Dr. M. K. Sharma, J: ( 1 ) THE present suit was instituted by the plaintiff seeking for a decree of permanent injunction, restraining the defendant-Delhi Development Authority fromgiving effect to the letter dated 17. 8. 1995 issued by it cancelling the allotment andlease of land of the plaintiff society at Sector -C, Pocket-3 Vasant Kunj, Newdelhi, and also for a decree not to dispossess the plaintiff -society from the land in question. ( 2 ) A copy of the letter dated 17. 8. 1995 is annexed as Annexure-L to the plaint. Bylhc said letter, the plaintiff-society was informed that the reply of the plaintiff-societyshowing cause as to why the lease/allotment of the land allotted to the plaintiff-societyshould not be cancelled due to violation of Clause 11 (13) of the lease deed byrenting out the building to a third parly for commercial use was examined and thesame was not found satisfactory and accordingly the decision of the defendantauthority was intimated to the plaintiff cancelling the lease/allotment of theaforesaid land allolled to the plaintiff-society. ( 3 ) IT may be mentioned herein that as against the show cause notice dated 3. 2. 3995issued by the defendant-authority to the plaintiff-Society. a suit was instituted by theplaintiff in the Court of Civil Judge, Delhi. A copy of the said plaint is also placed onrecord. In the said suit, the plaintiff sought for a decree for permanent injunctionrestraining the defendant from cancelling allotment of the land as well as lease ofthe suit property in the name of the plaintiff and also restraining the defendantfrom taking any action for cancellation of the land/lease or re-entering the samewith cost. Along with the said suit, the plaintiff also filed an application seeking forinterim injunction restraining the defendant from proceeding to cancel the said lease. The Civil Judge, Delhi, however, rejected the prayer for grant of ad interim temporary injunction as against which an appeal was preferred by the plaintiff which wasalso dismissed as against which Civil Revision was preferred by the plaintiff whichis pending disposal in this Court. ( 4 ) THE present suit was instituted by the plaintiff on 31. 8. 1995 when summons weredirected to be issued and in the injunction application filed by the plaintiff, anorder of ex parte injunction was passed restraining the defendant from taking anyfurther action as per their letter of cancellation of allotment/lease of land dated17. 8. ( 4 ) THE present suit was instituted by the plaintiff on 31. 8. 1995 when summons weredirected to be issued and in the injunction application filed by the plaintiff, anorder of ex parte injunction was passed restraining the defendant from taking anyfurther action as per their letter of cancellation of allotment/lease of land dated17. 8. 1995 which was received by the plaintiff on 30. 8. 1995. In the said injunctionapplication filed by the plaintiff, reply was filed by the defendant and the said application is also pending disposal in this Court. A number of other interim applications came to be filed in this Court which are pending disposal. Said similarapplications are I. A. Nos. 9048/1995, 2697/1996, 12254/1996, 1164/1997, 1697,1680/1998,2061/1999 and 464/1999. ( 5 ) IN I. A. No. 1164/1997, the plaintiff has sought for a direction to the defendant,directing them to allow the plaintiff change of user of the premises in dispute. Asagainst the aforesaid application, a reply has been filed by the defendant contending, inter alia, that the plaintiff has suppressed material facts in the present suitand, therefore, not only the injunction application is liable to be dismissed, but, thesuit itself is liable to be dismissed in view of suppression and concealment of materialand relevant facts by the plaintiff in the present suit. It is stated that the plaintifffiled an earlier suit for injunction against the defendant seeking for a decree forpermanent injunction against the show cause notice issued by the Delhi Development Authority, which was filed in the Court of Civil Judge, Delhi. The injunctionprayed for in the said suit was rejected by the Trial Court and the appeal preferredby the plaintiff was also dismissed as against which Civil Revision filed in the Highcourt is pending. It is stated that the aforesaid facts were suppressed in the presentsuit by the plaintiff. In this connection, reference was made to the averments madein the plaint by the plaintiff by the counsel appearing for the defendant. ( 6 ) IN paragraph 26 of the plaint of the present suit, it was stated by the plaintiffthat the plaintiff-society challenged the show cause notice dated 3. 2. 1995 receivedon 9. 3. 1995 before the Civil Judge, Delhi, and filed a suit for permanent injunction which is pending in the Court of the said Civil Judge, Delhi, as against defendant-Delhi Development Authority, which still has to be finally adjudicated upon. 2. 1995 receivedon 9. 3. 1995 before the Civil Judge, Delhi, and filed a suit for permanent injunction which is pending in the Court of the said Civil Judge, Delhi, as against defendant-Delhi Development Authority, which still has to be finally adjudicated upon. ( 7 ) I have carefully perused the statements and averments made in the plaint of thepresent suit and on careful perusal thereof, I find that no mention has been made bythe plaintiff in the said suit about the filing of the interim injunction application bythe plaintiff in the earlier suit filed. The fact that the prayer for issuance of interiminjunction against the defendant was rejected by the Trial Court and the Appellatecourt was not disclosed in the plaint of the present suit. ( 8 ) ALL the aforesaid pending applications were listed before me for arguments. Thecounsel for the defendant drew my attention to the averments made in the replyto the application registered as I. A. No. ll64/1997 and submitted that not only theinjunction application, but the suit itself filed by the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed in view of suppression and concealment of material facts by the plaintiff inthe present suit. ( 9 ) I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff as also the learnedcounsel appearing for the defendant on the aforesaid. issue and I propose to dispose of the said objection raised on behalf of this defendant by this order. ( 10 ) COUNSEL for the plaintiff submitted that no issue has been framed so far in thesuit and, therefore, the defendant cannot be permitted to argue the issue withregard to the alleged suppression and concealment of material facts, except bymoving a separate application or getting an issue framed in respect of the same. Hefurther submitted that the defendant has not filed any application so far raisingthe issue that the plaintiff has not disclosed in the plaint about the disposal of thesaid application on 9. 