HARI NATH TILHARI, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision petition under Sec. 19 (4) of the Family Court Act (as amended by Act No. 59 of 1991) arises from the judgment and order dt. 15-4-1998 passed by Smt. Rathnakala, II Addi. Principal Judge, Bangalore, in Miscellaneous case No. 480/96 whereby the learned subordinate court has overruled the objections raised by the present revision petitioner to the maintainability of the application for maintenance under Sec. 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and has held that the petition under Sec. 125 was maintainable. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case in the nutshell are that the minor children of the revision petitioner filed the claim for maintenance under Sec. 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure against their mother who has been working as a woman police constable in Dlsoor Gate Mahila Police Station, Bangalore. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the present revision petitioner who was respondent before the Court below to the effect that the application for maintenance was not maintainable against the mother who is a female. The contention was to the same effect as has been raised here. The contention raised before the Court below was that Sec. 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only fastens the liability and make the petition under Sec. 125 maintainable against a male and not against a female including the mother and as such, the application under Sec. 125 should have been rejected. The learned Court below considered the matter and opined that the contention raised on behalf of the present revision petitioner i. e. respondent before it was without substance and rejected that contention and held that there was no bar for petitioners in the matter of their proceeding against their mother. As such, the petitioners mother has come up before this Court by revision under Sec. 115 of CPC. ( 3 ) IT has been contended, as a preliminary objection, on behalf of the respondents, that the petition is under Sec. 115 and was not maintainable. As such, the petitioners mother has come up before this Court by revision under Sec. 115 of CPC. ( 3 ) IT has been contended, as a preliminary objection, on behalf of the respondents, that the petition is under Sec. 115 and was not maintainable. ( 4 ) IT is one of the trite principles of law that if a petition is maintainable under a correct provision of law or powers are vested under a correct provision of law, then those powers can be exercisable by the Court and the reference to a wrong provision of law will not make the application to be not maintainable nor will make the order illegal. As such, even if revision is not maintainable under Section 115, real course open to the person affected by the order, could be under Section 19 of Family Court's Act. I propose to deal with this question whether revision is maintainable under Section 19 itself or not. But, before I proceed, I may also make a reference to the contention raised by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner on, merits. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that a perusal of language of Sec. 125 leads to that in Section 125 expression persont has to be read as referring to a male. It may refer to a husband it may refer to a father of the minor child. But person is not to be taken as to refer to the wife or to the mother of the minor children. He made reference to use of expression hist used in clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) to Sec. 125 and to the use of expression father with that of expression minor female child used in the proviso and on that basis learned counsel for the petitioner Sri. M. C. Ramachandra contended that a perusal of Sec. 125 per se reveals that application for maintenance filed by the minor children against the mother was not maintainable. He made a reference to a decision of Gujarat High Court in the case of Rajkumari v. Yashodadevi. 4 (a ). On behalf of the respondents Sri. M. B. Nanjunde Gowda submitted that the present revision petition is misconceived and is not maintainable even under Sec. 19 itself. Learned counsel contended that the order in question is not a final order. 4 (a ). On behalf of the respondents Sri. M. B. Nanjunde Gowda submitted that the present revision petition is misconceived and is not maintainable even under Sec. 19 itself. Learned counsel contended that the order in question is not a final order. It is in the nature of an inter-locutary order and final order is yet to be passed in the case. Learned counsel for the respondents placed his reliance on sub-sec. (5) of Sec. 19. While meeting his contention or preliminary objection learned counsel for petitioner made a reference to sub-sec. (4) (as amended) of Sec. 19 of Family Courts Act. As regards merits of the claim, it has been contended on behalf of the respondents in reply to the arguments of the petitioners counsel that person herein includes the natural person, a male or female and both are to be taken to be included in this. Sri Gowda contended Sec. 125 is a provision in nature of social welfare legislation to enable the divorced wife or minor children from the vagaries of life and not to lead them to be subjected to frustration of life or destitution. Therefore, its being a social welfare legislation, it has to be interpreted in the best possible interest of the society and in the interest of social purpose keeping in view the provisions of General Clauses Act as well. 4a. As regards the preliminary objection, it will be appropriate at this juncture to quote the material portion of Sec. 19 of the Family Courts. Act. For our purpose, sub-section (4) and subsection (5) of Sec. 19 are material. Section 19:- Appeal: (1) (2) (3) (4) The High Court may, of its own motion or otherwise, call for and examine the record of any proceeding in which the Family Court situate within the jurisdiction passed an order under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order, not being an interlocutory order, and as to the regularity of such proceeding. (5) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, order or decree of a Family Court. (5) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, order or decree of a Family Court. A reading of sub-sections (4) and (5) clearly reveals from the orders passed under Code of Criminal Procedure, revision may lie to this Court subject to certain conditions namely that order impugned should be an order of final nature and not an interlocutory order. It has to be taken note of no revision is maintainable from the interlocutory order even if order is passed under Criminal Procedure Code. Further the purpose of this power is that Court has to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order and as to the regularity of these proceedings. But, apart from the orders of final nature and apart from orders passed under Chapter IX of Code of Criminal Procedure, no revision is entertain able under Sec. 19 (4 ). But, if the order passed under Criminal Procedure Code itself is of interlocutory nature, then it is not revisable under Sec. 19 (4) of the Act and no such order is revisable under Section 19 (4) nor is appealable in view of Section 19 (5 ). It means that orders