Gopal Ch. Biswas v. Pradip Kr. Ghosh — 1999 DIGILAW 407 (CAL)

JUDGMENT Dibyendu Bhusan Dutta, J. 1. The instant contempt rule was issued at the instance of the appellants of S.A. 15 of 1995. It has a chequered background. The appellants filed a suit being Title Suit No. 38 of 1970 against the respondents. Plot No, 1144 of mouza Deupuli within police station Ghaighata measuring one acre eight decimals in area constituted the subject matter of the suit. At the time of institution of the suit the appellants nos. 1, 2 and 3 were minors arid the appellant no.4, their father, sued as their next frind claiming declaration of their title and for permanent injunction against the respondents on the allegation that the appellant no.4 purchased the plot by virtue of a registered kobala dated 19.1.70 for and on behalf of his minor sons and that the defendant respondents having no right, title or possession in the plot of land were threatening to dispossess the plaintiffs. The defendants contested the suit denying the plaintiffs's title and possession and setting up his own title and possession in respect of the plot concerned. The suit was dismissed on 28.8.74. The plaintiffs preferred an appeal being Title Appeal No. 915 of 1974. The appeal was allowed on 16.6.75 and the plaintiff appellants obtained a decree that was prayed for in the suit. The defendants preferred a second appeal against the said decree and the High Court remitted the case back to the first appellate court. After the remand the first appellate court dismissed the appeal on 28.1.94 and being aggrieved, the plaintiffs preferred the second appeal being SAT 870 of 1994 which was subsequently registered as SA 15 of 1995. The memorandum of appeal was presented on 17.3.94. An application was filed for an injunction restraining the defendant respondents from interfering with the plaintiff appellants' possession of the suit property and also for staying the operation of the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court on 28.1.94. This application styled as one for stay and for injunction was supported by an affidavit affirmed on 18th May, 1994 and was also filed on that date. This application styled as one for stay and for injunction was supported by an affidavit affirmed on 18th May, 1994 and was also filed on that date. The appeal came up for admission under Order 41 Rule 11 CPC before the Division Bench of S.K. Mukherjee and J.P. Mathur, JJ, as their Lordships then were, and the Division Bench admitted the appeal by its order dated 19.9.94 which reads as under: "This appeal will be heard on the question of propriety of the finding of the court of appeal regarding adverse nature of interest of the father of the plaintiffs 1 to 3 and possession with regard to the suit property none of which can be said to have been arrived at upon consideration of the existing materials on record as, in our view, this raises a substantial question of law." The said application for stay and/or injunction was thereafter taken up for hearing on that very date by the Division Bench for appears in presence of the respondents who had already• lodged a caveat and the Division Bench directed the application to appear before the appropriate bench for hearing as a contested application and by giving liberty to both of parties to exchange affidavits. The bench however by its order of the self-same date that is 19.9.94 also directed status quo as to possession as on that day to be maintained till the disposal of the application. It is this order dated 19.9.94 which is complained by the plaintiff appellants to• have been violated. The plaintiffs appellants came forward with an application filed on 4.8.95 for drawing up of contempt proceeding against three opposite parties of whom the opposite party no.1 is Pradip Kr. Ghosh, the then Officer-in-Charge of Ghaighata Police Station, the opposite party. no.2, Nisikanta Das, the then Block Land and Land Reforms Officer, Ghaighata and the opposite party no.3, Nirapada Hazra who is none but the defendant no. 5 in the suit and respondent no.5 in the appeal. 2. The case that has been sought to be made out on behalf of the plaintiff appellants in their application for contempt dated 4.8.95 as far as can be gathered from the averments made in the application may, in substance, be, stated as follows. 5 in the suit and respondent no.5 in the appeal. 2. The case that has been sought to be made out on behalf of the plaintiff appellants in their application for contempt dated 4.8.95 as far as can be gathered from the averments made in the application may, in substance, be, stated as follows. The plaintiff petitioners claimed to have been in possession all along since their purchase and their allegation is that even in the year of filing of this application they cultivated the plot for aman paddy and the paddy crops were standing on the suit plot. Their further allegation is that suddenly on 9.7.95 they came to know from the local police station that on the application of the opposite party no. 3, the opposite party no. 2 granted police protection to the opposite party no. 3 in respect of the suit plot under his memo No. 1610/BL and LRO (Ghai) dated 23.6.95 which was communicated to the opposite party no. 1. The said order of police protection was passed by the opposite party no. 2 behind the back of the petitioners. The opposite party no.1 inferred the petitioners that he has no other alternative than to obey the order of the opposite party no. 2 and that they will destroy the paddy crops on the suit land within 2-3 days. The opposite party no. 1 also passed an order on 8.7.95 directing SI, S. Banerjee to render the police help to the opposite party no. 3. The petitioners moved an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the Hon'ble High Court against the memo dated 23.6.95 addressed by the opposite party no. 2 to opposite party