JUDGMENT 1. This appeal under Section 100 C.P.C. has been directed against the judgment and decree dated 2-2-93 by Second Additional District Judge, Raipur in Civil Appeal No. 25-A/87 affirming the judgment and decree dated 10-11-87 by Fourth Civil Judge, Class-II, Raipur in Civil Suit No. 60-A/86 decreeing the suit under Order 8 Rule 10 C.P.C. in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents. 2. The original plaintiff Sunderlal, the predecessor of present respondents filed a suit for eviction under Section 12 (1) (a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter mentioned as the 'Act' for short) for eviction of the defendant/appellant from the suit premises, bearing Municipal house No. 15/552 situate at Malviya Road, Raipur. It was alleged that the house was let out by the original plaintiff Sunderlal to the defendant/appellant on a monthly rent of Rs. 210/-. The defendant did not pay rent from 1-4-85 to 30-9-86. Hence, a demand-cum-quit notice dated 16-8-86 demanding the arrears and terminating the tenancy of the defendant/appellant on the expiry of 30-9-86 was sent, which was served on the defendant/appellant on 28-8-86. He failed to pay rent within two months after the receipt of notice, hence the suit for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent, mesne profit, etc., was filed. 3. The Trial Court granted the defendant opportunities to file written statement. On his failure to comply, a decree under Order 8 Rule 10 C.P.C. was passed by the Trial Court. The defendant preferred appeal against the said judgment and decree, which has been dismissed by the impugned judgment. 4. This second appeal has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law : "(1) Whether, the decree passed under Section 12 (1) (a) of the Accommodation Control Act against the appellant/tenant is in accordance with law ? (2) Whether, the delay, if any, in depositing the arrears of rent and monthly rent under Section 13 of the Act is liable to be condoned and I.A. No. 2247/94 filed for the purposes is liable to be allowed ?" 5. Learned counsel for appellant has urged that the defendant/tenant was from the inception alleging that he had entered into an agreement with the plaintiff/landlord for the purchase of suit house and the defendant/appellant also filed a Civil Suit No. 25-A/85 before the District Judge for specific performance of the said agreement. Learned counsel for appellant has urged that the defendant/tenant was from the inception alleging that he had entered into an agreement with the plaintiff/landlord for the purchase of suit house and the defendant/appellant also filed a Civil Suit No. 25-A/85 before the District Judge for specific performance of the said agreement. In view of the above, he bonafide prayed for time to file written statement. It has also been urged that the defendant ought to have been granted time for filing written statement and to put up his case. It was also urged that the Trial Court could not have passed the decree without recording the plaintiff's evidence in order to substantiate his case. 6. It was further submitted by the learned counsel for appellant that since the defendant/appellant has already deposited all the arrears of rent, his application filed in this Court I.A. No. 2247/94 for condonation of delay in depositing the rent may be allowed, and benefit under Section 12 (3) of the Act may be accorded to him. It may be mentioned that another application I.A. No. 3475/99 dated 1-5-99 has been filed in this appeal, in which it has been stated that defendant/appellant was under the bonafide impression though mistaken, that in view of the agreement to purchase suit house, the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties ceased to exist and therefore, he was not under an obligation to pay or to deposit rent in compliance of Section 13 (1) of the Act. It has therefore been prayed that since subsequent to the passing of decree by the trial Court the defendant has deposited all the rent, the delay in depositing the same be condoned. Learned counsel in this regard has placed reliance on Kamla Devi v. Vasdev ( AIR 1995 SC 985 ), Manoharlal v. Abdul Mazidkhan ( 1997 (1) M.P.L.J. 232 ), Khuman Singh v. Nathuram (1991 J.L.J. 348) and Phoolchand v. Chhotelal (1990 J.L.J. 434). 7. As against this, the learned counsel for respondent/landlord has urged that the Trial Court granted several opportunities to the defendant/tenant to file his written statement. However, he failed to avail of the same and continued filing applications on one ground or the other. 