if passed under the provisions of other Act, may be under Section 24 of Hindu Marriage Act or otherwise, revision may not be maintainable. Any way, I am not expressing any final opinion on reversibility of orders passed under Section 24 or Section 25 of Hindu Marriage Act or the like/under Section 19 (4 ). But, it clearly indicates that orders under Criminal Procedure Code may be revisable. In the Present case, a preliminary objection was raised as to the maintainability of the application against the order, The Court has prima facie held that application is maintainable, but the final order has yet to be passed granting maintenance. No doubt, if revision would have been maintainable under Section 115, such an order could be said to have amounted to a case decided under CPC, it means order being case decided could be challenged under Section 115. But, in view of express language of sub-section (5) of Section 19, revision under Section 115 would not have been maintainable from such an order. The final order could have been passed, after disposing of the objections as to maintainability of application, after determining the quantum of maintenance to be awarded. But, in view of express language of sub-section (5) of Section 19, revision under Section 115 would not have been maintainable from such an order. The final order could have been passed, after disposing of the objections as to maintainability of application, after determining the quantum of maintenance to be awarded. No such order is there. The present order being of interlocutory nature and not a final order, the revision from the present order could not be maintainable no doubt, had the order granting maintenance being passed as well after overruling the objections revision under Sec. 19 (4) would have been maintainable. If the application for maintenance would have been rejected holding that application for maintenance was not maintainable against the mother and so the claim for maintenance is rejected, definitely revision under Section 19 (4) would have been maintainable as that order would have amounted to a final order rejecting the claim for maintenance under Sec. 125 on the ground that the application was not maintainable. A nice question of law has been raised as to the question of maintainability of the maintenance application. It would be appropriate to refer to Sec. 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure:section 125. Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents. A nice question of law has been raised as to the question of maintainability of the maintenance application. It would be appropriate to refer to Sec. 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure:section 125. Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents. (1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain (a) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or (b) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself, or (c) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself, or (d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself, a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, at such monthly rate, nor exceeding five hundred rupees in the whole, as such Magistrate thinks fit and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct: Provided that the Magistrate may order the father of a minor female child referred to in clause (b) to make such allowance, until she attains her majority, if the Magistrate is satisfied that the husband of such minor female child, if married, is not possessed of sufficient means. Explanation - For the purposes of this Chapter, (a) minor means a person who, under the provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1875, (19 of 1875) is deemed not to have attained his majority; (b) wife includes woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried. (2) Such allowance shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the application for maintenance. (3) If any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each month's allowance remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which. May extend to one month or until payment if sooner made: Provided that no warrant shall be issued for the recovery of any amount due under this section unless application be made to the Court to levy such amount within a period of one year from the date on which it became due: Provided further that if such person offers to maintain his wife on condition of her living with him, and she refuses to live with him, such Magistrate may consider any grounds of refusal stated by her, and may make an order under this section notwithstanding such offer, if he is satisfied that there is just ground for so doing. Explanation - If a husband has contracted marriage with another woman or keeps mistress it shall be considered to be just ground for his wife's refusal to live with him. (4) No wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance from her husband under this section if she is living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent. (5) On proof that any wife in whose favour an order has been made under this section is living in adultery, or that without sufficient reason she refuses to live with her husband, or that they are living separately by mutual consent, the Magistrate shall cancel the order. In sub-section (1) expression used is T1any person having sufficient means. 'person' is a term of wider connotation. It may include natural person or juristic person if context so requires. At this stage, it will be appropriate and proper to refer to the provisions of the General Clauses Act, 1897 as General Clauses Act applies to the interpretation of Central Act. Sec. 3 of the General Clauses Act contains the definition clauses. Sec. 3 reads as under:"sec. 3: Definitions.- In this Act, and. in all Central Acts and Regulations made after the commencement of this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, 3 (42) Person shall include any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. This definition is inclusive and illustrative. It means that it may include in itself a natural person as well as a juristic person. This definition is inclusive and illustrative. It means that it may include in itself a natural person as well as a juristic person. Natural person means an individual without distinction of male or female, and as such, person may include a female as well. Sec. 13 (1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 reads as under: Section 13. Gender and number. In all Central Acts and Regulations, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context.- (1) words importing the masculine gender shall be taken to include females: and (2) words in the singular shall include the plural, and vice versa. " ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to the definition clause given in Code of Criminal Procedure and in particular to clause (y) of Sec. 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and with reference to that he invited my attention to certain provisions of Indian Penal Code. Sec. 2 (y) of the Criminal Procedure Code reads as under. 2. Definitions.- In this Code, unless the context otherwise requires, (y) words and expressions used herein and not defined but defined in the Indian Penal Code 45 of 1860 have the meanings respectively as signed to them in that Code. Chapter 2 of the Indian Penal Code deals with general explanation. