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1999 DIGILAW 419 (RAJ)

Brig. Ghasi Ram And Ram Pratap v. State of Rajasthan & Three Others

1999-03-30

P.P.NAOLEKAR

body1999
JUDGMENT 1. - Proceedings under Chapter ill-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (in short 'the Act of 1955') were initiated for determining the ceiling area applicable to the ex-maharaja of Bharatpur Col. Sawai Brijraj Singh (hereinafter shall be 'holder') by the Sub Divisional Officer, Bharatpur. It was stated that transfers made by sale deed executed on 22.12.1964 by the holder in favour of Ram Pratap of 62 bigha and 12 biswas of land situated at Bharatpur and the transaction of sale dated 22.12.1964 executed by holder in favour of Mahendra Pratap Singh of 62 bighas and 18 biswas which was gifted to Ram Pratap by Mahendra Pratap Singh by gift-deed dated 12.1.1968 and further part of the land of 35 bigha and 19 biswas was transferred by registered sale deed dated 8.8.1969 by Ram Pratap in favour of his father Brig. Ghasi Ram and other sale-deed executed in favour of the other transferees should be recognised and excluded while determining the surplus land. It was also, inter alia, stated that the land recorded in the name of the Royal Family Religions and Ceremonial Trust and in the name of Ex-maharani Videh Kanwar Should not be clubbed with the land held by the holder for the purposes of the ceiling.The authorised officer rejected the contention of the holder and clubbed all the lands held by the above Trust, Ex-maharani and transferees to be the land of the holder and directed resumption of the surplus land in the State by its order dated 31.3.1975. 2. The holder, all the transferees inclusive of Brig, Ghasi Ram, Ram Pratap etc., ex-maharani Videh Kanwar, and the trust filed appeals before the Revenue Appellate Authority. The Revenue Appellate Authority decided the appeals by a common order dated 18.10.1975 and transfers made in favour of Krapal Singh, Ram Pratap and Brig, Ghasi Ram were declared eligible for recognition under the law while the decision of the Sub Divisional Officer against the rest of the appellants was upheld. The Revenue Appellate Authority rejected the appeals filed by the other transferees, the ex-maharani and the Trust. 3. The Government filed revisions challenging the upholding of transfers whereas the holder, transferees, Trust and ex-maharani filed revisions challenging the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority rejecting their appeals. The Revenue Appellate Authority rejected the appeals filed by the other transferees, the ex-maharani and the Trust. 3. The Government filed revisions challenging the upholding of transfers whereas the holder, transferees, Trust and ex-maharani filed revisions challenging the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority rejecting their appeals. The Board of Revenue set-aside the order passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority upholding the transfers on the ground that the transferees had no right to file appeals. Consequently the order accepting transfers was set-aside whereas the order rejecting the transfer was accepted. As regards ex-maharani Videh Kanwar it was held that she being wife of the holder, the Sub-Divisional Officer was right in adding her land to that of the holder. As regards petitioner Ram Pratap, finding was also recorded on merits. It was held by the Board of Revenue that he was a student in 1964 and was minor. He attained majority in 1969. The transfer is valid if on the date of transfer the transferee is an agriculturist and domiciled in Rajasthan. The record does not show that petitioner Ram Pratap was a person who earned his livelihood wholly or mainly from agriculture in 1964 the year of transfer. In the absence of such proof petitioner Ram Pratap cannot be said to be an agriculturist within the meaning of provisions and hence the sale in his favour was not eligible for recognition under Section 30-DD of the Act of 1955. Revisions filed by the Trust and by other transferees were also dismissed. 4. Aggrieved by the said order, the holder, ex-maharani Videh Kanwar and the present petitioners filed separate writ petitions in this Court. The petitions were registered as D.B. Civil Writ Petitions No. 458/77, 140/77 and 13/78. On 12.1.1988 writ petitions No. 458/77 and 140/77 were decided by this Court. While disposing of these two writ petitions the Court said that factual aspect of the transfer could not be challenged in the writ petition because they were primary questions of facts depending on each case. The finding of Board of Revenue rejecting transfers made in favour of the petitioners was upheld by the High Court. When the matter of Ram Pratap in writ petition No. 13/78 came up for hearing the High Court dismissed the petition saying that in view of the order dated 12.1.1988 the writ petition stands disposed of. The finding of Board of Revenue rejecting transfers made in favour of the petitioners was upheld by the High Court. When the matter of Ram Pratap in writ petition No. 13/78 came up for hearing the High Court dismissed the petition saying that in view of the order dated 12.1.1988 the writ petition stands disposed of. It was obviously so because the finding as regards transfer made in favour of the petitioners was already arrived at by the High Court while disposing of the writ petitions No. 458/77 and 140/77. 