V. K. SINGHAL, J. ( 1 ) ASSESSMENT orders have been challenged in these writ petitions, on the ground that, according to the petitioner, iron ore lumps are not liable to purchase tax under entry 1 of the Third schedule to the Act and the petitioner can purchase them against form 37 under Section 5-A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957. A clarification was issued by the Commissioner on February 5, 1991 that if iron ore lumps, iron ore fines and red oxide fines are used as raw material in the manufacture of other goods, dealer can purchase the same against form 37. Subsequently, the notification dated April 1, 1996 was issued by amending item 1 of the Third Schedule to the Act, to which, bauxite, chromite, iron, manganese and other ores including lumps and fines were added by Act No. 5 of 1996. Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is, that, before april 1, 1996, lumps and fines cannot be included in the definition of iron ore. It is submitted that, in respect of fines, this Court has already given a decision in the case of Prakash v. State of karnataka (S. T. R. P. No. 85 of 1981 dated June 25, 1984 ). ( 2 ) IT is submitted that, the inclusive definition which has extended the meaning of "ore" would have prospective effect. Reliance is placed on the judgment given in the case of State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha AIR1960 SC 610 , (1960 )62 BOMLR553 , (1960 )I LLJ251 SC , [1960 ]2 SCR866 , wherein it was observed that : "it is obvious that the words used in an inclusive definition denote extension and cannot be treated as restricted in any sense. (Vide : Stroud's 'judicial Dictionary', Volume 2, page 1415 ). Where we are dealing with an inclusive definition it would be inappropriate to put a restrictive interpretation upon terms of wider denotation. " Reliance is placed on the judgment given in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax, Andhra pradesh v. Taj Mahal Hotel AIR1972 SC 168 , [1971 ]82 ITR44 (SC ), (1971 )3 SCC550 , [1972 ]1 SCR168 , 1971 (III )UJ798 (SC ), wherein, it was observed : "the word 'includes' is often used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute. When it is so used, those words and phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their nature and import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. The word 'include' is also susceptible of other constructions which it is unnecessary to go into. " Reliance is placed on the judgment given in the case of Lucknow Development Authority v, m. K. Gupta AIR1994 SC 787 , 1994 (1 )BLJR249 , [1994 ]80 compcas714 (SC ), (1994 )1 Complj1 (SC ), JT1993 (6 )SC 307 , (1994 )1 MLJ55 (SC ), 1994 (0 )MPLJ461 , 1994 (I )OLR (SC )258 , 1993 (4 )SCALE370 , (1994 )1 SCC243 , [1993 ]supp3 scr615 , where the observations in Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps 1899 AC 99 to the following effect were considered : " 'include' is very generally used (in) interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute, and when it is so used these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their natural, import, but also those things which the definition clause declares that they shall include. " ( 3 ) ON behalf of the department, it is submitted that the word 'including' could be a clarificatory also and reliance is placed on the judgment given in the case of B. P. Krishna Murthy v. State of mysore [1962] 13 STC 436 (Mys.), wherein, it was observed : "ordinarily, the word 'including' as contrasted with the word 'namely' imports addition indicating something not already included, whereas the word 'namely' imports interpretation. But that is not how the word 'including' has necessarily to be interpreted and understood wherever that expression occurs in a statute or elsewhere. In definitions contained in many statutes the definition is merely inclusive and the word 'includes' is employed by way of abundant caution so that the expression defined might not be understood to eliminate from its ambit, matters and things which the definition says should be included. In definitions contained in many statutes the definition is merely inclusive and the word 'includes' is employed by way of abundant caution so that the expression defined might not be understood to eliminate from its ambit, matters and things which the definition says should be included. " In National Timber Mart v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1979] 44 STC 205, it was observed by allahabad High Court that : "by the use of the word 'include' the legislature does not always intend to convey the intention that but for the inclusive language the matters referred to were not part of the earlier subject-matter. It is on many occasions used by way of clarification: see Commissioner of Sales tax v. Chawla Stores [1977] 40 STC 57 (All. ). In the present case, as the ballies were obtained by cutting timber trees and as cut timber is also included in the notification, it is not possible to hold that ballies did not come within the category of timber, and came to be included in the category only after 1971 when the inclusive words were introduced in the notification. " In Manickam and Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR1977 SC 518 , (1977 )1 SCC199 , [1977 ]1 SCR950 , [1977 ]39 STC12 (SC ), 1976 (8 )UJ943 (SC ), it was observed : "the fact that the amendment of Clause (b) of Section 15 was not like some other provisions given retrospective effect, would not materially affect the position. As already mentioned above, the legislature as a result of the amendment, clarified what was implicit in the provisions as they existed earlier. An amendment which is by way of clarification of an earlier ambiguous provision can be useful aid in construing the earlier provision, even though such amendment is not given retrospective effect. We may refer in this context to the observations on page 147 of Craies on statute Law (Sixth Ed.), which read as under :. . . . . . . In Cape Brandy Syndicate v.. R. C. [1921] 2 KB 403 Lord Sterndale, M. R. , said : 'i think it is clearly established in Att. Gen. v. Clarkson [1900] 1 QB 156, that subsequent legislation may be looked at in order to see the proper construction to be put upon an earlier Act where that earlier Act is ambiguous. In Cape Brandy Syndicate v.. R. C. [1921] 2 KB 403 Lord Sterndale, M. R. , said : 'i think it is clearly established in