no. 1 and His Lordship N.K. Mitra, J. dismissed the said application with the observation that the proper course would have been to move the appropriate Bench for contempt. At the instance of the opposite party no.3, the opposite party no. 1 called the appellant petitioner no. 1 to meet him on 21.5.95 regarding the issue concerning the disputed land and the petitioner met him on 21.5.95 and did also, submit a xerox copy of the High Court's order dated 19.9.94 and, apprised him of the factual position. At the instance of the opposite party no. 2, the opposite party no. 1 called the petitioner no. 1 to meet him on 21.5.95 regarding the issue concerning the disputed land and the petitioner met him on 21.5.95 and did also, submit a xerox copy of the High Court's order dated 19.9.94 and, apprised him of the factual position. At the instance of the opposite party no. 2, the opposite party no. 1 called the petitioner no. 1 again on 12.6.95 over the self-same issue and again the petitioner submitted a copy of the self-same order dated 19.9.94 along with an application before him and the opposite party no. 1 forwarded them to opposite party no. 2 on 12.6.95. The opposite party no. 1 told the petitioner no. 1 about the fact of intervention of the opposite party no. 2 and the petitioners also came to know that the opposite party no.2 was influenced by the opposite party no. 3. Due to the intervention of the opposite parties nos. 1 and 2, the opposite party no. 3 is trying to disturb the petitioners' peaceful possession of the suit land. The fact that the opposite party no. 2 intervenee in the matter came to the knowledge of the petitioners even earlier whereupon the petitioners submitted a copy of the order dated 19.9.94 of the Division Bench to the opposite party no.2 on 13.5.95. The opposite parties nos. 1 and 2 are not parties to the appeal and having full knowledge of the order of the Hon'ble High Court all the opposite parties deliberately and wilfully disobeyed the order dated 19.9.94 of the High Court which was duly served upon the opposite parties nos. 1 and 2 and which was passed in presence of the ld. advocate on behalf of the opposite party no. 3. The opposite parties have by flouting the said order of the Hon'ble High Court deliberately interfered with the administration of justice and lowered down the dignity of this High Court in the estimation of the general public and hence the application. 3. On the basis of this application of the appellant petitioners, the concerned Division Bench issued the contempt rule on 18.9.95 directing all the three opposite parties to appear personally and show cause why they should not be punished for contempt. The opposite party no. 1 in response to this rule entered appearance on 1.12.97 and filed his affidavit-in-opposition on 15.1.98. So far as the opposite party no. The opposite party no. 1 in response to this rule entered appearance on 1.12.97 and filed his affidavit-in-opposition on 15.1.98. So far as the opposite party no. 2 is concerned, appearance was made personally on 6.6.97 and affidavit-in-opposition was filed on 22.4.98. The opposite party no. 3 entered his appearance through his lawyer on 13.6.97, and prayed for exemption from personal appearance on the ground of illness. On the basis of an affidavit sworn in on his behalf by his son and a medical certificate, the Division Bench granted him exemption from personal appearance by its order dated 27.6.97 until further orders. The, affidavit-in-opposition on behalf of the opposite party no. 3 was affirmed on 16.1.98 by his son. On behalf of the petitioners, affidavits-in-reply were filed against the affidavits-in-opposition of the three contemnors" referred to above. Such replies were all affirmed on 26.3.98 and 8.5.98 by Nityananda Biswas, the appellant petitioner no. 4. 4. At the very outset, it may be stated here that none of the opposite parties has either traversed or specifically denied any of the averments made by the petitioners in paragraphs 8, 9 and 11 of their application dated 4.8.95 which are said to constitute the contumacious acts and conduct of the opposite parties nos. 1, 2 and 3. The cases of the opposite parties nos. 1, 2 and 3, as sought to be made out in their respective affidavits-in-opposition referred to above, may, in substance, he stated as follows. So far as opposite party no. 1 is concerned, his case appears to have been made out in paragraphs 5 and 9 of his affidavit-in-opposition. He received the relevant order of the High Court dated 19.9.94 from the petitioner no. 1 on 21.5.95. He deputed SI, Mr. Banerjee for rendering help after consulting the opposite party no. 2 since there was some controversy in regard to the plot concerned. Police help was meant to be given to the petitioner no. 1 and for that purpose a date that is to say 2.6.95 was specifically fixed. On 21.5.95 the petitioner no. 1 did cultivate the disputed land with the help of the police and when the police came back, the opposite party no. Police help was meant to be given to the petitioner no. 1 and for that purpose a date that is to say 2.6.95 was specifically fixed. On 21.5.95 the petitioner no. 1 did cultivate the disputed land with the help of the police and when the police came back, the opposite party no. 3 along with others caught hold of the petitioner arid his men and a scuffle ensued between the parties as a result of which both parties sustained injuries and as a sequel to this incident, two cases being Ghaighata P.S. case nos. 76 and 77 were started by the respective parties and both the cases ended in charge-sheet being Charge Sheet no. 91 dated 25.8.95 under sections 147/148/323/447/ 324 of IPC and Charge Sheet no. 114 dated 31.8.95 under sections 147/148/323/421/447 of IPC respectively. The petitioner no. 1 fired one case being M 299/94 before the Executive Magistrate, Bongaon under section 144 