G. PATRIBASAVAN GOUD, J. ( 1 ) SRI prabhuling k. Navadgi takes notice for the respondent. Heard on merits by consent. ( 2 ) THE petitioner, in this writ petition under articles 226 and 227 of the constitution, seeks quashing of the award of the labour court, fijapur, dated 16-7-1998 in kid. No. 66 of 1997 at Annexure-a. ( 3 ) RESPONDENT had been working as a conductor with the petitioner. He was proceeded against in a domestic enquiry on the charge of violation of "issue and start" Rule, with the allegation that, at the time his bus was checked on 25-3-1996 on bidar-jamkhandi route, it was found that he had not issued tickets to five passengers even though he had not collected fare from them. The respondent contended that he was in the process of issuing tickets. The inquiring authority gave a finding that the charge did not stand proved. The disciplinary authority disagreed with the said finding, and held the charge as proved and awarded the punishment of dismissal from service. The respondent raised an industrial dispute in that regard by way of filing an application under Section 10 (4-a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ('act' for short ). The labour court initially held the domestic enquiry to be valid. It then proceeded to hold, for the reasons to be presently referred to, that the order of dismissal was not legally sustainable. Consequently, by the impugned award, it set aside the order of dismissal, and directed reinstatement of the respondent into service. While doing so, it awarded only 50 per cent of back wages, denying other 50 per cent on the ground as stated in the penultimate paragraph of the impugned award, that the petitioner is providing conveyance facility to the general public. Questioning this very award, the respondent had approached this court under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution at W. P. No. 463 of 1999 complaining about denial of 50 per cent of back wages. That writ petition was disposed of by a learned single judge on 7-1-1999 at the preliminary stage, holding that the fact that the employer-corporation was running under loss was of common knowledge, and that the said factor had weighed with the labour court in restricting the back wages only to 50 per cent. That writ petition was disposed of by a learned single judge on 7-1-1999 at the preliminary stage, holding that the fact that the employer-corporation was running under loss was of common knowledge, and that the said factor had weighed with the labour court in restricting the back wages only to 50 per cent. Since the said writ petition came to be disposed of at the preliminary stage without notice to the present petitioner, and since the present petitioner-employer had no opportunity of putting forth its case in respect of award, the disposal of the said writ petition would not come in the way of the petitioner-employer seeking quashing of the very award on the grounds that it is urging here. ( 4 ) AS noticed earlier, the inquiring authority having held the charge as not proved, the disciplinary authority disagreed, and came to the conclusion that the charge stood proved. While doing so, it is the admitted position that the disciplinary authority had not afforded any opportunity to the respondent-workman to show cause in that regard. It is this particular aspect that the labour court finds fault with, and consequently holds the order of dismissal as not legally sustainable. Sri Mukunda menon, the learned counsel for the petitioner-employer, refers to sub-regulation (25) of regulation 23 of the Karnataka state road transport corporation servants (conduct and discipline) regulations, 1971 ('regulations' for short), and submits that no such opportunity nor any such show-cause notice needed to be given to the workman by the disciplinary authority under the said sub-regulation (25 ). Sri Mukunda menon therefore urges that the labour court's finding fault with the procedure to be followed by the disciplinary authority is contrary to the mandate of sub-regulation (25) of regulation 23. Sri Mukunda menon therefore urges that the labour court's finding fault with the procedure to be followed by the disciplinary authority is contrary to the mandate of sub-regulation (25) of regulation 23. ( 5 ) SRI Prabhuling K. Navadagi, the learned counsel for the respondent-workman, submits that even though sub-regulation (25) of regulation 23 does not specifically require the necessity of the disciplinary authority issuing a show-cause notice to the delinquent workman before a conclusion different from the one that the inquiring authority had arrived at is to be recorded, the principles of natural Justice have to be lead into the said sub-regulation (25), and so read, the disciplinary authority had to give a show-cause notice to the respondent-workman before he recorded a finding of guilt as opposed to the finding of innocence recorded by the inquiring authority, and since no such opportunity was given by the disciplinary authority to the workman, the order of dismissal was rightly held by the labour court as not sustainable in law. ( 6 ) SUB-REGULATION (25) of regulation 23 of the regulations reads thus. "the disciplinary authority shall, if it disagrees with the finding of the inquiring authority on any Article of charge, record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings on such charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose". ( 7 ) A bare reading of the said sub-regulation (25) no doubt does not indicate that the disciplinary authority is required to issue notice to the delinquent workman before it records a finding contrary to the one that the inquiring authority had arrived at. But Sri Prabhuling K. Navadagi, the learned counsel for the respondent, refers to a decision of a learned single judge of this court in P. M. Khode v State Bank of India and others, which the labour court has also relied upon. Like sub-regulation (25) of regulation 23 of the regulations concerned herein, the service rules which the learned