5. 1995 in Suit No. 66/1995 pending in the Court of Civil Judgebesides, according to him both the suits are not similar which would be apparentfrom the pleadings of the respective suit. He also submitted that in view of thechanged circumstances and vacation of the suit premises by the tenant who wasusing it for commercial purpose, the allegation of mis-user/ violation of Clause11 (13) of the lease dated 27. 8. He also submitted that in view of thechanged circumstances and vacation of the suit premises by the tenant who wasusing it for commercial purpose, the allegation of mis-user/ violation of Clause11 (13) of the lease dated 27. 8. 1993 is no longer existing and, therefore, the defendantis required to re-consider the order of cancellation of the lease taking note of thechanged circumstances. IT was also submitted by the counsel appearing for the plaintiff that the plaintiffin the present suit had challenged the order dated 17. 8. 1995 cancelling the allotment of lease of the land in dispute with a further prayer not to dispossess theplaintiff-society from the land in dispute whereas, in the earlier suit filed in the Courtof Civil Judge, Delhi, the plaintiff based its plaint mainly on the show cause noticedated 27. 9. 1994 and, therefore, cause of action in both the suits are different andthere being no identity of issues and causes of action and the same being different,the two suits are different and, therefore, the allegation of suppression and concealment of material facts is mis-placed and non-existent. ( 11 ) ON the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant took methrough the pleadings of the parties in both the suits. Counsel for the defendantspecifically drew my attention to paragraph 26 of the plaint on the basis of whichthe present suit was instituted. Counsel for the defendant submitted that in paragraph 26, the plaint iff has only mentioned about the filing of the suit as against theshow cause notice dated 3. 2. 1995 suppressing and concealing the very material factthat the interim injunction sought for as against the aforesaid show cause noticedated 3. 2. 1995 was rejected by the Civil Judge, Delhi, and that the appeal preferredas against the said order was also dismissed as against which the Civil Revisionfiled in this Court is pending. In support of his submissions, the learned counselappearing for the defendant relied upon the ratio of the decision in Satish Khoslavs. M/s. Eli Lilly Runbaxy Ltd. and another, reported in 71 (1998) Delhi Law Times 1. Counsel also relied upon the ratio and the principles laid down by the Supremecourt in the case of S. P. Chengalvaraya Naida Vs. Jagannath and others; reported in air 1994 SC 853 , to which reference was also made by the Division Bench of thiscourt. Counsel also relied upon the ratio and the principles laid down by the Supremecourt in the case of S. P. Chengalvaraya Naida Vs. Jagannath and others; reported in air 1994 SC 853 , to which reference was also made by the Division Bench of thiscourt. ( 12 ) IN the light of the respective submissions of the learned counsel appearing forthe parties, I have given my anxious and thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions of the counsel for the parties. ( 13 ) THE present suit was instituted by the plaintiff as against the order dated17. 8. 1995 passed, by the defendant-Delhi Development Authority cancelling the allotment and lease of the land of the plaintiff-society, which is the suit property. Theatoresaid letter of cancellation was preceded by a show cause notice dated 3. 2. 1995 issued by the defendant asking the plaintiff-society to show cause as to why lease/allotment of land allotted to the plaintiff-society should not be cancelled due toviolation of Clause 11 (13) of the lease deed by renting the building to a third parlyfor commercial use. As against the aforesaid show cause notice, the plaintiff filed asuit being Suit No. 66/1995 in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Delhi, praying for adecree for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from cancelling allotmentof the land and the lease of the said suit properly. The interim application filed bythe plaintiff in the said suit was, however, dismissed by the Civil Judge as againstwhich an appeal was preferred, which also came to be dismissed. A Civil Revisionfiled as against the said order is pending disposal in this Court. The aforesaid factsrelating to disposal of the injunction application filed by the plaintiff are verymaterial and relevant and were necessarily required to be mentioned in the plaintfiled in the present suit when the plaintiff mentioned about the filing of a suit in thiscourt as against the aforesaid show cause notice. IN this connection, reference may be made to the decision in Satish Khosla (supra)wherein, the Division Bench of lhis Court held that by not mentioning anythingabout the Court having not granted any stay in similar circumstances in favour of therespondent in the earlier suit, the respondent had not only suppressed materialfacts from the Court, but, had also tried to over-reach the Court. ( 14 ) I have carefully perused the principles laid down in the aforesaid decision by thedivision Bench of lhis Court and on perusal thereof, I find that the facts of that caseand the present case are almost identical. In the said proceedings also two suitscame to be filed by the plaintiff. In the earlier suit filed by the plaintiff, the Court didnot grant any stay in its favour whereas, in the second case, the plaintiff did not mentionand disclose to the Court about the rejection of the prayer for slay in itsfavour. The facts, therefore, in the present suit are identical and similar