7. As against this, the learned counsel for respondent/landlord has urged that the Trial Court granted several opportunities to the defendant/tenant to file his written statement. However, he failed to avail of the same and continued filing applications on one ground or the other. It has therefore been urged that the Trial Court was wholly justified in pronouncing judgment in exercise of its discretion under Order 8 Rule 10 C.P.C. In this connection reliance has been placed on the Modula India v. Kamakshya Singh Deo ( AIR 1989 SC 162 ) and Mathew Electrical (Evengical) and Anr. v. The Nagpur Roman Catholic Diocasan Corporation (P) Ltd. (1997 II M.P.W.N. 443). It has been pointed out by the learned counsel for respondent that the defendant/tenant also did not deposit rent in the Trial Court in compliance of Section 13 (1) of the Act, and continued to insist that he may be exempted from doing so. In view of the callous indifference shown by the defendant in depositing rent as per provisions of Section 13 (1) of the Act; he was not entitled to get benefit under Section 12 (3) of the Act. 8. In view of the above rival contentions, it is first to be considered as to whether the Trial Court was justified in taking recourse to Order 8 Rule 10 of C.P.C. and passing a decree against the defendant under Section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. 9. To properly appreciate the circumstances leading to the passing of the decree by the Trial Court, it would be useful to consider the progress of the suit, from its inception, in the Trial Court. 10. The suit was filed on 17-11-86. It was registered on 19-11-86 by the Trial Court and notice for settlement of issues was issued. On 1-4-87, the defendant entered appearance through counsel, and on his prayer time was granted to file written statement to him. The case was fixed for 15-4-87. On the said date, i.e., 15-4-87 written statement was not filed by the defendant and instead two applications- one under Order 8 Rule 1 read with Section 151 of C.P.C. and another under Section 13 (1) (2) of the Act marked as I.A. No. 1 and I.A. No. 2 respectively were filed on behalf of the defendant. On the said date, i.e., 15-4-87 written statement was not filed by the defendant and instead two applications- one under Order 8 Rule 1 read with Section 151 of C.P.C. and another under Section 13 (1) (2) of the Act marked as I.A. No. 1 and I.A. No. 2 respectively were filed on behalf of the defendant. It was stated in application I.A. No. 1 under Order 8 Rule 1 read with Section 151 of C.P.C. that the plaintiff Sunderlal had entered into an agreement dated 24-7-87, with the defendant/tenant for the sale of the suit house and that the defendant had also filed a suit, registered as Civil Suit No. 25-A/85, in the Court of District Judge, Raipur, for the specific performance of the said agreement. It was therefore prayed in the said application that the defendant may be granted liberty not to file the written statement till the above Civil Suit for specific performance was decided. 11. In the other application I.A. No. 2 filed under Section 13(1) (2) of the Act, it was stated that in view of the above agreement between the parties for the purchase of the house by the defendant, the plaintiff Sunderlal was not entitled to recover rent from the date of agreement, i.e., from 24-7-85; and therefore the defendant/tenant may be excepted from depositing the rent in compliance of Section 13 (1) of the Act. 12. The Trial Court directed the plaintiff to file the reply of the said applications. It appears from the order sheets of the Trial Court that the matter was adjourned from time to time for consideration of the said applications I.A. No. 1 and I.A. No. 2. On 14-9-87 after hearing parties on I.A. No. 1 and I.A. No. 2, the said applications were dismissed and the case was fixed for further hearing on 25-9-87. 13. Obviously in view of the dismissal of his applications praying for time to file written statement as also to comply with Section 13 (1) of the Act, the defendant/tenant was under an obligation to file his written statement and also to deposit all the arrears of rent or to seek extension of time therefor, as provided under Section 13 (1) of the Act. However the defendant did not take recourse to either of the above steps and neither did he file the written statement, nor deposited the arrears of rent. However the defendant did not take recourse to either of the above steps and neither did he file the written statement, nor deposited the arrears of rent. However, on the next date, i.e., on 25-9-87 the defendant was again granted time by the Trial Court, to file written statement and the case was fixed for 15-10-87. 14. On 15-10-87 the written statement was again not filed by the defendant and instead an application under Order 8 Rule 10 C.P.C. was filed, which was marked as I.A. No. 3. In the said application it was stated that the defendant has filed a revision against the aforementioned order dated 14-9-87 of the Trial Court and the defendant may be granted time to file written statement, till the decision of the revision. The Trial Court by its order dated 15-10-87 dismissed the said application I.A. No. 3. 