ORDER C.K. Prasad, J. 1. By this Writ Petition, filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner prays for quashing of the order dated 1st June, 1983 (Annexure-P/14), passed by the disciplinary authority, whereby, as a measure of punishment after the departmental enquiry, petitioner has been removed from the service of the respondent Bank. Petitioner further prays for quashing of the appellate order dated 28-8-1985 (Annexure P/3), whereby the appellate authority dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order of the disciplinary authority. It is relevant here to state that later on, by order dated 28th September, 1985 (Annex. P/4) the appellate authority has substituted the words "dismissed from the Bank's service" to that of "removed from the Bank's service". 2. Facts giving rise to the present Writ Petition are that the petitioner at the relevant time was working as officer in the Junior Management Grade of the respondent State Bank of India, hereinafter referred to as the Bank. While he was serving as such, a disciplinary action was initiated and by letter dated 15th April, 1982, he was charge-sheeted. It consisted of four charges, these were :-- Charge No. 1 : The petitioner passed a withdrawal of Rs. 2,000/-purported to be of one Hiralal without there being any loan application and other documents. An application for term loan was produced by him after repeated reminders which too was for purchase of a buffalo. The withdrawal form has not been signed by the borrower. Hiralal disowned any knowledge of Shri Abdul Hamid who was alleged to have sold the buffalo to him and denied having tendered the money receipt for Rs. 3,000/- obtained from Abdul Hamid. The money receipt was prepared by the petitioner himself. Hiralal and Bheronlal stated that the petitioner took signature on blank forms and that payment had been taken by him. Charge No. 2 : That, the petitioner knowingfully well that Smt. Kumud Saraf and Smt. Kshirsagar could not be classified as eligible persons, wilfully and deliberately made available to them bank finances for purchases of a buffalo by each of them. In order to wilfully allow misutilisation, he released the amount in cash in open contravention of laid down instructions. To cover up the irregularities in disbursement of the two advances, he deliberately did not obtain necessary documents thus jeopardising the interest of the Bank. In order to wilfully allow misutilisation, he released the amount in cash in open contravention of laid down instructions. To cover up the irregularities in disbursement of the two advances, he deliberately did not obtain necessary documents thus jeopardising the interest of the Bank. He also wilfully and deliberately failed to put up the relative papers to the Branch Manager/Manager, Agricultural Banking Division for sanction. Charge No. 3 : That, in disbursing the two loans in the name of Batanlal without due sanction, he wilfully and deliberately allowed misutilisation of the Bank's funds by the guarantor and unreasonably permitted benefits of the concessional rate of interest to the guarantor, who was not eligible for such facility and thereby he abused his position. Charge No. 4 : That, the petitioner unauthorisedly disbursed the amounts of the three loans without obtaining due sanction from the Branch Manager or Manager, Agri. Banking Division. He also failed to obtain necessary papers relating to such loans and left the Bank's interest in jeopardy. He also tampered with the Branch records by deleting remarks of the Day Book checking official. The petitioner, with malafide intention of availing of financial accommodation for his use, disbursed to himself three loan amounts by drawing withdrawal forms in the name of a non-existent illiterate borrower and thus misused his official position detrimental to the interests of the Bank. 3. On receipt of the charge-sheet, petitioner submitted his reply dated 26-4-1982 (Annex. P/9) denying all the allegations made against him. However, before that, by order dt. 23-4-1982, respondent Bank appointed the Enquiry Officer as also the Presenting Officer for the Bank. After enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted its report holding the petitioner guilty for Charge No. 1. Enquiry Officer further found that allegation of wilfully allowing misutilisation of the loan, which is subject matter of Charge No. 2 has been proved but ingredients II and III are not established. Enquiry Officer further held that respondents have not been able to substantiate Charge No. 3 but found Charge No. 4 proved. 4. On consideration of the report of the Enquiry Officer, disciplinary authority agreeing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, by the impugned order dt. 1st June, 1983, passed the order of removal from service. Petitioner aggrieved by the same preferred appeal and his appeal has also been dismissed by the appellate authority. 4. On consideration of the report of the Enquiry Officer, disciplinary authority agreeing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, by the impugned order dt. 1st June, 1983, passed the order of removal from service. Petitioner aggrieved by the same preferred appeal and his appeal has also been dismissed by the appellate authority. It is relevant here to state that after the order of removal from service was passed by the disciplinary authority, petitioner earlier filed Misc. Petition No. 2416/85 and this Court by order dt. 7-1-1985 disposed of the writ petition on the ground of availability of remedy of appeal. After the disposal of the writ petition, the appellate authority considered the appeal of the petitioner in its meeting held on 18th Jan., 1985 and dismissed the same. Same was communicated to the petitioner by letter dt. 28th August, 1985. Later on, the resolution of the appellate authority was amended in the meeting of the appellate authority held on 28-8-1985 and the expression "since dismissed from the Bank's service" was substituted by the words "since removed from the Bank's service". 