JUDGMENT D. RAJU, C. J.—The above appeal has been filed by the plaintiff in Civil Suit No. 119 of 1986 on the file of the learned Senior Sub-Judge, Kullu, who lost before both the Courts below against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Kullu dated 3.5.1993 in Civil Appeal No. 29/89 whereunder the learned First Appellate Judge while affirming the judgments of the learned trial Judge dismissed the appeal thereby confirming the dismissal of the suit filed for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the alleged peaceful enjoyment, ownership and possession of the plaintiff in the land shown on the back of mutation No. 1182 of Phati Ratocha sanctioned and attested on 5.6.1984 referred to hereinafter as the suit land and for recovery of Rs. 29,750/- by way of damages with an alternative relief for recovery of possession. According to the plaintiff the suit land was allotted to him in Nautor by Rai Mohinder Singh and thereafter mutation No. 1182 dated 5.6.1984 was attested in his name and as such he had been in ownership and possession of the land since 28.2.1969 when it was said to have been allotted to him in Nautor. The plaintiff also claimed to be one of the Bartandar of Phati Ratocha prior to 1911-12 and asserted his claim as such with a further claim that the suit land was allotted to him and as a consequence thereof mutation was attested in his favour by the District Revenue Officer, Kullu on 5.6.1984. It is the grievance of the plaintiff that the defendants actuated with malice and in a clandestine manner managed to secure the permission of the Collector, Sub-Division, Kullu dated 29.6.1984 for the review of the above mutation but the said mutation has neither been reviewed nor cancelled till the date of the filing of the suit at any rate. It was also alleged by the plaintiff that on the night intervening 27/28.3.1986, the defendants committed criminal trespass into the suit land and cut, removed and damage 250 apple and pear trees of the age of 1 to 7 years and again on 29.3.1986 cut, damaged and removed 30 more apple and pear trees causing thereby a monetary loss to the tune of Rs. 29,550/- and it is with such claim and grievance, the plaintiff has approached the trial Court for the reliefs noticed supra. 29,550/- and it is with such claim and grievance, the plaintiff has approached the trial Court for the reliefs noticed supra. The defendants filed a written statement contesting the claim of the plaintiff that the suit itself was not maintainable for the reason that the plaintiff was neither in possession of the suit land nor he had any interest in it and that even Rai Mohinder Singh had no right or title or interest and authority to grant Nautor in the area where the suit land was situated because according to the defendants, though the Sanad granted to him had been even revoked on 23.1.1960, whereas the rights as Jagirdar to allot Nautor had been extinguished even under (the Punjab) Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1957. A plea of bar of limitation as also the defect of non-joinder of all necessary parties has also been raised. The further plea of the defendants appears to have been that the suit land is Banjar land and nothing has been cultivated upon it and, therefore, there was no question of cutting, removing or damaging the trees from the suit land and consequently the plaintiff is not entitled to recover any amount towards the damages for any alleged wrongful loss as claimed. The defendants in their turn asserted and claimed right, as right holders, in the area and that they have a right on the suit land as such right holders. 2. On the above claims and counter claims so made before the learned trial Judge, the suit came to be tried after framing issues. Among other things, an issue has been framed as to whether the plaintiff is owner in possession of the suit land in terms of the claim made and the pleadings filed on behalf of the plaintiff, placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff in this regard, the other issue being as to whether the plaintiff is entitled for recovery of possession or prohibitory injunction, as prayed for. An issue has also been raised in the teeth of the claim about the grant under the Nautor by Rai Mohinder Singh by the plaintiff as to whether Rai Mohinder Singh had any right to make a grant in Nautor to the plaintiff and whether the alleged Patta granted on 28.2.1989 was fraudulently given on back date, viz., ante dating it as alleged, as contended by the defendants and the onus of proof in this regard has been placed on the defendnats. The learned trial Judge after considering the oral and documentary evidence on record, recorded a categorical factual finding that the possession of the suit land never remained with the plaintiff and that he has tried to prove his case by procuring false witnesses. In coming to such a conclusion, the learned trial Judge appears to have placed reliance upon the admission said to have been made even by Rai Mohinder Singh himself that though he has issued Patta he had not delivered possession of the property to the plaintiff on the spot. In view of the above and in teeth of, certain inherent infirmities pointed out in the matter of very want1 or lack of power on the said Rai Mohinder Singh himself to grant the land in Nautor as also the non-compliance with the relevant procedure, the learned trial Judge also was of the view that the plaintiff cannot be considered as owner of the suit land and that he never exercised domain over the suit land. As a consequence thereof the plaintiffs claim for damages also was rejected and the suit came to be dismissed. 3. Aggrieved, the plaintiff pursued the matter on appeal before the District Court, Kullu in Civil Appeal No. 29/89 and the learned Additional District Judge, Kullu by his judgment and decree dated 3.5.1993, after undertaking an elaborate consideration of the matter concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Judge by giving his own reasons further in support of the factual findings recorded by the learned trial Judge. It appears that the plaintiff has invoked the powers of the First Appellate Court under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for letting in an additional evidence by means of producing a copy of the judgment of this Court dated 13.5.1991 in C.W.P. No. 4/91, which on a consideration made by the learned First Appellate Judge, was considered to be not relevant to the point in issue. Consequently, the appeal also came to be dismissed necessitating the filing of the above second appeal before this Court. 