants are entitled to an amount of Rs. 15,000/- towards loss of consortium for wife, Rs. 15,000/- towards loss of love and affection for the children and Rs. 4,000/- for funeral expenses. After these amounts are added to the award already passed by the Tribunal, the total amount of compensation to which the claimants are entitled come to Rs. 1,60,000/-, which is within the original claim. 28. As held by the Tribunal that both the lorry driver and the bus driver are equally negligent, the Insurance Company on behalf of the lorry owner and the appellant-Corporation on behalf of the bus driver are liable to pay this amount of compensation equally. This amount should be paid along with the interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of claim petition till realisation. The respondents/claimants are directed to pay the required Court-fee for the enhanced amount. 29. With this observation, the appeal is disposed of. No costs.