JUDGMENT - J.A. PATIL, J.:---The deceased Alkabai was married to the appellant on 25-5-1986. She committed suicide on 13-12-1990 by consuming some insecticide. It is the prosecution case that the appellant and his mother, Chandrabhagabai (accused No. 2) used to illtreat Alkabai in connection with payment of dowry. Accordingly, both the accused were put on trial in Sessions Case No. 51 of 1991. The learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Ambejogai, however, found that no case was proved against the accused No. 2-Chandrabhagabai. He, therefore, acquitted her. The learned Judge, however, found the appellant (accused No. 1) guilty of the offences punishable under sections 498-A and 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. He sentenced the appellant on the first count to suffer rigorious imprisonment for two years with a fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default, to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for six months and on the second count to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven years. Hence this appeal. 2.We have heard Shri R.M. Borde, learned Advocate for the appellant and Shri P.B. Varale, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, for the respondent-State. Shri. Borde submitted that the evidence on record is not sufficient to hold the appellant guilty on both counts. He pointed out that there is no proximate connection between the alleged demand of dowry and suicide by Alkabai. Shri Varale, on the other hand, laid emphasis on five letters written by the appellant to his father-in-law Ankush and pointed out that in all these letters there is an unequivocal demand of dowry made by the appellant. Shri Varale also pointed out from the evidence of the witnesses that Alkabai used to disclose that she was harassed by the appellant in connection with non-payment of dowry. 3.The facts which are not disputed before us are that, Alkabai was married to the appellant on 25-5-1986 and after the marriage she started living with the appellant and his mother Chandrabhagabai at village Dhawadi. Alkabai did not bear any issue of the marriage. It is not disputed before us that a sum of Rs. 2,500/- was agreed to be paid by Ankush (P.W. 3), the father of deceased Alkabai to the appellant towards the dowry. But due to some financial difficulty he could pay only Rs. 1,500/- to the appellant and the remaining amount of Rs. 1,000/- remained unpaid. It is not disputed before us that a sum of Rs. 2,500/- was agreed to be paid by Ankush (P.W. 3), the father of deceased Alkabai to the appellant towards the dowry. But due to some financial difficulty he could pay only Rs. 1,500/- to the appellant and the remaining amount of Rs. 1,000/- remained unpaid. The oral evidence of Ankush (P.W. 3), Sushila (P.W. 7), who is mother of deceased Alkabai; Bhima (P.W. 4) and Gautam (P.W. 6) who are uncles of Alkabai and Bhagwat (P.W. 8), who is the brother of Alkabai clearly shows that Alkabai had disclosed to them that she was being harassed by the appellant and his mother in connection with non-payment of dowry. The denial made by the appellant in this respect loses its force in view of the letters (Exhibits 46 to 50) which he had sent to Ankush (P.W. 3). It is true that the appellant has denied to have sent these letters. However, mere suggestion given to Ankush (P.W. 3) to that effect is of no consequence. It is material to note that these letters were produced by Ankush (P.W. 3) during the course of investigation soon after the death of his daughter Alkabai. There is absolutely no reason to believe that he has prepared false letters in the name of the appellant and produced the same. We do not find any effective cross-examination in this respect to disbelieve the version of Ankush (P.W. 3) that Exhs. 46 to 50 are the letters written by the appellant to him. 4.These letters were sent by the appellant to his father-in-law Ankush (P.W. 3) during the period from 4-6-1986 to 8-9-1988. The earliest letter is Exh. 48 which is dated 4-6-1986 in which the appellant has informed his father-in-law Ankush that the time limit to pay the amount was already over and that no money was sent although about 8 to 15 days had passed thereafter. He requested in the said letter to send money. The next letter is Exh. 50 which is dated 17-11-1986. In this letter the appellant has scolded his father-in-law Ankush and mentioned that repeated tellings had no effect on Ankush. At the end of the said letter the appellant has repeated his demand for money. The third letter is Exh. 47 which is dated 14-1-1987. The next letter is Exh. 50 which is dated 17-11-1986. In this letter the appellant has scolded his father-in-law Ankush and mentioned that repeated tellings had no effect on Ankush. At the end of the said letter the appellant has repeated his demand for money. The third letter is Exh. 47 which is dated 14-1-1987. In this letter the appellant has used some abusive language to his father-in-law Ankush and stated that Ankush should have informed him if he was short of amount of dowry. The fourth letter is Exh. 49 which is dated 29-2-1988. In this letter the appellant has repeated his demand for the remaining amount of dowry and pointed out that the said was not paid by his father-in-law Ankush although the marriage had taken place 2 years back. The appellant further informed that he was going to approach Ankush for collecting the remaining amount. The last letter is Exh. 46 and it is dated 8-9-1988. In this letter also the appellant has used abusive language to his father-in-law Ankush and expressed his disappointment for being the son-in-law of a wretched