single judge was dealing with in the said decision, namely the service rules of state bank of india, also did not contemplate issuing of any such notice to the delinquent workman before the disciplinary authority could record a finding of guilt as against the finding of innocence that the inquiring authority had recorded. Nevertheless, the learned single judge, Justice h. l. dattu, after referring to various decisions, held at the end of paragraph 10 of the Order, thus. "it is now well-established that disciplinary authority is not bound to accept the finding of the enquiry officer since the finding of the enquiry officer is merely recommendatory in nature and the disciplinary authority is expected to apply his mind independently to the report of the enquiry officer. The findings and recommendations of the enquiry officer is intended only to supply the appropriate material for consideration of the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority when he concurs with the findings of the inquiring officer, he need not give detailed reasons, but, when he differs with the findings, and gives his own finding, then certainly he is obliged to give reasons and the only question that remains is, should there be a notice to the delinquent official to make representation before disciplinary authority differs from the findings of the enquiry officer in the absence of any such provision in the rules. This question is no more a res integra, in view of the law laid down by apex court in the case of Narayan Mishra v State of Orissa and in the case of Ram Kishan v Union of India and others and also the decision of this court in the case of Karnataka Agro Industries Corporation Limited v K. Vittal Das. Respectfully following the Ratio of these decisions, I hold that, though there is no provision in the staff rules for giving an opportunity to the delinquent official, in case the disciplinary authority gave its own finding disagreeing with the report of the enquiry officer, rules of natural Justice require that an opportunity to make representation should be given to the delinquent official, in the absence of which the order is liable to be set aside". ( 8 ) THE facts of the present case are in no way different from the one that the learned single judge was dealing with in the above said case of p. m. khode, supra. The learned single judge, in coming to the above said conclusion, has referred to various decisions, and particularly the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the two cases referred to above. The learned single judge, in coming to the above said conclusion, has referred to various decisions, and particularly the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the two cases referred to above. Following the said decision therefore, I hold that even in respect of sub-regulation (25) of regulation 23 of the regulations, where the disciplinary authority disagrees with the finding of the inquiring authority on any Article of charge and records its reasons for such disagreement and records its own finding on such charge if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose, it would not be open to the disciplinary authority to do so unless the delinquent workman is given a notice and an opportunity to make a representation before the disciplinary authority so records a finding to the contrary, and that principles of natural Justice would require such a procedure to be followed by the disciplinary authority. ( 9 ) HAVING said so, the question that still remains is as to whether, in the particular circumstances of this case, it was open to the labour court to hold the order of dismissal was unsustainable in law solely on the footing that the disciplinary authority had afforded no such opportunity to the delinquent workman. The labour court having earlier held the domestic enquiry to be valid, could it have reverted to a stage earlier to that finding in order to say that the order of dismissal is unjustifiable for the said defect of the disciplinary authority not following the principles of natural Justice in the above said manner. Since the respondent-workman had, at the outset, contended that the domestic enquiry was invalid, it was open to the management at the very commencement to give up the very domestic enquiry and to choose to lead evidence for the first time before the labour court to substantiate the charge and to justify the action, in which event, if the labour court held the charge proved and the punishment of dismissal justifiable, the order of dismissal would take effect from the date of the award, the workman being entitled to full wages up to the date of the award. It is an altogether different matter if the management stands by the domestic enquiry and maintains that it is valid. It is an altogether different matter if the management stands by the domestic enquiry and maintains that it is valid. In that event, it would be necessary for the labour court to decide as a preliminary issue whether the domestic enquiry is valid or invalid. If the domestic enquiry were to be held valid, then the scope of the further proceeding would get severely restrict, with only the aspects of perversity, victimisation, etc. , being required to be looked into. If the domestic enquiry were to be held invalid, then the scope of the further proceeding would get enlarged so as to necessitate the leading of fresh evidence on the part of the management to substantiate the charge and to justify the action. It is for this reason that the finding on the validity of the domestic enquiry at the threshold would be very crucial. When such a finding is given, it must be taken that the said finding is, given taking into consideration all relevant aspects of the domestic enquiry. Looked at in this background, when the labour court, on the preliminary issue, held the domestic enquiry to be valid, then, it would not be open to the labour court to revert to a stage during the domestic enquiry itself, and to point out a mistake in the conduct of the domestic