P. K. MISRA, J. ( 1 ) PLAINTIFF has filed this appeal against a confirming decision. The suit was filed for declaration of the exclusive right of the plaintiff over the disputed properties and for declaration that the licence issued in favour of defendant No. 1 is fraudulent and for confirmation of possession. The disputed properties, as described in 'a' Schedule are certain machinery. The case of the plaintiff is as follows.-defendant No. 4 is the father-in-law of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3 are her brothers-in-law being the younger brothers of her husband. From her own fund and by incurring loan from the United Commercial Bank the machinery in question 'had been purchased by the plaintiff and had been installed for the purpose of running a hulier and mill. Since the plaintiff's h'usband and other defendants were remaining in joint family and there was good relationship among themselves and defendant no. 1 was sitting idle after graduation without any employment the plaintiff, had handed over the papers for obtaining licence from Competent Authority for running the hulier, but defendant No. 1 fraudulently obtained licence in his name by practising fraud. However, plaintiff herself was looking after the running of the mill and the hulier from the date of installation. After dissension arose in the family, the defendants tried to deprive the plaintiff from her right over the disputed properties thus forcing the plaintiff to file the suit. ( 2 ) DEFENDANTS in their joint written statement denied the allegations made in the plaint. It was pleaded by them that the disputed properties had been purchased on behalf of the joint family by incurring loan, The loan had to be incurred in the name of the plaintiff as defendant No. 4 was a Government servant and defendants 2 and 3 were minors and defendant No. 1 was an unemployed person. However, it was stated that the mill house was constructed by defendant No. 4 from out of the joint funds and by selling joint family property and the disputed machinery were not the ex-:lusive properties of the plaintiff. It was further pleaded that licence was obtained in the name of defendant No. 1 for carrying on the business, which was, in fact, a joint family business. It was further pleaded that licence was obtained in the name of defendant No. 1 for carrying on the business, which was, in fact, a joint family business. ( 3 ) THE trial Court found that the parties were joint at the time of acquisition of the properties and there has been no partition by metes and bounds even though subsequently dissensions had arisen. It was further found that the properties claimed by the plaintiff had been purchased out of the joint family funds and as such the same were joint family properties. It was further found that defendant No. 1 was running the mill on behalf of the family and plaintiff was not the exclusive owner. The lower Appellate Court while affirming the aforesaid findings also negatived the contention of the plaintiff relating to applicability of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition)act, 1988. ( 4 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has raised two submissions : (i) The claim of the defendants is barred under the provisions contained in the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988; and (ii) Even assuming that such bar is not applicable, the finding that the properties has been acquired out of the joint family funds is not supported by evidence on record and cannot be accepted, as the Courts below have relied upon irrelevant and inadmissible evidence to come to a conclusion that the properties were joint family properties. ( 5 ) THE appellant has relied upon the provision contained in Section 4 (2) of the Benami transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (in short, the "act"), which is extracted hereunder"4. Prohibition of the right to recover property held benami- (1) No suit, claim or action to enforce any right in respect of any property held benami against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person shall lie by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property. (2) No defence based on any right in respect of any property held benami, whether against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person, shall be allowed in any suit. claim or action by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of s'uch property. (2) No defence based on any right in respect of any property held benami, whether against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person, shall be allowed in any suit. claim or action by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of s'uch property. (3) Nothing in this section shall apply- (a) where the person in whose name the property is held is a coparcener in a Hindu undivided family and the property is held for the benefit of the coparceners in the family; or (b) where the person in whose name the property is held, is a trustee or other person standing in a fiduciary capacity, and the property is held for the benefit of another person for- whom he is a trustee or towards whom he stands in such capacity,", as evident from Section 1 (3) of the Act, the provisions of Sections 3, 5 and 8 of the Act came into force at once, that is to say on 5th september, 1988, whereas the remaining provisions of the Act came into force with effect from a retrospective date, that is to say, on 19th May, 1988. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the properties having been purchased and held for the benefit of the coparceners in the family, the embargo envisaged in Section 4 (2} is not applicable. In the present case, the properties had been purchased in the name of the plaintiff who was a female member of the joint family. The learned Counsel for respondents submitted that the expression "coparcener" included in sub-section (3) of Section 4 should be given liberal meaning to include any member of the Hindu Undivided Family and the term "coparcener" should not be confined to only male members of the joint family, as ordinarily understood. ( 6 ) THE expression "coparcener" has not been defined in the Act. In the absence of any definition, the normal meaning attributed to the term "coparcener" should be accepted. The expression "coparcener" has got a definite meaning under the Hindu Law and it is well settled that it does not include female member of the joint family. It must be presumed that the legislature was aware of this well-settled meaning of the expression "coparcener" while incorporating the said expression in the Act. The expression "coparcener" has got a definite meaning under the Hindu Law and it is well settled that it does not include female member of the joint family. It must be presumed that the legislature was aware of this well-settled meaning of the expression "coparcener" while incorporating the said expression in the Act. The submission of the Counsel for the respondents that the expression "coparcener" should also be interpreted to include any female member of the joint family is not acceptable. Thus, the provisions contained in sub-section (3) of section 4 of the Act cannot come to the aid of the defendant-respondents arid it should be taken that the embargo contained in Sections 4 (2) is otherwise applicable. ( 7 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondents then submitted that in the present case, the suit itself had been filed prior to the coming into force of Section 4 of the Act. It is further submitted that though the formal written statement was filed after 19. 