5. Shri R.P. Agrawal, appears on behalf of the petitioner whereas, respondents are represented by Shri V.S. Shroti. Shri Agrawal, appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer as regards charges No. 1, 3 and 4 are perverse and that calls for interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. According to Mr. Agrawal, in case the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer is perverse or has been arrived at without any material or the conclusion arrived at is of such nature that no prudent person can come to that conclusion, same does call for interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. He terms the finding of Enquiry Officer as perverse. 6. Before I proceed to consider this submission of Shri Agrawal, it is apt to consider the scope of Judicial review in such matters. Mr. Shroti, appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that the power of Judicial review in relation to the finding arrived at by the Enquiry Officer and affirmed by the disciplinary authority is limited and this Court can not act as a Court of appeal against the findings recorded by the authorities. Mr. Shroti, appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that the power of Judicial review in relation to the finding arrived at by the Enquiry Officer and affirmed by the disciplinary authority is limited and this Court can not act as a Court of appeal against the findings recorded by the authorities. In support of his submission, Shri Shroti has placed reliance on a Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Apparel Export Promotion Council v. S.K. Chopra, AIR 1999, SC page 625. My attention has been drawn to paragraph 17 of the aforesaid Judgment which reads as follows :-- "17. The High Court appears to have overlooked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority is the sole Judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the Appellate, the Appellate Authority has also the power/ and jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact finding authorities. Once findings of fact based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since, the High Court does not sit as an Appellate Authority, over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court can not normally speaking substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. Even in so far as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the Disciplinary or the Departmental Appellate Authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Even in so far as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the Disciplinary or the Departmental Appellate Authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court, it appears, ignored the well settled principle that even though Judicial Review of administrative action must remain flexible and its dimension not closed, yet the Court in exercise of the power of judicial review is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings which can not be faulted with for procedural illegalities or irregularities which vitiate the process by which the decision was arrived at, Judicial Review, it must be remembered, is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process." 7. Finding of the Enquiry Officer on the charges proved are held as follows :-- Charge No. 1 : "I have carefully weighed the documentary evidence produced before me, the depositions of the witnesses and the cross examination by the Defence, Shri Hardikar has been charged with gross misuse of official position in putting through a withdrawal of Rs. 2,000/- with the sole malafide intention of availing of financial accommodation to himself. There is no dispute over the withdrawal of Rs. 2,000/- on 26-3-1981. Presenting Officer's witness Shri Hiralal deposed that he had no account of buffalo, that he did not receive any cash amount relating to that account, that Shri Hardikar brought some papers to his village for his signature saying that they were pertaining to Thresher account, that he also told him that he was taking Rs. 2,000/- on his buffalo account, that Shri Hardikar gave him Rs. 2,000/- after 8-10 days saying that the money which was taken by him on his buffalo account he was giving him which he should deposit (pages 15, 16 of the proceedings). During cross-examination Shri Hardikar had attempted to bring out that the voucher for Rs. 2,000/- on his buffalo account, that Shri Hardikar gave him Rs. 2,000/- after 8-10 days saying that the money which was taken by him on his buffalo account he was giving him which he should deposit (pages 15, 16 of the proceedings). During cross-examination Shri Hardikar had attempted to bring out that the voucher for Rs. 2,000/- was signed by Shri Hiralal, that it was signed on 26-3-1981 at the Branch of Shri Hiralal had returned the sum of Rs. 2,000/- to Shri Parashar, at village Godawal since he had not purchased the buffalo and he had also signed a letter addressed to the Bank. The question to consider now is whether Shri Hiralal received the cash pertaining to the withdrawal of Rs. 2,000/-. The paying Cashier, Shri Birhaiya in his deposition has categorically stated that the amount was taken by Shri Hardikar. Shri Hardikar in his defence statement to the articles