D. K. SETH, J. ( 1 ) SHRI M. D. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner had pointed out from the affidavit as well as from the documents annexed as annexures that the petitioner was appointed as paid apprentice by virtue of an order dated 6. 1. 1990 (Annexure-I ). It had come to an end on 22. 2. 1990 by virtue of an order dated 22. 2. 1990 (Annexure-II ). Thereafter on 18. 8. 1990, the petitioner was again appointed as paid apprentice till 20. 2. 1991 after which his appointment should be treated to have been automatically ceased. The said order is Annexure-IV to the writ petition. By an order dated 21. 8. 1990 (Annexure-V), his appointment was said to have been irregular and as such was cancelled. The petitioner made a representation on 5. 9. 1990 (Annexure-VI ). By an order dated 26. 9. 1990 (Annexure-VII), the petitioner was alleged to have been appointed in the post of paid apprentice. The said order indicates that the appointment was made at a salary of Rs. 950 per month for doing daily work purely on temporary and ad hoc stop-gap arrangement. The appointment was made till 20. 2. 1991. The said appointment could be terminated without any notice even before 20. 2. 1991. It was also indicated that no benefit of the said appointment would be available to the petitioner. The petitioner made a further representation on 15. 11. 1990. It appears that a letter was issued on 10. 8. 1989 (Annexure-8b) wherein the Additional commissioner on behalf of the Commissioner had informed all the Chief Development Officers or the Additional District Magistrate (Development) or the District Development Officer that before making any recruitment in the post of Junior Clerk, in case there are such vacancies should be filled up by the said apprentice through adjustment or absorption for which no duration of period of service as paid apprentice is provided. By a letter dated 2. 12. 1990 (Annexure-IX), the District Development Officer had sought for clarification from the commissioner as to what should be done in respect of those paid apprentice who had been claiming regular appointment or promotion to the post of Junior Clerk on account of their temporary appointment as paid apprentice. Whereas by an order dated 27. 2. 12. 1990 (Annexure-IX), the District Development Officer had sought for clarification from the commissioner as to what should be done in respect of those paid apprentice who had been claiming regular appointment or promotion to the post of Junior Clerk on account of their temporary appointment as paid apprentice. Whereas by an order dated 27. 2. 1990, it was directed in respect of all vacancies after the issue of said letter should be followed by recruitment through the Selection Committee. After forwarding request for such selection against vacancies in reply to the said clarifications, the Assistant Commissioner on behalf of the Commissioner had informed through his letter dated 4. 12. 1990 (Annexure-X) that by reason of a letter dated 18. 9. 1990, all Group-C posts should be filled up by direct recruitment through the selection board. But there is no impediment for posting paid apprentice in the post of Junior Clerk. Thereafter, by an order dated 12. 12. 1990 (Annexure-XI ). the petitioner was promoted to post of junior Clerk from the post of paid apprentice. But such promotion was stated to be purely temporary and could be reverted without any reason and without any notice to the post of paid apprentice. ( 2 ) THE service of the petitioner has since been dispensed with by an order. dated 27. 4. 1991 (Annexure-X) on the ground that there was no necessity of his service as Junior Clerk. This order has since been challenged in this writ petition. ( 3 ) SHRI M. D. Singh had contended that the termination of service has been purported to be made on the basis of U. P. Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975 without complying with the provisions contained in the said Rules inasmuch as neither notice nor pay in lieu of notice was given to the petitioner while terminating the service. Secondly, he contends, that the said order of termination is a penalty in disguise. It has inflicted civil consequence on the petitioner without giving him any opportunity. The petitioner having been appointed against permanent vacancy on regular basis, 1975 Rules cannot be invoked since definition of temporary service does not include temporary appointment against substantive vacancy. Secondly, he contends, that the said order of termination is a penalty in disguise. It has inflicted civil consequence on the petitioner without giving him any opportunity. The petitioner having been appointed against permanent vacancy on regular basis, 1975 Rules cannot be invoked since definition of temporary service does not include temporary appointment against substantive vacancy. He then contends that since the petitioner was appointed against substantive vacancy on regular basis, his service could not have been terminated in the manner as it has been done, which is violative of the principles of natural justice and equity. According to him by reason of the order dated 10. 8. 1989 contained in Annexure-VIIl-B and the clarifications contained in annexure-X dated 4. 12. 