Judgment :- S. Marimuthu, J. This C.M. A. has arisen impugning the order delivered in LA. No. 414 of 1998 by the District Judge, Manjeri in O S. No.1 of 1998. The defendants are appellants. The suit was filed by the respondents as plaintiffs against the appellants under S.26 read with 0.7 R.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Ss.55 and 58 of the Copyright Act, 1957 (Act 14 of 1957) (hereinafter called 'the Act') for reliefs of injunction restraining the appellant, their men, etc. from printing, publishing, distributing and selling copies of the book titled Quran, prepared, printed and published, distributed and sold by the appellants/ defendants, etc. Along with the suit, they filed the above said LA. for a temporary injunction till the disposal of the suit. The learned District Judge on hearing both sides, granted the temporary injunction in the above said I. A. till the disposal of the suit. Now as pointed out above, that order is challenged in this appeal. 2. According to the respondents, the first respondent is the author of oJicraioi) sxrjfS rarajoS njaieonii (Quran-Translation and Interpretation). They were in two volumes marked as Exts. Al and A2. Second respondent is the printer, publisher and seller of these books. The first appellant has produced Ext. A3 book by name Quran and the first appellant has used in verbatim by quoting Exts. Al and A2. In other words, the works of the first respondent in Exts. Al and A2 have been copied by the first appellant and appellants 2 and 3 are the printers and sellers of Ext. A3. Since the literary work of the first respondent in Exts. Al and A2 has been copied by the appellants, respondents can rightly sue the appellants under the above-said provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957 and in the meanwhile, they are also entitled to a temporary injunction as prayed for in their interlocutory application and accordingly, the temporary injunction was granted by the trial Court and that need not be now vacated by this Honourable Court. 3. On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the appellants that the order of injunction granted is not sustainable and in fact, the provisions of the Act do not apply to the case of the respondents and therefore, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed in liminie. 3. On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the appellants that the order of injunction granted is not sustainable and in fact, the provisions of the Act do not apply to the case of the respondents and therefore, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed in liminie. When that be so, no order could be passed granting temporary injunction under 0.39 CPC. Nobody can have copyright over the Holy Quran for translation since the author of the book is the God himself. Therefore, the order passed by the District judge has to be vacated. 4. On account of the above rival submissions of both the learned counsel, Mr. T.P.M. Ibrahim Khan, appearing for the appellants and Mr. O. Ramachandran Nambiar appearing for the respondents, the only point that arises for consideration is whether the order of temporary injunction granted by the District judge can be sustained or not? The arguments of both the learned counsel are mainly on the question whether the first respondent can be the author of Exts. Al and A2. Therefore, in the start, it is better to extract here the meanings of 'author', 'work' and 'literary work' as defined in the Act. In S.2(d) of the Act, 'author' is defined as follows: "S.2(d) 'author' means, (i) in relation to a literary or dramatic work, the author of the work; (ii) in relation to a musical work, the composer; (iii) in relation to an artistic work other than a photograph, the artist; (iv) in relation to a photograph, the person taking the photograph; (v) in relation to a cinematograph film or sound recording, the producer; and (vi) in relation to any literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is computer-generated, the person who causes the work to be created; S.2(o) "literary work" includes computer programmes, tables and compilations including computer data basis; S.2(y): "work" means any of the following works, namely:-(i) a literary .dramatic, musical or artistic work; (ii) a cinematograph film; (iii) sound recording;" 5. In addition to the above, I can also refer to hereunder the meaning of "infringing copy" as defined in S.2(m) of the Act which is as follows: "S.2(m): "infringing copy" means,- (i) in relation to a literary dramatic, musical or artistic work, a reproduction thereof otherwise than in the form of a cinematographic film: (ii) in relation to a cinematographic film, a copy of the film made on any medium by any means; (iii) in relation to a sound recording, any other recording embodying the same sound recording, made by any means; (iv) in relation to a programme or performance in which such a broadcast reproduction right or a performer's right subsists under the provisions of this Act, the sound recording or cinematographic film of such programme or performance, if such reproduction, copy or sound recording is made or imported in contravention of the provisions of this Act." 6. In the Law Lexicon of