Honble GUPTA, J.–This misc. petition is directed against the order dt. 30.6.98 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge No.3, Udaipur whereby he, accepting the appeal of the petitioner, set aside his conviction and sentence u/S. 7/16 P.F. Act, but ordered his retrial by the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate. (2). The relevant facts to decide the misc. petition are these: Shri Gauri Shan- ker, Food Inspector purchased sample of ground-nut oil from the petitioner for analysis on 4.5.90 and sent it to the Public Analyst, who opined that the sample was adulterated as it did not conform to the prescribed standard of purity. After obtaining sanction for prosecution, the Food Inspector filed complaint against the petitioner. The learned Magistrate recorded the statement of the Food Inspector and framed a charge under Section 16 read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Thereafter the remaining prosecution witnesses were examined. The accused petitioner led evidence in defence. After hearing the counsel for the parties, the learned ACJM convicted and sentenced the petitioner to undergo 6 months S.I. and pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-. The conviction was challenged by the peti- tioner by preferring appeal before the learned Sessions Judge, Udaipur. The appeal was heard by the Addl. Sessions Judge No.3 Udaipur who in the impugned order held that it was mandatory for the Magistrate to follow procedure of summary trial and as the trial was not held in summary manner the conviction was not sustainable. He, therefore, set aside the conviction but directed the retrial of the petitioner. (3). Mr. Mehta, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the petitioner was entitled to acquittal as he had already suffered a lot. In support of this contention, he cited the case of Ramdayal vs. State of Rajasthan (1). (4). The learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, submitted that as the entire evidence had already been recorded, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge should have decided the appeal on merits. (5). I have considered the above arguments. Section 16A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 provides that the offences under Sub-section (1) of Sec- tion 16 shall be tried in summary way. The offence under which the petitioner was tried falls in sub-section (1) of Section 16, was not disputed at the time of arguments. A perusal of the record shows that the Addl. Section 16A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 provides that the offences under Sub-section (1) of Sec- tion 16 shall be tried in summary way. The offence under which the petitioner was tried falls in sub-section (1) of Section 16, was not disputed at the time of arguments. A perusal of the record shows that the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate had tried the case by following the procedure provided for a warrant case instituted otherwise than on police report. (6). The question to be considered is whether on the ground that the trial of the offence was not held in a summary way, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge was justified in quashing the proceedings and directing a retrial. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shyam Sunder Modi vs. State of Raj. (2) has considered the effect of trial by warrant procedure for an offence which ought to have been tried in a summary way. Their lordships have held that if the trial is complete and conviction is recorded, the error should be considered as an `irregularity and not an `illegality. It has been observed that after the conviction is recorded, the procee- dings can be quashed if it is shown to the Court that prejudice has been caused to the accused because of courts failure to try the case summarily. It is profitable to read the observations of their lordships at page 118 of the report hereunder:- ``Thus, in other words the Legislature in its own wisdom empowered the courts to try the accused both, by following the procedure of summary trial and for warrant trial. In normal course he has no option left to try all the cases when the offences are one under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 16 of the Act and if without recording the reason he proceeds with the trial, the trial is illegal: accused has a right to object the continuance of trial as a warrant case and the proceedings are bound to be quashed till the trial is not over. But in cases where the conviction is recorded and sentence is passed, in our humble opinion, ques- tion of prejudice will have to be looked into. Provisions of summary proceedings have been provided for early disposal of the cases. But in cases where the conviction is recorded and sentence is passed, in our humble opinion, ques- tion of prejudice will have to be looked into. Provisions of summary proceedings have been provided for early disposal of the cases. At times it is to the disadvantage of the accused as he has better chances of defence in a procedure followed by warrant trial procedure. In case sentence passed against the accused is one which is beyond the scope of what could be imposed by the Magistrate empowered to try the cases summarily by following the summary trial procedure then ex facie there is a prejudice writ large. There may be other instances also of showing the prejudice but in case no prejudice is caused and the accused has faced a protracted trial, in our opinion, it will be too late for him to challenge the trial on the ground that summary procedure has not been followed. Thus, distinction has to be drawn in cases prior to conviction and post-conviction. Prior to conviction we have no hesitation in holding that there is an absolute bar and the offences under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 16 of the Act, are to be tried in a summary manner only, provided the Magistrate does not come to the conclusion that nature of the case requires sentence exceeding one year to be passed in the case and secondly for any other reason to be mentioned during the process of the trial. But regarding the part of quashing the proceedings, in our opinion, there is no absolute bar as there are enabling provisions as mentioned above, in certain given circumstances and given cases. But regarding the part of quashing the proceedings, in our opinion, there is no absolute bar as there are enabling provisions as mentioned above, in certain given circumstances and given cases. Therefore, post conviction for quashing the proceedings in cases where sentence for imprisonment exceeding one year has not been passed, it will be essential for the court to insist on the accused to show that prejudice has been caused to him because of courts failure to try the case summarily and this prejudice has to be looked into the light of the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. vs. Bhagwat Kishore Joshi (1964 SC 2211), Punjab and Haryana High Court itself in Subhash Chand vs. State of Haryana : 1991(2) FAC 113 held that no prejudice was caused to the accused by adopting warrant case procedure instead of summary procedure as the trial court committed irregularity and not illegality: hence conviction was sustainable. Even in cases where the trials are held in accordance with Chapter XXI of the Code of Criminal Procedure. When during the course of summary trial if the Magistrate thinks that it would be more appropriate to try the accused on the regular side. Sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 260 Cr.P.C. enables him to do so. Thus, for the purpose of giving interpretation to the provisions of Sec. 16A of the Act, in our opinion, after conviction, the error is to be considered as `Irregularity and not `Illegality. (7). The legal position that has emerged out is that law mandates the trial of the offence falling under sub-sec. (1) of Section 16 of the Act in summary way and the accused has a right to object the continuance of the trial as a warrant case, but once the trial is complete and the conviction is recorded the error is to be consid- ered as an `irregularity and not `illegality. In view of the decision of the Division Bench, it cannot be proper to acquit the petitioner on the basis of Single Bench ruling of Ramdayal (supra). (8). The fact remains that if an accused is convicted under Section 16(1) of P.F. Act after following the procedure meant for warrant case, he can succeed if he satisfies the court that prejudice was caused to him by not following the summary procedure. It was therefore, incumbent for the learned Addl. (8). The fact remains that if an accused is convicted under Section 16(1) of P.F. Act after following the procedure meant for warrant case, he can succeed if he satisfies the court that prejudice was caused to him by not following the summary procedure. It was therefore, incumbent for the learned Addl. Sessions Judge to have decided the appeal on merits keeping in view the plea of prejudice if raised before him. The order of learned Addl. Sessions Judge, being not sustainable, is liable to be set aside. (9). Consequently, the petition succeeds in part. The impugned order of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge is set aside. He is directed to decide the appeal on merits.