Honble SINGH, J.–Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondents. (2). The main contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the amount of compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal on account of loss of affection and shock caused by death to the husband, daughters and the son is excessive. The submission advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant on the basis of the above contention is that even if an appeal by the Insurance Company is not maintainable in view of Sec. 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988, this Court can admit the appeal in order to undo miscarriage of justice caused by awarding excessive compensation by the tribunal. (3). On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that in the instant case the appellant did not seek any permission under Sec. 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, therefore, in view of the provisions contained in Sec. 149 of the aforesaid Act the appellant cannot challenge the award on any grounds other than the grounds mentioned in Sec. 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In support of his submission the learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the following judgments:- (4). In British India General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Captain Itbar Singh and others (1), the Honble Supreme Court held that in view of the provisions contained in sub-sec.(2) of Sec. 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 an insurer is entitled to defend on any of the grounds enumerated in the Section and no others. It was further held that when the grounds of defence have been specified, they cannot be added to. To do that would be adding words to the statute. (5). In Narendra Kumar and another vs. Yarenissa and others (2), the Honble Supreme Court held that once the opportunity is made available to the Insurance Company, the insurer shall not be entitled to avoid his liability to any person entitled to the benefit of such judgment otherwise than in the manner provided in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939. (6). In Shankarayya and another vs. United India Insurance Co. (2) of Sec. 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939. (6). In Shankarayya and another vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and another (3), the Honble Supreme Court held that the Insurance Company when impleaded as a party by the Court can be permitted to contest the proceedings on merits, only if the conditions precedent mentioned in the Section (170) are found to be satisfied and for that purpose, the Insurance Company is to obtain an order in writing from the Tribunal and which should be a reasoned order by the Tribunal. Unless that procedure is followed, the Insurance Company cannot have a wider defence on merits than what is available to it by way of statutory provisions. (7). In the instant case, the learned counsel for the appellant has admitted that the appellant did not seek any permission under Sec. 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Hence in view of the provisions contained in Sec. 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act the Insurance Company cannot take any defence other than the defences permissible to it under sub-sec.(2) of Sec. 149 of the said Act. (8). Consequently, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that in the present case the appeal filed by the Insurance Company is not maintainable. (9). The second contention that even if the appeal is not maintainable, this Court should interfere because amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal on account of loss of affection to the husband, minor daughters and son is excessive is concerned, I am afraid the contention of learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted. Firstly, because the provisions of Sec. 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act does not permit the Insurance Company to take any defence other than those enumerated in Sec. 149 (2) of the aforesaid Act unless permission has been given by the Court under Sec. 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Secondly, even if it were open for the Court to interfere with the award given by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal on the ground that the award is highly excessive, I do not think it is a fit case in which such a power should be exercised. (10). For the reasons mentioned above, the appeal is rejected at admission stage.