15. However, on the above date i.e., 15-10-87, time was once again granted to the defendant to file written statement with the specific direction that in case the defendant failed to file written statement, recourse will be taken to Order 8 Rule 10 of C.P.C.. The case was then fixed for 26-10-87. The defendant, however again did not file written statement on 26-10-87 also and instead chose to file an application under Section 10 read with Section 151 of C.P.C., marked as I.A. No. 4, reiterating that he has entered into an agreement for purchase of the suit house and that he has filed a suit before the District Judge for specific performance of the said agreement. He also stated in the application that he has also filed a revision against the order dismissing his application under Section 13 (1) of the Act. The defendant therefore prayed that in view of Civil Suit No. 25-A/85 filed by him, the suit for eviction filed by Sunderlal be stayed. The said application I.A. No. 4 was fixed for consideration on 27-10-87 and the defendant was further directed to file his written statement by that date. It appears that the defendant did not comply with the said order and failed to file his written statement. The case was thereafter adjourned for a few dates and by order dated 10-11-87 the said application I.A. No. 4 under Section 10 read with Section 151 of C.P.C. was dismissed. It appears that the defendant did not comply with the said order and failed to file his written statement. The case was thereafter adjourned for a few dates and by order dated 10-11-87 the said application I.A. No. 4 under Section 10 read with Section 151 of C.P.C. was dismissed. It was also observed in the order dated 10-11-87 that in view of the failure of defendant to file written statement, recourse is being taken to the provision of Order 8 Rule 10 C.P.C. and a separate judgment decreeing the suit of plaintiff was delivered. 16. From the above it is clear that the defendant though entered appearance through his counsel as early as on 1-4-87 and was granted time to file written statement. However, subsequently on that date and several times, thereafter instead of filing written statement he repeatedly filed applications asserting that in view of the agreement entered by him for the purchase of the house with the plaintiff Sunderlal and in view of a Civil Suit filed by him for specific performance of the said agreement, he be granted exemption from filing written statement till the decision of the said suit. Similarly he also claimed exemption from payment and depositing rent in compliance of Section 13 (1) of the Act. Despite the dismissal of the above applications and despite further opportunities granted to the defendant/tenant to file written statement by the Trial Court, he persisted to commit default and did not file written statement. 17. It is therefore obvious that the defendant did not comply with the specific directions to file written statement and failed to file the same despite several opportunities granted to him in this regard. It may be noticed that even assuming that the defendant had entered into an agreement with the plaintiff for the purchase of house, even then the relationship of landlord and tenant would not automatically come to an end, as was his stand. Therefore, merely because the defendant claimed the existence of alleged agreement or had filed a suit for specific performance thereof, it would not constitute justifiable ground for him not to file written statement. 18. Clearly therefore, as the defendant continued to dis-regard the repeated orders of the Trial Court to file written statement; the Trial Court was wholly justified in granting a decree under Order 8 Rule 10 of C.P.C. against him. 18. Clearly therefore, as the defendant continued to dis-regard the repeated orders of the Trial Court to file written statement; the Trial Court was wholly justified in granting a decree under Order 8 Rule 10 of C.P.C. against him. In the circumstances as above, the discretion vested in the Trial Court does not seem to have been wrongly exercised. The submission of the learned counsel for the defendant/appellant that the Trial Court could not have passed the decree without recording plaintiff's evidence doesn't appear to be justified. It is clear from the language of Order 8 Rule 10 C.P.C. that where any party from whom written statement is required under Rule 1 or 9 fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the Court, the Court can pronounce judgment against him. Therefore, the Court can in the exercise of its discretion has the power to straightway pronounce judgment, in case of failure of the defendant to file written statement. Therefore, the contention as above of the learned counsel for defendant/appellant that, even if the defendant defaulted in filing written statement, the Trial Court had no power to pronounce judgment, without recording the plaintiff's evidence, does not deserve to be accepted. 