JUDGMENT A.N. TRIVEDI, J 1. Since these nine Writ Petitions are based on similar facts and involve identical questions of law with the consent of learned counsel for the parties they have been heard together and CWJC No. 9052 of 1988 as agreed by learned counsel for the parties has been treated as the leading case and all the Writ Petitions are being decided by a common judgment. 2. In first seven Writ Petitions interim orders had been granted on various dates by Division Benches of this Court as a result whereof the petitioners of first seven Writ Petitions are continuing in the employment of Bihar Police Building Construction Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Company). 3. All the 196 petitioners are aggrieved by the orders issued by and on behalf of the Company terminating their services and instructions purported to be issued on behalf of the State Government in Home (Police) Department directing the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Company to forthwith terminate the services of 214 Officers/ Employees and have prayed for quashing the impugned orders and the impugned directions. 4. In CWJC No. 9052 of 1988 Petitioner No. 1 initially was appointed as an Architectural Draughtsman on 27.5.1977 and Petitioner No. 2 was initially appointed as a Junior Engineer (Civil) on 23.9.1976 and have impugned the order dated 21.11.1988 (Annexure-1) and the directions dated 24.12.1986 (Annexure-4). In CWJC No. 9033 the 165 Petitioners were initially appointed between 1975 and 1981 on Class III and Class IV posts and have impugned the order dated 21.11.1988 (Annexure-1) and the impugned directions dated 24.12.1986 (Annexure-5). In CWJC No. 9391 of 1988 the petitioner was appointed on Class IV post as a Godown Chowkidar on 1.3.1980 and has challenged the impugned order dated 21.11.1988 (Annexure-10) and the direction dated 24.12.1986 (Annexure-7). In CWJC No. 2793 of 1988 the petitioner was initially appointed on a Class III post as a Lower Division Clerk on 28.3.1977 and has challenged the impugned order dated 18.4.1988 (Annexure-1) and the direction dated 24.12.1986. In CWJC No. 2796 of 1988 the petitioner was initially appointed on a Class III post as a Correspondence Clerk on 1.1.1975 and has challenged the order dated 21.11.1988 contained in Annexure-1. In CWJC No. 2796 of 1988 the petitioner was initially appointed on a Class III post as a Correspondence Clerk on 1.1.1975 and has challenged the order dated 21.11.1988 contained in Annexure-1. In CWJC No. 2833 of 1988 the petitioner was appointed on 14.6.1975 on a Class III post as a Peon and has challenged the impugned order dated 21.11.1988 (Annexure-1) and the impugned direction dated 24.12.1986. In CWJC No. 3042 of 1988 the 23 petitioners were appointed on various Class III and Class IV posts between 1975 and 1981 and have challenged the order dated 18.4.1988 (Annexure-1). In CWJC No. 2734 of 1989 the petitioner was initially appointed on a Class IV post as a Godown Chowkidar on 4.3.1980 and has challenged the order dated 12.1.1989 (Annexure-1). In CWJC No. 3813 of 1988 the petitioner was initially appointed on a Class IV post on 6.5.1978 as a Peon and has challenged the order dated 18.4.1988 (Annexure-1). 5. We may now briefly refer to pleading of the parties in CWJC No. 9052 of 1988. Petitioner No. 1 was working as Architect and Petitioner no. 2 was Executive Engineer in the Company when their services were sought to be terminated in compliance with the impugned directions. Petitioner No. 1 being a graduate in Architecture applied for being considered for appointment on the post of Architectural Draughtsman on 27.5.1977 in leave vacancy. Some time in June, 1977 the Agricultural Marketing Board invited application for appointment to the post of Architectural Assistant and the petitioner no. 1 responded through proper channel however the Company, decided to create a post of Architectural Assistant in the scale of Rs. 510-1155 and he was promoted on ad-hoc basis for a period of six months on 27.9.1977. He was later promoted as Assistant Architect by the Chairman of the Company on 9.2.1978. The question of validity and legality of the appointment of petitioner no. 1 was considered by the High Level Selection Committee of the Bureau of Public Enterprises as also the Home Department of the State Government and the petitioner no. 1 was found fit for being promoted on the post of Architect (Class-1) in 1981 and it was further found that the appointment of petitioner no. 1 was regular and valid. Later in 1982 he was granted pay scale of Rs. 1 was found fit for being promoted on the post of Architect (Class-1) in 1981 and it was further found that the appointment of petitioner no. 1 was regular and valid. Later in 1982 he was granted pay scale of Rs. 1575-2300 and his promotion to the post in the grade of Superintending Engineer was under consideration by the Bureau of Public Enterprises although Board of Directors of the Company had upgraded the post of Architect to that of Senior Architect. Petitioner No. 1 had been, faithfully and honestly to the best of his ability, discharging his duties and function to the utmost satisfaction of his superiors and there was never any complaint or adverse comments by anyone against petitioner no. 1. 