of charges has stated that since the services of the messenger were not available and since the business time was nearing to a close, the borrower was personally escorted to the cash counter and payment made. It is thus clear that Shri Hardikar had gone to the cash department at that time. Further, Shri Hardikar himself in his defence brief has stated that the borrower was at the Branch up to 3.00 p.m. If that were so, there was no reason why he should have gone to the cash department unless it was to receive the payment. Shri Hiralal himself in his answer to the queries of the Presenting Officer Shri Parashar and Shri Hardikar (vide pages 16 and 19 of the proceedings) has categorically stated that Shri Hardikar gave him Rs. 2,000/- when he visited village Godawal after 8/10 days. In spite of consistent cross-examination, the above statement of the witness could not be disputed. It is, therefore, clear that Shri Hardikar had obtained the payment of Rs. 2,000/- from the Bank counter and gave it to Shri Hiralal only after 8-10 days at village Godawal or as a corollary Shri Hiralal did not receive the payment of the cash pertaining to the withdrawal on 26-3-1981." Charge No. 2 : "There is no record brought in the enquiry to establish Shri Hardikar's version that the animals were inspected. 2,000/- from the Bank counter and gave it to Shri Hiralal only after 8-10 days at village Godawal or as a corollary Shri Hiralal did not receive the payment of the cash pertaining to the withdrawal on 26-3-1981." Charge No. 2 : "There is no record brought in the enquiry to establish Shri Hardikar's version that the animals were inspected. There was absolutely no turnover in the Accounts excepting for the lump-sum credit of the overdues and closure of the account, Shri Khale's enquiry with neighbours had revealed that they had not seen any buffalo, the farfetched version that the buffalo used to be kept in the Petrol Pump, the borrower's misgivings about insurance and doctor's certificate go amply to show that the loans were not only mis-utilized, they were infact, meant to be misutilized and Shri Hardikar knew well about it for it was he who had released the amount in cash without the Branch Manager's clearance. The charge of wilfully allowing mis-utilisation of the loans is established, while the other ingredients II and III in the charge are not established." Charge No. 4 : "Thus, the expert has given a positive clear view on the impressions on the reverse of the last two withdrawals given above and these have been made by Shri Hardikar. Based on the above, the reasonable conclusion is that all the three withdrawals have been made through the thumb impressions of Shri Hardikar, which also indicates that the borrower is a fictitious person. These withdrawals I am, therefore, led to conclude, have been made by Shri Hardikar to avail himself of financial accommodation through fraudulent means. Based on the above, I am of the view that these disbursements were made without due sanction, necessary papers were not obtained, Shri Hardikar tampered with the Branch records, disbursed to himself the three loans with malafide intention of availing financial accommodation in fictitious names and caused serious breach of trust. The charge is established. 8. Power of Judicial review by this Court has been succinctly explained by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case. Keeping in view the law laid down by the Apex Court, now, I advert to the facts of the present case. Here, the Enquiry Officer has adverted to the charges levelled against the petitioner, his plea, the materials placed and its conclusion. Keeping in view the law laid down by the Apex Court, now, I advert to the facts of the present case. Here, the Enquiry Officer has adverted to the charges levelled against the petitioner, his plea, the materials placed and its conclusion. Findings of guilt recorded by the Enquiry Officer can not be said to be without considering the relevant materials or without any justification. It is well settled that this Court does not Act as a Court of appeal against the findings of the Enquiry Officer, the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority. Enquiry Officer has recorded its findings, on the basis of materials produced before it and the materials produced, clearly establish the charge. Hence, finding of the Enquiry Officer cannot be said to be perverse, so as to call for interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction. I do not find any substance in this submission of Shri Agrawal. 9. There is an ancillary submission of Shri Agrawal in regard to the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. He submits that the Enquiry Officer has referred to the report of the handwriting expert to arrive at a conclusion that the petitioner has committed misconduct but the handwriting expert was not examined. He submits that failure to examine the handwriting expert in the departmental enquiry and relying on his report to record finding of guilt is in the teeth of the principles of natural justice and that vitiates the enquiry report. Natural corollary of the aforesaid infirmity, according to the learned counsel, is that punishment on the basis of such enquiry report is also vitiated. It is relevant here to state that on 29th September, 1982, before the Enquiry Officer, the Presenting Officer requested for examination of the handwriting expert as witness. That was opposed by the petitioner and on the said date, the report of the handwriting expert was taken into evidence. It is relevant here to state that objection to the examination of the handwriting expert was made by the petitioner on the ground that in the list of witnesses; given alongwith the memorandum of charges, his name was not mentioned. Mr. Agrawal points out that notwithstanding the opposition of the prayer made by the petitioner, Enquiry Officer could have rejected the same and asked the Presenting Officer to examine the handwriting expert. Mr. Agrawal points out that notwithstanding the opposition of the prayer made by the petitioner, Enquiry Officer could have rejected the same and asked the Presenting Officer to examine the handwriting expert. According to him, non-examination of the handwriting expert, notwithstanding the opposition of the petitioner to that, vitiates the enquiry. 