D. C. SRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) THE prayer of the petitioner in this writ petition is for quashing the Award dated 10. 10. 1994 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad, in Reference made at the instance of the respondent. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is a statutory Corporation under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act for the city of Ahmedabad. It has panel of Advocates to represent before the Small Causes Court and City Civil Courts. One Shri P. T. Sheth, a very Senior Advocate was the Counsel for the petitioner. He had a team of Advocates to assist him who were engaged by him. He had also clerical staff which was engaged by him on his own terms and conditions. By extra-ordinary Award the Industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad held that the clerks of the Advocate Shri P. T. Sheth may be treated as employees of the Corporation. Shri P. T. Sheth was not an employee of the Corporation. He was advocate of the Corporation and the relation between Shri P. T. Sheth and the petitioner was that of an Advocate and client. He had no administrative powers to exercise on behalf of the Corporation. Neither the Advocates engaged by him nor the clerks or the peon engaged by him were ever employees of the Corporation. Seven clerks and one peon claiming to be employees of the petitioner raised industrial dispute which was referred to the Tribunal. The Tribunal in the impugned award held that the employees at Sr. Nos. 1 to 7 are employees of the Corporation and they were given grade of Rs. 950 - 1500 with effect from 1. 11. 1994 and employee at Sr. No. 9 was held to be peon of the Corporation and was ordered to be given grade of Rs. 750-940 with effect from 1. 11. 1994. One employee at Sr. No. 8 expired, hence no relief was given in his favour. The directions for seniority, promotion, transfer and super-annuation were also given by the Industrial Tribunal in the impugned award. It is this Award which has been challenged in this writ petition. ( 3 ) LEARNED Counsel for the parties Shri M. R. Anand for the petitioner and Shri M. B. Gandhi for the respondent were heard at length. The directions for seniority, promotion, transfer and super-annuation were also given by the Industrial Tribunal in the impugned award. It is this Award which has been challenged in this writ petition. ( 3 ) LEARNED Counsel for the parties Shri M. R. Anand for the petitioner and Shri M. B. Gandhi for the respondent were heard at length. ( 4 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner has contended that the Award is without jurisdiction inasmuch as the respondents, namely, seven clerks and one peon could not be placed in the category of employees of the Corporation nor they can be held to be workmen within the meaning of Section 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the Act" ). He also argued that there are errors apparent on the face of the Award as well as on the record hence for these two reasons interference of this Court is called for. It was also contended by him that the Industrialtribunal has crossed its jurisdiction in granting pay-scales to the clerks and peon and also in issuing directions regarding seniority, special pay, promotion, transfer, super-annuation, etc. To this extent, according to Shri Anand the Award goes beyond jurisdiction. He also pointed out that the relevant material on record placed before the Industrial Tribunal was either misread or material portions were totally ignored, for example, clause : (g) of the settlement terms contained in Annexure : D which also amounts to error manifest on the face of the record. ( 5 ) AFTER hearing the learned Counsel for the parties it can be said that the Award is patently beyond jurisdiction and suffers from manifest error on the face of the Award as well as on the face of the record. ( 6 ) UNLESS there is relationship of employer and employee between the petitioner and the seven clerks and one peon they can not be termed as workmen within the meaning of Section 2 (s) of the Act. ( 6 ) UNLESS there is relationship of employer and employee between the petitioner and the seven clerks and one peon they can not be termed as workmen within the meaning of Section 2 (s) of the Act. Section 2 (s) of the Act defines workmen as under :"workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute. . . . " the above definition, therefore, implies that there should be relationship of employer and employee between the parties to the dispute. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has rightly contended that the relationship of employer and employee could not be established in this case and as such the industrial Tribunal travelled beyond its jurisdiction in rendering the Award. Shri M. B. Gandhi on the other hand contended that the relationship of employer and employee is duly established from the material on record and the Award does not suffer from any manifest error either on its face or on the face of the record. ( 7 ) IT is really difficult to appreciate how the Industrial Tribunal could fix the scale of clerks and peon of the so called employees of the Corporation. Leaving aside the controversy whether they are employees of the Corporation or not the Tribunal could not have fixed the scales in which they are to be placed. If they are employees of the Corporation it is for the Corporation to take care of, under the existing rules and the Government orders the scale which is to be given to them. It is not the function of the Industrial Tribunal to fix the grade and scale for such employees. Likewise it is not for the Industrial Tribunal to lay down the criteria for determining the seniority, promotion, special pay, etc. for these employees nor the tribunal acted within its jurisdiction in laying down the guidelines for their