Cr.P.C against the opposite party no. 3 before the admission of the second appeal and also before the filing of this application for contempt. The opposite party no. 1 annexed the xerox copies of the FIRs on the basis of which the Ghaighata Police Case nos. 76 and 77 were registered and the xerox copies of the orders that were passed by the Executive Magistrate on 28.7.94 and on 29.7.94 in connexion with the case no. M 299 of 1994 under section 144 Cr.P.C. The opposite party no. 1 appears to have also annexed a xerox copy of another memo no. 1692/BIL (Ghai) dated 5.7.95 which was addressed to the Officer-in-Charge, Ghaighata Police Station by the opposite party no. 2 with reference to his earlier memo dated 23.6.95 about which reference was made in the contempt application by the petitioners. The opposite party no. 1 has, however, not disclosed in his affidavit as to what action was taken by him on the basis of this particular memo dated 5.7.95. He has also not explained the reasons as to why he has annexed this memo to his affidavit. All these averments were made and the connected annexures were referred, to in paragraph 5 of the affidavit. In paragraph 9 of his affidavit, the opposite party no. 1 virtually reiterated whatever stand he has taken in paragraph 5 of the affidavit. He has also not explained the reasons as to why he has annexed this memo to his affidavit. All these averments were made and the connected annexures were referred, to in paragraph 5 of the affidavit. In paragraph 9 of his affidavit, the opposite party no. 1 virtually reiterated whatever stand he has taken in paragraph 5 of the affidavit. He admitted that he came to know of the relevant order of the High Court only after he got it from the petitioner no. 1. He again asserted that after consultation with the opposite party no. 2, for giving police help to the petitioner no. 1 for carrying out peaceful cultivation of the disputed land, 2.6.95 was fixed. He further repeated that only to give police protection he deputed SI, B. Banerjee to recommend administrative help to the petitioner no. 1 and SI, B. Banerjee after consultation with the opposite party no. 2 fixed a date for rendering police help to the petitioner no.1 on 2.6.95. He appears to have made a comment to the effect that the High Court was pleased to dismiss even the writ application that was filed on behalf of the petitioners against the opposite party no. 2's memo dated 23.6.95. The averments made in paragraph 5 of this affidavit are, however, not affirmed by the opposite party no. 1 to be true to his knowledge. They were alleged to be his mete respectful submissions before this court but at the same time, the very same allegations which were made in paragraph 9 of his affidavit were affirmed by him to be true to the information which he derived from the record of the case and which he believed to be true. Finally, it has been stated by the opposite party no. 1 that he acted in accordance with law to maintain peace and tranquility of the area and had neither any intention to violate the Court's order nor had he wilfully violated the same. In case, it is found that he has violated the Hon'ble Court's order, in any way, he offered unqualified apology to this court. The opposite party no. 1 that he acted in accordance with law to maintain peace and tranquility of the area and had neither any intention to violate the Court's order nor had he wilfully violated the same. In case, it is found that he has violated the Hon'ble Court's order, in any way, he offered unqualified apology to this court. The opposite party no. 2 annexed a large number of documents to his affidavit most of which related to his alleged illness and are meant to explain the delay which he made in filing the affidavit in response to the 'contempt rule issued as far back as on 18.9.95. As regards the remaining annexures, one is his own memo dated 23.6.95 addressed to the opposite party no. 1 which also forms an annexure of the contempt application and the other is a lengthy memo addressed by him again to the opposite party no. 1 on 1.10.96 which is said to have been issued with reference to an application of the opposite party no. 3 dated 28.6.96 and the opposite party no.1's letter dated 1.7.96. The opposite party no. 2 wanted to suggest in paragraph 5 of his affidavit that it appeared from the office record as if his memo dated 23.6.95 was issued at a time when the relevant file was not readily available. The relevant file, however, is said to have been collectively marked as annexure 1 but from the marking of the annexure it appears that what has been collectively marked as annexure 1 is nothing but only his memo dated 23.6.95 which he addressed to the opposite party no. 1, as referred to above. He further wanted to state in paragraph 5 of his affidavit that subsequently as per the application of the opposite party no. 3 and the request of the opposite party no. 1 dated 1.7.96 he had the occasion to peruse the matters carefully and the outcome of such careful perusal was the issuance of the memo dated 1.10.96 wherein' he made specific comments in details with regard to the matter of possession. He also stated in this paragraph of his affidavit that the matter of possession is sub-judice in the second appeal and at this stage he has no comment to make in the said memo which is collectively marked as annexure 2. He also stated in this paragraph of his affidavit that the matter of possession is sub-judice in the second appeal and at this stage he has no comment to make in the said memo which is collectively marked as annexure 2. He, however, affirmed his statements made in paragraph 5 of this affidavit to be only his respectful submissions before this court. Finally, he stated that he has not violated the court's order as alleged by the petitioners and that the said application should be dismissed with cost. In