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner made reference to Sec. 8 which reads as under: Section 8. Gender.- The pronoun he and its derivatives are used of any person, whether male or female. It means he may be read as she also and his may be read as her as well. Sec. 10 of the Indian Penal Code specifically points out the meaning of man and woman. Sec. 10 defines man and woman as under: Section 10. Man, Woman, - The word man denotes a male human being of any age: the word woman denotes a female human being of any age. Where expression where he or she is used or his or her is used, that will not be controlled by Sec. 10, but that may be controlled by definition given in Sec. 8 of I. P. C. Section 11 of I. P. C. defines Person. Section 11. Person.- The word person includes any Company or Association or body of persons, whether incorporated or not. Again the definition of person is distinguished from man and woman. Section 11. Person.- The word person includes any Company or Association or body of persons, whether incorporated or not. Again the definition of person is distinguished from man and woman. Person may include a natural person, may be male or female, it will also include a juristic person as given in General Clauses Act. But where Legislature specifically intends to refer to male human being, it may use as man or woman. Taking into view these definitions and explanation in I. P. C. as well as General Clauses Act for the purpose of Sec. 125 when Section 125 uses the word person, it has to be taken to include both male and female. It means that if any male or female having sufficient means neglects or refuses to accept his or her liability to maintain then if other conditions of either clause (a), (b) or (c) of Section 125 are shown to exist, liability pay be fastened to maintain. Here, the case is not of the husband making a provision for maintenance. So, I dont express any opinion that. I leave it for consideration at appropriate stage when any such problems or question arises before the court in that context. But, no doubt, as regards child, legitimate or illegitimate child male or female unable to maintain itself has got the right to be maintained by his parents male and female, and expression his has to be read as her also. In the same way, under clause (c) expression used is legitimate or illegitimate child, exception has to doubt been made to it clearly by expression not being a married daughter which is clearly indicative of the fact that the person who has sufficient means if he has got legitimate or illegitimate child, male or female, who has attained majority who has physical or mental abnormality and is unable to maintain himself or herself, liability is of the person concerned to maintain with exception to the case of a married daughter who has attained majority. But, in case of minor children, no exception has been provided. In view of Sec. 8, when he or his is used, it has to be read including in itself she or her. If we look to sub-sec. But, in case of minor children, no exception has been provided. In view of Sec. 8, when he or his is used, it has to be read including in itself she or her. If we look to sub-sec. (3) as well, the Legislature has used the word, if any person so ordered means where a person having sufficient means be a father or mother neglects to maintain his or her children, legitimate or illegitimate, minor or major, with exception to clause (c) and he has been ordered to maintain them without any sufficient cause, fails to comply with the order, the Magistrate has been given power to issue warrant. When Legislature has not used the expression of man but used person, it includes male and female and it cannot be read to be referring to man only. The provisions of Sec. 125 are social welfare legislation. The object of such a provision has been considered to be that such persons who are not able to maintain themselves, they should not be left to the agony of starvation, frustration or of destitution and in case of female destitution, which may lead to prostitution. To avoid such, a situation, the Legislature has enacted this provision. A social welfare legislation has to be interpreted keeping in view the object of the provision. If a female person is earning and she has got minor children to maintain and she refuses to maintain the minor children, be it be male or female, then definitely she is liable to maintain them as the Legislature has not used the expression man or woman, but person, it has to be taken that person includes both male and female, his may also be interpreted as her in view of the above provisions of the General Clauses Act as well as provisions of I. P. C. referred to above. In sub-section, again the Legislature has used the expression any person. So, in my opinion, the petition for maintenance under Sec. 125, no doubt, is maintainable against the mother irrespective of the fact that mother belongs to feminine gender. In the decision given by the Punjab and Haryana High Court referred by the revision petitioners counsel, the question involved was question of liability of maintaining the father and mother, and the question was whether son is only liable or daughter is also liable. In the decision given by the Punjab and Haryana High Court referred by the revision petitioners counsel, the question involved was question of liability of maintaining the father and mother, and the question was whether son is only liable or daughter is also liable. In that decision, no doubt, reference has been made to Section 11 of IPC, but neither Section 8 of CPC nor Section 13 of General Clauses Act nor illustrative nature of the section has been considered. Any way, I am unable to agree with the view expressed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Raj Kumari v. Yashodha Devi and another (supra ). The question of maintenance of old parents if a person has no son and parents are old aged, question is whether they should be left to die of starvation or frustration or destitution, to vagaries of life particularly when daughters are given share in the property of the father, then why they should not be held liable to maintain their old parents. Any way, I have observed earlier, I am unable to accept the view expressed by that decision by Punjab and Haryana High Court. I agree with the decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Repalli Mastha-namma v. Thota Sriramulu and another in which single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has taken the same view as I have taken that here person includes both male and female and his is to be read as her also. ( 6 ) THUS considered in my view, the learned Court below was justified in holding that the application under Sec. 125 filed by the children against their mother was maintainable. There was no error of law committed on the part of the Court below in holding the application to be maintainable. ( 7 ) THUS considered, present revision petition is without merits and it is hereby dismissed with costs. Let the sub ordinate Court proceed with the matter of considering and determining the question of maintenance and its quantum. Revision dismissed.