British India by P. Ramanatha Aiyar,1940 Edn., "author" is meant as follows: "author": One who composes or writes a book, as distinguished from an editor, translator or compiler; One who produces, by his own intellectual labour applied to the materials of his composition, an arrangement of compilation new in itself. The original composer of a book or writing of any kind, as distinguished from a compiler, translator, editor, or copyist. "author and translator": An author has the choice of his own thoughts, which a translator has not." 7. In the book'Words and Phrases (Judicially Defined)' Vol.1 by Roland Burrows, Esq., Recorder or Cambridge, 1943 Edition, it is defined as follows: "Author": A person to whom words are dictated for the purpose of being written down is not an'author But an author may come into existence without producing any original matter of his own... The compilation of a street directory, the reports of proceedings in Courts of law... have been held to bring the producers within the word 'author'; and yet in one sense no original matter can be found in such publications. Still there was something apart from originality on the one hand and mere mechanical transcribing on the other which entitled those who gave these words to the world to be regarded as their authors." 8. Apart from the meaning of the words 'author' 'literary work', infringement of copyright', etc. Still there was something apart from originality on the one hand and mere mechanical transcribing on the other which entitled those who gave these words to the world to be regarded as their authors." 8. Apart from the meaning of the words 'author' 'literary work', infringement of copyright', etc. found in the Act as well as jn the dictionaries the settled principle of law cited by both the learned counsel can also be extracted hereunder so that those principle can also be applied while examining the contentions of both sides: (i) The Privy Council in Macmillan & Co. v. K & J Cooper AIR 1924 PC 75 held that-"use of another's labour or ski 11 alone is prohibited and that would amount to infringement." (ii)Calcutta High Court in Mohini Mohan Singh v. Sita Nath Basak (AIR 1931 Cal. 233) has ruled as follows "In the case of works not original in the proper sense of the term, but compiled or prepared from materials which are open to all the principle is that a person is not at liberty to use or avail himself of the labour which another has bestowed for the purpose of producing his works, that is, in fact merely to take away the result of another man's labour, or in other words his property." (iii) The Allahabad High Court in S.K. Dutt v. Law Book Co. (AIR 1954 All. 570) has ruled as follows: "Several persons may originate similar works in the same general form without anyone infringing the law in regard to copyright. The infringement comes in only when it can be shown that someone has, instead of utilising the available sources to originate his work, appropriated the labours of another by resorting to a slavish copy or mere colourable imitation thereof. The 'animus furandi', that is an intention to take from another for purpose of saving labour is one of the important ingredients to be found against a defendant before he can, in a suit under the Copyright Act, be damnified." (iv) In the decision reported in Byrne v. Statist Co. The 'animus furandi', that is an intention to take from another for purpose of saving labour is one of the important ingredients to be found against a defendant before he can, in a suit under the Copyright Act, be damnified." (iv) In the decision reported in Byrne v. Statist Co. (1914 (1) KB 622), it is held' as follows: "Held, that the translation was an "original literary work", within S.1 of the Copyright Act, 1911, of which the plaintiff was the author; that the plaintiff was the owner of the copyright therein, within S.S; that the defendants were not innocent infringers, within S.8, who were not aware of, and had no reasonable ground for suspecting, the existence of copyright in the work; and that the plaintiff was entitled to damages;" (v) In Walter & Am v. Lane (1900 AC & PC (House of Lords (E) 539), it is held as follows: "A person who makes notes of a speech delivered in public, transcribes them, and publishes in a newspaper a verbatim report of the speech, is the "author" of the report within the meaning of the Copyright Act, 1842, is entitled to the copyright in the report and can assign the copyright." (vi) The Madras High Court in Govindan v. Gopalakrishna (AIR 1955 Mad.: , 391) has held thus: "In the case of dictionary a man is not allowed to appropriate for himself the arrangement, sequence, order, idioms, etc„ employed by another, using his brain, skill and labour. The proposition that never can there be any right to a book involving an infringement is not countenanced by modern law. Even an unauthorised translator of a well-known book covered by copyright, like one Bernard Shaw's plays, cannot be said to have no right to maintain an action against a person who simply takes his book and copies it bodily and prints and sells it in the market." (vi) In C. Cunniah & Co. v. Balraj & Co. (AIR 1961 Mad. Ill) the Madras High Court has held thus: "It is well