case it is found that for any act of commission and/or omission he has violated the court's order dated 19.9.94 such acts or omission were made unknowingly for which he tendered his unconditional apology before the court. The case made out on behalf of the opposite party no. 3 in his affidavit dated 16.1.98, affirmed by his son, is that he is the actual owner of the disputed land and he has been possessing the same for a long time. He denied the petitioners' right, title and possession as also cultivation in respect of the disputed land. It has been alleged that the petitioners are trying to enter-into the suit land forcibly with the help of their anti-social associates and disturb the peaceful possession of the opposite party no.3. On 21.5.95, the petitioners and their associates tried to enter the suit land being armed with deadly weapons when his sons and relatives protested as a result of which they were assaulted and a tile shed was damaged. A criminal case was started in Ghaighata Police Station against the petitioners which is pending. In the above circumstances, the opposite party no. 3 had no alternative but to inform the police in order to save their lives and property. It is also alleged that the petitioners had lodged an FIR before filing the contempt application before this court. This opposite party never violated the court's order. If the lodging of the FIR by the present opposite party amounted to contempt, lodging of FIR at the instance of the petitioners did also tantamount to violation of Court's order. The opposite party no. 2 passed the order on the basis of the written complaint of this opposite party. The opposite party no. 2 by his impugned memo simply stated that this opposite party might get legal help in possession. The opposite party no. 2 passed the order on the basis of the written complaint of this opposite party. The opposite party no. 2 by his impugned memo simply stated that this opposite party might get legal help in possession. The possession of the disputed land was determined and established by the finding arrived at in the judgment of the first appellate court dated 28.1.94 in Title Appeal no. 915 of 1974, the High Court did not grant any stay of the operation of the order of the first appellate court and this opposite party is always maintaining the Hon'ble Court's order directing maintenance of status quo with regard to the possession of the disputed land. This opposite party also denied the allegation that he took any illegal advantage by influencing others. Since this opposite party has not violated the court's order, the present contempt application is liable to be dismissed as against him. The subsequent memo dated 5.7.95 which was issued by the opposite party no. 2 to the opposite party no. 1 and which was annexed by the opposite party no. 1 with his affidavit dated 15.1.98 appears to have been annexed with this affidavit affirmed on 16.1.98 by the son of the opposite party no. 3. 5. As regards the affidavits-in-reply affirmed by the petitioner no. 4, the petitioners wanted to say that on 21.5.95, they cultivated the disputed land and after finishing their cultivation when they were on their way back home they were attacked by the opposite party no. 3's men at the instigation of the opposite party no. 3 for which a complaint was lodged with the local police station. The petitioners' positive case is that they did not pray for any police help nor did they cultivate the land with police help as the opposite party no. 1 wanted to make out a case. It was the opposite party no. 3 who prayed for police help and according to his prayer the opposite party no. 2 passed the order for police help on 23.6.95 illegally and in pursuance of that order the opposite party no. 1 deputed the SI, B. Banerjee to give the necessary help to the opposite party no. 3. It is absolutely false to suggest that 2.6.95 was fixed as has been alleged by the opposite party no. 1 for giving police help to the petitioners. 1 deputed the SI, B. Banerjee to give the necessary help to the opposite party no. 3. It is absolutely false to suggest that 2.6.95 was fixed as has been alleged by the opposite party no. 1 for giving police help to the petitioners. The statement to the contrary made by the opposite party no. 1 in his affidavit is false. He gave this false statement in order to exonerate himself from the liability for contempt. In the affidavit-in-reply affirmed on 26.3.98 by the petitioner no. 4 as against the opposite party no.3.s affidavit-in-opposition, he has given a denial to the allegations made in the said affidavit. He referred to a case no. M 367 of 1975 which was filed by him under section 144 Cr.P.C. in respect of the disputed land and appears to have annexed Xerox copy of his application under section 144 Cr.P.C. on the basis of which the said case no M 367 of 1975 was registered before the Executive Magistrate and a copy of the police report recommending initiation of a proceeding under section 144 in favour of the petitioner and a copy of the order dated 24.12.75 whereby the petitioner got an order of injunction in his favour in relation to the disputed land. In the affidavit-in-reply that was affirmed by the petitioner no. 4 against the affidavit-in-opposition of the opposite party no. 2, the petitioner reiterated his case that the relevant order of the High Court was served upon the opposite party no. 2 on 13.5.95. It was further submitted in this affidavit that the opposite party no. 2 has no jurisdiction to take such matter in his hand and adjudicate it and to repeat his comments favouring the opposite party no. 3 in the year 1996. All the orders that were passed by the opposite party no. 3 on 23.6.95, 8.7.95 and 1.10.96 were without jurisdiction and constituted wilful violation of the Hon'ble Court's order. It is further submitted that the opposite party no. 2's comment in annexure 1 of his memo dated 1.10.96 suggesting that the Hon'ble Court rejected the petitioners' prayer for injunction and stay by its order dated 19.9.94 is illegal. 