Judgment 1. In this habeas corpus petition, the petitioner/detenu has impugned the order of detention dated 9-3-1998 passed under Sec. 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) by the District Magistrate, Bhojpur. 2. Two main submissions have been urged before us by counsel for the petitioner. Firstly, it is submitted that the District Magistrate, Bhojpur has no jurisdiction to pass the order of detention under Sec. 3 of the Act unless he is vested with that jurisdiction under Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 3 of the Act. Secondly, it is submitted that though the petitioner was in custody at the time when the order of detention was passed, neither the order of detention nor the grounds of detention disclosed consciousness on the part of the detaining authority that the petitioner was already in custody and yet it was necessary to pass an order of detention under the Act. 3. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the District Magistrate, Bhojpur, reference is made to various criminal cases in which the petitioner is an accused and it is stated that the facts would show that the petitioner is a habitual offender and is constant danger to public order in the district of Bhojpur, his movements and activities pose a serious threat and alarm to the public order. Since there is sufficient ground to believe that he has been habitually committing murder for nothing, a proceeding under the Act was initiated against him. In reply to the averments contained in Paragraph 14 of the writ petition that the District Magistrate of Bhojpur had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order and therefore the order was without jurisdiction, it is stated in paragraph 19 of the counter-affidavit that under Sec. 3(3) of the Act, the District Magistrate is empowered to pass an order of detention, and therefore, the order passed by the District Magistrate was within his jurisdiction. Every District Magistrate has power to deal with the situation within his jurisdiction and to exercise such jurisdiction under the Act. 4. In our view both the submissions urged on behalf of the petitioner must prevail. Every District Magistrate has power to deal with the situation within his jurisdiction and to exercise such jurisdiction under the Act. 4. In our view both the submissions urged on behalf of the petitioner must prevail. Under the Act, the power to make orders of detention is vested in the Central Government or the State Government if it is satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community it is necessary so to do. Under Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 3, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, the State Government may, if satisfied, that it is necessary so to do by order in writing direct that for such period as may be specified in the order, such District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police may also, if satisfied as provided in Sub-sec. (2), exercise the powers conferred by the said sub-section. Under proviso to Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 3, the period specified in the order of the State Government shall not in the first instance exceed three months, but if it is considered necessary so to do, the period may be extended from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time. 5. A plain reading of Sec. 3 of the Act leaves no room for doubt that the power to issue an order of detention under Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 is primarily vested in the Central Government or the State Government. However under Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 3, such power may also be vested in the District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police who may be authorised to exercise the powers conferred by sub-sections (1) and (2) of Sec. 3 if having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do. Sub-sec. Sub-sec. (3) therefore clearly prescribes that the power under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Sec. 3 cannot be exercised by a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police within his jurisdiction unless the State Government after recording its satisfaction orders in writing that the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police may exercise such power for such period as may be specified in the order.The submission on behalf of the detainingauthority that the District Magistrate has been vested the powers under the Act to issue orders of detention without anything more, must be rejected. Such powers may be vested in the District Magistrate by the State Government, but in the absence of an order vesting such power in the District Magistrate, District Magistrate cannot issue an order of detention. Nothing has been shows to this Court to satisfy the Court that the State Government did exercise its power under Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 3 vesting power of detention in the District Magistrate. On the basis of the material placed before this Court, it must be held that the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to exercise the power of detention conferred by sub-sections (1) and (2) of Sec. 3 of the Act. 6. The second submission urged on behalf of the petitioner also has force. We have perused the order of detention and grounds of detention. Though, it is not disputed that the petitioner was taken into custody on 16-2-1998 in connection with a criminal case, there is no mention of this fact either in the order of detention or in the grounds of detention. On a mere perusal of the order of detention and grounds of detention, it appears to us that the detaining authority was oblivious of the fact that the petitioner was already in custody in connection with a criminal case. On a mere perusal of the order of detention and grounds of detention, it appears to us that the detaining authority was oblivious of the fact that the petitioner was already in custody in connection with a criminal case. While the power of detention can be exercised also in respect of a person in custody, a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court have settled the principle that in case of detenu already in jail, the order of the detaining authority must state the awareness of this fact along with its belief based on reliable material about possibility of detenus being released on bail and that in the event of his being released on bail, the detenu may indulge in activities prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of the public order etc. We may only refer to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (1994) 2 SCC 337 , Veeramani V/s. State of Tamil Nadu. The impugned order of detention as well as the grounds do not disclose this awareness on the part of the detaining authority and this in the second ground on which the impugned order of detention dated 9-3-1998 must be quashed. 7. In the result, this writ petition is allowed and the detention of the petitioner is quashed. The order of detention dated 9-3-1998 and all subsequent orders passed under various provisions of the Act are also quashed. The petitioner shall be released forthwith unless required in connection with any other case.Petition allowed.