JUDGMENT - VISHNU SAHAI, J.:---Through this writ petition preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner-detenu has impugned the detention order dated 30-3-1998 passed by the first respondent Mr. R.H. Mendonca, Commissioner of Police, Brihan Mumbai, detaining him under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981 (No. LV of 1981) (Amendment- 1996). 2.The detention order along with the grounds of detention also dated 30-3-1998 was served on the petitioner-detenu on 23-10-1998. The detention order and the grounds of detention have been annexed as Annexure A and B respectively to the petition. 3.We have heard learned Counsel for the parties. Since this writ petition can be decided on the legal contention contained in Ground No. 7(B) of the petition, we are not adverting to the prejudicial activities of the petitioner-detenu, contained in the grounds of detention. Ground No. 7(B) in short is that the Detention Order dated 30-3-1998 was served on the detenu after about seven months and the delay in its service throws a cloud of doubt about the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority. It has also been mentioned in the ground that the most effective methods to have the detention order executed/served on the detenu like prompt action under section 7(a)(b) of the M.P.D.A. Act was not initiated nor was any application for cancellation of his bail moved. 4.Ground No. 5(B) has been replied to in para 9 of the return of the Detaining Authority. In the said para, the Detaining Authority has averred that since the detenu was absconding and despite best efforts, could not be traced out, the detention order could not be served upon him. In para 9, there is a reference to 33 station diary entries of J.J. Marg Police Station relating to the period between 20-4-1998 and 7-10-1998 showing that the Executing Authority tried to serve the detention order on the detenu on various addresses but, failed to do so because, he could not be traced. 5.We have examined the averments contained in ground No. 5(B) and the reply contained in para 9 of the return of the detaining Authority. 5.We have examined the averments contained in ground No. 5(B) and the reply contained in para 9 of the return of the detaining Authority. In our view, in the eyes of law, the delay in executing the detention order on the detenu has not been satisfactorily explained by the Executing Authority and consequently, the impugned detention order is vitiated in-law. A Division Bench of this Court of which one of us was a member (Vishnu Sahai, J) in the case of (Ismail Shaikh Ali v. The State of Maharashtra others)1, reported in 1998 All.M.R. (Cri.) 928 has dealt at length the question of delay in the execution of the detention order. In para 7 of the said decision, this Court observed thus:- "It should be borne in mind that delay ipso facto in the execution/service of the detention order, does not vitiate it, for if that was so, the person sought to be preventively detained would either abscond or conceal himself/herself and thus frustrate the service of the detention order on him/her. A detention order is only vitiated in law on the ground of delay in its execution, if there is no plausible explanation for its belated service on the person sought to be detained and the most effective methods stipulated by law to have it executed are not taken recourse to." 6.That there has been a delay in the execution of the detention order cannot be disputed because, the detention order was issued on 30-3-1998 and served on the detenu on 23-10-1998. The question whether the delay in its issuance has been satisfactorily explained and the authorities took steps stipulated by law, such as cancellation of the detenu's bail, prompt action under section 7(1) and 7(2) (a) of the M.P.D.A. Act to facilitate the expeditious execution of the detention order. To that our answer is in the negative. In the instant case, a perusal of para 9 of the return of the Detaining Authority would show that no action under section 7(1) and 7(2) (a) of the M.P.D.A. Act was taken and also no application for cancellation of bail was moved. To that our answer is in the negative. In the instant case, a perusal of para 9 of the return of the Detaining Authority would show that no action under section 7(1) and 7(2) (a) of the M.P.D.A. Act was taken and also no application for cancellation of bail was moved. For not taking recourse to the provisions of section 7(1) and 7(2) (a) no explanation has been furnished and for not moving an application for cancellation of bail, what has been averred is that the application for cancellation of bail would have taken a longer time, as the detenu was absconding and therefore, such an application was not