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1999 DIGILAW 422 (ORI)

Benudhar Tanty v. Sunabati alias Nalini Dei

1999-11-22

P.K.MOHANTY, P.K.PATRA

body1999
JUDGMENT P. K. MOHANTY, J. — This is an appeal against the order of the learned Judge, Family Court, Rourkela passed in a petition filed under Sec. 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, directing en¬forcement of an order of maintenance in favour of the respondent-wife passed under Sec. 125, Cr.P.C. 2. The short facts of the case is that an order under Sec. 125, Cr.P.C. was passed in Misc. Case No. 79 of 1991 against the appellant on 8.8.1991 directing him to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 250/- with effect from 25.5.1989. The appellant-husband having not complied with the order and having defaulted in payment, the respondent filed an application under Sec. 128, Cr.P.C. for enforcement of the order of maintenance. The appel¬lant appeared before the learned Judge, Family Court and filed his show cause denying his liability on several grounds. In course of the proceeding, a reconciliation was attempted and the appellant and the respondent filed a joint petition on 10.1.1992 to the effect that the appellant would pay a sum of Rs. 200/- out of Rs. 500/- in the first instalment on 23.1.1992 and on payment of the said amount, the respondent would go to the house of her husband for resuming conjugal life. On 23.1.1992, the appellant deposited a sum of Rs. 1200/-, but the respondent expressed her displeasure and unwillingness to resume the conjugal life. Howev¬er, another application was filed signed by both the parties to live together, and the respondent would go with her husband after receiving some amount. However, the petitions of compromise dated 10.1.1992 and 23.1.1992 were directed to come on 12.2.1992. The parties appeared on 12.2.1992 and it is said that they went to the house of the appellant to resume their conjugal life. 3. However, on 17.2.1992, the respondent appeared before the learned Judge, Family Court and filed a petition alleging therein that though she had gone to the house of the appellant in conso¬nance with the compromise, but she was assaulted by the inmates as well as by the appellant for which she has left the matrimoni¬al home and a prayer was made for not acting upon the joint peti¬tions purportedly made on 10.1.1992 and 23.1.1992. On considera¬tion of the petition and the materials on record, the learned Judge, Family Court rejected the petition filed on 10.1.1992 and 23.1.1992 and directed enforcement of the order of maintenance passed under Sec. 125, Cr.P.C. The appellant is aggrieved by the said order. 4. It is contended by Sri Samantray, learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Court below having allowed the parties to act upon the compromise and remain together, the subsequent order rejecting the application is unsustainable in law, inasmuch as he could not have directed enforcement of the order passed under Sec. 125 Cr.P.C. because of the compromise placed before the Court. Mr. S. K. Nanda, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. Pradip Mohanty, however, contends that since the order under Sec. 125, Cr.P.C. has neither been challenged nor an application for variation of the order has been filed, the learned Judge, Family Court could not have varied the said order in an application under Sec. 128, Cr.P.C. and has rightly directed enforcement of the order. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has referred to a decision of the apex Court in the case of Bhupinder Singh v. Daljit Kaur : AIR 1979 SC 442 . 5. Thus, the short question that arises for consideration is as to whether in a proceeding instituted upon a petition under Sec. 128 Cr.P.C. the Judge, Family Court has the jurisdiction and power to vary/modify or regional the order of maintenance passed under Sec. 125 Cr.P.C. purportedly on the basis of the compromise entered into by the parties to resume conjugal life. 6. The apex Court in Bhupinder Singh v. Daljit Kaur : AIR 1979 Supreme Court 442 at paragraphs 7 and 8 thereof observed thus : “7. We are concerned with a Code which is complete on the topic and any defence against an order passed under Sec. 125, Cr.P.C. must be founded on a provision in the Code. Section 125 is a provision to protect the weaker of the two parties, namely, the neglected wife. If an order for maintenance has been made against the deserter it will operate until vacated or altered in terms of the provisions of the Code itself. If the husband has a case under Sec. 125(4), (5) or Section 127 of the Code it is pen to him to initiate appropriate proceedings. If an order for maintenance has been made against the deserter it will operate until vacated or altered in terms of the provisions of the Code itself. If the husband has a case under Sec. 125(4), (5) or Section 127 of the Code it is pen to him to initiate appropriate proceedings. But until the origi¬nal order for maintenance is modified or cancelled by a higher Court or is varied or vacated in terms of Section 125(4) or (5) or Section 127, its validity survives. It is enforceable and no plea that there has been cohabitation in the interregnum or that there has been a compromise between the parties can hold good as a valid defence. In this view, we hold that the decisions cited before us in favour of the proposition contended for by the petitioner are not good law and that the view taken by Sir Shadi Lal Chief Justice is sound. 8. A statutory order can ordinarily be demolished only in terms of the statute. That being absent in the present case, the Magistrate will execute the order for maintenance. Our order does not and shall not be deemed to prejudice the petitioner in any proceedings under the law which he may start to vacate or vary the order for maintenance.” 7. Undisputedly, no application or any appeal has been filed by the appellant for varying or vacating the maintenance granted in favour of the respondent under Sec. 125, Cr.P.C. The purported compromise petition has been filed in a proceeding under Sec. 128, Cr.P.C. Section 128, Cr.P.C. is quoted hereunder : “128. Enforcement of order of maintenance — A copy of the order of maintenance shall be given without payment to the person in whose favour it is made or to his guardian, if any, or to the person to whom the allowance is to be paid; and such order may be enforced by any Magistrate in any place where the person against whom it is made may be on such Magistrate being satisfied as to the identity of the parties and the non-payment of the allowance due”. 8. 8. Under Sec 128 of the Code, the Magistrate (in the present case the Family Court) is required to enforce an order of mainte¬nance passed under Sec. 125 of the Code and the Section does not contemplate a proceeding either for conciliation or for compro¬mise in the matter to nullify the order passed for maintenance. The order of the competent Court under Sec. 125 remains valid and enforceable unless and until it is modified or annulled by a higher forum or it is varied or vacated under Sub-sec. (4) or (5) of Section 125 or under Sec. 127. The plea therefore of the appellant that there was a compromise during the proceedings under Sec. 128 and the conjugal relationship was revived for sometime in terms of such compromise and as such the order cannot be enforced under Sec. 128, Cr.P.C. does not stand to reason and has to be rejected. We do not appreciate the procedure adopt¬ed by the learned Judge, Family Court for conciliation and a compromise in a proceeding under Sec. 128, Cr.P.C. was not in accordance with any law. But however on ultimate analysis, the Court has rightly rejected the petition for compromise and di¬rected compliance of the order of maintenance through the Dis¬trict Inspector of Schools, the Pay Disbursing Authority of the appellant. 9. In view of the discussions made in the foregoing para¬graphs and the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to above, which is squarely applicable to the present case, there is no merit in this appeal. The appeal is therefore dismissed. However, the dismissal of this appeal would not debar the appellant from taking recourse to any other legal proceeding as is available to him under law. P. K. PATRA, J. I agree. Appeal dismissed.