5A. In course of hearing of the Contempt Rule, on 23.6.99, opposite parties nos. It is further submitted that the opposite party no. 2's comment in annexure 1 of his memo dated 1.10.96 suggesting that the Hon'ble Court rejected the petitioners' prayer for injunction and stay by its order dated 19.9.94 is illegal. 5A. In course of hearing of the Contempt Rule, on 23.6.99, opposite parties nos. 1 and 2 affirmed two separate supplementary affidavits individually seeking permission to withdraw the affidavits they had filed earlier and for treating those affidavits as cancelled for the reasons that the said affidavits which have been earlier submitted to this court by them did not reflect their correct submissions because of communication gap in sending the instructions to the ld. counsel who drafted those affidavits with the result that some errors and mis-statements crept into those affidavits. They offered unconditional apology for any act or omission committed by them which now, according to them, prima facie amounted to contempt of this court and have even given an undertaking to be cautious in future so that such lapse does not recur. At a later stage of hearing the opposite parties nos. 1 and 2 again came forward with two separate affidavits affirmed on 16.7.99 and 19.7.99 repeating their offer of unconditional apology for violation of the relevant order of the Court dated 19.9.94 with a prayer for acceptance thereof and also for exonerating them from the offence of contempt of court. On 23.6.99 we directed the contemnor no. 3 to appear personally before us and in compliance with our aforesaid direction the opposite party contemnor no. 3 did personally appear before us on 5.7.99 and took leave of the court to file affidavit by himself and in pursuance of the leave granted by us he affirmed a fresh affidavit on 20th July, 1999. In this affidavit "his stand is that it appears from the judgment and order of the trial court as well as the first appellate court that he has been in possession of the land in question and that the High Court's order dated 19.9.94 regarding maintenance of status quo is being maintained by him. His allegation is that the. petitioner disturbed his possession by trespassing into the land and assaulting his son and causing damage to the doors and windows of his house giving rise to Ghaighata Police Station case no. 76 of 1995. He made the application to the opposite party no. His allegation is that the. petitioner disturbed his possession by trespassing into the land and assaulting his son and causing damage to the doors and windows of his house giving rise to Ghaighata Police Station case no. 76 of 1995. He made the application to the opposite party no. 2 complaining of the attempts on the part of the petitioners to dispossess him by applying criminal force and the opposite party no. 2 by passing the impugned orders on the said application exceeded the jurisdiction for which the opposite party no. 2 himself is liable. It is also submitted that the opposite party no. 2 being a quasi judicial authority ought not to have passed any order on mis-conceived application. It is further submitted in this affidavit that the opposite party no. 2 asked the opposite party no. 1 to afford 'legal help' and not 'police help'. It has been submitted by the opposite party no. 3 that the legal help is not identical with police help and it is alleged that he got neither any legal help nor any police help from the opposite party no. 1. Finally, he prayed for mercy alleging that he is a layman having no knowledge about 'the legal impact which his application addressed to the opposite party no. 2 might have had. 6. The point that arises for our decision here is whether any of the opposite parties nos. 1, 2 and 3 is liable to be found guilty of contempt of court. 7. It is clear from the order dated 19.9.94 disobedience of which has been complained of that by the said order the second appeal preferred by the petitioners was admitted by the Division Bench of this Court under Order 41 Rule 11 CPC only because of the fact that the Division Bench was of the view that the said appeal raised a substantial question of law on the propriety of the finding of the first appellate court regarding the adverse nature of interest of the appellant no. 4 and possession in relation to the suit property which in view of Their Lordship could not be said to have been arrived at upon consideration of the existing materials on record. 4 and possession in relation to the suit property which in view of Their Lordship could not be said to have been arrived at upon consideration of the existing materials on record. By the self-same order, after admitting the appeal, the Division Bench directed the status quo as to possession as on that date to be maintained, on an application that was moved on behalf of the appellants before the Bench is presence of the Id. Counsel for the opposite party no.3 caveator. The said application, if scanned, appears principally to be one for an injunction restraining the respondents from disturbing the appellant's possession over the suit property coupled with a prayer for stay of the operation of the judgment and decree of the first appellate court and also for an ad interim order of injunction cum stay till the disposal of the application. The Division Bench appears to have entertained the application and gave directions for exchange of affidavits by the parties and thought it fit to pass an order for maintenance of the status quo as to possession of the property as obtaining on the date of that order to be maintained till the disposal of the application. The order does not at all suggest that the Division Bench rejected the prayer for