transfers and super-annuation, etc. It is not the function of the Industrial Tribunal to fix the grade and scale for such employees. Likewise it is not for the Industrial Tribunal to lay down the criteria for determining the seniority, promotion, special pay, etc. for these employees nor the tribunal acted within its jurisdiction in laying down the guidelines for their transfers and super-annuation, etc. By giving such direction the Industrial Tribunal has practically acted as delegated body of legislation for legislating the service rules for these employees. This was patently beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and as such the Award to this extent can be said to be without jurisdiction and is liable to be quashed. ( 8 ) ON the question of determination of relationship of employer and employee between the Corporation and the seven clerks and one peon the Tribunal has given self contradictory findings and has over looked material evidence on record. The following observations made by the Tribunal in the Award will itself show in what casual manner it was dealing with the material on record. ( 9 ) IN order to establish the relationship of employer and employee between the Corporation and its clerks and peon it was necessary for the appointing authority to invite application and lay down the procedure for appointment and selection. It should have been shown as to who was the appointing Authority of these persons and who was the authority competent to inflict punishment on these persons. The relationship of employer and employee between the parties was up held by the Tribunal on mere surmises and conjectures. The Tribunal has observed "that it is true that appointment of the concerned employee is not made by the Corporation. The appointment of these employees was made by Shri P. T. Sheth who is law officer and retainer of the Corporation". If this is so then the Tribunal could not have come to the conclusion that these persons were employees of the Corporation. Shri P. T. Sheth was Law Officer of the Corporation. He was not employee of the Corporation. The establishment under Shri P. T. Sheth was running under his supervision and control. He was authorised to engage clerks and peon, but that does not mean that he was empowered to employ these persons as employees of the Corporation. Shri P. T. Sheth was Law Officer of the Corporation. He was not employee of the Corporation. The establishment under Shri P. T. Sheth was running under his supervision and control. He was authorised to engage clerks and peon, but that does not mean that he was empowered to employ these persons as employees of the Corporation. There was arrangement between the Corporation and Shri P. T. Sheth that charges for clerks and peon were paid lumpsum by the Corporation to Shri P. T. Sheth and he was responsible for disbursement of the fixed amount to these clerks and peon. It was therefore not in the nature of salary to be paid to these persons by the Corporation, rather it was amount paid by Shri P. T. Sheth in lieu of services rendered by these persons who were employed at the instance of Shri P. T. Sheth. ( 10 ) THE Tribunal has further admitted that the appointment of these employees is not made as per rules of the Corporation. Still it held that they are employees of the Corporation. It was not a case where there were some irregularities in the appointment of these employees ignoring the rules of the Corporation. The situation would have been different if there exists rule for appointment of these persons in the Corporation, but there was some lacuna in following the rules for making such appointment. Of course in such situation the Corporation could not be permitted to say that these employees are not the employees of the Corporation. ( 11 ) THE Tribunal has further admitted that these employees had not moved any application for getting employment in the Corporation. It further admitted that no interview was taken and no appointment letter was given by the Corporation. Still the Tribunal was ready to hold that they are employees of the Corporation simply because they were employed by Shri P. T. Sheth who was Law Officer and retainer employed by the Corporation. The Tribunal had observed that Shri P. T. Sheth had authority from the Corporation to make these appointments. On the question of authority Shri M. B. Gandhi vehementally argued that such authority is to be found in Exh. 28. However, translated copy of Ex. 28 which consists of office note and suggestions does not indicate that there was any such authority given by the Corporation to Shri P. T. Sheth. On the question of authority Shri M. B. Gandhi vehementally argued that such authority is to be found in Exh. 28. However, translated copy of Ex. 28 which consists of office note and suggestions does not indicate that there was any such authority given by the Corporation to Shri P. T. Sheth. On the other hand the Municipal Commissioner at the end of these notes on Ex. 28 made it clear that "we may agree to clerkage fee of Rs. 550. 00 for each person and pay ad-hoc per month to senior Advocate for disbursement. This time please ensure to clarify that they are not municipal employees, but belong solely and wholly to Advocte establishment". This note of Municipal Commissioner clearly shows that only ad-hoc payment per month was to be made to Senior Advocate for disbursement to clerks and peon and these persons were not to be treated as municipal employees rather they belong solely and wholy to the advocate establishment. There is then little scope for contention that Shri P. T. Sheth had delegated authority from the municipal Commissioner to employ these persons as employees of the Corporation. ( 12 ) SHRI M. B. Gandhi further referred to Ex. 25 and contended that from this also it appears that Shri P. T. Sheth was given authority to appoint eight clerks who will be deemed to be clerks of the Corporation. However, in this note suggestion was given that in order to avoid these disputes and problems it was advised by Shri G. N. Desai, Advocate, that Senior Advocate be given authority to appoint eight clerks and they will be deemed to be the clerks of the Senior Advocates and not the employees of the Corporation. This suggestion therefore indicates that Shri P. T. Sheth had no authority to engage clerks as employee of the Corporation. On the other hand suggestion was specific that these eight clerks will be deemed to be clerks of the Senior Advocate and not the employees of the Corporation. ( 13 ) OFFICE order dated 17. 