person like Ankush. The appellant has also given a threat to Ankush to recover the amount of Rs. 1,500/- even from his (Ankush) dead body. 5.We have carefully gone through all these letters and we have absolutely no doubt that the accused was dissatisfied with his father-in-law Ankush as the remaining amount of Rs. 1,500/- of the dowry had remained unpaid. There is, therefore, no wonder if the appellant had harassed his wife Alkabai over the non-payment of the remaining amount of dowry by her father. It is on the background of this fact that the evidence of the close relatives of Alkabai about the disclosure of harassment at the hands of the appellant becomes acceptable. This conduct on the part of the appellant clearly falls within the ambit of Clause (b) of section 498-A. The harassment of the woman with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property which is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand is cruelty. In our opinion, the trial Court was, therefore, right in holding the appellant guilty of committing the offence of cruelty under section 498-A, I.P.C. Shri Borde was unable to point out any material which could dislodge the positive evidence of demand of dowry by the appellant. We, therefore, do not see any reason to disturb the order of conviction and sentence for the offence under section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. 6.As pointed out above, the trial Court has also held the appellant guilty of the offence of dowry death under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Judge has observed that Alkabai committed suicide due to ill-treatment given to her by the appellant over the non-payment of remaining amount of dowry. Shri Borde, however, submitted that the said finding is without any evidence on record and that there is no evidence to establish any connection between the demand of dowry by the appellant and suicide by Alkabai. We have carefully considered the submission of Shri Borde in the light of the evidence on record and we find much substance in the submission. 7.It is material to note that on the date of incident i.e on 13-12-1990, there was marriage of Bhagwat (P.W. 8), who is the brother of deceased Alkabai. The evidence of Sushilabai (P.W. 7) shows that about 2 or 3 days before the marriage she had gone to village Dhawadi to bring her daughter Alkabai. At that time the appellant was not present but his mother Chandrabhagabai was there and she allowed Sushilabai to take Alkabai with her. It is further seen that the marriage was to be solemnized on 13-12-1990 at about 4.00 p.m. However, on that day at morning time the appellant came to the house of his father-in-law Ankush and took Alkabai with him back to his village. He did not attend the marriage ceremony nor did he allow Alkabai to attend the same. It is obvious that Alkabai must have, therefore, felt very much disappointed. Admittedly after returning to the appellant's home, she committed suicide on the same day by consuming some insecticide. There is no dispute of the fact that Alkabai had committed suicide. 8.The material question which requires to be considered is whether the death of Alkabai could be termed as dowry death within the meaning of section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. There is no dispute of the fact that Alkabai had committed suicide. 8.The material question which requires to be considered is whether the death of Alkabai could be termed as dowry death within the meaning of section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. She committed suicide within 7 years of her marriage and, according to the prosecution, it was due to the harassment by the appellant in connection with the demand of dowry. It may be pointed out that in order to establish the charge under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, the prosecution must prove- (1) the death of the woman was caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances; (2) such death had occurred within 7 years of her marraige; (3) that the woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband soon before her death; and, (4) that such cruelty or harassment was for or in connection with demand for dowry. Reference may also be made to the presumption envisaged by section 113-B of the Evidence Act and it reads as follows: "113-B. When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation : For the purposes of the section, "dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code." 9.In (Nandkishore v. State of Maharashtra)1, 1996(5) Bom.C.R. 315 a Division Bench of this High Court pointed out that there should be a nexus between cruelty or harassment on one hand and the demand for dowry on the other. The two must co-exist and should not be independent of one another. 10.Shri Borde relied upon the decision in (Sham Lal v. State of Haryana)2, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 1873 wherein Their Lordships referred to the presumption envisaged in section 113-B of the Evidence Act and pointed out that for invoking said legal presumption it is imperative for the prosecution to prove that soon before the death the woman was subjected to such cruelty or harassment. In that case the facts were that deceased Neelam Rani died of burns within 7 years of her marriage. There was evidence that there was a dispute between two sides regarding the dowry paid or to be paid. On account of the failure to meet the demands of dowry Neelam Rani was taken back by her parents to their house about 1½ year before her death. There was evidence that an attempt was made to patch up between the two sides by calling a Panchayat in which it was resolved that Neelam Rani would go back to her matrimonial home. Accordingly, her husband took her to his house. This happened about ten to fifteen days prior to the death of Neelam Rani and there was nothing on record to show that during the said period she was either treated with cruelty or harassed with the demand for dowry. On these facts, Their Lordships held that the presumption of dowry death as envisaged by section 113-B of the Evidence Act could not be raised and the accused could not be convicted of the offence under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. 