5. Aggrieved by the order passed by the High Court, Col. Sawai Brijendra Singh filed Civil Appeal No. 3297 of 1988 before the Supreme Court. The Apex Court disposed of the Civil Appeal No. 3297/88 on 13.8.1990 by passing the following order - "The Civil Appeal stands disposed of in view of the decision of this Court in Adhunik G.N.S Samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1989 SC 867 ." Ram Pratap alongwith his father Brig. Ghasi Ram filed Civil Appeal No. 366 of 1991 before the Apex Court. The Apex Court in its order dated 22.3.1993 decided as under- "...It appears that the Revenue Appellate Authority decided in favour of the appellants but the Board of Revenue dislodged that order holding that it was without jurisdiction. Against the order of the Board, the appellants approached the High Court by way of writ petition. The High Court without going into the question whether the Revenue Appellate Authority had or had not jurisdiction disposed of the matter on the basis of an order dated 12.1.1988." It has been argued before the apex court that whether the Board of Revenue was right in holding that the Revenue Appellate Authority had no jurisdiction to go into the question adjudicated upon by it. The apex court has observed that if the high court had come to the conclusion that the Authority had the jurisdiction then the order of the Board would have been rendered unsustainable which would have revived the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority and, therefore, it is necessary for the high court to determine the question of jurisdiction of the Revenue Appellate Authority. The learned counsel appeared for the State before the Supreme Court did not raise any objection to this proposition if the matter is remitted to the high court for a fresh consideration on the question regarding the jurisdiction of the Revenue Appellate Authority. The apex court in view thereof has set-aside the order of high court and remitted the matter to the high court for disposal in accordance with law. It was further directed that after deciding on the question of jurisdiction of the Revenue Appellate Authority, the high court would consider such other contentions as were raised in the original proceedings before the high court and the high court would deal with them in accordance with law.The net result of the order of apex court in Civil Appeal No. 366 of 1991 is that the entire writ petition filed by the petitioners stood revived and the questions which have been raised in it became open for decision by the high court. In the matrix of the aforesaid facts, the writ petition is to be decided on merits. The High Court is required to decide the question of jurisdiction of Revenue Appellate Authority to entertain the appeal and interference with the order of Sub-Divisional Officer in regard to transfer as also the question whether the transfer made in favour of Ram Pratap and his brother Mahendra Pratap by the holder falls within the purview of Section 30-DD of the Act of 1955 and thus is being exempted for consideration in the ceiling proceedings by the Competent Authority as land of the holder. 6. It is submitted by the counsel for the petitioners that the principles of natural justice are not excluded and as such the principle of audi alteram partem is applicable in case of transfers falling in the category of recognised transfers and if any order is passed not recognising the transfer the transferee would be an affected party and therefore is entitled to file an appeal. 7. in a case reported in 1988 RRD 160 (Desa v. State of Rajasthan) the Full Bench of this Court has held that a transfer affected upto 1st of December, 1969 would not in a,i cases become a recognised transfer. It would rather be so subject to the conditions mentioned in clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 30-DD of the Act being fulfilled. It would rather be so subject to the conditions mentioned in clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 30-DD of the Act being fulfilled. Whether those conditions are fulfilled or not is to be proved by the transferor who wants to take advantage of those transfers. The matter is between the State and the transferor whose ceiling area is in question. Simply because third person may be affected by an order of authorised officer it cannot be said that the third person is necessary party to the proceedings. The transfer is recognised only when the transferor satisfies the authorised officer that a transfer out of the land under consideration before him is recognisable according to clause (i) and (ii) of Section 30 DD. It is for the transferor to prove the legality of the transfer. If the transferor does not prove the legality of his transfer he has to lose and therefore the interest of transferee is safeguarded by the provisions of reimbursement of consideration he has to pay for the land. It is held that there is no provision in Chapter III-B and the Rules framed under the Act for issuance of notice to the transferee and necessary implication exclude principle of natural justice the principles of natural justice are not attracted in proceedings under Chapter III-B of the Act. It was held that the transferee is not entitled to a notice of the proceedings under the Act. 8. In view of the Full Bench decision that the transferee has no right to be heard and his interest is safeguarded by the transferor who has a right to be heard, the transferee would not be entitled to file an appeal challenging the order of the court whereby his transfer is not accepted.But in the present case the matter may be looked into in a different manner. The appeal was filed before the Revenue Appellate Authority not only by the transferee but also by the transferor/holder who has certainly a right to challenge an order, not recognising the transfers made by him because if the transfers are not accepted the land under transfers would be clubbed with his land for the purpose of ascertaining the ceiling limit. The order of Revenue Appellate Authority is a composite order passed in an appeal preferred by the transferor, transferees, trust and wife of the holder. The order of Revenue Appellate Authority is a composite order passed in an appeal preferred by the transferor, transferees, trust and wife of the holder. The Revenue Appellate Authority was within its jurisdiction to pass the order regarding transfers in an appeal filed by the transferor holder. The Revenue Appellate Authority has upheld the transfers made in favour of the petitioners. It cannot be said that the Revenue Appellate Authority had not exercised the jurisdiction vested in it to decide the nature of transaction of transfer while deciding the composite appeals filed by the aforesaid persons. Board of Revenue has failed to take into consideration this aspect and has wrongly set-aside the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority only on the ground that the Revenue Appellate Authority was not competent to adjudicate the matter of transfers in an appeal filed by transferee. 