10. Mr. Shroti, however, appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that petitioner cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold at the same time. He submits that when the Presenting Officer wanted to examine the handwriting expert, it was opposed by the petitioner and at a later stage, he can not be allowed to take advantage of the same. He submits that the report of the handwriting expert was admitted in evidence and the Presenting Officer offered him for cross-examination, which opportunity the petitioner did not, avail. 11. Rule 50 (2) (xvi) of the State Bank of India (Supervisory Staff) Service Rules, hereinafter referred to as 'Service Rules' inter alia gives discretion to the Enquiring Authority to allow the Presenting Officer to produce evidence not included in the charge sheet. Presenting Officer in the light of the aforesaid provision made prayer before the Enquiry Officer for examination of the handwriting expert. That prayer, as stated earlier, was opposed by the petitioner and thereafter the report of the handwriting expert was admitted in evidence. I am of the opinion that because of the conduct of the petitioner himself, non-examination of the handwriting expert shall not vitiate the enquiry. The opinion of the handwriting expert was admitted in evidence. The Presenting Officer was prepared to examine the handwriting expert as witness which was opposed by the petitioner and in that view of the matter, the petitioner cannot be permitted to make any grievance about the same. 12. Shri Agrawal, then, submits that charge sheet was issued to the petitioner on 15-4-1982 and its reply was given by him on 26-4-1982, but even before the consideration of the reply, respondents on 23-44982 has chosen to appoint the Enquiry Officer as also the Presenting Officer, which is in teeth of Rule 50 (2) (iv) of the 'Service Rules'. Rule 50 (2) (iv) of the 'Service Rules' inter alia provides that on receipt of the written statement of the employee the disciplinary authority shall appoint an Enquiring Authority. 13. Rule 50 (2) (iv) of the 'Service Rules' inter alia provides that on receipt of the written statement of the employee the disciplinary authority shall appoint an Enquiring Authority. 13. True it is, that the Enquiry Officer was appointed by the disciplinary authority before the receipt of the reply of the petitioner but in my opinion, this itself will not vitiate the enquiry. In my opinion breach of every nature does not go to the root of the matter and vitiates the enquiry. Here in the present case, in view of the nature of allegations the disciplinary authority decided to appoint the Enquiry Officer even before the receipt of the reply of the petitioner. This in no way causes prejudice to the petitioner. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of Patiala and Ors. v. S.K. Shanna, AIR 1996 SC 1669 , mere violation of procedural provision, in the absence prejudice, shall not render the enquiry vitiated in the eye of law. It is apt to reproduce what has been said by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case. "In the case of violation of a procedural provision, which is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the person proceeded against or in public interest. If it is found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirement, either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found that the delinquent officer/employee has not waived it or that the provision could not be waived by him, then the Court or Tribunal should make appropriate directions (include the setting aside of the order of punishment), keeping in mind the approach adopted by the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar (1994 AIR SCW 1050). The ultimate test is always the same, viz., test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called." 14. Shri Agrawal, then, contends that the respondents having failed to give notice to the petitioner against the proposed punishment, it has vitiated the impugned orders. However, Mr. The ultimate test is always the same, viz., test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called." 14. Shri Agrawal, then, contends that the respondents having failed to give notice to the petitioner against the proposed punishment, it has vitiated the impugned orders. However, Mr. Agrawal has not drawn my attention to any provision from the Service Rules providing for notice against proposed punishment. It is not a rule of law that in every case before a punishment is imposed the employer is required to give notice to the delinquent. This is governed by the provision of the rules by which the employer and the employees are governed and in the absence of any provision in the Service Rules providing for notice against proposed punishment, I do not have the slightest hesitation in rejecting this submission of Shri Agrawal. 