Att. Gen. v. Clarkson [1900] 1 QB 156, that subsequent legislation may be looked at in order to see the proper construction to be put upon an earlier Act where that earlier Act is ambiguous. I quite agree that subsequent legislation if it proceeded on an erroneous construction of previous legislation cannot alter that previous legislation: but if there be any ambiguity in the earlier legislation, then the subsequent legislation may fix the proper interpretation which is to be put upon the earlier'. " In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (1991) Supp 2 SCC 18, it was observed : "the word 'includes' is generally used to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases used in the statute so that, words and phrases may be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their nature and import, but also these things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. " In Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. High Land Coffee Works of p. F. X. Saldanha and Sons JT1991 (3 )SC 325 , 1991 (2 )SCALE221 , (1991 ) 3 SCC617 , it was observed : "the word 'include' is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute ; and when it is so used, these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. " ( 4 ) IT is submitted that, iron-ore has been classified by the Indian Bureau of Mines and has been classified on the basis of beneficiation, characteristics and on the basis of iron contents and size range. Ores above 6 to 10 mm are generally referred as lumps and the rest,. e. , minus 6 mm as fines. The description which has been given with regard to classification of iron ore leads to the conclusion that, ore is a genus which has the specie of lumps and fines, etc. Ores above 6 to 10 mm are generally referred as lumps and the rest,. e. , minus 6 mm as fines. The description which has been given with regard to classification of iron ore leads to the conclusion that, ore is a genus which has the specie of lumps and fines, etc. Thus, lumps have to be considered as ore and the contention that the extended definition of "ore" has come from april 1, 1996 should not be made applicable to the period prior to April 1, 1996 is not a correct interpretation of the notification. It is not the extended meaning which could be contemplated by the word "including". Sometime it is also by way of clarification of the meaning and therefore, the decisions which have been relied on, have to be interpreted as subject to context. The definition of "ore" in the Strouds Judicial Dictionary is : " 'ore' is a metal in its crude state separated from the rock. " under the Customs Tariff Act/central Excise Tariff : the definition of "ore" reads : "a naturally occurring mineral from which a metal can be extracted. Usually on a commercial basis. The metal may be present in the ore as the native metal, but more commonly it occurs in a combined form, as an oxide, sulphide, sulphate, silicate, etc. ,". In Websters Unabridged Dictionary, the definition of "ore" reads : "as, ar, brass, copper, identified with ore, unwrought metal ; hence, the form is from the former, the meaning from the latter. 1. any natural combination of minerals, especially one from which a metal or metals can be profitably extracted. 2. a natural substance from which a non-metallic material, such as sulfur, can be extracted. " ( 5 ) THE lumps, therefore, have to be given a meaning that they are ore and even for the period prior to April 1, 1996 they will be considered to be iron ore. ( 6 ) THE other question which remains is, that the petitioner has made purchase of iron ore lumps against form 37 and during the relevant period, there was a circular in his favour. ( 6 ) THE other question which remains is, that the petitioner has made purchase of iron ore lumps against form 37 and during the relevant period, there was a circular in his favour. On the interpretation, it has been held that the lumps would be covered by the term "ore", but the question arises as to when there was a beneficial circular which was in favour of the petitioner and there was no decision contrary to the interpretation of the Commissioner earlier, whether the petitioner should be denied the benefit thereof. Reliance is placed on the judgment given in the case of UCO Bank v. Commissioner of Income-tax AIR1999 SC 2082 , 1999 (111 )ELT673 (SC ), [1999 ]237 ITR889 (SC ), JT1999 (4 )SC 40 , 1999 (4 )SCALE1 , (1999 )4 SCC599 , [1999 ]3 SCR635 wherein, it was observed that, the circulars having the effect recourse to law, cannot be considered as inconsistent with the provision of the statute and binding on the authorities. It is contended by the learned counsel for the department that the circulars have already been withdrawn in accordance with the directions of this Court in the case of Sree Jagadish Colour Co. v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes ILR1996 KAR 2052 , where it was observed by this Court that the Commissioner cannot exercise the powers at his whims and fancies and the communications were held entirely illegal. This judgment was confirmed by a Division Bench also. It is submitted that, in view of the law laid down by this Court, the petitioner cannot take the advantage of the circular. ( 7 ) IN Collector of Central Excise, Patna v. Usha Martin Industries AIR1997 SC 3871 , 2002 (84 )ECC795 (SC ), 1997 ECR257 (NULL ), 1997 (94 )ELT460 (SC ), jt1997 (7 )SC 557 , 1997 (5 )SCALE600 , (1997 )7 SCC47 , [1997 ]supp3 SCR601 , [1998 ]111 STC254 (SC ), the circular issued by the Board was held binding on the Revenue and it was observed that, when the Central Board of Excise and Customs made all others to understand a notification in a particular manner and when the latter have acted accordingly, it is not open to the Revenue to turn against such persons on a promise contrary to such instructions. Such circulars would be binding on the department. Such circulars would be binding on the department. In view of the judgment given by the apex Court in Usha Martin Industries case (1998) 111 STC 254, it could be considered that the circulars issued shall stand cancelled only from the date this Court has so declared in the case of Sree jagadish Colour Co's. case ILR1996 KAR 2052. Therefore, the petitioner having acted on the basis of the circular, was entitled to. purchase the lumps against form 37. The assessing authority shall modify their order in accordance with the directions given above.