moved. We have examined the averments made in para 9 of the return of the Detaining Authority and in our view, they do not satisfactorily explain the delay in the execution of the detention order. If the Detaining Authority was really sincere in its efforts to execute the detention order, it should have promptly applied to the State Government under section 7(1) of the M.P.D.A. Act to take action under section 82, 83, 84 and 85 of the Criminal Procedure Code for issuing a proclamation against the detenu and for attachment of his property. The Detaining Authority under section 7(2)(a) of the M.P.D.A. Act should have approached the State Government for notifying in the Official Gazette that the detenu should appear before the notified officer at the time and place stipulated in the said proclamation. In our view, the failure of the Detaining Authority on these two counts has vitiated the genuineness of his subjective satisfaction. 7.We wish to point out that in 1998 All.M.R.(Cri.) 928 in connection with the provisions contained in section 7(1)(a) and section 7(1)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act, which are analogous to the provisions contained in section 7(1) and section 7(2) of the M.P.D.A. Act, this Court relying on the earlier Division Bench decision of this Court, in 1992 Cri.L.J. 2363 (Netaji Lotlikar v. The State of Goa and others)2, observed in para 19 that coercive measures like those contained in section 7 are meant to be resorted to without undue delay. In the instant case, we find that admittedly, no action under section 7(1) and 7(2)(a) of the M.P.D.A. Act was taken. In the instant case, we find that admittedly, no action under section 7(1) and 7(2)(a) of the M.P.D.A. Act was taken. 8.With regard to the failure on the part of the Detaining Authority to apply for cancellation of ball this Court, in 1998 All.M.R. (Cri) 928, in para 14 has observed thus:- "The failure of the detaining authority to apply for cancellation of bail has been frowned upon by the courts and has been construed to mean that the authorities were not serious to serve the detention order on the detenu." In the said para, this Court has quoted from the decision of the Supreme Court, reported in A.I.R. 1996 S.C. page 70 (P.M. Harikumar v. Union of India and others)3, wherein in para 13 the Apex Court has held that "if the respondents were really sincere and anxious to serve the order of detention without any delay, it was expected of them, in the fitness of things, to approach the High Court or the Court which granted the bail for its cancellation". 9.In our view, failure on the part of the authorities to apply for cancellation of bail also throws a cloud of doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction to detain the detenu under the M.P.D.A. Act. We make no bones in observing that the reason for not moving an application of cancellation of bail furnished in para 9 of the return of the Detaining Authority namely that such an application would have taken a longer time, does not appeal to us. 10.It would be pertinent to refer to two Division Bench decisions of this court, to which one of us (Vishnu Sahai, J.,) was a party; which in our view, are relevant for the disposal of the present petition. They are reported in:- (i) 1998 All.M.R. (Cri) 1481 (Mohammed Ashraf v. State of Maharashtra others)4, and (ii) 1999 All.M.R. (Cri) 492 (Narayan Madhavji Jat v. The State of Maharashtra others)5. In the former decision there was a delay of nine months in the service of the detention order under the COFEPOSA Act. They are reported in:- (i) 1998 All.M.R. (Cri) 1481 (Mohammed Ashraf v. State of Maharashtra others)4, and (ii) 1999 All.M.R. (Cri) 492 (Narayan Madhavji Jat v. The State of Maharashtra others)5. In the former decision there was a delay of nine months in the service of the detention order under the COFEPOSA Act. A perusal of paras 7 and 8 of the decision would show that an application for cancellation of bail and action under section 7(1)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act, was initiated after in-ordinate delay and this Court relying upon 1998 All.M.R.(Cri) 928 (supra) and 1992 Cr.L.J. 2363 (supra), concluded that the detention order was vitiated on the vice of delay in its execution. In the latter decision, the detention order under the COFEPOSA Act was served after 13 months, As is evident from a perusal of para 9, no application for cancellation of the detenu's bail was moved; on the converse, an application for extension of his bail was moved; and action under section 7(1)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act was initiated more than 10 months after passing of the detention order. In view of this, this Court held that the detention order was vitiated on the vice of delay in its execution. 