JUDGMENT Amitava Lala, J. 1. This is an application under clause 13 of the Letters Patent, 1865 read with section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 2. Clause 13 of the Letters Patent speaks as follows: "And we do further ordian, that the said High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal shall have power to remove, and to try and determine, as a court of extraordinary original Jurisdiction, any suit being or falling within the jurisdiction of any court, whether within or without the Bengal Division of the Presidency of Fort William, subject to its superintendence, when the said High Court shall think proper to do so, either on the agreement of the parties to that effect, or for purposes of justice, the reasons for so doing being recorded on the proceedings of the said High Court." 3. On the other hand section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure speaks as follows :- "On the application of any of the parties and after notice to the parties and after hearing such of them as desired to be heard, or of its own motion without such notice, the High Court or the District may at any stage- (a) transfer any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending before it for trial or disposal to any court subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the same, or (b) withdraw any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending in any Court subordinate to it, and i) try or dispose of the same; or ii) transfer the same for trial or disposal to any court subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the same; or iii) retransfer the same for trial or disposal to the Court from which it was withdrawn. 2. Where any suit for proceeding has been transferred or withdrawn under sub-section (1), the court which (is thereafter to try or dispose of such suit or proceeding) may, subject to any special directions in the case of an order of transfer, either retry it or proceed from the point at which it was transferred or withdrawn. 3. For the purposes of this section :- a) Courts of Additional and Assistant Judges shall be deemed to be subordinate to the district Court, b) 'Proceeding' includes a proceeding for the execution of a decree or order. 4. 3. For the purposes of this section :- a) Courts of Additional and Assistant Judges shall be deemed to be subordinate to the district Court, b) 'Proceeding' includes a proceeding for the execution of a decree or order. 4. The Court trying any suit transferred or withdrawn under this section from a Court of Small Causes shall, for the purposes of such suit, be deemed to be a Court of Small Causes. 5. A suit or proceeding may be transferred under this section from a Court which has no jurisdiction to try it." 4. A conjoint reading of the clause 13 of the Letters Patent as well as section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure speaks that one is supplement to other to keep a clear picture of power of superidentence of the High Court when occasion will arise. Such occasion might have been for the purpose of removing a suit or proceedings from a Court to do to its own jurisdiction or transfer it to any subordinate Court as per the factual situation. 5. Now let us find out what is the factual submissions made by the parties herein. 6. The grounds as taken by the petitioners are mostly based on apprehension of biasness of the petitioner about the concerned Assistant District Judge at Burdwan (now known as Civil Judge, Senior Division, Burdwan) such apprehension of biasness is related to proceeding of the Court is respect of a money suit No.4 of 1995. 7. It appears that the respondent herein being plaintiff instituted a suit being money suit No.4 of 1995 as far back as on 13th February, 1995 in the said Court claiming damages for Rs. 216201159.45 paise as against the petitioner herein being defendant therein. The petitioner therein being defendant therein sought for adjournment for filing written statement when the concerned Court was pleased to grant such adjournment on numerous occassions 13th April, 1995, 24th May, 1995, and 30th June, 1995 without imposing any costs whatsoever. The said court was also pleased to grant adjournments on 31st August, 1995, 15th November, 1995, 15th December, 1995 and 12th January, 1996 upon imposition of meagre amount of costs like Rs. 10 or 15 or Rs. 45 thereafter time to time the suit was proceeded accordingly till 27th January, 1999 when the decree was passed in money suit No.4 of 1999. 10 or 15 or Rs. 45 thereafter time to time the suit was proceeded accordingly till 27th January, 1999 when the decree was passed in money suit No.4 of 1999. However, an appeal was preferred by the petitioners in this Hon'ble Court in the month of March, 1999 from the judgment and decree dated 27th January, 1999 as aforesaid. 8. In the course of hearing of that suit two applications under clause 13 of the Letters Patent were filed before this Court one is on 14th May, 1998 and another is on 24th June, 1998. First application being ALP No. 12 of 1998 was made for transferring the instant suit being money suit No.33 of 1995 while ALP No. 18 of 1998 was made similarly for transferring the money Suit No.4 of 1995. 9. Both the applications were dismissed while a Single Bench of this Hon'ble Court on 8th of July, 1998. 10. On 10th August, 1998 and 12th August, 1998 the petitioner herein filed two special leave petitions being No. 13194 of 1998 and 14236 of 1998 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. On 30th October, 1998 both the special leave petitions were dismissed but during the course of hearing before the Hon'ble High Court as well as Hon'ble Supreme Court of India the proceeding was continued before the trial. 