stay. Pending filing of-affidavits and disposal of the application, the Bench directed the status quo with regard to the possession to be maintained by both parties. It is, therefore, clear that this order could not be construed as rejection of the application for stay. It could at best be construed as refusal to grant an interim stay of the operation of the judgment and decree of the' lower appellate court for the time being. But then this order does contain the prima facie view of the concerned Bench to the effect that the finding of the first appellate, court regarding the adverse nature of interest of appellant no. 4 as' also possession was not arrived at upon consideration of the existing materials on record. It is not disputed that a copy of this order of the Division Bench was submitted by the petitioners to the opposite party no. 2 on 13.5.95 and to the petitioner no. 1 twice, first on 21.5.95 and again on 12.6.95. It is not denied or disputed by the opposite party no. 1 that he directed SI. It is not disputed that a copy of this order of the Division Bench was submitted by the petitioners to the opposite party no. 2 on 13.5.95 and to the petitioner no. 1 twice, first on 21.5.95 and again on 12.6.95. It is not denied or disputed by the opposite party no. 1 that he directed SI. B. Benerjee to render police help to the opposite party no. 3 so as to maintain his possession with regard to the suit property. The relevant allegations of the petitioners in paragraphs 8, 9 and 11 stand completely unchallenged and untraversed by the opposite party no. 1. It is also not disputed that the opposite party no. 1 passed an order on 8.7.95 directing police help to the opposite party no. 3. The opposite party no. 1 wanted, however, to recklessly suggest as if he directed police help to be given to the petitioners and not to the opposite party no. 3. But he has not cared to furnish any scrap of paper to substantiate this part of his case. It is the positive assertion of the petitioners that they never prayed for police help nor did they get any police help for cultivating the suit land at any point of time. The opposite party no.1 even went to the length of saying that 2.6.95 was specifically fixed for the purpose of rendering police help to the petitioners in consultation with the opposite party no. 2. The opposite party no. 2 does not at all corroborate this part of the opposite party no. l's version. The opposite party no. 1 does not even know on what basis he made such allegations. These allegations appear to have been made in both the paragraphs 5 and 9 of his affidavit-in-opposition dated 15.1.98. The statements made in paragraph 5 have been affirmed to be his submissions and the self-same allegations made in paragraph 9 of this very affidavit were affirmed by him to be based on information which he derived from record but curiously enough, he has not cared to disclose the nature of that record nor has he placed that record before this court. The averments in the affidavit in this regard virtually are contradictory and tantamount to blowing hot and cold in the same breath. Undisputedly, the opposite party no. The averments in the affidavit in this regard virtually are contradictory and tantamount to blowing hot and cold in the same breath. Undisputedly, the opposite party no. 2 issued two memos dated 23.6.95 and 5.7.95 addressed to the opposite party no.1 on the basis of an application made by the opposite party no. 3. It is true that the expression used in both the memos reads as "legal help" and not "police help" but if we read the contents of these two memos as a whole and consider the fact that it was addressed to the Officer-in-Charge of the police station, it could mean nothing but police help. The relevant memos are on the same lines and a scrutiny reveals that one is virtually a verbatim reproduction of the other and the earlier memo was really followed up by the subsequent memo dated 5.7.95 by way of a reminder. When the matter was subjudice before the Hon'ble High Court in the second appeal how the occasion arose within the knowledge of the opposite party no. 2 it is really not clear for him to examine records, documents and lower courts orders to conclude that the opposite party no. 3 is the owner of the suit plot. He even drew his inspiration from the relevant order of the High Court itself for the purpose of making his comment that opposite party no. 3 can be presumed to be in possession of the suit plot until and unless the High Court's verdict goes against him. The grant of police help or any legal help in relation to possession of a property does not lie within the domain of the Block Land and Land Reforms Officer. There is no law which vests with him any jurisdiction to decide as to who is and is not in possession of a particular plot of land. It is true that the opposite party no. 3 made an application for police help before the opposite party no. 2, despite his knowledge of existence of an order of status quo by the Hon'ble High Court which was passed in presence of his lawyer, instead of approaching the Bench which passed that order of status quo. But then the mere fact that such an application was filed by the opposite party no. 3 before the opposite party no. 2, despite his knowledge of existence of an order of status quo by the Hon'ble High Court which was passed in presence of his lawyer, instead of approaching the Bench which passed that order of status quo. But then the mere fact that such an application was filed by the opposite party no. 3 before the opposite party no. 2 would not confer any jurisdiction upon him to decide as to who is in possession or with whom the title lay and to recommend any help vis-a-vis possession to the officer-in-charge of a police station. It is really beyond our comprehension as to what business the opposite party no. 2 had to poke his nose into the