15. Non-supply of enquiry report before the order of punishment was passed by the disciplinary authority is another ground urged by Shri Agrawal for invalidation of the impugned orders. It is relevant here to state that in the present case, the order of the disciplinary authority is dated 1st June, 1983, i.e. before the cut-off date enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, (1991) 1 SCC 588 . Mr. Agrawal has taken me to the various provision of the Service Rules and made feeble attempt to demonstrate that supply of enquiry report before imposition of punishment is required under the Service Rules itself. But having gone through the Service Rules closely, I do not find any such provision in the same. Infact, Rule 50 (5) of the Service Rules provides that the order made by the disciplinary authority shall be communicated to the employee concerned; who shall also be supplied with the copy of the report of the enquiry. It is not in controversy that the disciplinary authority while communicating the order of removal from service has furnished to the petitioner the enquiry report. Thus, there being no provision in the Service Rules for supply of the enquiry report before the decision is taken by the disciplinary authority and the order of the disciplinary authority being prior to the cut-off date, laid down in Ramzan Khan's case (supra), I am of the opinion that non-supply of enquiry report to the petitioner is of no consequence. I do not find any substance in this submission of Shri Agrawal. 16. Another submission of Shri Agrawal is that neither the disciplinary authority nor the appellate authority while imposing the punishment of removal from service and affirming the same respectively have assigned any reasons. Mr. Shroti submits that the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority has concurred with the finding of the enquiry officer and in that view of the matter, it was not incumbent upon either of the authorities to give detailed reasons. In support of his submission, Shri Shroti has placed reliance on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of Bikaner and Ors. v. Prabhu Dayal Grover, 1995 AIR SCW 4117, and my attention has been drawn to the following paragraph from the said Judgment :-- "14. That brings us to the order of the Appellate Authority under Regulation 70 (2), the Appellate Authority is required to consider whether the findings recorded against the concerned officer are justified and/or whether the penalty is excessive or inadequate and pass appropriate order confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty or remitting the case to the authority which imposed the penalty or to any other authority with such directions as it deems fit in the circumstances of the case. This Regulation also does not obligate the Appellate Authority to give any reasons for its order. Assuming, that by necessary implication this Regulation also requires the Appellate Authority to give the reasons, still its order cannot be invalidated, as we find that it has discharged its obligation by considering the records and proceedings pertaining to the disciplinary action and the submissions made by Grover. In other words, the order clearly demonstrates that the Appellate Authority had applied its mind not only to the proceedings of the enquiry, but also the grounds raised by Grover in his appeal and on such application found that there was no substance in the appeal." 17. It is relevant here to state that in the present case also, the Service Rules by which the petitioner is governed does not contemplate of giving reasons. I am of the opinion that in case the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority agree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer in that case, no detailed reasons is required to be given. I am of the opinion that in case the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority agree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer in that case, no detailed reasons is required to be given. I do not find any substance in this submission of Shri Agrawal. 18. Shri Agrawal, lastly submits that in any view of the matter, the nature of allegations made against the petitioner is not of such grave nature that extreme penalty of removal from service is called for. He submits that this Court is not precluded from going into this question and in case it comes to the conclusion that the penalty imposed is shocking to the conscience of the Court or is disproportionate to the gravity of allegation, then in that case same calls for interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. In support of his submission, Shri Agrawal has placed reliance on a Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, AIR 1997 SC 3387 , and my attention has been drawn to the following paragraph of the said Judgment :-- "31. In such a situation, unless the Court/Tribunal opines in its secondary role, that the administrator was, on the material before him, irrational according to Wednesbury or CCSU norms, the punishment can not be quashed. Even then, the matter has to be remitted back to the appropriate authority for reconsideration. It is only in very rare cases as pointed out in B.C. Chaturvedi's case (1995 AIR SCW 4374) that the Court might, to shorten litigation--- think of substituting its own view as to the Quantum of punishment in the place of the punishment awarded by the competent authority. (In B.C. Chaturvedi and other cases referred to therein it has however been made clear that the power of this Court under Article 136 is different). For the reasons given above, the case cited for the respondent, namely, State of Maharashtra v. M.H. Mazumdar, ( AIR 