6. Petitioner No. 2 is B.Sc. (Engineering) in First Class from Patna University was registered in the Employment Exchange, Patna in the year 1975 and had been making applications for being considered for appointment in various organisations/institutions. It appears that some time in the year 1976 the Company requisitioned the names of eligible registered candidates from the Patna Employment Exchange for appointment on the post of Junior Engineer (Civil) the minimum qualification for which was diploma in engineering from any recognised university. Although the candidature of petitioner no. 2 was not sponsored by the employment exchange he, having come to know about the steps taken by the Company, made an application in the Company giving his bio-data and was eventually called for interview before a board along with other candidates and having been found most suitable was appointed on the post of Junior Engineer (Civil) in the scale of Rs. 335-555. From time to time he was promoted to the next higher post and at the time when his services were sought to be terminated he was working as Executive Engineer Incharge. It is further claimed that the Board of Directors of the Company by its Resolution dated 6.4.1974 had delegated the powers of the Board under Article 47(iii) to the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Company enabling him to make appointments on posts carrying the pay not exceeding Rs. 1750. Petitioner No. 2 claims to have received an offer of appointment from the Central Water Commission on the post of Design Assistant in the scale of Rs. 550-750 whereupon he brought the matter to the notice of the Company. 1750. Petitioner No. 2 claims to have received an offer of appointment from the Central Water Commission on the post of Design Assistant in the scale of Rs. 550-750 whereupon he brought the matter to the notice of the Company. Thereafter considering the suitability and the qualification of petitioner no. 2 he was appointed on the post of Assistant Engineer in the scale of Rs. 510-1155 with effect from 14.2.1978. Meanwhile he received offer for appointment from other departments/organisations but he continued to serve the Company. 7. The Company took a policy decision on 13.7.1982 to regularise the services of all the officers/employees working under it continuously for three years. Copy of the office order has been annexed as Annexure-2 to the Writ Petition. Later by an order dated 6.4.1986 the Company put a ban in forwarding the application of any officer/employee for opting for services elsewhere. Soon thereafter the Deputy Secretary in the Home (Police) Department of the State Government issued the impugned Letter No. 12701 dated 24.12.1986 directing the Chairman-cum-Managing Director (For Short CMD) of the Company to forthwith terminate the services of 214 officers and employees as the State Government has carefully considered the matter. Accordingly, the impugned order of termination dated 21.11.1988 (Annexure-1) was issued on the basis of the directions of the Deputy Secretary, Home (Police) of the State Government contained in Annexure-4. It appears that in course of time the matter was brought to the notice of the Chief Minister and then a report from the CMD was called who by his Letter No. 2082 dated 24.9.1988 categorically stated and admitted that out of 214 employees, the appointment of only 28 employees could be said to be irregular and the appointment of rest of the officers/ employees were absolutely regular and perfectly legal, yet the petitioners services were sought to be terminated by the impugned orders. Petitioner No. 2 reiterates that his career is unblemished and he has been faithfully and honestly discharging his duties and functions as Executive Engineer Incharge and there was never any complaint or adverse comment by any authority whomsoever. 8. Petitioner No. 2 reiterates that his career is unblemished and he has been faithfully and honestly discharging his duties and functions as Executive Engineer Incharge and there was never any complaint or adverse comment by any authority whomsoever. 8. Letter dated 8.11.1988 from the Home Secretary, Government of Bihar to the CMD has been annexed as Annexure-9 to CWJC No. 9033 of 1988, a perusal of which reveals that directions had been issued to dispense with the services of 188 employees forthwith and intimate the Government about tile compliance, failing which the matter would be viewed seriously by the State Government. Copy of Letter No. 21/C dated 19.4.1988 from the CMD to the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar has been annexed as Annexure-6 in which the CMD reiterated and informed the Chief Secretary that out of 214 total employees, the appointments of 28 employees were not regular and valid and rest of the employees have regularly and validly been appointed and in the circumstances notices for termination of services of 28 employees only was being issued. The aforesaid letter dated 19.4.1988 from the CMD was in reply to the Chief Secretary letter dated 13.4.1988 in which it was insisted that the directions contained in the Home (Police) Department Letter No. 1270 dated 24.12.1986 De implemented and despite several reminders n1e then CMD's predecessor-in-office failed to implement the directions which amount to violation of Government orders and the CMD was warned that if compliance report is not sent within one week the CMD would be personally responsible for violation of Government order and action would be taken. 