19. In case of Modula India (supra) the Supreme Court has observed that under Order 8 Rule 10 C.P.C. there is an option with the Court either to pronounce judgment on the basis of the plaint against the defendant or to make such other appropriate order as the Court may think fit. It was further observed that under the said provision it is not mandatory for the Court to pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff straightway because a written statement has not been filed, and that even in case the written statement is not filed, it is for the Court to exercise a discretion as to the manner in which the further proceedings in the case shall take place. From the above pronouncement it would appear that the Court can in the exercise of its discretion, pronounce judgment under Order 8 Rule 10 C.P.C. on failure of the defendant to file written statement. 20. Similarly, in Mathew Electrical (Evengical) and another (supra) the Division Bench of this Court has ruled that under Order 8 Rule 1 C.P.C. the Court has the power to pronounce judgment. 20. Similarly, in Mathew Electrical (Evengical) and another (supra) the Division Bench of this Court has ruled that under Order 8 Rule 1 C.P.C. the Court has the power to pronounce judgment. It has been observed that : "The net result of these provisions is that the defendant must, under Sub-rule (1) of Order VIII CPC, file his written statement within the time allowed for this purpose by the Court; on failure of the defendant to file the written statement within the time allowed, the Court has the power to pronounce judgment against him for mere non-filing of the written statement; the Court has, however, a discretion in the matter to be exercised judicially on the facts of each case and it is not incumbent on the Court to pronounce judgment against the defendant simply because he has failed to file the written statement as required under Rule 1; the Court in its discretion is empowered to make any order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit when such a situation arises; the Court can in its discretion even grant a further adjournment for filing the written statement and when the Court does not consider it a fit case for grant of further time to file the written statement; any other order which the Court considers proper in a particular case can be passed; such other order after refusing further time to file the written statement, may even be of requiring the plaintiff to prove the plaint averments notwithstanding the absence of the written statement, as laid down in Sub-rule (2) of Rule 5." 21. In case of J.B. Exports Pvt. Ltd. v. J.C. Mills (1992 (1) M.P.J.R. 133) a single bench of this Court has observed that no hard and fast rule can be laid down for the exercise of discretion under Order 8 Rule 10 C.P.C.. It has further been observed therein that Order 8 Rule 10 C.P.C. enables the Court to adopt either of the two courses envisaged by the rule namely either to pronounce judgment or to pass such orders as it thinks fit. 22. It has further been observed therein that Order 8 Rule 10 C.P.C. enables the Court to adopt either of the two courses envisaged by the rule namely either to pronounce judgment or to pass such orders as it thinks fit. 22. Thus, it is clear that the Trial Court is not precluded to pronounce judgment straightway in exercise of discretionary powers under Order 8 Rule 10 C.P.C., in case of failure of the defendant to file the written statement within the time granted to him for doing so; though the Court has also the discretion not to do so and to pass such orders in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. 23. In the instant case as noted above, since the defendant persistently defaulted in filing written statement, despite several opportunities granted to him for the purpose; the discretion exercised by the Trial Court in pronouncing the judgment straightway under Order 8 Rule 10 C.P.C. cannot be said to be unjustified and discretion exercised as above does not call for any interference. 24. Therefore the decree granted by both the Courts below in favour of plaintiff/respondent under Section 12 (1) (a) of the Act was in accordance with law. 25. The other contention of the learned counsel for appellant/tenant was that since he has deposited the rent after passing of the decree by the Trial Court, benefit under Section 12 (3) of the Act should be given to him and decree under Section 12 (1) (a) of the Act, deserves to be set aside. 