9. As the order of Revenue Appellate Authority was within its jurisdiction, now the question remains whether the transfers made in favour of the petitioners could be upheld under Section 30-DD of the Act. Under Section 30-DD of the Act the transfers made by the transferor in favour of the transferee shall be upheld if the land not exceeding 30 standard acre is transferred upto 31st day of December, 1969 in favour of the agriculturist domiciled in Rajasthan. The explanation I to Section 30-DD defines the 'agriculturist' to mean-'a person who earns his livelihood wholly or mainly from agriculture and cultivates land by his own labour or by the labour of any members of his family or alongwith such labour as aforesaid with the help of hired labour or servant on wages payable in cash or in kind and shall include an agricultural labour and a village artisan. Thus the transfer if it is made prior to December, 1969 of an area below 30 standard acres of land to an agriculturist who is domiciled in Rajasthan the transfer shall be upheld. The agriculturist is defined to be a person who earns his livelihood wholly or mainly from agriculture and who cultivates his land by his own labour or by the labour of any member of his family or with the help of other hired labour. 10. The agriculturist is defined to be a person who earns his livelihood wholly or mainly from agriculture and who cultivates his land by his own labour or by the labour of any member of his family or with the help of other hired labour. 10. From the mutation order dated 29.3.1957 of a land situated at Behror Jaat, Tehsil-Mundawar issued in favour of the father of petitioner Ram Pratap it is clear that certain lands are ancestral properties in the hands of the father of petitioner Ram Pratap and he was a right by birth in an ancestral property held by his father. Therefore he was holding the land on the relevant date. When the ceiling provisions are made applicable, Ram Pratap was aged fourteen years only. His father was allotted hundred acres of land by allotment order dated 1.1.1974. It is certified that Ram Pratap is a resident of Behror Jaat village where the property of the holder is situated. From the aforesaid documents it is clear that the father of petitioner Ram Pratap was holding agriculture land. In some of the lands petitioner Ram Pratap had right, title and interest by birth. He was 14 years of age at the time when the ceiling Act came into force and that he was resident of the village. 11. From the aforesaid facts petitioner Ram Pratap has prima faciely proved that he was wholly or atleast mainly dependent on agriculture income and as such he was an agriculturist within the meaning of Explanation I to Section 30-DD of the Act. No evidence has been led in rebuttle by the State that petitioner Ram Pratap was wholly or mainly not depended for his livelihood upon the earnings from agriculture. The sale made in favour of petitioner Ram Pratap by sale deed dated 22.12.1964 of 62 bighas and 12 biswas situated at Bharatpur will fall within the ambit of Section 30-DD of the Act of 1955. The land under the sale deed dated 22.12.1964 made in favour of Ram Pratap shall not be counted for the purpose of the ceiling limit in the proceedings commenced against the holder of the land namely Col. Sawai Brijraj Singh. 12. As regards another sale the case shall be different, by sale-deed executed on the same day i.e. 22.12.1964 in favour of Mahendra Pratap Singh, holder had transferred 62 bighas and 18 biswas of land. Sawai Brijraj Singh. 12. As regards another sale the case shall be different, by sale-deed executed on the same day i.e. 22.12.1964 in favour of Mahendra Pratap Singh, holder had transferred 62 bighas and 18 biswas of land. This transaction do not fail within the purview of Section 30-DD of the Act because at the relevant time when the transfer was effected, he was Captain in Indian Army and cannot be said to be an agriculturist within the meaning of Explanation I to Section 30-DD of the Act as he was not mainly or wholly dependent on the earning from agriculture. Mahendra Pratap Singh further gave the property under gift deed to Ram Pratap on 12.1.1968 and Ram Pratap in turn transferred a part of the land measuring 35 bighas and 19 biswa'by registered sale deed dated 8.8.1969 in favour of his father Brig Ghasi Ram. The gift deed in favour of Ram Pratap and sale deed in favour of Brig Ghasi Ram shall be subjected to the transfer made in favour of Mahendra Pratap Singh.As I have already reached to the conclusion that the transfers in favour of Mehendra Pratap Singh will not be recognised under Section 30-DD of the Act, the subsequent transfer of the land in favour of Ram Pratap and that of in favour of Brig. Ghasi Ram are not the transfers which can be saved under Section 30-DD of the Act and will have the same fate. 13. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this petition is partly allowed. The sale deed executed on 22,12.1964 by the holder i.e. Col. Sawai Brijraj Singh in favour of petitioner Ram Pratap transferring 62 bighas and 12 biswas of land situated at Bharatpur shall be treated as land of Ram Pratap and will not be included as a land of the holder i.e. Col. Sawai Brijraj Singh for the purpose of ceiling limit. The order of Revenue Appellate Authority upholding the transfer in favour of Mahendra Pratap Singh and subsequent transfers is set-aside. The order of Board of Revenue regarding this transfer is upheld although on different reasons.Petition Partly Allowed. *******