4. The learned Counsel for the appellant while pursuing the substantial questions of law formulated in the appeal contended that the grant made by Rai Mohinder Singh of Rupi under Ex. PW-8/A, which according to the appellant has been duly incorporated in the revenue record after the issuance of Patta, could not be interfered with or revoked and that on a proper construction of the provisions of the Nautor Rules and the provisions of the Constitution, as Rai of Rupi, Rai Mohinder Singh was competent to issue the Nautor and Patta in question and consequently the Courts below ought, to have accorded the relief of prohibitory injunction sought for to protect the possession of the appellant. Incidentally, the learned Counsel for the appellant also invited my attention to the decision of this Court in C.W.P. No. 4/91 to contend that, if at all, the Sanad granted to the Jagirdar of Rupi, who was known as Rai came to be finally revoked only on 10.1.1972 and that any orders of grant of Nautor made by the said Rai, as Jagirdar of Rupi cannot be said to be without the authority of law or illegal and consequently the ownership of the appellant could not be disputed seriously in this proceeding, and the conclusions arrived at to the contra by the Courts below are not sustainable in law. 5. Per contra, Mr. D.D. Sood, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents while adopting the reasons assigned by the learned First Appellate Judge in affirming the judgment of the learned trial Judge also contended that the concurrent factual findings recorded by the Courts below are based on relevant materials placed on record and no objection could be taken or infirmity could be pointed out successfully in them so as to dis-lodge such findings and, therefore, there are no merits in the appeal. Argued the learned Senior Counsel further that the judgment of the Division Bench in C.W.P. No. 4/ 91 has been rightly construed and held by the learned First Appellate Judge to be not relevant for the purpose having regard to the character of the land in question over which there was taboo or restriction on the Jagirdar in question to give the land in Nautor even when there was Sanad in force and, therefore, there is no merit in the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant as well. In traversing the claim of the plaintiff/appellant that liberties must be left with the plaintiff to vindicate his rights relating to the ownership in respect of the land in a separate suit for the purpose notwithstanding the findings recorded by the Courts below in these proceedings, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents contended that the plaintiff having deliberately and knowingly invited findings of the Courts even on his rights as owner in the course of seeking the relief of prohibitory injunction as well as an alternative relief of recovery of possession, it is not given to the plaintiff to have the luxury of another round of litigation and that the issue adjudicated and decided by the Courts below even incidentally would retain finality and no such liberties should be granted to the plaintiff. 6. The learned Counsel appearing on either side invited my attention extensively to the elaborate consideration undertaken by the Courts below to support their respective stand point. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing on either side. In my view, the grievance made on behalf of the appellant to the concurrent judgments of the Courts below does not carry weight of acceptance. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing on either side. In my view, the grievance made on behalf of the appellant to the concurrent judgments of the Courts below does not carry weight of acceptance. Though I find that the learned trial Judge has undertaken a limited consideration of the issues on the basis of certain glaring factual details starring against the plaintiff made available to non-suit the plaintiff, the learned First Appellate Judge has gone into the matter both on factual aspect as also on the legal position governing the matter, elaborately and extensively and in my view has given substantial, cogent and convincing reasons based on concrete and relevant materials to sustain his findings not only that the plaintiff cannot claim himself to be the owner in possession of the suit land but he had never been put in possession and had never been in possession of the land in question and the Jagirdar of Rupi had no right whatsoever to part with this land in favour of any one under the Nautor grant. It is useful at this stage to advert to some of the sailent factual aspects which has been noticed and found by the learned First Appellate Judge in paragraphs 9 to 22 of the judgment. Except the interested testimony of some of the witnesses on the side of the plaintiff who themselves had to concede during the course of cross-examination on certain vitally important aspects which militated against the genuineness besides also the legality of the so called grant, the materials brought on record on the side of the plaintiff itself seem to belie the claim of possession and the so called improvements made by him by planting and rearing of trees. Such admissions made by PW-1, PW-2, PW-5, PW-7 and PW-8 Jagirdar Rai Mohinder Singh seems to have cut at the root of the very case. As a matter of fact, the version of PW-7 was found to be totally different from the very claim of the plaintiff when he stated that after the Nautor grant the plaintiff had not planted any tree but such plantation of the trees was before such grant, when the plaintiff himself and other witnesses would assert that he planted the trees after the grant and during the period spread over to 6 or 7 years after the Nautor granted in his favour. There is not only a tacit admission by some of the witnesses cited by the plaintiff but the records regularly maintained also indisputably show that the land in question falls under the category of "third class forest" belonging to the State Government and not a mere barren waste land. It is in the said context and in the teeth of the further fact on record in the shape of the notification issued by the Forest Department of the Government in July, 1977 under the Indian Forest Act, 1927 which was marked as Ex. D-4 and the records maintained and produced by DW-12, Accountant of the Forest Department, about