JUDGMENT : P.K. Misra, J. - Plaintiffs are the Appellants. The suit was filed for partition in respect of 'B' Schedule property. The relationship between the parties is revealed from the geneology furnished in Schedule-A of the plaint. From the said geneology it appears that one Paramananda Rout had three sons-Purnananda, Banambar and Banamali and four daughters - Suna, Guna, Moni and Dukhi. Purnananda and Banambar are dead and their widows are Defendant No. 1 and Defendant No. 2 respectively. 'Banamali has died issueless prior to death of Paramananda, Suna, Guna and Moni are dead. Dukhi as Plaintiff No. 1, whereas the legal representatives of Suna are Plaintiffs 2 and 3 and legal representatives of Guna are Plaintiffs 4 and 5. Defendant No. 12 represents the branch of Moni. 2. It is the case of the Plaintiffs that Banamali had predeceased Paramananda. It is fursher claimed that Paramananda died on 15-4-1958 leaving behind two sons, Purnananda and Banambar and three daughters Suna, Guna and Dukhi. Thereafter, Banambar, Suna, Guna and Paramananda passed away successively. It is claimed that the Plaintiffs and Defendants 1 and 2 have inherited the properties -left by Paramananda. It is further claimed that in order to deprive the present Plaintiffs of their legitimate share, Title Suit No. 5161 was collusively filed by present Defendant No. 2 (widow of Banambar) against Purnananda for partition without impleading the present Plaintiffs claiming eight annas share in the properties. In the said suit, a collusive compromise final decree was passed allotting one-third share to present Defendant No. 2 and two-third share to Purnananda, Purnananda and after him his widow (defendant No. 1) have alienated certain properties in favour of Defendants 3 to 9, but the Plaintiffs are not bound by such alienations. Similarly, Defendant No, 2 without any right alienated properties to Defendants 10 and II. 3. Defendant No. 1 in her written statement claimed that Paramananda died on 14-6-1949. The disputed properties were the ancestral properties of Paramananda who was the Karta of the joint family consisting of himself and his sons, Purnananda and Banambar. After death of Paramananda, his sons were entitled to the property and after death of Banambar, Defendant No. 2 being his widow filed Title Suit No. 5/61 claiming partition. The suit was decreed on 13-12-1962 giving one-fourth share to Defendant No. 2, who filed First Appeal No. 26 of 1963 in the High Court. After death of Paramananda, his sons were entitled to the property and after death of Banambar, Defendant No. 2 being his widow filed Title Suit No. 5/61 claiming partition. The suit was decreed on 13-12-1962 giving one-fourth share to Defendant No. 2, who filed First Appeal No. 26 of 1963 in the High Court. The said appeal ended in a compromise allowing one-third share to present Defendant No. 2 and,two-third share to Purnananda and final decree was passed on 25-4-1975. A separate written statement was filed by Defendants 2 and 9 taking similar stand. Alienation in favour of Defendant No. 9 was defended. Similar written statements were filed by Defendant No. 10 and Defendants 3, 4 and 5. Defendant No. 12 in her written statement claimed one-fifth share in the land of Paramananda. 3. On the above pleadings, the following Issues were framed by the trial court: 1. Whether the suit is maintainable in law? 2. Whether the Plaintiffs have got cause of action to bring the suit? 3. Whether Paramananda died on 15-4-1958 or on 14-6-1949 ? 4. Whether the properties in suit are liable for partition? 5. To what relief, if any Plaintiffs are entitled ? 4. While deciding Issue Nos. 3 and 4 together, it was held that Paramananda had expired on 14.6-1949 and not on 15-4.1958 as claimed by the Plaintiffs. In view of such finding, it was held that the Plaintiffs had no right to claim partition as the properties bad devolved upon the sons of Paramananda and the daughters of Paramananda did not have any right. Accordingly the suit was dismissed. 5. In the present appeal at the instance of the Plaintiffs, the main question relates to date of death of Paramananda. The Plaintiffs have also filed two applications almost similar in nature for amendment of the plaint, wherein the Plaintiffs have sought to incorporate new paragraphs is the plaint. In Misc. Case No. 674/99, the Plaintiffs sought for the following amendment: 1(a) In paragraph-1 of the plaint after the words two sons Purnananda. Banambar and before the name of 'Suna' - Chanda widow of the deceased Paramananda' be added. 1 (b) In the paragraph 1 of the plaint after the word 'thereafter' and before the mime 'Banambar' the name 'Chanda' be added. 2. Banambar and before the name of 'Suna' - Chanda widow of the deceased Paramananda' be added. 1 (b) In the paragraph 1 of the plaint after the word 'thereafter' and before the mime 'Banambar' the name 'Chanda' be added. 2. In paragraph 2 of the plaint following sentences shall be added as a sub-para: It is humbly submitted here that the husband of Defendant No. 1 i.e. Purnananda was living separately since 1949 from Paramananda. By amicable arrangements not effecting partition by metes and bounds, Paramananda allotted some properties for his enjoyment. and he was used to living in separate mess and residence. 