1990, the petitioners appointment shall be treated to be a regular appointment and cannot be unceremoniously terminated in the manner it has been sought to be done. ( 4 ) HE also contends that the orders contained in Annexures-VIII-B and X were Issued in exercise of powers conferred on the State Government under Rule 36 of the U. P. Subordinate Service ministerial Staff (Direct Recruitment) Rules, 1985. He then contends that though the expression of appointment was used as promotion but it was not a promotion but an appointment and, therefore. Rule 36 has every manner of application. He further contends that by reason of interim order granted in this writ petition, the petitioners are still continuing in service and their seniority has been fixed after publishing seniority list and are being treated as regular employees by allowing them to become members of the provident fund by conferring on them all other service benefits as are available to a regular confirmed employee. Therefore, after lapse of long 7 years, if the petitioners are thrown out of employment, it would work under hardship and injustice on the petitioners. ( 5 ) SRI K. R. Singh, learned standing counsel on the other hand contends that the petitioner was never appointed against a vacancy substantive or otherwise. He contended that the orders dated 10. 8. 1989 are simple administrative instructions which cannot override the 1985 Rules. The order contained in Annexure-X dated 4. 12. 1990 also does not empower appointment but speaks of posting of paid apprentice in the post of Junior Clerk. He contended that the orders dated 10. 8. 1989 are simple administrative instructions which cannot override the 1985 Rules. The order contained in Annexure-X dated 4. 12. 1990 also does not empower appointment but speaks of posting of paid apprentice in the post of Junior Clerk. He further contends that the said sentence is contrary to the sentence immediately preceding to the extent that it has been decided that appointment should be made only by the Selection Board. These two sentence contradicts each other. He further contends that the clarification contained in Annexure-IX sought for on 2. 12. 1996 and the same was clarified on 4. 12. 1990 and the alleged appointment was purported to have been given on 12. 12. 1990, which dates are in very close proximity and gives rise to a presumption of suspicion. Then he contends that in the order dated 12. 12. 1990, the word used was promotion while providing that he should be reverted at any point of time to the post of paid apprentice without giving him any notice or assigning any reason. According to him, the appointment in the post of paid apprentice was for a period till 20. 2. 1990. Therefore, on 27. 4. 1991, there was no scope for reverting the petitioner from the post of Junior Clerk to the post of paid apprentice but to dispense with the service since it was purely a temporary arrangement. According to him the petitioner was never appointed following the 1985 Rules and as such, he cannot claim any legal right to establish such right out of the alleged appointment. Inasmuch as the appointment in the post of paid apprentice clearly indicated that such appointment will not confer any benefit which could be established in law. According to him, unless a person is recruited through the regular rules, he cannot claim any right on the basis of such appointment. He further contends that unless the petitioner is able to show that he was appointed against a post he cannot claim any right. According to him. the facts disclosed does not show that the petitioner was appointed against a post, therefore he cannot claim any right. According to him, the facts disclosed does not show that the petitioner was appointed against any substantive. post through regular process of recruitment. According to him. the facts disclosed does not show that the petitioner was appointed against a post, therefore he cannot claim any right. According to him, the facts disclosed does not show that the petitioner was appointed against any substantive. post through regular process of recruitment. By virtue of such appointment, the petitioner did not acquire any legal right to sustain such appointment. He further contends that unless the petitioner is a regularly appointed person and holds a post even temporary he cannot claim to be governed by the 1975 Rules. Therefore, it is not necessary that 1975 Rules are to be followed. Since there was no proper appointment, the petitioner cannot claim any legal right on the basis of such appointment and as such his service could be terminated even without notice. ( 6 ) SHRI M. D. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner in reply had contended that the respondents in their counter-affidavit had never contended that the appointment was invalid. On the other hand, it was contended that there was no necessity of the work and therefore, the service was dispensed with. Therefore, it is open to the respondent to take the point that the appointment was invalid. ( 7 ) I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. ( 8 ) IT appears from the pleadings made in the writ petition that the petitioner was appointed as paid apprentice for a limited period which has ceased initially and thereafter he was reappointed for a limited period till 20. 