26. It may be noted in the above context that despite several opportunities, the defendant/appellant did not deposit the rent in compliance of Section 13 (1) of the Act and instead continued filing applications I.A. No. 3 and I.A. No. 4 claiming exemption from compliance under Section 13 (1) of the Act; in view of the alleged agreement of purchase of suit house entered into by him with the plaintiff/landlord. As already mentioned firstly, the relationship of landlord and tenant did not come to an end even assuming such an agreement existed between the parties. Moreover, if the defendant/tenant desired to avail of benefit under Section 12 (3) of the Act, it was obligatory on his part to comply with Section 13 (1) of the Act. As already mentioned firstly, the relationship of landlord and tenant did not come to an end even assuming such an agreement existed between the parties. Moreover, if the defendant/tenant desired to avail of benefit under Section 12 (3) of the Act, it was obligatory on his part to comply with Section 13 (1) of the Act. Having failed to do so, he cannot after passing of the decree, claim benefit under Section 12 (3) of the Act. It may be noticed that he does not appear to have filed any application in the Trial Court or in the lower appellate Court, under Section 13 (1) of the Act for extension of time. Therefore, merely depositing the rent after the decree by the Trial Court was passed, would not entitle him to the privilege under Section 12 (3) of the Act. 27. In Kamla Devi's case (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for appellant, which was a case under Section 15(1) and 15(7) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, which are similar to provisions under Section 13 of the Act, it was held that the penal consequence under Section 15(1) of the Act afforded discretionary power in the Rent Controller in the matter of striking out of defence. It was further observed that it was not obligatory for the Rent Controller to strike out the defence under Section 15(7) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, if the tenant fails to make payment or deposit rent, as provided under Section 15(1) of the said Act. 28. However, in the instant case the position is entirely different and the question of striking out of defence is not involved. As noticed earlier, the matter in the instant case relates to passing of decree under Section 12 (1) (a) of the Act, as there was non-compliance of Section 13 (1) of the Act. 29. Learned counsel for appellant/tenant has also cited the case of Phoolchand (supra). However, the same stands overruled by the decision of Division Bench of this Court in case of Nathibai v. Maheshwari Samaj (1996 J.L.J. 368). 30. In Khuman Singh's case (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for appellant, the dispute raised under Section 13 (2) of the Act regarding the amount of rent was not decided and since the whole amount of rent was deposited in that case, the delay in depositing the rent was condoned. 30. In Khuman Singh's case (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for appellant, the dispute raised under Section 13 (2) of the Act regarding the amount of rent was not decided and since the whole amount of rent was deposited in that case, the delay in depositing the rent was condoned. It is therefore clear that the facts of that case have no application to the facts of the case in hand. 31. Similarly, in the case of Manoharlal (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for defendant/appellant, the tenant had already deposited rent and it was held that the delay would not cause any material injury to the landlord. Therefore, the discretion to condone delay was held to be rightly exercised. It was observed therein that the question, whether to strike out the defence or not of the tenant is a matter of discretion with the Court, before which the application for condonation of delay is filed. 32. In the instant case, as the defendant/appellant did not file any application for condonation of delay in depositing the rent and instead made successive applications claiming exemption from depositing the rent in compliance of Section 13 (1) of the Act. The said applications were found to be filed on mis-conceived grounds. Therefore, even if the defendant after passing of the decree deposited the rent, is not entitled to get the benefit of Section 12 (3) of the Act, as has been rightly held by the learned lower appellate Court. In the foregoing circumstances, the applications I.A. No. 2247/94 as also I.A. No. 3475/99 do not deserve to be allowed and the delay in depositing the rent does not deserve to be condoned. 33. Accordingly, the decree granted under Section 12 (1) (a) of the Act docs not call for any interference. The appeal has no merit, the same is accordingly dismissed. The parties in the circumstances of the case however are left to bear their own costs.