4. This suggestion therefore indicates that Shri P. T. Sheth had no authority to engage clerks as employee of the Corporation. On the other hand suggestion was specific that these eight clerks will be deemed to be clerks of the Senior Advocate and not the employees of the Corporation. ( 13 ) OFFICE order dated 17. 4. 1997 of the Legal Department of the petitioner further clarifies in the end that the above employees engaged by the Senior Advocate are not the employees of the Corporation and hence there will be a control and supervision over them as that of the senior advocates and the liability of payment to them will be that of the senior Advocate. This also shows that eight persons were never treated as employee of the Corporation by the petitioner. ( 14 ) THE statement of one witness of the petitioner recorded at Annexure : C further clarifies that only two stenographers who were provided to the Senior Advocate were employees of the Corporation and that the appointment of eight clerks was not made by the Corporation. No advertisement was made by the Corporation nor any application was invited and no interview was held by the Corporation for their appointment and selection. This was the statement on oath and his evidence was totally ignored by the Industrial Tribunal. Likewise this witness clarified that the muster rolls Exh. 29 and 30 which was produced by these employees were not muster rolls of the Corporation. The reasons given by him was that the muster roll of the Corporation is printed one and seal of the Corporation is affixed thereon. He also stated that salary or remuneration to these employees was paid by Shri P. T. Sheth and no increment or any kind of allowance was given to them. It was also on record that the service books of these employees are not maintained by the Corporation. ( 15 ) FROM the above discussions it follows that there was over-whelming evidence on record to show that these eight persons could never be employed by the Corporation nor they were employed by the Corporation hence the relationship of employer and employee between the petitioners and these employees never came into existence. Mere issue of entry passes during curfew or utilising their services for election and other duties could not render them as employees of the Corporation. Mere issue of entry passes during curfew or utilising their services for election and other duties could not render them as employees of the Corporation. Thus the over-whelming evidence indicated absence of relationship of employer and employee between the petitioner and these eight employees. The findings to the contrary recorded by the Industrial Tribunal can safely be styled as perverse finding. The award based on such perverse finding is liable to be quashed in exercise of writ jurisdiction of this Court. ( 16 ) THE Industrial Tribunal has taken notice of the consent terms in Special Civil Application No. 1145 of 1983 on the basis of which the aforesaid Special Civil Application was decided by this Court. But it has totally over-looked clause (g) of the said terms of settlement which reads as under :"the Municipal Corporation has entered into settlement with workmen in view of peculiar facts of the case and suggestion of the High Court and this should not be considered by way of binding precedent in respect of other employees of the Corporation. "the effect of this clause in the settlement will be that these terms in the settlement would govern only those employees who were parties in the aforesaid Special Civil Application. This concession was given for three reasons, firstly because they were appointed by the Municipal Commissioner and secondly because of the peculiar facts of the case and thirdly because of suggestion given by this Court that because those employees were to retire shortly, the matter should come to end. The Industrial Tribunal had tried to take help from this clause in the settlement, but it went totally wrong in misconstruing clause (g) of the settlement terms. If a finding is arrived at by ignoring material portion of a clause in the terms of settlement it can again be said to be perverse finding and in any case such finding suffers from manifest error apparent on the face of the record. ( 17 ) TO sum up therefore it can be concluded that there existed no relationship of employer and employee between the petitioner and eight persons for whose benefit the impugned Award was given and as such the reference of Industrial Tribunal was incompetent and without jurisdiction inasmuch as these employees can not be defined as workmen within the meaning of Section 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Award further suffers from jurisdictional error. The Award further suffers from the vice of perversity. The award suffers from the vice of error apparent on the face of the record as well as apparent on the face of the Award. In the result such award cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed. ( 18 ) THE petitin, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The impugned award dated 10. 10. 1994 of the Industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad is hereby quashed. No order as to costs. .