2. 1991. By virtue of an order dated 21. 8. 1990. In between 21. 8. 1990 and 27. 2. 1991 the matter moved very fast. Between 2. 12. 1990 and 12. 12. 1990, the matter were processed, appointments were given as discussed hereinbefore which is apparent from the respective contentions of the respective counsel. ( 9 ) MR. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show anything from the 1985 Rules that there was provision for recruitment or appointment of paid apprentice. Whereas rule 6 provides source of recruitment to the lowest grade in the Ministerial Staff in subordinate office by direct recruitment though a Selection Committee referred to Rule 17 on the basis of academic and other attainments as provided in Rule 9. Whereas rule 6 provides source of recruitment to the lowest grade in the Ministerial Staff in subordinate office by direct recruitment though a Selection Committee referred to Rule 17 on the basis of academic and other attainments as provided in Rule 9. There is no provision in the rules either to appoint paid apprentice and promote them from the post of paid apprentice to the post of Junior clerk. Admittedly Junior Clerk is the lowest grade in the ministerial staff in a subordinate office. Rule 17 on the other hand prescribed constitution of Selection Committee while Rule 18 prescribes that recruitment is to be made every year and the basis of selection should be according to the Rule 21 by the Selection Committee on the basis of academic attainments of the candidates for which Employment Officer while forwarding the names of candidates shall have regard to the academic attainments. Such selection can only be made after notification to the employment Exchange in terms of Rule 22 and by advertising/inviting applications from persons registered in the Employment Exchange and directly through advertisement in a local daily and by pasting the same on the notice Board. Rule 23 prescribes the procedure for selection to be made on the basis of the merit of the candidates determined by the percentage of marks at the minimum qualifying examination added by additional 10 per cent of marks obtained for every higher examination being final examination. After the merit list is prepared by the Selection committee the candidates figuring in the merit list shall be called for interview for which respective marks are to be awarded on the basis of general knowledge, proficiency in sports, retrenched employee. The proficiency of sports is also divided in different assignments on the basis of note appended thereto. Similar marks for retrenched employee are also provided according to the prescribed mode provided in the said note. The marks allotted in the interview shall be added to the marks entered on the basis of academic attainments and the aggregate of the marks and then the position of the candidate is to be determined and then merit is to be drawn up. In case more than one candidate secure equal marks in the aggregate, the candidates who secures more marks on the basis of academic attainment shall be placed higher. In case more than one candidate secure equal marks in the aggregate, the candidates who secures more marks on the basis of academic attainment shall be placed higher. In terms of Rule 24 a candidate seeking selection is required to pay the fees as prescribed. The appointment shall thereupon be made according to Rule 26 on the basis of such select list by the appointing authority and such select list shall hold good for one year from the date of such selection. Rule 27 prescribes for ad hoc appointment when candidate in the list is exhausted or no candidate is available for appointment out of the list of selected candidates. Such appointment on ad hoc basis can be made from amongst persons eligible for appointment under the said rules but such appointment should not last for a period exceeding one year or beyond the next selection under these rules whichever is earlier. Rule 28 provides that all such candidates are to be appointed on probation for a period of one year which can be extended for the reasons to be recorded in respect of each individual case for a period not beyond one year. After the probation is over if his service is found satisfactory and integrity is certified and the appointing authority is satisfied that he is otherwise fit for appointment, he may be confirmed. Thus in Part IV and V of the said rules, specific procedure has been laid down for direct recruitment. ( 10 ) IN the present case, the petitioner has not pleaded that he has come through such recruitment process, on the other hand, his case as made out shown that he was Initially inducted as paid apprentice and then sought to be promoted on the post of Junior Clerk by virtue of annexures-8b and 10, that too purely on temporary basis on the condition of reversion as observed earlier. If no case of regular selection is made out in the pleadings, the respondents are not supposed to call on to dispute such contention of pleading, even if the service is dispensed with, unless it is shown that the petitioner has been able to establish his right that he was appointed on the post. The alleged appointment said to be a promotion does not show that there was any valid appointment. The alleged appointment said to be a promotion does not show that there was any valid appointment. Unless the petitioner is able to make out a case of valid appointment, it is not open to him to invoke writ jurisdiction. In order to invoke writ jurisdiction, one has to make out a case that he has a legal right. ( 11 ) THE orders dated 10. 