matter particularly when he does not have any jurisdiction to do so under the law and when the matter is subjudice with the Hon'ble High Court being in full seisin thereof. West Bengal Land Reforms Act does vest him with some jurisdiction to discharge some adjudicatory functions in relation to specified matters. But in the instant case, it is apparent on the face of the record that the' opposite party no. 2 grossly exceeded his jurisdiction to entertain the application of the opposite party no. 3 and to recommend police help for maintaining his possession over the suit property which constitutes the subject matter of the second appeal pending before the High Court. It is evident from the materials on record that the opposite party no. 1 did direct his SI, one Mr. Banerjee to render police help to the opposite party no. 3 at the intervention of the opposite party no. 2. It is the positive allegation of the petitioner no. 4 in his contempt application supported by affidavit that the opposite party no. 1 informed the petitioners that he had no alternative other than to obey the orders of the opposite party no. 2 even though he was already furnished with copies of the relevant order of the High court by the petitioner no. 1 on 21.5.95 and 12.6.95. The opposite party no. 1 did not even care to traverse or deny this part of the allegation. It is also the positive assertion of the petitioner no. 4 that the opposite party no. 1 held out a threat to destroy the crops standing upon the suit property. The opposite party no. 1 on 21.5.95 and 12.6.95. The opposite party no. 1 did not even care to traverse or deny this part of the allegation. It is also the positive assertion of the petitioner no. 4 that the opposite party no. 1 held out a threat to destroy the crops standing upon the suit property. The opposite party no. 1 can be deemed to have made a similar admission by reason of his having not traversed this part of the averments in his own affidavit. The fun is that the opposite party no. 2 on his own annexed a copy of his letter dated 1.10.96 which he addressed to the opposite party no. 1. On a plain reading of this letter it seems as if the opposite party no. 2 was delivering a judgment on the question of title or possession in respect of the suit plot. It refers to an application alleged to have been filed before him by the opposite party no. 3 long after the contempt rule was issued against all the opposite parties by the High Court and the affidavits-in-opposition were yet to be filed by all of them. It also refers to a written communication dated 1.7.96 addressed by the opposite party no. 1 to the opposite party no. 2. We are really at a loss to understand how the occasion could arise for the opposite party no. 3 to file an application on 28.6.96 or for the opposite party no.1 to address a communication on 1.7.96 to the opposite party no. 2. The said application of the opposite party no. 3 and the communication of the opposite party no. 1 have not, however, been placed before us. The opposite party no. 2 in this letter dated 1.10.96 purports to go into the merit of the orders passed by the trial court, by the first appellate court and also by the High Court. He also extensively quoted the observations made by the Executive Magistrate on 28.7.94 and 29.7.94 in relation to an application that was filed by the petitioners under section 144 Cr.P.C. even before the admission of the second appeal or passing of the relevant order of status quo by the High Court. Indeed, the reason which prompted the opposite party no.2 to write such a lengthy letter with copy to his superior authority is not clear. Indeed, the reason which prompted the opposite party no.2 to write such a lengthy letter with copy to his superior authority is not clear. In his affidavit-in-opposition the opposite party no.2 has even gone to the length of saying as if his earlier memo dated 23.6.95 was issued by him when the relevant file was not readily available. What he actually meant by the expression "relevant file" is not clear. What was actually available at that point of time and when the so called relevant file was actually available is also not clear. It is also not clear how the opposite party no. 1 could justify rendition of police help to one party in preference to another in relation to act of cultivation or possession of certain land which constitutes the subject matter of a litigation which is pending adjudication before the High. Court between that party and his adversary when the High Court was yet to determine as to who was really in possession of the suit property on 19.9.94 the date on which it directed maintenance of the status quo, simply because of the fact that the opposite party no. 2 recommends help in favour of the opposite party no. 3 by addressing one communication or the other to the opposite party no. 1. The undisputed acts and conduct on the part of the opposite parties nos.1 and 2 which we have set out above are such that they do not require any closer scrutiny to find that they per se amount to disobedience of the High Court's order dated 19.9.94 and it is needless to comment that such disobedience was anything but deliberate and wilful so as to amount to contempt of court. That apart, it goes without saying that the reckless statement on the part of the opposite party no. 1 to the effect that the police help for cultivation of the suit land was given to the petitioners virtually amount to swearing false affidavit before this Court in a contempt proceeding. Such act on the part of the opposite .party no. 1 is only aimed at interfering or obstructing the administration of justice. The issuance of the letter dated 1.10.96 by the opposite party no. Such act on the part of the opposite .party no. 1 is only aimed at interfering or obstructing the administration of justice. The issuance of the letter dated 1.10.96 by the