to that ofthe said case. In paragraph 14, the Division Bench of this Court posed a question asto whether it was not obligatory on the part of the respondent to disclose to the courtthat in an earlier suit filed by it, the Court had not granted any slay in its favour and ifon such a disclosure having been made the Court still granted slay in favour of therespondent, it could be said that the respondent had not concealed any material factfrom the Court? The Division Bench also referred to the decision of the Supremecourt in S. P. Chengalvuraya Naidu (supra) wherein, it was held by the Supreme Courtthat the Courts of Law are meant for imparting Justice between the parties and thatone who comes to the Court, must come with clean hands. In the said decision, it washeld that it could be said without hesitation that a person whose case is based onfalsehood has no right to approach the Court and that he could be summarily thrownout at any stage of the litigation. It was further held thus:- "a litigant, who approaches the Courl, is bound to produce all thedocuments executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If hewithholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other sidethen he would be guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on I he opposite parly". It was further held thus:- "a litigant, who approaches the Courl, is bound to produce all thedocuments executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If hewithholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other sidethen he would be guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on I he opposite parly". IN the said decision it was also held that by withholding the plaint and the application in the earlier suit from the Courl and by nol disclosing to the Courlabout the proceedings in the earlier suit and the same having not been granted toit, the plaintiff had tried to get an advantage from the Court and was, therefore, guiltyof playing fraud on the Court as well as on the respondent. ( 15 ) IN fact, it was held by the Division Bench that the respondent had not come tothe Court with clean hands and had also suppressed material fads from the Courtwith a view to gain advantage in the second suit, which amounted to over-reaching thecourl and in that view of the matler, the Division Bench directed for dismissal ofthe suit itself. ( 16 ) THE principles laid down in the said case and the ratio of the decision, In myconsidered opinion, are fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of thepresent case. The plaintiff while filing the present suil did not disclose to the Courtabout the plaint and the application in the earlier suil and also did not disclose to thecourt aboul the proceedings in the earlier suit, particularly, the lad of rejection ofthe prayer for interim injunclion and dismissal of the appeal therefrom to thecourt. The plaintiff did not disclose to the Courl either in the plainl or in the application as to what had transpired in the Court on the dales when the said suit wasfixed, nor it was disclosed to the Court that injunction had not been granted in itsfavour by the Court and the relief claimed in the application in the earlier suitwas almost similar to the relief as claimed in the present suil for the earlier suil wasbased on the show cause notice issued to the plaintiff whereas, the present suil isbased on the final notice issued to the plaintiff cancelling the lease. ( 17 ) I am, therefore, of the considered opinion that the plaintiff did not come tothis Court with clean hands and has also suppressed material fads from this Courlwith a view to gain advantage in the second suit and this is clearly over-reaching thecourt. In coming to the aforesaid conclusions. I am fortified by the decision of thedivision Bench in Satish Khosla (supra ). Thus, an attempt has been made by theplaintiff to over-reach the Court and the plaintiff has played fraud upon the Court aswell as upon the opposite party and thus, the suit filed by the plaintiff itself is liableto be dismissed, in view of suppression and concealment of material facts by the plain- tiff and his failure to come to the Court with clean hands. ( 18 ) THE submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the subject matter ofthe two suits were not identical and, therefore, there was no suppression of materialfacts is also baseless. In the earlier suit filed by the plaintiff in the Court of the Civiljudge, Delhi, the relief sought for in the plaint was for passing a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendant from cancelling allotment of land as wellas the lease of the suit property. In the present suit, the relief sought for by theplaintiff is also for a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendantfrom giving effect to the letter dated 17. 8. 1995 issued by the defendant cancellingthe allotment of land as well as the lease. The reliefs sought for in both the suits,therefore, are identical and almost similar. Even otherwise, the two suits relate to the same suit property and, therefore, all material and relevant facts were to be disclosedin the present suit filed by the plaintiff including the fact of rejection of the prayerof interim injunction by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court. ( 19 ) THE other submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the objection/issue regarding alleged suppression of material facts cannot be considered bycourt unless the same is specifically raised by way of an application is also withoutany merit. The defendant has raised the issue in the pleadings filed by way of replyand on the basis thereof) the Court is competent to decide the issue as the same relates to the conduct of the parties in approaching the Court, which goes to the root ofthe matter. The defendant has raised the issue in the pleadings filed by way of replyand on the basis thereof) the Court is competent to decide the issue as the same relates to the conduct of the parties in approaching the Court, which goes to the root ofthe matter. ( 20 ) IN view of the aforesaid conclusions, the suit and the injunction application filedby the plaintiff stand dismissed for suppression and concealment of material facts. Parties shall bear their own costs.