11. According to the respondent that a case of interpolation/tampering of exhibit A (4) while was in the custody of the court was taken for the first time by the petitioner on 24th August, 1998. The petitioner was also directed to file an affidavit about the source of information and knowledge and correctness of the averments by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India by an order dated 14th September, 1998. The respondent put forward a case by saying since the special leave petitions were dismissed even thereafter the chapter in respect of transferring the suit and for proceedings for interpolation/tampering of exhibit, if any, is a close chapter. Moreover such ground was taken only in respect of money suit No.4 of 1995 which has got no connection in respect of the instant suit being money Suit No. 33 of 1995. Moreover such ground was taken only in respect of money suit No.4 of 1995 which has got no connection in respect of the instant suit being money Suit No. 33 of 1995. The petitioner joined issue therein by saying had it been a position of interpolation/tampering of exhibit was available before the Single Bench of this Hon'ble Court wherein the applications under clause 13 were dismissed in the earlier occasion the court would not have passed such order of dismissal of ouch applications, therefore, such issue is a new issue and may be taken by making a fresh application under clause 13 of the Letters Patent. The application is outcome of such factual aspects. 12. I have perused the documents annexed with the petition as well as with the affidavits and I found that all submissions are going to one goal i.e. apprehension of biasness about proceeding with the money suit No. 33 of 1995 on the basis of their experience about money Suit No.4 of 1995 in respect of stand taken by the Court about interpolation/tempering of the exhibit while the same was in the custody of the Court. 13. According to me apprehension of biasness in proceeding with a suit being money Suit No.4 of 1995 wherein a decree was passed by a competent Court and an appeal was preferred therefrom cannot be valid ground for transferring the another suit being money suit No. 33 of 1995 for which this application was made to this Hon'ble Court. 14. The petitioner herein although taken few grounds lightly in their petition to cover up the scope of ambit of the clause 13 of the Letters Patent but in effect they have rested their argument only on the cause of apprehension of biasness in respect of money suit No.4 of 1995 at best the clause 13 of the application in this respect be fit in on the ground of interest of the petitioner will be prejudiced if no order is based about transfer or transferring is required for the purposes of justice in the circumstances of this case. Therefore, such question is not restricted only transfer of the suit before this High Court alone because the attact is not cause but the person who is dealing with the cause. 15. Mr. B.K. Bachawat and Mfr. P.K. Mallick, learned two senior Counsels reportedly stressed various points. 16. Mr. Therefore, such question is not restricted only transfer of the suit before this High Court alone because the attact is not cause but the person who is dealing with the cause. 15. Mr. B.K. Bachawat and Mfr. P.K. Mallick, learned two senior Counsels reportedly stressed various points. 16. Mr. Bachawat cited a judgment reported in AIR 1951 Cal 129 (Kalidas Roy and Ors. vs. University of Calcutta and Ors.). He contended that power of transfer under clause 13 of the Letters Patent is in a wide form and has to be construed as such provided purpose of justice is necessary. The words "purposes of Justice" are general and wide. 17. He also relied upon AIR 1990 SC 113 (Dr. Subramaniam Swami vs. Ramkrishna Hegde) in its paragraphs 8 and 9 to establish that paramount consideration in this respect is to see that justice according to law is down. If in achieving the objective the transfer of the case is imperative, there should be no hesitation to transfer the case even if it is likely to cause some inconvenience to the plaintiff. 18. He also relied upon AIR 1953 SC 198 (Asrumati Devi vs. Kumar Rupendra Dev Raikot and Ors.) It appears from the order that the application for transfer neither affects the merits of the controversy between the parties in the suit itself nor does it terminated or disposed of the suit on any ground. An order for transfer cannot be placed in the same category as an order rejecting a plaint or one dismissing a suit on a preliminary ground. In addition thereto it was held that the order under clause 13 of the Letters Patent is not appealable order under clause 15 of the same. He thereafter cited 1969 (1) QB 577 (Metropolitan Properties Co. F.G.C. Ltd. vs. Lannon and Ors.) in its page 599. 19. He also cited AIR 1978 SC 851 (Mohinder Singh Gill and Anr. vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Ors.) and relied upon paragraph 55 therein contended before this Court that justice must be rooted in confidence and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking (the Judge was biased). In fact this, portion of the judgment has been quoted from the expression of Lord Justice Denning. 20. vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Ors.) and relied upon paragraph 55 therein contended before this Court that justice must be rooted in confidence and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking (the Judge was biased). In fact this, portion of the judgment has been quoted from the expression of Lord Justice Denning. 20. He cited another judgment being 43 CD 366 (Lesson vs. General Council of Medical Education and Registration) and relied upon page 385 only to say the Judges like Caesar's wife should be above suspicion. 21. Likewise he relied upon 1993 of England report page 233 (R. vs. Sussex Justice Ex parte Mccarthy) and relying upon page 234 contended that fundamental importance is that justice should not only be' done but that it should also be manifestly seen to be done. 22. He cited AIR 1988 SC 1099 (International Airport Authority of India vs. K.D. Bali and Anr.) and relied upon paragraph 6 therein contended that it is well settled that there must be purity in the administration of justice as well as in administration of quasi-justice as are involved in the adjudicatory process. The purity of administration requires that the party to the proceeding should not have apprehension that the authority is biased and is likely to decide against the party. 