opposite party no. 2 cannot but be characterised as another desperate attempt by him to whitewash the contempt which he had already committed by issuance of his earlier two memos dated 23.6.95 and 5.7.95 and is aimed at giving an impression to the court as if those memos were issued by him bona fide. As against the opposite party no. 3, one of the charges levelled by the petitioner is that he has wilfully disobeyed the order dated 19.9.94 by trying to disturb the possession of the petitioners in respect of the suit plot. In this contempt proceeding we are not in a position to decide merely on the basis of the affidavits and counter-affidavits as to who had been in the actual physical possession of the suit plot on the date on which the order of status quo was passed by the High Court and unless and until the court can come to a definite finding to the effect that the petitioners had been in possession of the suit land on the material date and the opposite party no. 3 did some positive acts to disturb such possession and thereby disturb the status quo, the question of committing any contempt of court by the opposite party no. 3. by reason of the alleged attempts to disturb the alleged possession of the petitioners does not arise. The other allegation levelled against the opposite party no. 3 is that he influenced the opposite party no. 2 in issuing the memos dated 23.6.95 and 5.7.95. On this point, there is assertion and denial supported by affidavits. As such, it cannot be said that the petitioners have succeeded in establishing the fact that the opposite party no. 3 did really influence of the opposite party no. 2 and thereby aided and abetted the commission of contempt by the opposite party no. 2. The only other act alleged against the opposite party no. 3 which is said to constitute contempt of court is the fact that he applied for police help. It goes without saying that it was highly improper on the part of the opposite party no. 3 to by pass the High Court and approach the opposite party no. 2. The only other act alleged against the opposite party no. 3 which is said to constitute contempt of court is the fact that he applied for police help. It goes without saying that it was highly improper on the part of the opposite party no. 3 to by pass the High Court and approach the opposite party no. 2 for police help with regard to the subject matter of the lis pending before the High Court during the period in which the High Court's order of maintenance of status quo with regard to the possession was in operation but it would be too much for us to hold that by reason of his having made such a misconceived application for police help before the opposite party no. 2, he has wilfully disobeyed that order of the High Court or has aided or abetted the wilful disobedience of that order by the opposite party no. 2 or by the opposite party no. 1. 8. Thus giving our anxious consideration to all the materials on record, we have no hesitation to hold that the acts which have been proved to have been done by both the opposite parties nos. 1 and 2 do constitute wilful disobedience to the order dated 19.9.94 passed by the High Court in the concerned second appeal. The acts are really such which also tend to lower the authority of this court and to interfere with due course of a judicial proceeding and also to obstruct the administration of justice. In such view of the matter, it would necessarily follow that the opposite party no. 1, Pradip Kumar Ghosh and the opposite party no. 2, Nisikanta Das are guilty of contempt of court. The opposite party no. 3 cannot however be said to have committed contempt of court in the strict sense of the term. Accordingly, we find him not guilty and discharge him. 9. Coming to the question of punishment we are satisfied that the contempt committed by the opposite parties nos. 2, Nisikanta Das are guilty of contempt of court. The opposite party no. 3 cannot however be said to have committed contempt of court in the strict sense of the term. Accordingly, we find him not guilty and discharge him. 9. Coming to the question of punishment we are satisfied that the contempt committed by the opposite parties nos. 1 and 2, who are public servants, is of such a nature that it substantially interferes or tends substantially to interfere with the due course of justice and regard being had to the facts and circumstances of this case particularly the nature and gravity of the contempt they have committed, we do not consider it to be a fit case to accept the apology which they have offered and discharge• them without actually punishing them for the contempt of court. Having regard to the fact that they have virtually pleaded guilty even though at a much belated stage and given an undertaking to the effect that they will not repeat such contempt in future by affirming the affidavits, we are inclined to take a lenient view and desist from imposing a substantive sentence of imprisonment. In our view, a sentence of fine of Rs. 1,000/- would substantially meet the ends of justice. We therefore sentence opposite party no. 1 (Pradip Kumar Ghosh) and opposite party no. 2 (Nisikanta Das) to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- each, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month each. The contempt rule is thus disposed of. Tarun Chatterjee, J.: I agree. Contempt rule disposed of LATER After the sentence is pronounced in open court, the contemnor no. 1 Shri Pradip Kumar Ghosh, now Sub-Inspector of Police attached to District Intelligence Branch, West Bengal and the contemnor no. 2 Shri Nisikanta Das, now Additional Land Acquisition Officer, Howrah, expressed their willingness to pay the fine here and now. Accordingly, in terms of Rule 32 of the Calcutta High Court Contempt of Courts Act, 1975, the Registrar General, Appellate Side, High Court. Calcutta is directed to accept the fine.