9. In the Counter Affidavit filed on behalf of Respondents 1 and 2 by the Assistant Secretary of the Company it has been admitted that the services of the petitioners have been terminated in pursuance of the directions issued by the Government of Bihar, Home (Police) Department vide their Letter No. 12701 dated 24.12.1986 and Letter No. 1611 dated 8.11.1988. It appears that the then Chief Minister directed the then CMD of the Company to place before him the relevant facts regarding illegal and irregular appointments in the Company and the matter was examined on that basis and the State Government came to the conclusion that in most of the cases appointments in the Company were made without following the prescribed procedure. It is asserted that Petitioner No. 1 was appointed in a leave vacancy but he was allowed to continue in service without observing the normal procedure for appointment inasmuch as the post against which he was appointed was never advertised nor was any selection board constituted and other eligible candidates were not invited. As regards petitioner no. 2 it has been stated that he was appointed as Junior Engineer in the Company and then as Engineer Assistant without following the procedure insofar as the post was not advertised and was not subjected to any interview along with other candidates who could have applied in pursuance of the advertisement but was appointed as an Engineer Assistant on the recommendation of the Chief Engineer of the Company and was later promoted as an Assistant Engineer in the same manner and thus the appointments of the petitioners are void ab initio. It is admitted on behalf of the State Government that the Company requested for reconsideration of the proposal of the Government and to permit the petitioners and other employees to continue in services in whose appointments there had been no material irregularity but the request of the Company was not acceded and directions were issued in their Letter No. 12701 dated 24.12.1986 and Letter No. 1611 dated 8.11.1988 which are impugned calling upon the CMDs. to terminate the services of all the employees in the Company who had been appointed irregularly and therefore, the orders dated 21.11.1988 were issued for and on behalf of the CMD giving one month's notice from the date of the issue of the order for termination of the services of the petitioners and other employees. 10. It may be clarified that dates of the orders of termination vary in different cases but the orders of termination recite that the services of the petitioners and other employees stand terminated after the expiry of one month from the date of issue of the order and are purported to be under section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 11. On behalf of the Government an Assistant in the Home (Police) Department, Government of Bihar, has filed the Counter Affidavit in which it has been stated that there are no Rules and Regulations, Circular and Memoranda etc. 11. On behalf of the Government an Assistant in the Home (Police) Department, Government of Bihar, has filed the Counter Affidavit in which it has been stated that there are no Rules and Regulations, Circular and Memoranda etc. in the Company regarding mode of recruitment for appointments and promotion of officers and employees in the Company at the time of appointments of the petitioners but the Appointment Department memoranda Nos. 1981 dated 18.1.1976, 16440 dated 3.12.1980 and 16441 dated 3.12.1980 prescribed and lay down the mode of recruitment on posts in Class III and Class IV categories. These memoranda, inter alia, provide that the post have to be advertised, written and oral examinations have to be conducted and qualifications for recruitment on the post have to be prescribed but the Company in absence of its own Rules or Regulations in that behalf did not adheres to the memoranda of the Appointment Department of the Government of Bihar and appointments had been made without taking the consent of the Administrative Department i.e. the Home (Police) Department of the Government of Bihar. It is further stated that the Government deeply examined the matter and obtained the advice of the Law Department and came to the conclusion that there were grave and serious irregularities committed by the then CMDs. of the Company in the matter of appointments of all the petitioners and therefore, directions were issued by the State Government in the Home (Police) Department to the CMD vide Memo No. 9432 dated 23.8.1982 but instead of complying with the directions of the State Government the Company raised certain difficulties in implementing the Government directions which needed further examination. Therefore, the matter was examined again and the State Government reached the conclusion that the appointments of the two petitioners including other petitioners of the Writ Petitions were irregular and illegal and thus the impugned directions were issued and merely because the petitioners in the Writ Petitions have continued in the employment of the Company for 11-12 years would not validate or regularise their appointments. The State Government has controverted the allegations of the petitioners that the appointments of only 28 employees were illegal but it is asserted that appointments of all the employees whose services have been terminated were found to be illegal and irregular. 12. The State Government has controverted the allegations of the petitioners that the appointments of only 28 employees were illegal but it is asserted that appointments of all the employees whose services have been terminated were found to be illegal and irregular. 