JUDGMENT A.K. Mathur, C.J. 1. This is a Letters Patent Appeal directed against judgment and order dated 12-9-1997 passed by learned Single Judge in First Appeal No. 608 of 1996 (Lalit Gurubaxani v. Smt. Usha Gurubaxani) whereby the learned single Judge has dismissed the First Appeal filed by the appellant and confirmed the judgment and decree of restitution of conjugal rights passed by the trial Court. 2. Brief facts which are necessary for disposal of this appeal are that marriage between the appellant and the respondent took place at Satna according to Hindu rites. The wife (respondent) stayed at her matrimonial home at Satna for about three months. It is alleged that the behaviour of the husband and his family members was not very cordial with her. It is alleged that she was neglected by the members of the husband's family and was not allowed to sit along with other family members of the husband. It is alleged that her husband expressed his intention to marry one Ku. Hemlata and also expressed number of times that the present marriage had been forced upon him and it had been solemnised against his wishes and without obtaining his consent, only to obtain dowry and other valuable gifts from the family of the wife. It is further alleged that the husband demanded certain monetary benefits or certain gifts like car etc. and those demands were not fulfilled. It is alleged that she was driven out from the matrimonial home on 15-10-1991 and was asked to bring money for purchase of car. It is alleged that she came back to Jabalpur and had written letters to her husband requesting him to come to Jabalpur and take her to the matrimonial home but he did not come. Hence, present petition was filed. 3. The plea of the husband was that the petitioner had already filed number of cases including criminal cases against him and her behaviour was not very affectionate towards him. It is alleged by him that he and his family members' behaviour was very affectionate towards the wife and she was not driven out from her matrimonial home. It is also alleged by the husband appellant that since the respondent wife belongs to a rich family, she was in the habit of going out and spent lavishly and because of her arrogant nature she could not adopt the culture of his family. It is also alleged by the husband appellant that since the respondent wife belongs to a rich family, she was in the habit of going out and spent lavishly and because of her arrogant nature she could not adopt the culture of his family. It is alleged that the wife insisted that she would live according to her wishes either at Satna or at Jabalpur. The allegation of dowry was denied. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed number of issues including whether the wife was sent to her parents' home on 15-10-1991 :in order to perform second marriage. Learned trial Judge recorded the finding in favour of the wife and ordered restitution of conjugal rights. Though the husband (appellant) appeared before the trial Court initially but subsequently he absented; therefore, the learned trial Court passed ex parte decree on 30-9-1994. Thereafter the appellant filed a petition for setting aside the ex parte decree which was allowed and the parties were directed to proceed with the trial. The wife examined herself as P.W. 1 and her brother Prakash Keshawani was examined as P.W. 2. No witness was examined on behalf of the appellant/husband, nor the husband cross- examined the witnesses produced by the wife. Then another decree was passed by the learned trial Court on the basis of evidence placed before him by order dated 25-10-1996. 5. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 25-10-1996, a First Appeal was preferred by the husband. The matter was heard by the learned single Judge and after examining the matter in detail, learned single Judge found that ample opportunity was given to the husband for cross-examining the witnesses of the wife. Learned single Judge reproduced in the judgment some proceedings in order to show that sufficient time was given to the appellant to enable him to cross-examine the witnesses produced by the wife, but no attempt was made on behalf of the husband to do so, or to produce any witness in support of his case and the matter was kept adjourning for one reason or the other. Learned single Judge therefore was satisfied that there was no ground to hold that the appellant/husband did not get sufficient opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses produced by the wife. Learned single Judge therefore was satisfied that there was no ground to hold that the appellant/husband did not get sufficient opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses produced by the wife. The learned single Judge thus found that the view taken by the learned trial Court is justified and affirmed the decree of restoration of conjugal rights. Hence, the present appeal. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. The first question which was agitated by the learned counsel for the appellant was with regard to jurisdiction of District Court, Jabalpur to try the present case. It is alleged that marriage was solemnised at Satna and, therefore, Satna District Court had jurisdiction to try the case. Our attention was invited to Section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Learned counsel submitted that since the marriage was solemnised at Satna, therefore, Satna Court had jurisdiction to try the suit and secondly, the appellant is also working at Satna and hence the Satna Court alone could have entertained the suit. Learned counsel invited our attention to a decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Darshan Kaur v. Malook Singh Learned counsel also invited our attention to the decisions in the cases of Seeta Ram v. Smt. Phooli AIR 1972 Raj. 313 and Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan AIR 1954 SC 340 . As against this, learned counsel for the respondent wife invited our attention to the cases of Munni Devi v. Ashok Kumar 1989 DMC 245 , R.S.D.V. Finance Co. Ltd. v. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. AIR 1993 SC 2094 , Smt. Mani v. Kishan LaL AIR 1997 Raj 19 and Spl. Secretary, Government of Rajasthan v. Venkataramana Seshaiyer AIR 1984 AP 5 . The question of jurisdiction has to be raised at the first available opportunity. In the present case, the question of jurisdiction has been raised for the first time in this Letters Patent Appeal and it was not raised either before the trial Court or before the learned single Judge. It is only for the first time this objection has been raised in this Letters Patent Appeal. 7. So far as question of jurisdiction is concerned, in the case of Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan (supra), their Lordships of Supreme Court have observed that paramount consideration should be whether there has been failure of justice. It is only for the first time this objection has been raised in this Letters Patent Appeal. 7. So far as question of jurisdiction is concerned, in the case of Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan (supra), their Lordships of Supreme Court have observed that paramount consideration should be whether there has been failure of justice. It was also observed that the question of jurisdiction should be raised at first available opportunity. In this connection, it may be relevant to mention the following observation of the Apex Court: "Even apart from this, we are satisfied that no prejudice was caused to the appellants by their appeal having been heard by the District Court. There was a fair and full hearing of the appeal by that Court; it gave its decision on the merits on a consideration of the entire evidence in the case, and no injustice is shown to have resulted in its disposal of the matter. The decision of the learned Judges that there were no grounds for interference under Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is correct." In the present case, it is pointed out that no such objection was raised which ought to have been raised at the first available opportunity. Secondly, the conduct of the husband that he did not participate in the proceedings after filing written statement and did not raise any objection regarding jurisdiction shows that no prejudice was caused to the husband in holding trial in Court at Jabalpur. In this connection, reference can also be made to the decision in the case of R.S.D.V. Finance Company Ltd. v. Shri Vallabh Glass Works Ltd., (supra) where also, their Lordships have observed that such objection should be taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement and unless there has been consequent failure of justice, such objection cannot be allowed. It was observed by their Lordships as under : "7...........Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that no objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any appellate or revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement and unless there has been consequent failure of justice. The above provision clearly lays down that such objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by the appellate or revisional Court subject to the following conditions: (i) That such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity; (ii) in all cases where issues are settled then at or before such' settlement of issues; (iii) there has been a consequent failure of justice." These are the three cardinal principles laid down with regard to jurisdiction. Their Lordships have held that in case objection had not been raised at first opportunity and there is no consequential failure of justice, then in that case, the Court should not interfere on the question of jurisdiction. We are satisfied that in the present case, the conduct of the husband appellant is that he did not raise this objection before the trial Court nor before the first Appellate Court and we are satisfied that no prejudice has been caused. The conduct of the husband that he did not participate in the proceedings and did not avail of the opportunity of contesting the matter, is established and, therefore, we overrule the objection of jurisdiction raised by the learned counsel for the appellant husband for the first time. In this connection, our attention was invited to the decisions of Darshan Kaur v. Malook Singh, AIR 1983 P&H 28 and Seeta Ram v. Smt. Phooli AIR 1972 Raj. 313 . In the case of Darshan Kaur (supra), learned Single Judge of Punjab & Haryana High Court held that: "....................Therefore, on a plain reading of Section 19 and reading it harmoniously with Section 25, the only conclusion to be drawn would be that even if a petition for divorce, or any other decree, is granted by one of the Courts having jurisdiction under Section 19, it may give cause to the opposite party to move for the grant of permanent alimony or any other relief under Section 26 or 27 again the jurisdiction will be governed by Section 19 and not merely by the passing of a decree by a particular Court." Question is whether the party had raised the objection at the earliest opportunity or not. In case the party had raised objection at the earliest opportunity, perhaps the plaint could have been returned by the District Court, Jabalpur to be presented before the competent Court at Satna. In case the party had raised objection at the earliest opportunity, perhaps the plaint could have been returned by the District Court, Jabalpur to be presented before the competent Court at Satna. But no such objection was raised and as the Apex Court in the case of R.S.D.V. Finance Co. Ltd (supra) has held that the revisional Court or Appellate Court should not entertain such objection unless it is shown to have caused prejudice or occasioned failure of justice. As mentioned above, the conduct of the petitioner/husband was such that he did not participate in the proceedings after filing written-statement and despite number of opportunities given to him for joining the proceedings, he did not do so; therefore, ex parte proceedings were taken up by the trial Court. Hence, this decision is of no help to the petitioner. In the case of Seeta Ram v. Smt. Phooli (supra) which was with regard to claim of maintenance and decree for restitution of conjugal rights, question with regard to the jurisdiction of the Court did not arise; as such this case has no relevance so far as the present case is concerned. 