established that, in order to obtain copyright production for literary, domestic, musical and artistic works, the subject dealt with need not be original, nor the ideas expressed be something novel. What is required is the expenditure of original skill or labour in execution and not originality of thought. Ill) the Madras High Court has held thus: "It is well established that, in order to obtain copyright production for literary, domestic, musical and artistic works, the subject dealt with need not be original, nor the ideas expressed be something novel. What is required is the expenditure of original skill or labour in execution and not originality of thought. Thus, though pictorial representation of Lord Balasubrahmanya in a human for miss a subject which is common to everyone, still, if a picture of Lord Balasubrahmanya drawn by an artist made up of conventional ideas as to his posture, his form, the ornaments he wears, the vahanam he uses and other matters, the picture produced is still the result of skill and labour of the artist; and it certainly entitles him to claim copyright in the product of his labour." (vii) The Patna High Court injagdish Prasad v. Parmeshwar Prasad (AIR 1966 Patna 33) has held thus: "Question papers are the original literary works, though paper-setter may have copied questions from text books". (viii) The Karnataka High Court in Associated Electronic v. M/s. Sharp Tools (AIR 1991 Kar. 406) has ruled as follows: "There can be no copy right in the word of words, but the right can only be in the artistic manner in which the same is written. One of the surest test to determine whether or not there has been a violation of copyright is to see if the reader, spectator or the viewer after having read or seen both the works would be clearly of the opinion and get an unmistakable impression that the subsequent work appears to be a copy of the first. In other words, dealing with the question of infringement of copyright of the artistic work, the Court is to test on the visual appearance of the object and drawing, design, or artistic work in question and by applying the test viz. 'the lay observer test' whether to persons who are not experts in relation to objects of that description, the object appear to be a reproduction. If to the 'lay observer', it would not appear to be reproduction, there is no infringement of the artistic copyright in the work." (ix) The Delhi High Court in Camlin Pvt, Ltd. v. National Pencil Industries (AIR 1986 Del. 444) held as follows: "In the present case, the printed cartons/boxes appear to be mechanically reproduced one. If to the 'lay observer', it would not appear to be reproduction, there is no infringement of the artistic copyright in the work." (ix) The Delhi High Court in Camlin Pvt, Ltd. v. National Pencil Industries (AIR 1986 Del. 444) held as follows: "In the present case, the printed cartons/boxes appear to be mechanically reproduced one. It cannot be said that any skill or labour has been expended upon the allegedly artistic carton, as the same has been produced by mechanical actions of a printing machine, and not by skill and labour having been expended upon them by any natural person. Further, the boxes/ cartons in question are not "engraving" as contained in S.(i). Any print obtained from either on offset printing process or by a letter press or in combination of the various printing process including silk printing process cannot amount to an engraving". (x) The Supreme Court in R.G. Anand v. M/s. Delux Films & Ors. ((1978) 4 SCC 118) has laid down the following tests and principles with references to deciding the copy right and infringement: "(1) There can be no copyright in an idea, principle, subject-matter, themes, plots or historical or legendary facts and violation of the copyright in such cases is confined to the form, manner and arrangement and expression of the idea by the author of the copyrighted work. (2) Where the same idea is being developed in a different manner, it is manifest that the source being common, similarities are bound to occur. In such a case the Courts should determine whether or not the similarities are on fundamental or substantial aspects of the mode of expression adopted in the copyrighted work. If the defendant's work is nothing but a literal limitation of the copyrighted work with some variations here and there it would amount to violation of the copyright. In other words, in order to be actionable the copy must be a substantial and material one which at once leads to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty of an act of piracy. In other words, in order to be actionable the copy must be a substantial and material one which at once leads to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty of an act of piracy. (3) The surest and safest test to determine whether or not there has been a violation of copyright is to see if the reader, spectator or the viewer after having read or seen both the works is clearly of the opinion and gets an unmistakable impression that the subsequent work appears to be a copy of the original, (4) Where the theme is the same but is presented and treated differently so that the subsequent work appears to be a copy of the original. (5) Where, however, apart from the similarities appearing in the two works there are also material and broad dissimilarities which negative the intention to copy the original and the coincidences appearing in the two works are clearly incidental no infringement of the copyright comes into existence. (6) As a violation of copyright amounts to an act of piracy it must be proved by clear and cogent evidence after applying the various tests laid down by the case-law. (7) Where however the question is of the violation of the copyright of stage play by a film producer or a director the task of the plaintiff becomes more difficult to prove piracy. It is manifest that unlike a stage play a film has a much broader prospective, wider field and a bigger background where the defendants can by introducing a variety of incidents give a colour and complexion different from the manner in which the copyrighted work has expressed the idea. Even so, if the viewer after seeing the film gets a totality of impression that the film is by and large a copy of the original play, violation of the copyright may be said to be proved". 9. Now, on the above principles of law, both statutory and settled, I shall discuss the contentions of both the learned counsel. Mr. O. Ramachandran Nambiar, learned counsel for the respondents would contend that the first respondent being the author of Quran -Translation and Interpretation (Vols.1 and 2, Exts. Al and A2 ) has the copyright over the same and not over the Quran. Mr. O. Ramachandran Nambiar, learned counsel for the respondents would contend that the first respondent being the author of Quran -Translation and Interpretation (Vols.1 and 2, Exts. Al and A2 ) has the copyright over the same and not over the Quran. In translating Quran first respondent spent about 2 years and during this period of two years, he coined words and in fact, he did literary work. By doing so, he has obtained copyright over Exts. Al and A2. The same has been copied by first defendant-appellant by Ext. A3 in verbatim. Second and third appellants are the printer and seller of Ext. A3. In these circumstances, the submission of the other side that the God is the author of Quran has no bearing. In short, his contention would be that the first respondent has spent his brain, labour and skill in the preparation of Exts. Al and A2 and therefore, as per the principle even when a translation is done using his brain, labour and skill, it could be very well said that the translator is the author of it. Further, he contended that in para 8 of the plaint, it is averred as follows: "8On a scrutiny and comparison of the book of the Ist plaintiff printed, published and distributed and sold by the 2nd plaintiff and the book claimed to have been authored by the 1st defendant and printed and published by the 2nd defendant and distributed and sold by the 3rd defendant from April, 1997 onwards as claimed by them, it is found that the translation of Quranic verses and explanatory note Viakliianam shown as revealed by the book printed and published by the 2nd plaintiff as aforesaid were virtually copied down, reproduced and shown in the book of the defendants." It is not denied in the written statement. 10. As against the above submission of the learned counsel for the respondents, Mr. T.P.M. Ibrahim Khan, learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the first respondent could never be the author of Quran. Quran is only a translation under Exts. Al and A2 and the first appellant also has translated under Ext. A3 and it does not amount to infringement of the copyright of the first respondent. 11. T.P.M. Ibrahim Khan, learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the first respondent could never be the author of Quran. Quran is only a translation under Exts. Al and A2 and the first appellant also has translated under Ext. A3 and it does not amount to infringement of the copyright of the first respondent. 11. When I examine the above submissions of both the counsel along with the principles of law stated supra, I am of the view that even in the translation where brain, labour and skill have been used or where some literary works are carried out, the person who did the said work in the translation is the author having copyright over the same. When I examine Exts. Al, A2 and A3 thorough I feel that in Exts. Al and A2, skill of the first respondent has been used and therefore, though they are the translation, the author is the first respondent. In this context, it is also to make a reference that even in the matter of preparation of question, papers the setter can be said as an author (as per the decisions stated supra). I also went through the order passed by the District Judge and in my view, he has thoroughly considered the contentions of both sides and has reached at a correct conclusion. In a case of Ms nature. I am also of the view that a temporary injunction can be granted till the disposal of the appeal. In a nutshell. I view that the order of the District Judge is sustainable and it needs no interference by this Court. The result, the appeal stands dismissed upholding the order passed by the District Judge, Manjeri in I.A. No. 414 of 1998 in O.S. No.l of 1998.