23. He also cited 1980 CWN 777 (Gorachand Das vs. Dipali Das) and relying upon Head Notes pages 778 and 782 contended that biasness can be assessed from the facts taken together. He also relied upon another judgment being 1992 SC 1132 (Pushpa Devi Saraf and Anr. vs, Jai Narayan Parasrampuria and Ors.) and relied upon paragraph 9 therein contended that which in effect is holding a view giving an impression that it should be proper that the matter should be transferred to another Bench and such transfer report should proceed with the suit expeditiously. 24. Mr. Ajit Kumar Panja and Mrs. D.B. Mukherjee made their various submissions opposing the contentions of the petitioners. 25. Mr. Panja first of all stated that the ratio of 1988 SC 1099 is in effect supporting the contention of the petitioner. He stated that it is not every suspicion felt by a party which must lead to the conclusion that the authority hearing the proceedings is biased. 25. Mr. Panja first of all stated that the ratio of 1988 SC 1099 is in effect supporting the contention of the petitioner. He stated that it is not every suspicion felt by a party which must lead to the conclusion that the authority hearing the proceedings is biased. The apprehension must be judged from a healthy, reasonable and average point of view and not on mere apprehension of any whimsical person. It will be a sad day in the administration of justice if such be the state of law. 26. He further contended by saying that all other judgments are cited on the basis of certain principles with which are to be based on each and every factual position. In the instant case no such factual position come forward so that the matter transferred before this Court on the ground of such apprehension of biasness. The question of destruction of confidence when the right minded people can go away thinking that the Judge is biased is dependable who are the persons judging the Judge. In other words whether the right minded persons are claiming that Judge is biased or not so that the ratio or principle as laid down in AIR 51 Cal 286, AIR 53 SC 198 or 1969 (1) QB 577 will be applicable in this case. He stated that a judgment of this Court reported in 1998 (1) CHN 555 (Senior Divisional Manager, National Insurance Company Limited and Anr. vs. Satima Cold Storage and Ors.), arose in connection with a revisional application out of the instant money suit No. 33 of 1995 wherein the petitioners herein failed to establish any case whatsoever any cause of biasness therein. The dilatory tactics of the petitioners herein in hearing the suit before the trial Court has been observed by the Single Bench of this Hon'ble Court under the aforesaid judgment. Therefore, from the tactics adopted by them cannot encouragable at all at least to establish that they are not the like minded person. 27. He also cited a judgment reported in AIR 1976 Del 184 (Krishan Kanahya and Anr. vs. Vijay Kumar & Ors.) to establish that decision or procedure in one case cannot be an evidence of bias in another case deal with by the same Judge. 28. I have proceeded with the matter to the fullest extent to come to an appropriate conclusion. vs. Vijay Kumar & Ors.) to establish that decision or procedure in one case cannot be an evidence of bias in another case deal with by the same Judge. 28. I have proceeded with the matter to the fullest extent to come to an appropriate conclusion. According to me transferring the suit from a subordinate Court to High Court is dependable upon various grounds but the main ground of transfer herein is dependable upon a very peculiar circumstances. Peculiarity is that apprehension biasness of the concerned Judge on the basis of their apprehension in other suit from which an appeal was preferred. The petitioner Counsels were very much eager to show the judgment and order passed by the appeal Court in hearing the said application in connection with the appeal and making comments thereto although the said was happened when the hearing was concluded and the judgment was reserved. 29. Be that as it may, I am not concerned with the judgment and order passed by an appeal court in respect of any different appeal or application arising out of different suit. Moreover conduct of the petitioners in proceeding with the suit before the Court is not encourageable. The Court has every material to believe that dilatory tactics or avoiding tactics of the Court opted by the petitioners herein. In do not see what is the reason behind it. The reason may be good may be bad or may be indifferent but the action on the part of the petitioners in the trial Court is not encourageable. 30. However, the Court of Superintendence has certain duties to visualise the situation and to do the justice in favour of the parties and if in furtherance of the order to be passed herein after if it appears that the petitioner is proceeding in the suit following the same dilatory tactics then in that event it will be evidently proved that it is not an affair of a like minded person. In any event to avoid all complications it would be just fit, proper and equitable that the suit being money suit No. 33 of 1995 (Satima Cold Storage Vs. National Insurance Company and Ors.) and proceedings in connection therewith will be transferred of to the next of the Court of Assistant District Judge i.e. Civil Judge, Senior Division, 2nd Addl. In any event to avoid all complications it would be just fit, proper and equitable that the suit being money suit No. 33 of 1995 (Satima Cold Storage Vs. National Insurance Company and Ors.) and proceedings in connection therewith will be transferred of to the next of the Court of Assistant District Judge i.e. Civil Judge, Senior Division, 2nd Addl. Court, Burdwan and to be heard therein from the stage it was completed before the earlier Court. 31. It is expected that the suit will be proceeded expeditiously. 32. The application is thus disposed of but no order is passed as to costs. Application disposed of.