enquiry. This non-compliance with the principles of natural Justice in the matter of sub-regulation (25) of regulation 23 was certainly a defect in the domestic enquiry that the labour court could have pointed out, and could have consequently held the domestic enquiry invalid, because compliance with principles of natural Justice at the stage of sub-regulation (25) was a step in course of the domestic enquiry, since the domestic enquiry must be taken as having come to an end with the final order being passed by the disciplinary authority. If, on the ground that the principles of natural Justice are not complied with in course of sub-regulation (25) of regulation 23, the labour court had found the very domestic enquiry to be invalid, then it would have been open to the management to lead evidence before the labour court for the first time, and to substantiate the charge. If, on the ground that the principles of natural Justice are not complied with in course of sub-regulation (25) of regulation 23, the labour court had found the very domestic enquiry to be invalid, then it would have been open to the management to lead evidence before the labour court for the first time, and to substantiate the charge. By the course it followed, the labour court not only held the domestic enquiry indirectly invalid, but also denied an opportunity to the management to lead evidence before the labour court for the first time to substantiate the charge, which the management would have otherwise had, had the finding on the domestic enquiry been different from the one that the labour court had recorded in this case. For this reason, I hold that it was not permissible for labour court tp go back to one of the stages of the domestic enquiry to point out the mistake in the domestic enquiry on the ground of non-compliance with the principles of natural Justice in the matter of sub-regulation (25) of regulation 23, after it had given a finding in favour of the management on the question of the validity of the domestic enquiry. The labour court's finding that the order of dismissal is unsustainable on this ground, therefore, is a result of legally erroneous approach. ( 10 ) THE labour court having initially held the domestic enquiry to be valid, and the management, therefore, having found it unnecessary to lead evidence for the first time before the labour court to substantiate the charge, if we look to the domestic enquiry proceedings, it could be seen that nothing more was required to hold the charge as proved in view of the very stand taken by the respondent-workman. As said earlier, the charge was one of violation of "issue and start" rule. Strict adherence to this Rule is insisted upon as one of the measures for checking pilferage. The explanation of the respondent-conductor that he was still in the process of issuing tickets at the time the bus was checked therefore was not acceptable. The very stand impliedly led to admission of the charge. There was therefore no perversity in the finding reached by the disciplinary authority with regard to proof of charge. The question that still remains is as to whether the punishment of dismissal is commensurate with the charge proved. The very stand impliedly led to admission of the charge. There was therefore no perversity in the finding reached by the disciplinary authority with regard to proof of charge. The question that still remains is as to whether the punishment of dismissal is commensurate with the charge proved. In the circumstances of the case, the punishment of dismissal from service is certainly disproportionate, and I am of the opinion that the appropriate lesser punishment to be substituted would be denial of 50 per cent of back wages from the date of order of dismissal till the date of reinstatement. The labour court has denied 50 per cent of back wages to the respondent-workman altogether for different reasons. I now find that the respondent-workman needs to be denied 50 per cent of back wages not for the said reasons assigned by the labour court, but as a lesser punishment for the proved charge of violation of "issue and start" Rule in place of extreme penalty of dismissal from service. Denial of 50 per cent of back wages that the labour court has done therefore needs to be upheld though for different reasons. While so modifying the award in this regard, one more aspect needs to be taken note of. The operative portion of the award does not mention the fact that the reinstatement is with the benefit of continuity of service and consequential benefits. The order of dismissal is set aside on the ground that the said extreme punishment is disproportionate to the charge proved. The workman is being reinstated with lesser punishment of denial of 50 per cent of back wages. There are no other circumstances to deny the benefit of continuity of service and consequential benefits. Therefore, reinstatement must be directed with the said benefit of continuity of service and consequential benefits. Modification of the impugned award needs to take care of this aspect also. ( 11 ) IN view of the above, impugned award is modified as follows. Charge of violation of issue and start Rule held proved. Punishment of dismissal from service held disproportionate. In its place, lesser punishment of denial of 50 per cent of back wages from the date of the order of dismissal till the date of reinstatement substituted. ( 11 ) IN view of the above, impugned award is modified as follows. Charge of violation of issue and start Rule held proved. Punishment of dismissal from service held disproportionate. In its place, lesser punishment of denial of 50 per cent of back wages from the date of the order of dismissal till the date of reinstatement substituted. With this lesser punishment, the order of dismissal is set aside and the respondent-workman is directed to be reinstated in service with the benefit of continuity of service and consequential benefit. Compliance within two months from today. ( 12 ) PETITION disposed of accordingly. --- *** --- .