8. 1989 and 4. 12. 1990 being Annexures-8b and 10 respectively appears to be an administrative Instruction. Then again the order contained in Annexure-10 itself contradicts itself to the extent that the appointment is to be made through selection board and then says that there is no embargo in posting paid apprentice as Junior Clerks. Wherefrom the office found that there was no embargo when the rules itself specify the mode of recruitment. The rules does not permit/provide appointment of paid apprentice or appointment of Junior Clerk from the paid apprentice. The 1985 Rules were promulgated under Article 309 of the constitution by the Governor whereas the orders contained in Annexures-8b and 10 were Issued by the Additional Commissioner and the Assistant Commissioner respectively on behalf of the commissioner. This also does not show that these were Government Orders notified by notification published in the Government Official Gazette. On the other hand, these are simple official letters containing administrative instruction. If there is conflict between administrative instruction and the statutory rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution, in that event, the administrative instruction shall make room for the statutory rules which would prevail. Therefore, reliance placed on such administrative Instruction cannot find force to withstand the impact of the recruitment rules which provide specific procedure. ( 12 ) WORKING of the petitioner by virtue of Interim order does not confer any right. Therefore, no claim can be based on the basis of work pursuant to the interim order granted in this case. The petitioner has to succeed on the basis of the case made out in the pleading and not on the basis of weakness of the argument advanced by the respondents. The question is a question as to whether the petitioner has acquired any legal right therein. In the case of State of Haryana v. Pyara Singh, ( AIR 1992 SC 2130 ), the Apex Court had deprecated such back door entry into service. The question is a question as to whether the petitioner has acquired any legal right therein. In the case of State of Haryana v. Pyara Singh, ( AIR 1992 SC 2130 ), the Apex Court had deprecated such back door entry into service. In the case of State of Himachal Pradesh v. Suresh Kumar Verma. ( 1996 (2) SLR 321 ), the Apex Court has held that the Judicial process cannot be utilised to support a mode of recruitment de hors the rule. In the case of State of U. P. v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, 1991 (1) SCC 691 , and Director institute of Management and Development U. P. v. Smt. Puspa Srivastava, AIR 1992 SC 2070 , the Apex Court had held that appointment limited by time does not confer any right to the post and on the expiry of the time limited the appointment ceased automatically. The alleged appointment having been found de hors the rules the petitioner cannot be said to have acquired any right to any post. Thus in the absence of any legal right established through the pleadings in this writ petition, the right cannot be asserted through writ Jurisdiction. Therefore, the relief claimed in the writ petition cannot be acceded to. ( 13 ) AT the same time, admittedly, the petitioner is working for long 7 years and had acquired some experience. Therefore, in such cases if any vacancy arises, the petitioner case may be considered for appointment whenever fresh recruitment is to be made against appropriate vacancy in accordance with the 1985 Rules after relaxing the age of the petitioner by the period during which he has been working till such selection is made by giving preference to the petitioner after all things being equal without subjecting them to the interview with regard to question of general knowledge for which they should be awarded full marks and subjecting them to the interview with regard to question of general knowledge for which they should be awarded full marks and making them eligible for the marks with regard to the retrenched employee for the whole period they had worked in terms of Rule 2. However, the respondent shall determine the vacancy within a period of three months and take step for recruitment in terms of 1985 Rules within a period of three months thereafter. However, the respondent shall determine the vacancy within a period of three months and take step for recruitment in terms of 1985 Rules within a period of three months thereafter. Till for the period of six months, the petitioners service shall not be interfered with and shall be subjected to the recruitment that might be made in terms of this order. This order is being passed without creating any precedent. ( 14 ) WITH the aforesaid observation, this writ petition is disposed of. ( 15 ) THIS order will also govern the Writ Petition Nos. 16115 of 1991, 16116 of 1991, 16117 of 1991 and 16119of 1991. ( 16 ) HOWEVER, there will be no order as to cost. .