11.In the instant case the last letter sent by the appellant demanding the remaining amount of dowry is dated 8-9-1988. Alkabai committed suicide on 13-12-1990 i.e. after 2 years and 3 months from the said letter. There is no evidence on record to show that during the period from 8-9-1988 till 13-12-1990, the appellant was repeating his demand of dowry and that he was harassing his wife Alkabai on that count. It is true that there is evidence of the witnesses who state that Alkabai had disclosed to them that she was being harassed by the appellant for dowry. However, it is not clear from their evidence as to when actually the said disclosures were made by Alkabai. To be specific, there is no evidence on record to show that the said disclosures were made by Alkabai at the time when she had come to her father's house to attend the marraige of her brother Bhagwat. It is important to bear in mind that the cruelty or harassment to the woman must be soon before her death. To be specific, there is no evidence on record to show that the said disclosures were made by Alkabai at the time when she had come to her father's house to attend the marraige of her brother Bhagwat. It is important to bear in mind that the cruelty or harassment to the woman must be soon before her death. In (Keshab Chandra Panda v. State)3, 1995(1) Cr.L.J. 174 it was held that the expression "soon before her death" used in the substantive section 304-B, I.P.C. and section 113-B of the Evidence Act is pregnant with the idea of proximity test and that no definite period has been indicated. It was further observed that the determination of the period which can come within the term "soon before" is left to be determined by the courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. It was further held that the expression "soon before" would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the concerned cruelty or harassment and the death in-question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence. As pointed out above in Sham Lal's case (supra) the intervening period of 10 to 15 days was held to be not proximate in the facts and circumstances of the said case. 12.In the instant case the prosecution did succeed in proving that the appellant used to harass Alkabai in connection with demand of dowry. However, there was a long intervening period between the said harassment and death of Alkabai. It is true that the appellant forcibly took Alkabai with him, to his village without allowing her to attend the marriage of her brother. The said act on the part of the appellant was improper and it may amount to harassment. However, it is not certainly a harassment for or in connection with demand of dowry. There is nothing in the evidence of any of the witnesses particularly Ankush (P.W. 3), Sushila (P.W. 7) and Bhagwat (P.W. 8) to indicate that before taking Alkabai with him the appellant had picked up a quarrel with Ankush and repeated his demand for payment of remaining amount of dowry. There is nothing in the evidence of any of the witnesses particularly Ankush (P.W. 3), Sushila (P.W. 7) and Bhagwat (P.W. 8) to indicate that before taking Alkabai with him the appellant had picked up a quarrel with Ankush and repeated his demand for payment of remaining amount of dowry. Their evidence is totally silent on this aspect. None of them has stated as to why the appellant was insisting on taking Alkabai with him immediately without attending the marraige ceremony. As seen from the evidence of Sushila (P.W. 7) she had brought Alkabai during the absence of the appellant at home. Therefore, it is quite probable that the appellant did not like that his wife was taken by her mother without his consent or knowledge. He might have, therefore, felt offending and thought it proper to take back his wife. There is also no evidence as to what had happened after Alkabai left with the accused and before she committed suicide on the same day. The learned trial Judge has failed to take into consideration this material aspect of the case and fallen in error to hold the appellant guilty of the offence under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. We are of the opinion that the death of Alkabai cannot, in the circumstances discussed above be regarded as dowry death within the meaning of section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. Consequently, the order of conviction passed against the appellant for the said offence cannot be sustained. 13.In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant (accused No. 1) for the offence under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code is hereby quashed and set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the said offence. The order of conviction and sentence passed against him for the offence under section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code is, however, maintained. The appellant having already undergone the sentence on that count shall be forthwith released in case he is not required in connection with any other case. Appeal partly allowed. -----