12. Besides other documents and correspondences a Division Bench decision of this Court in CWJC No. 3801 of 1997 (Jugeshwar Rabidas and others vs. Bihar Police Building Constructions Corporation and others) is on record in which Association of the employees of the Company had represented to the CMD who agreed to place their grievance regarding enhancement and revision of pay structure of Lower Division Clerks before the Board of Directors but the Bureau of Public Enterprises did not agree. It was held that the Company is a Government Company and a State Government undertaking and is fully owned and controlled by the State Government and, therefore, the State Government and its departments too have control over the affairs of the Company and as such the power of Bureau of Public Enterprises could not be questioned and accordingly the Writ Petition was dismissed. 13. In another Counter Affidavit filed on behalf of the Company and the State Government it has been pointed out that none of the petitioners in other cases were appointed on the posts after advertisement or were subjected to written examination or interview nor was a selection board for the purpose ever constituted by the Company. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the impugned orders of termination of the petitioners had been issued on the dictate and at the behest of the State Government which has no authority under the Articles of Association to issue the impugned directions and the impugned orders of termination of the petitioners have been mechanically and arbitrarily issued by and on behalf of the Company. 15. Learned counsel further submitted that the Governor has been defined in Article 2(iii) of the Articles of Association to mean the Governor of Bihar and in absence of any direction of the Governor the impugned orders of termination would not be passed against the petitioners. 15. Learned counsel further submitted that the Governor has been defined in Article 2(iii) of the Articles of Association to mean the Governor of Bihar and in absence of any direction of the Governor the impugned orders of termination would not be passed against the petitioners. Moreover Article 48 of the Articles of Association provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any of the Articles the Governor may, from time to time, Issue such directives or instructions as may be considered necessary in regard to finance, conduct of business and affairs of the Company and the Company shall give immediate effect to the directives or instructions so issued. The said Article further provides that approval of the Governor will be required for (i) the enterprise's five year annual plan of development and the enterprise's capital Budget; and (ii) agreements involving foreign collaboration proposed to be entered into by the Company. 16. Elaborating his submission learned counsel contended that the powers of Directors of the Board in the matter of appointments of staff have been prescribed in Article 47 of the Articles of Association which enables the Board of Directors of the Company to appoint such staff or create such posts as may be necessary for the purposes of the Company provided that no appointment or creation of such post carrying an ultimate salary exceeding Rs. 1,750 per month shall be made without prior approval of the Governor. Learned counsel, therefore, submitted that none of the petitioners' initial appointments on various posts carried an ultimate salary exceeding Rs. 1,750 per month and therefore neither the approval of the Governor nor in any case of the State Government in the Home (Police) Department was required to be obtained and the Board of Directors of the Company by its resolution dated 6.4.1974 had delegated the power of the board under Article 47(iii) of the Articles of Association to the CMD of the Company and thus the appointment made by CMDs. of the petitioners was not without authority. of the petitioners was not without authority. Learned counsel submitted that by the year 1988 majority of the petitioners had put in over 13 years of service and few of them 7-8 years and, therefore in view of the long tenure the services of the petitioners could be terminated only if an opportunity to show cause was given to the petitioners to explain as to why their services be not terminated and further that their appointments had been validly and regularly made by the competent authority and therefore, there being violation of principles of natural justice, the impugned orders of termination is void. Moreover, in any case the State Government and the Company ought to have considered the matter sympathetically and adopted humanitarian approach in the matter. 17. The last contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in clause (a) specifically provides that the workman has to be given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages of notice and in the present cases one month's notice to the petitioners has been given from the date of issue of the orders and not from the date of receipt of orders of termination by the petitioners and, therefore, the mandatory conditions in clause (a) of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has violated rendering the impugned orders of termination void. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the following decisions of this Court:– (1) Balmiki Prasad & others vs. State of Bihar & others, 1983 PLJR 131 (2) Bijoy Kumar Bharti & others vs. State of Bihar & others, 1983 PLJR 667 (3) Sailendra Narain Choudhary & others vs. State of Bihar & others, 1989 PLJR 902 (4) Ashok Kumar & others vs. State of Bihar & others, 1994(2) BLJR 499 The citation of other decisions i.e. 1974 BLJR 6 and 1998 PLJR 317 , are wrong citations as no decision is available in these citations pertaining to termination of services or in support of the contention of the petitioners. 19. In Balmiki Prasad (Supra) a Division Bench of this Court held that:– "The impugned letters of termination do not speak with respect to any illegality in the initial appointments. 19. In Balmiki Prasad (Supra) a Division Bench of this Court held that:– "The impugned letters of termination do not speak with respect to any illegality in the initial appointments. Moreover, the order of termination is based upon the assumption that the appointment was made duly for a period of six months and the same came to an end by efflux of time without taking into account the intervening action of the Managing Director regularising the post under the said appointments which apparently put an end to the period fixed for which the petitioners were appointed on ad hoc basis. The status of the petitioners may still have been precarious but in view of their services being regularised, they cannot be said to be merely ad hoc appointees for a period of six months only. The very foundation for issuing the letter of termination is entirely misconceived and erroneous." 20. In Bijoy Kumar Bharti (Supra) the Full Bench of this Court held after review of several English precedents and decisions of the Apex Court held that the rule of alteram partem is intended to inject justice into law and it cannot be applied to defeat the ends of justice or to make the law "lifeless" absurd, stultifying, self defeating or plainly contrary to the common. sense of the situation and further that no rigid rules can be laid down for the application of the principles of natural justice and the circumstances in which or the occasion where the action under challenge has been taken determines the applicability of the rules and further also that the generally accepted guiding test would be whether any person is being deprived of his life, property, right or legitimate expectation or is visited with civil consequences and whether taking all the matters into consideration it would be unfair to deprive him of the same without having his viewpoint presented to the decision making authority. 21. In Sailendra Narain Choudhary (Supra) learned Single Judge of this Court after review of several decisions of the Apex Court held that:– "Plainly enough the respondent corporation is a separate juristic person and is not a department of the Government. The control of the State Government, if any, over such corporation evidently is by reason of its article of Association and not by reason of any provisions of statute. The control of the State Government, if any, over such corporation evidently is by reason of its article of Association and not by reason of any provisions of statute. The resolution of the State of Bihar accepting the recommendation of the 4th Pay Revision Committee was thus not binding upon the Corporation. In other words if the corporation or for that matter Bureau of Public Enterprises has not given effect to the aforementioned resolution of the State of Bihar, the petitioners cannot be said to have acquired any legal right to enforce the said resolution upon the respondent-corporation or the respondent no. 4 by obtaining a writ of mandamus from this Court." 22. In Ashok Kumar (Supra) a Division Bench of this Court held that even if the initial appointments of the petitioners were wrong but the fact remains that the petitioners have not obtained their appointment by means of fraud or misrepresentation and later their services had also been regularised and in view of the fact that they had continuously worked for about 12 years the validity of their initial appointments could not be reopened and questioned and accordingly quashed the order of termination. 23. On behalf of the Company learned counsel admitted that the orders of termination had been issued in compliance of the direction of the State Government but the appointments of the petitioners were irregular as the prescribed procedure had not been followed and, therefore, there was incurable infirmities in the initial appointments of the petitioners. Learned counsel extensively referred to the stand of the Company in the Counter Affidavit which has already been noticed above. 24. Learned counsel for the State reiterated the stand taken by the State Government in the Counter Affidavit but did not refute the submission of learned counsel for the petitioners that opportunity of hearing was denied to the petitioners and also that it is the Governor alone who could have at all issued the impugned directions. 25. Having considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and the material on record, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned orders and directions are liable to be quashed. 26. 25. Having considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and the material on record, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned orders and directions are liable to be quashed. 