8. Our attention was invited by the learned counsel for the respondent/wife to the decision in the case of Munni devi v. Ashok Kumar (supra). There question arose with regard to territorial jurisdiction for filing the suit for restitution of conjugal rights and no question was raised by the respondent husband therein that the Karnal Court had no territorial jurisdiction. His Lordship observed that since this question was not raised in the Court below and it was raised in the Appellate Court, no injustice was shown to have been caused because of lack of territorial jurisdiction; therefore, the learned Court declined to entertain the objection at that stage. Our attention was also invited to the case of Krishna Kant R. Dalvi v. Smt. Sadhana K. Dalvi, 1984 Vol. I D.M.C. 97 wherein petition was filed under Section 13 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 and a preliminary objection was raised before the Appellate Court as to the pecuniary jurisdiction. The learned Court held that assuming that there was lack of pecuniary jurisdiction, it cannot be raised for the first time in appeal and the preliminary objection was overruled. The Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Mani v. Kishan LaL AIR 1997 Raj. The learned Court held that assuming that there was lack of pecuniary jurisdiction, it cannot be raised for the first time in appeal and the preliminary objection was overruled. The Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Mani v. Kishan LaL AIR 1997 Raj. 19 took the view that though the objection with regard to pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court was raised at the first instance but despite that the parties went on a trial and the defendant cross-examined the plaintiffs witnesses and produced his own witness without any protest. Therefore, their Lordships held that despite the objection to the authority and jurisdiction of the Court, objection with regard to jurisdiction stood waived by the defendant as he participated in the whole trial. Learned counsel for the respondent also invited our attention to the decision of this Court in the case of Mahendra Kumar v. Bank of Baroda, 1997 (2) MPLJ 596 which relates to interference by the Appellate Court in Letters Patent. It was submitted that the appellant has to demonstrate that the order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from infirmity of impropriety, incorrectness and illegality and assumes the nature of perversity so as to warrant interference. In the present case, the order passed by the learned Single Judge does not suffer from any infirmity of impropriety, incorrectness and illegality and so far as the question of jurisdiction is concerned, this was not raised before the learned Single Judge. Unless the objection had been raised before the learned Single Judge, such a new objection should not be allowed to be entertained in the Letters Patent Appeal. 9. In view of decisions of the Apex Court as well as the view taken by various High Courts, we are of the opinion that the petitioner/husband himself is responsible for not raising the objection with regard to jurisdiction at the inception and he allowed the trial by his own conduct to proceed ex parte. The petitioner/husband, therefore, cannot be heard for the first time in Letters Patent Appeal on the question of jurisdiction. 10. The petitioner/husband, therefore, cannot be heard for the first time in Letters Patent Appeal on the question of jurisdiction. 10. Coming to the question whether the appellant had got sufficient opportunity or not, to produce his witnesses or to cross-examine the witnesses produced by the wife, learned single Judge has examined the matter in detail and we also find that first ex parte decree which was passed was set aside by the trial Court and the husband appellant was given opportunity to further examine the witnesses or cross-examine the witnesses produced on behalf of the wife, but he did not avail of that opportunity also and for one reason or the other tried to seek adjournments to delay the agony of the wife. We are therefore, satisfied that the husband had been afforded adequate opportunity to contest the case but he did not avail of the same for which he has to blame himself. Learned counsel for the appellant/husband also submitted that in fact, as per allegations of the wife, the husband has already entered into second marriage and the present marriage is completely broken, therefore, no purpose would be served in restoring the conjugal rights. Our attention was invited to the decision of this Court in the case of Baburao v. Sushila Bai 1963 MPLJ 426 : AIR 1964 MP 73 wherein their Lordships have considered the scope of Section 9. It is observed that it is the discretion of the Court whether to grant or not to grant a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. Learned counsel for the appellant/husband submitted that the marriage has irretrievably broken down and as per allegations of the wife that the second marriage has been contracted by the appellant/husband, therefore, no useful purpose would be served in affirming the decree of restitution of conjugal rights. It is true that it is a discretion of the Court whether to grant a decree of restitution of conjugal rights or not, but in the present case, we need not to go into this question and we are satisfied that the act of the appellant/husband was reprehensible and he himself is responsible for the problem created by him and he can not be permitted to be given benefit of his own wrong. It is he who deserted his wife, therefore, the wife has a right to seek redress of her grievance. It is he who deserted his wife, therefore, the wife has a right to seek redress of her grievance. We are not going to exercise our discretion in favour of the husband looking to his conduct. Consequently, we overrule this submission also. 11. As a result, we do not find any merit in this appeal which is dismissed. There shall be no order as to cost.