5. 1988, the defendants had already taken defence relating to benami nature of the property purchased in the name of the plaintiff in their objection to the petition filed by the plaintiff under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, Code of Civil Procedure. It has been submitted that since they had already taken the defence relating to benami nature of the properties prior to the coming into force of the Act, such defence is not barred. ( 8 ) THOUGH in the decision reported in mithilesh Kumari and Another v. Prem behari /chare1, it has been held that the provisions contained in Section 4 of the Act were applicable to all pending suits and appeals, the said view has been overruled subsequently in the decision of the Supreme Court reported in r. Rajagopal Reddy (dead) by L. Rs. and others v. Pat/mini Chandrasekharan (dead)by L. Rs. , In the latter decision after considering the provisions of the Act and considering the earlier decision, it was held that the suit filed prior to 19. 5. 1988 is not hit by the prohibition contained in Section. 4 (1) of the Act and similarly defence taken prior to 19. 5. 1988 in a pending suit would not be hit by the prohibition contained in Section. 4 (2) of the Act. This decision of the Supreme Court. 5. 1988 is not hit by the prohibition contained in Section. 4 (1) of the Act and similarly defence taken prior to 19. 5. 1988 in a pending suit would not be hit by the prohibition contained in Section. 4 (2) of the Act. This decision of the Supreme Court. has, been subsequently followed and amplified in the decision reported in Smt, Rebti Devi v. Ram Dutt and Another, In view of the conclusions in the aforesaid two Supreme Court decisions the question to be considered is as to whether the defence relating to benami nature of the properties can be said to have been taken by the defendants prior to 19. 5. 1988, or thereafter. ( 9 ) IT is not disputed that Misc. Case under1 order 39, Rules 1 and 2, CPC filed by the plaintiff was disposed of on 13. 5. 1988, that is to say, prior to the coming into force of section 4 of the Act and in such Misc. Case, the defendants had filed objection contending that the properties purchased were of the joint family and not of the plaintiff herself. The sole question is as to whether such taking of objection in a proceeding under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, CPC can be said to be a "defence" as contemplated in the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act. , The taking of defence must be understood in its popular sense. In a suit even prior to filing of written statement, such as application for appointment of receiver or for injunction. However, it cannot be said as popularly understood that by raising objection, a party can be said to have raised a defence. Raising a "defence" has got a peculiar accepted meaning. A party can raise a defence only by filing written statement as contemplated in order 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This also becomes indirectly clear on close reading of the two decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1996 Supreme Court 235 and AIR 1998 Supreme Court 310, preferred to supra. ( 10 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondents faintly submitted that the defendants are protected by the provisions contained in Section 4 (3){b) of the Act. However, by no stretch of imagination, it cannot be said that the plaintiff was holding a position of a Trustee or standing in a fiduciary capacity vis-a-vis the defendants. ( 10 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondents faintly submitted that the defendants are protected by the provisions contained in Section 4 (3){b) of the Act. However, by no stretch of imagination, it cannot be said that the plaintiff was holding a position of a Trustee or standing in a fiduciary capacity vis-a-vis the defendants. ( 11 ) IN view of the above analysis, the contentions raised by the defendants in their written statement which had been admittedly filed after 19. 5. 1988, cannot be accepted as no such defence can be allowed to be taken, as contemplated in Section 4 (2) of the Act. ( 12 ) IN such view of the matter, the appeal is to be allowed and as such it is unnecessary to consider the second contention raised by the Counsel for plaintiff-appellant. However, even such contention raised by the appellant appears to be correct. In the written statement itself it has been stated that as the income of the joint family was not sufficient, loan had to. be incurred. This itself is indicative of the fact that the joint family did not have sufficient nucleus. In the present case, the properties had been purchased in the name of a female and not a coparcener. As such, defendants were required to prove that the consideration money for the purchase was provided by the defendants, the conclusion of the lower appellate court on this aspect appears to be based on mere conjectures and surmises. On the other hand, the plaintiff has also shown that she had sufficient property of her own which she had got from her father, Though such finding is apparently a finding of fact, since the finding is not based on any evidence on record, it cannot be sustained. ( 13 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is allowed. Since admittedly, the licence in the name of defendant No. 1 has subsequently been cancelled it is unnecessary to consider the relief relating to such licence and the suit is decreed in respect of properties described in 'a' Schedule. It is made clear that no opinion has been expressed relating to the land on which such movable properties had been affixed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.