11.For the said reasons, we feel that the Detaining Authority has not been able to furnish a cogent and adequate explanation in law for the delay in executing the detention order. 12.The Supreme Court has repeatedly frowned upon the delay in the execution of the detention order but, to eschew proxility, we are only referring to one authority namely that reported in A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 225 (A. Abdul Rehman v. State of Kerala and others)6, wherein the detention order was issued on 7-10-1987 and the detenu was arrested on 18-1-1988 and since the said delay was not properly explained the Supreme Court quashed the detention order. 13.In our view, the delay in the execution of the detention order has resulted in:- (a) the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority to preventively detain the detenu under the M.P.D.A. Act being rendered suspect; (b) the live link between the prejudicial activities of the detenu and the rationale of preventively detaining him under the M.P.D.A. Act being snapped; and (c) the detention order instead of being preventive becoming punitive. 14.We would be failing in our fairness if we do not refer to the three decisions cited by Mrs. V.K. Tahilramani, (Public Prosecutor) namely those reported in 1992 (2) L.J. 593 (Mohamed Aslam Musliya v. State of Maharashtra others)7, 1979 Supreme Court 541 (Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji Appellant v. The State of Tamil Nadu and another, Respondents)8, and unreported decision of this Court rendered in Criminal Writ Petition No. 1365 of 1997 (Bhavani Shankar B. Paliwal v. The Union of India and others)9, decided on 8-10-1998 Mrs. Tahilramani pointed out that in each of these decisions, there was a delay of more than seven months in the execution of the detention order and yet it was not held to be vitiated on the vice of delay. We have perused the said decisions. In our view, they do not come to her rescue. It should be borne in mind that delay simplicitor in the execution of a detention order would not vitiate it and a detention order would be only vitiated on the vice of delay in execution, if there is no explanation for its belated service on the person sought to be detained and/or the most effective methods stipulated by law to execute it are not taken, recourse to, at the earliest. In each of the decisions cited by Mrs. Tahilramani, not only was there a plausible explanation for the delay in the execution of the detention order, but, the statutory provisions to execute the detention order were also resorted to expeditiously. In Mohd. Aslam's case, the detention order was issued on 30-1-1995 and an application for cancellation of bail was moved on 2-5-1995 and on 8-6-1995, the learned Magistrate issued non-bailable warrant of arrest against the detenu as a sequel to the application for cancellation of bail. On these facts, the Division Bench was implicitly satisfied that the detenu has absconded and hence, in para 9 took the view that since he had absconded, he could not complain that the detention order had been belatedly executed because, the situation was of his own making. For the said reasons, Mohd. Aslam's case, would have no application in our case. In A.I.R. 1979 Supreme Court 541 under section 7 of the COFEPOSA Act as also proceedings under section 82 of the Criminal Procedure Code were taken A proclamation was also issued in the leading English and local language daily newspapers. For the said reasons, Mohd. Aslam's case, would have no application in our case. In A.I.R. 1979 Supreme Court 541 under section 7 of the COFEPOSA Act as also proceedings under section 82 of the Criminal Procedure Code were taken A proclamation was also issued in the leading English and local language daily newspapers. A photo of the detenu was also exhibited in cinema halls. Inspite of this, the detention order could not be executed on the detenu because, of the detenu's act of absconsion. This decision is not applicable to our case because, no action under section 7(1) and 7(2)(a) of the M.P.D.A. Act was taken. Neither any proceedings under section 82 of Criminal Procedure Act were taken. In Bhavani Shankar Paliwal v. The Union of India others (supra), action under section 7(1)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act was taken against the detenu; and a red alert was also issued against the detenu. In our view, the said decision accordingly is also not applicable. 15.For the said reasons, we allow this petition; quash the impugned detention order; and direct the petitioner-detenu to be released forthwith unless wanted in some other case. Rule is made absolute. Petition allowed. -----