3. In Schedule 'A' below 'Paramananda' the name of her wife 'Chanda" shall be added. Objection has been filed by Respondent No. 1 objecting to such prayer for amendment. It is stated that if such amendment is allowed, a fresh trial would be necessitated. In Misc. Case No. 780 of 1999, the following amendment has been sought for: The following be added as para 5(a) to the plaint: 5(a). That assuming for the sake of argument though not concluding in the least that the death of Paramananda occurred prior to the commencement of Hindu Succession Act and for that reason or for any other reasons, the Plaintiff', claim for share in the suit properties as heirs of Paramananda is not tenable even then the Plaintiffs shall be entitled to inherit as per their share out of the properties left behind by Chanda Bewa, the widow of Paramananda who died after Hindu Succession Act came into force. Objections have been filed by Respondent No. 1 challenging such prayers for amendment. 6. The main purpose in the petitions for amendment is to incorporate allegation to the effect that there was a separation among the male members of the family and as such after death of Paramananda daughters would inherit his share and further Chanda, the wife of Paramananda, died after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force and as such after death of Chanda Dei, widow of Paramananda, succession will be to her and the Plaintiffs would be entitled to succeed. 7. It is submitted by the counsel for the Appellant Petitioners that the prayer for amendment should be allowed as it reveals an alternative mode of acquisition of right. The suit itself had been filed in the year 1979 and the same was dismissed in 1982. 7. It is submitted by the counsel for the Appellant Petitioners that the prayer for amendment should be allowed as it reveals an alternative mode of acquisition of right. The suit itself had been filed in the year 1979 and the same was dismissed in 1982. First Appeal remained pending in the High Court for about more than 16 years. The two petitions for amendment have been filed at the fag end of hearing of the appeal. The amendment, if allowed at this stage would definitely necessitate a fresh trial. In the two petitions for amendment no explanation has been given as to why such pleas could not be taken earlier. It appears that the plaint had been filed by Late Mr. M. Patra, an experienced and eminent lawyer. The pleas which are now sought to be raised, if correct, would not have escaped notice of such an eminent lawyer. It is thus apparent that the pleas now taken are mere after-thoughts. Even though an amendment can be allowed at any stage of the suit including at the stage of appeal, the Court considering the prayer for amendment is required to find.out as to why such amendment could not be incorporated earlier. The plea that Plaintiff No. 2 being an old lady could not recollect such fact is on the face of it unacceptable as she was aged 50 years at the time of filing the suit and at the time of deposition her age was 53 years. Moreover, since such amendment would necessitate a re-trial, it would not be appropriate to permit such amendment at such a belated stage. 8. Learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants has placed strong reliance upon the decision reported in Pandit Ishwardas Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, in support of his contention that an amendment raising a new plea can be allowed even at the appellate stage. In the afore said case, the Appellant had filed the suit for declaration that agreement between his brother and the Government and the surety bond executed by the Appellant were illegal and unenforceable inter alia, on the ground that provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution had not been complied with. The trial court accepted such plea. In the afore said case, the Appellant had filed the suit for declaration that agreement between his brother and the Government and the surety bond executed by the Appellant were illegal and unenforceable inter alia, on the ground that provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution had not been complied with. The trial court accepted such plea. In appeal, the High Court permitted the Defendant-appellant to raise an additional plea that the suit was barred by res judicata by decision of the High Court in another appeal. Such plea taken by way of amendment having been accepted and the appeal having been allowed the Plaintiff who had succeeded before the trial court took the matter to the Supreme Court and contended, inter alia, that the High Court should not have permitted the Appellant before it to raise the plea of res judicata at the appellate stage, such plea could not be decided without receiving additional evidence, namely the judgment in the connected litigation. While negativing such contention, the Supreme Court observed: 4......The learned Counsel appeared to argue on the assumption that a new plea could not be permitted at the,appellate stage unless all the material necessary to decide the plea was already before the Court. There is no legal basis for this assumption. There is no impediment or bar against an appellate Court permitting amendment of pleadings so as to enable a party to raise a new plea. All that.is necessary is that the Appellate Court should observe the well known principles subject to which amendments of pleadings are usually granted. Naturally one of the circumstances which will be taken into consideration before an amendment is' granted is the delay in making the application seeking such amendment and, if made at the Appellate stage, the reason why it was not sought in the trial Court. 