26. Admittedly in the year 1988 majority of the petitioners who had been appointed in 1975 and a few in 1981 had put in 14 to 8 years of Service and in view of their long tenure it was incumbent for the Company to have afforded opportunity to show cause as to why their services be not terminated as their initial appointments were found to be invalid. In fact the alleged enquiry made by the Company or the State Government was an ex-parte enquiry and in course of the enquiry none of the petitioners were in any manner associated. Besides the Company succumbed to the direction of the State Government ignoring the provision of Article 48 of the Articles of Association which specifically empowers only the Governor of Bihar to issue directives with regard to the finance, conduct of business and affairs of the Company. 27. A Division Bench of this Court comprising of Hon'ble P.S. Mishra (as he then was) and Hon'ble B. Prasad, JJ. while considering the alleged illegal appointments in Biveka Nand Singh and others vs. State of Bihar and others (CWJC No. 5998 of 1989 disposed of on 17.1.1990) held that:– "The Supreme Court and this Court in several judgments have repeated the law that by merely alleging that a certain appointment is illegal or irregular without holding enquiry after notice to the employee concerned, he should not be removed. Yet, it appears in the instant case, the said method has been adopted. To cross to the illegality aforementioned, respondents have retained several juniors of the petitioners in service who were similarly appointed as petitioners were appointed on daily wages on purely ad hoc basis. Yet another settled rule of law is that, in case of retrenchment of any employee or termination of service of any ad hoc or temporary employee, the rule of last come first go has to be applied, that rule has also not been followed. The petitioners have for the said reason been discriminated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution which have been violated by the respondents. The petitioners have for the said reason been discriminated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution which have been violated by the respondents. The petitioners have also alleged that they had worked more than 340 days in one calendar year, they could not have been removed without following the procedure prescribed by section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act". 28. In our considered opinion the matter relating to appointments in the facts and circumstances of the present case could neither fall in any of the three categories for which the Governor is empowered to issue directives in view of clause (iii) of Article 47 of the Articles of Association which enables the Board of Directors to appoint such staff or create such posts as may be necessary for the purpose of the Company provided that no appointment for creation of such post carrying an ultimate salary exceeding Rs. 1,750 shall be made without prior approval of the Governor. It has not been shown that any of the petitioners had been appointed on post carrying the ultimate salary exceeding Rs. 1,750 per month. Moreover Article 47(w) (xv) provides for delegation of powers by the Board of Directors to the Chairman and/or the Managing Director for the time being either individually or collectively such of the powers exercisable under these Articles by the Directors as may be deemed fit and may from time to time revoke or withdraw, alter or vary all or any such powers. Besides even if it is assumed that the State Government could have issued the impugned directions on behalf of the Governor the infirmity lies as none of the directions issued by and on behalf of the State Government had been expressed in the name of the Governor or authenticated in accordance with the Authentication of Orders and Instruments Rules framed by the State Government. This aspect of the matter was not examined by the Division Bench of this Court in Jugeshwar Rabidas (Supra). 29. This aspect of the matter was not examined by the Division Bench of this Court in Jugeshwar Rabidas (Supra). 29. The Respondents failed to take into notice the fact that the Board of Director in the meeting held on 8.11.1988 in which Home Secretary, the CMD., the Special Secretary, Chief Engineer, Joint Secretary, Secretary, Secretary of the Company and the Superintending Engineer participated and adopted resolution sanctioning interim relief and enhanced house rent allowance, city compensatory allowance at par with Public Sector Undertakings in the State and other matter relating to appointment on the post of Junior Engineers and Assistant Engineers. 30. The other infirmity in the impugned order of termination is that the mandatory condition for resorting to Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act is that one month's clear notice is to be given to the employee whose services are sought to be terminated or wages in lieu thereof are paid but in the instant case it is apparent on the face of record that one month's clear notice was not given to any of the petitioners instead period of one month's notice was reckoned from the date of issue of the order and not from the date of service of the order and thus the mandatory condition prescribed in Section 25F clause (a) of the Industrial Disputes Act has been violated rendering the impugned order of termination void. 31. The result of the foregoing discussion is that the impugned orders of termination of the services of the petitioners cannot be sustained and therefore the impugned orders dated 21.11.1988, 18.4.1988 and 12.1.1989 are quashed. Accordingly, the Writ Petitions are allowed. No order as to costs.