1988 SC 842 ) can not be of any help." 19. Another decision on which Shri Agrawal has placed reliance is the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. M. Natarajan and Anr., (1997) 6 SCC 415 , and my attention has been drawn to the following paragraph of the said Judgment, which reads as follows :-- "4. Another decision on which Shri Agrawal has placed reliance is the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. M. Natarajan and Anr., (1997) 6 SCC 415 , and my attention has been drawn to the following paragraph of the said Judgment, which reads as follows :-- "4. In view of these findings, we think that no procedural illegalities were committed in conducting the enquiry. The question is : What punishment should be awarded to the respondents ? The Enquiry Officer himself has recommended to impose penalty of stoppage of three increments with cumulative effect. We find that the Enquiry Officer was justified. On the facts and circumstances of the case, we set aside the order of the removal from service. Instead, the disciplinary authority is directed to impose the punishment of stoppage of four increments with cumulative effect." 20. Shri Shroti, however, appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that what punishment should be imposed on a delinquent employee exclusively falls within the domain of the employer and that cannot be substituted by this Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. However, in fairness to Mr. Shroti, I must state that he has not taken the extreme stand that in no case the High Court can substitute the punishment imposed by the employer. His stand is that the punishment imposed on the petitioner is not shocking to the conscience of the Court or disproportionate to the gravity of allegations. He submits that an officer of the Bank holds a senior position and he is the trustee of the public fund. In case dishonest act of an officer of the Bank is viewed leniently, the entire financial health of the Bank will go out of gear. He submits that this is not one of the exceptional case in which this Court should exercise its jurisdiction to substitute the punishment. In support of his submission, Shri Shroti has placed reliance on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sanchalakshri and Anr. v. Vijayakumar Raghuvirprasad Mehta and Anr., AIR 1999 SC 578 , the relevant portion of the same is quoted below:-- "Neither the Tribunal nor the High Court in this case has held that the punishment imposed upon Respondent 1 was shockingly disproportionate. Respondent 1 was a school teacher. v. Vijayakumar Raghuvirprasad Mehta and Anr., AIR 1999 SC 578 , the relevant portion of the same is quoted below:-- "Neither the Tribunal nor the High Court in this case has held that the punishment imposed upon Respondent 1 was shockingly disproportionate. Respondent 1 was a school teacher. A teacher is expected to maintain higher standard of honesty and integrity in view of the position he holds. He committed acts of forgery either himself or with the help of some other person by forging signatures of the District Education Officer, the Auditor and the Sanchalak and Principal of Pallavi Vidyalaya. Even after he was called upon by the School Management to disclose the names of the persons who had put their signatures in the service-book, he has stated that it was signed by the District Education Officer, Mr. S.M. Parmar. That statement was false to his knowledge. It was on the basis of the forged endorsements that he wanted to get payments as per the revised pay scale regularised. Respondent 1 had thus not only committed a serious misconduct but also a serious criminal offence. If under such circumstances, the punishment of dismissal was imposed by the School Management, it cannot be said that it was shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct". 21 From the reading of the Judgments of the Supreme Court referred to above, it is clear that ordinarily, this Court does not interfere with the quantum of punishment. However, as a rule, it can not be said that in no case the power of Judicial Review can be invoked in relation to the quantum of punishment. In case the punishment is disproportionate to the gravity of allegation or to put it differently, is shocking to the conscience of the Court or in other words, no prudent person can impose such a punishment, same can be interfered with by this Court, exercising its power of Judicial Review. Here in the present case, petitioner was an officer of the Bank. According to the charges proved, he withdrew money for himself in the name of someone else, allowed misutilisation of loans and availed financial accommodation in fictitious name. Petitioner occupied a position of trust, which, he betrayed. Here in the present case, petitioner was an officer of the Bank. According to the charges proved, he withdrew money for himself in the name of someone else, allowed misutilisation of loans and availed financial accommodation in fictitious name. Petitioner occupied a position of trust, which, he betrayed. Taking into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of this case, I am of the opinion that the punishment imposed cannot be said to be disproportionate to the gravity of the allegation and as such, same does not call for interference by this Court in exercise of its power of Judicial Review. 22. Having negatived all the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, I do not find any merit in the writ petition and it is dismissed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost. Security amount, if deposited, be refunded to the petitioner.