the spending of public funds for encircling the area in question and the surrounding areas by fence by the Forest Department that the learned First Appellate Judge has come to categorical conclusion that the category of the land in question was beyond the reach of even the Jagirdar of Rupi for making any grant of Nautor under the Nautor Rules. In this process, the learned First Appellate Judge had made de hors even the provisions of (The Punjab) Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1957, that the very Rules governing the grant of Nautor in the undemarcated waste Jagir of Kullu framed even prior to the independence of India carried insubstance and effect a bar in respect of the lands in Kothi Chong, where the suit land is said to be indisputably situated and Kothi Harkandi to make any grant without the prior permission of the Assistant Commissioner of Kullu. It is on record through evidence in this case that neither the procedural prescription made before invoking the extra ordinary power and discretion vested with the Jagirdar was shown to have been complied with nor the prior permission of the Assistant Commissioner was said to have been obtained and, therefore, by the very restriction and bar imposed on the power of Jagirdar to give this land on Nautor grant which remained un-effected the grant could not have been made at all and, therefore, the claim of the appellant based on the decision of this Court in C.W.P. No. 4/91 or the so called grant the genuineness of which itself in doubt having regard to the patent infirmities pointed out and noticed by the learned First Appellate Judge from the very admissions of the witnesses who were alleged to be connected with such grant does not merit acceptance in my hands and was rejected rightly by the Courts below. The actual date of the grant also seems to be very much shrouded in mystry in this case and the person to whom the grant was attributed has not only himself given or entered the date of grant in the proceedings but a person who was stated to have made such entry has not been examined under the pretext that he was no more and such vitiating circumstances in the teeth of so much of the limitation not only in respect of the character of the land but also with reference to the legislation relating to the resumption of Jagir in question has been rightly relied upon by the learned First Appellate Judge to come to the conclusion that the grant in this case was not shown to have been substantiated or proved to be a genuine or legal one and that no reliance on the same could be placed to claim or assert any rights in court of law. Therefore, the conclusions of the Courts below that the plaintiff cannot be said to be an owner in occupation of the land in question is well merited and does not call for any interference in my hands, being a matter of pure question of fact which has been in my view properly decided on the basis of relevant materials. 7. So far as the claim relating to the possession or possessory rights are concerned the least said is better. 7. So far as the claim relating to the possession or possessory rights are concerned the least said is better. Even Rai Mohinder Singh had to admit while being examined as PW-8 that he had not handed over the possession of the property to the appellant and there is no proper evidence from the plaintiffs side as to how the land was earmarked or identified separated from the large tract or extent and through whom he was able to get possession of this specific item of property in particular. In this connection also the learned First Appellate Judge has chosen to point out the infirmities in the preparation of the so called map which also does not appear to have been properly proved since neither the original is forthcoming nor the so called copy produced had any authentication to vouch its authenticity or genuineness and correctness. In view of this starring facts glaringly against the case pleaded by the appellant, I am unable to find any infirmity whatsoever in the concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below against the plaintiff to non suit him. The findings recorded are not shown to suffer any patent error of law or that they were based on total absence of any evidence or could be said to be vitiated on account of any perverse consideration of the materials. 8. As for the claim made by the learned Counsel for the appellant about the liberties to be left with the plaintiff to vindicate his ownership in a separate and different proceedings, I am afraid I can leave such liberties in this case particularly when not only the plaintiff sought for the relief of merely protecting his possession but specifically prayed for the relief of protecting ownership of the plaintiff and apart from a specific issue being framed by the learned trial Judge, the parties have endeavoured to prove such claim also by the evidence, oral and documentary. Since the plaintiff knowingly and wilfully has invited such a finding by his own pleadings and his conduct in undertaking and attempting to prove such claims and failed, it would not be appropriate or proper to leave with the plaintiff the luxury of another round of litigation. It may be useful to advert to the decision of the Apex Court reported in Sulochana Amma v. Narayanan Nair, (1994) 2 SCC 14, in this regard. It may be useful to advert to the decision of the Apex Court reported in Sulochana Amma v. Narayanan Nair, (1994) 2 SCC 14, in this regard. That was a case wherein the suit was for injunction and incidentally the title was also in issue end when subsequently a suit came to be filed and the plea of resjudicata has been set up, their Lordships of the Apex Court observed that in a suit for injunction when the title is in issue for the purpose of granting injunction, the issue directly and substantially arises in that suit between the parties and when the same issue is put in issue in a later suit based on title between the same parties or their privies, the decree earlier passed, be it in the injunction suit equally operates as res judicata. In view of such declaration of law, it would not be possible for this Court to give any liberties to the plaintiff to re-agitate the question in a separate and different proceeding afresh, all the more so when he sought protection of ownership also in the present suit itself. For all the reasons stated above, the second appeal fails and shall stand dismissed. No costs. Interim order is vacated. Appeal dismissed.