1? the necessary material on which the plea arising from the amendment may be decided is already there, the amendment may be more readily granted than otherwise. But, there is no prohibition against an Appellate Court permitting an amendment at the appellate stage merely because the necessary material is not already before the Court. Though a prayer relating to amendment can be allowed at any stage including at the appellate stage, the matter has to be considered on the basis of explanation furnished for seeking such an amendment at belated stage. Though a prayer relating to amendment can be allowed at any stage including at the appellate stage, the matter has to be considered on the basis of explanation furnished for seeking such an amendment at belated stage. As observed by the Supreme Court itself, one of the circumstances which will be taken into consideration before an amendment is allowed, is delay in making such application and if made at the appellate stage, the reason why it was not sought in the trial court. 9. In the decision reported in A.I.R 1970 SC 42 (Raj Kumar Mohan Singh and Ors. v. Raj Kumar Pashupati Nath Saran Singh and Ors., the prayer for amendment made before the Supreme Court was rejected on the ground that it had been sought for at a belated stage. In the decision reported in Chandrasekhar Praharaj and Others Vs. Pitambari Dibya the amendment sought for at the second appellate stage at the fag end of the conclusion of hearing was rejected on the ground that such amendment if allowed would have necessitated taking of fresh evidence. Similar view has been expressed in the decision reported in Bhubaneswar Patel Vs. Janak Patel and Others. In the present case, as already indicated, the explanation for not seeking an amendment an earlier stage even though the Plaintiffs were represented by a senior and eminent counsel has been found to be unsatisfactory. The amendment, if allowed at this stage after about more than twenty years of filing of the suit would necessitate taking of fresh evidence on new issues. 10. The learned Counsel for the, Appellants has challenged the finding of the trial court relating to date of death of Paramananda. He has placed reliance upon certain oral evidence as well as the Death Certificate., Regarding the original Death Register produced before the trial court, it was observed that there has been some overwriting in the surname as well as in the name of the father of the deceased Paramananda in the entry relating to Ext. 1. Such observation of the trial court has not been specifically challenged at the time of hearing. On the other hand, Ext. A-1 produced by Defendant No. 1 indicates that one Parami Rout of Sankarpur had expired on 14-6-1949. 1. Such observation of the trial court has not been specifically challenged at the time of hearing. On the other hand, Ext. A-1 produced by Defendant No. 1 indicates that one Parami Rout of Sankarpur had expired on 14-6-1949. Though the witness examined on behalf, of the Plaintiffs tried to deny that Parami Rout was not the same as Paramananda Rout, from the evidence on record well discussed by the trial court, it is apparent that Parami Rout and Paramananda Rout are the same person The Plaintiffs have claimed that the disputed properties had been recorded in the name of Paramananda Rout, son of Arta Rout Ext. D. the original Record-of-Rights indicates that Khata No. 366 had been recorded in the name of Paramananda Rout, son of Arta Rout, whereas Khata Nos. 367, 368 and 27 had been recorded in the name of Parami Rout, son of Arta Rout of the very same village and Khata No. 25 had been recorded in the name of Natha Patra and another. From Ext. B, the certified copy of the decree in T.S. No. 5 of 1961, it is apparent that Parami Rout had purchased land from Khata No. 25. It is not the case of the Plaintiffs that there was any other Parami Rout, son of Arta Rout in the same village nor it is the case that the lands under Khata Nos. 367, 368 and- 27 had been subsequently acquired from said Parami Rout, son of Arta Rout by Paramananda Rout; son of Arta Rout. Thus, there cannot be an iota of doubt that Parami Rout, son of Arta Rout and Paramananda Rout, son of Arta Rout are not two different persons. Once this conclusion is reached, it is obvious that the witnesses examined on behalf of Plaintiffs and Defendant No. 12 are not speaking the truth by stating that Parami and Paramananda are two different persons. 11. However, apart from these materials, there is a clinching circumstance indicating that Paramanahda must have died prior to 1950. Ext. C-1 is a registered sale deed dated 13-7-1950 executed by one Sadhu Sahu in favour of Purnananda Rout, husband of present Defendant No. 1. In the aforesaid sale deed, the name of father of Purnananda Rout has been described as "Late Paramananda Rout". This sale deed came into existence at a time when there was no dispute between the parties. C-1 is a registered sale deed dated 13-7-1950 executed by one Sadhu Sahu in favour of Purnananda Rout, husband of present Defendant No. 1. In the aforesaid sale deed, the name of father of Purnananda Rout has been described as "Late Paramananda Rout". This sale deed came into existence at a time when there was no dispute between the parties. From the recital in the sale deed, which was a thirty year old document at the time of its admission, it is apparent that death of Paramananda occurred prior to the date of execution of such sale deed, that is to say, prior to 13-7-1950. 12. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merits in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed