STATE OF M. P. v. SHIV SHANKAR — 1999 DIGILAW 452 (MP)

JUDGMENT S.P. Srivastava, J. Feeling aggrieved by a common order passed by a learned Single Judge disposing of the two writ petitions filed by the petitioner/respondent No. 1 that respondents-appellants have come up in the present two Letters Patent Appeals seeking redress praying for the setting-aside of the impugned order, disposing of both the writ petitions. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants as well as the learned Counsel representing the respondent No. 1 at length and have carefully perused the record. The Letters Patent Appeal No. 315/1996 arises out of the writ petition No. 1573/1991 filed on 17-9-1991 praying that the act of the present appellants as per Annexure-P/13 restraining the petitioner-respondent from raising any construction over the land leased out as per lease deed, Annexure-P/8, be quashed and the present appellants as well as the respondent No. 3 be further directed to allow the petitioner to carry out the construction and take steps for running the small scale industry as permitted by the present respondent No. 2/the District Industries Centre, Morena through General Manager. In this writ petition, the State of M.P. through the Collector, Morena the District Industries Centre, Morena and the M.P. Housing Board had been impleaded as respondents No. 1 to 3, respectively. Vide the order dated 27-8-1991 (Annexure-P/13), at the instance of the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Morena the Collector, district Morena had restrained the present petitioner-respondent from raising any construction over the land in dispute and had directed for maintaining the status-quo as the Housing Board had raised an objection in regard to the transferring of the land in favour of the Industries Department. During the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition, the respondent No. 1 had filed another writ petition being W.P. No. 1289/1994 on 20-10-1994 challenging the order passed by the Board of Revenue granting permission to the Collector exercising the jurisdiction u/s 51 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 to review the order passed by his predecessor in office dated 27-8-1991 with a direction to enquire as to why the land in dispute had been recorded in the khasara as "Chamoi extra Nazul" observing that in fact the nature of the description of the land in dispute should have been chamoi and the entry showing it "extra Nazul" appeared to be unauthorised. The Collector was directed to examine the revenue records relating to the period anterior to the settlement or misal bandobast in order to find out the correctness of the entry. The petitioner in the aforesaid writ petition had prayed for the quashing of the order passed by the Board of Revenue referred to hereinabove and had further sought for a writ of prohibition seeking to restrain the respondents from reviewing the grant in his favour. Reliance had been placed in support of the aforesaid relief on the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Usha Devi and others. Vs. State of M.P. and others reported in 1990 RN 77, clarifying that suo motu exercise of the power has to be done within reasonable period of time and the extent of reasonable period is to be determined with reference to the facts and circumstances of the case. Taking into consideration the nature of the controversy raised in the aforesaid writ petitions, the learned Single Judge had heard them together and had disposed them of by a common judgment and order. With the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties, both the appeals have been heard together and are being disposed of by a common order. The facts in brief shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of these appeals lie in a narrow compass: On 27-7-1991, after holding various enquiries, the Collector, district Morena accepting the proposal of the Tehsildar, Morena in regard to the transfer of 11 biswa area of survey plot No. 462 in dispute, in favour of the District Industries Centre, Morena, which was recommended by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Morena, reserving the aforesaid land for utilisation for industrial purpose, had transferred the same to the District Industries Centre, Morena. The entry in the revenue records relating to the aforesaid plot was directed to be altered accordingly. Subsequently, on 30-7-1991, the Governor of the State of Madhya Pradesh acting through the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Morena executed a lease in respect of the aforesaid plot of land in favour of Shri Shiv Shankar Mandil, the respondent No. 1. The entry in the revenue records relating to the aforesaid plot was directed to be altered accordingly. Subsequently, on 30-7-1991, the Governor of the State of Madhya Pradesh acting through the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Morena executed a lease in respect of the aforesaid plot of land in favour of Shri Shiv Shankar Mandil, the respondent No. 1. This lease, which was registered on 3-8-1991, had been granted subject to several conditions for a term of 99 years commencing from 30-7-1991, for the purpose of construction and establishing thereon a factory for the manufacture of Steel Furniture and Purposes Ancillary thereto. The clause 37 of the aforesaid lease stipulated that nothing contained therein shall be constructed as giving the lessee any right or interest in the land and if put in possession of the premises before the execution of the lease deed, he shall be deemed to be a licensee only. It was further provided under Clause 38 of the lease that in the event of any dispute arising between the parties in respect of the deed or on any matter whatsoever connected therewith, except in respect of the matters on which decision of the Industries Commissioner is declared thereunder as final and binding on the lessee, the same shall be referred to the arbitration of local Court concerned whose decision thereon shall be final and binding on the parties. Pursuant to the execution of the lease, the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Morena vide the Dakhalnama dated 5-8-1991 put the lessee in possession of the said land. On 27-8-1991, the Collector, Morena had issued the restraint order, to which a reference has already been made hereinabove. It may be noticed that on 23-8-1991, the Assistant Engineer. M.P. Grih Nirman Mandal, Up Sambhag, Morena had moved an application before the Collector, district Morena for cancelling the allotment of the land in dispute and transferring the same in favour of the petitioner-respondent, praying further to restrain the respondent No. 1 from continuing the digging work carried out in the land in dispute. The Collector, district Morena sent a letter on 11-2-1994 to the Commissioner, Chambal Division, Gwalior for setting aside the order transferring the land in dispute to the industries department. The Collector, district Morena sent a letter on 11-2-1994 to the Commissioner, Chambal Division, Gwalior for setting aside the order transferring the land in dispute to the industries department. It may also be noticed that the possession of the land in question was not with the Grih Nirman Mandal as is apparent from the letter dated 30-8-1991 of the Sanyukt Sanchalak, Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh, Gwalior wherein referring to the objection filed by the M.P. Grih Nirman Mandal, Morena, it has been stated that the Mandal had not yet obtained the possession of the land in dispute. It is not disputed that the land in question had not been acquired in the Land Acquisition proceeding for the Board. In fact, the letter of the Housing Commissioner, Bhopal dated 12-1978, a true copy of which has been filed as Annexure-R/3(4) in the writ petition No. 1573 of 1991, indicates that the request for proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act was in respect of khasra plot Nos. 458, 462, 482 and 485, which were Government land, but no action was taken for acquiring the land in dispute which is a part of plot No. 462. In fact, it is not disputed that survey plot No. 462 was not acquired at all but the stand of the Housing Board was that it was by inadvertence that this had happened. After submitting the representation to the Commissioner, Chambal Division, referred to hereinabove the State of M.P. moved an application before the Board of Revenue in the year 1994 seeking its permission u/s 51 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code for reviewing the order dated 7-1991. The Board of Revenue while granting the permission u/s 51 of the Code for reviewing the order noticed that so far as the order dated 27-7-1991 was concerned, it consisted of two parts, one relating to transfer of the land in dispute in favour of the Industries Department and the other in regard to the alteration of the entries in the revenue records relating to the land in dispute. So far as that part of the order which related to the transfer and allotting of the land in dispute was concerned, the Board of Revenue had come to the conclusion that such an order did not fall within the purview of section 51 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code. So far as that part of the order which related to the transfer and allotting of the land in dispute was concerned, the Board of Revenue had come to the conclusion that such an order did not fall within the purview of section 51 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code. However, so far as that part of the order directing for the correction of the entries in the revenue records relating to the land in dispute was concerned, the Board of Revenue was of the view that it fell within the purview of section 51 of the Code and granted the permission with the directions, to which a reference has already been made above. The learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that in case the land in dispute was Nazul, the allotment of the same was to be governed by the executive instructions contained in Revenue Book Circular. However, in case the land in dispute was a pasture land or a charnoi, the provisions of section 237 of the Code would be attracted. Considering the facts and circumstances as brought on record, the learned Single Judge had come to the conclusion that two questions had arisen for determination in the case, of which one was as to whether a lease granted by the State of M.P. through the Industries Department could be set at naught or nullified by exercise of powers of review by the succeeding Collector u/s 51 of the Code, the other question was as to whether by exercise of power of review u/s 51 of the Code, the lease granted to the petitioner could be set aside. The learned Single Judge after carefully considering the facts and circumstances brought on record came to the conclusion that a valid lease granted under the Code could not be set-aside on a ground other than those specifically provided for in section 182 of the Code and permitting powers of review for setting aside the lease would be contravention of the aforesaid provision and violative of the rights of the Government lessee conferred u/s 182 of the Code. It was emphasised by the learned Single Judge that the power of review conferred u/s 51 of the Code could not be exercised with any obliqqe motive of setting aside a valid grant of lease of land made in favour of a government lessee. It was emphasised by the learned Single Judge that the power of review conferred u/s 51 of the Code could not be exercised with any obliqqe motive of setting aside a valid grant of lease of land made in favour of a government lessee. It was further observed that in the present case the lease of the land had been granted for raising a factory and the petitioner had obtained possession, paid premium, spent money for obtaining the registered lease-deed and had made initial expenditure for preparing the land for raising structure. In such a situation, it was indicated that the power of review should have been exercised well before the petitioner made substantial expenditure incurring liabilities for setting up of an industry as a means of his livelihood, pursuant to the grant of lease in his favour. It was held that the exercise of powers of review was highly belated and the impugned action of the respondents was not at all supportable in law. The learned Single Judge however made it clear that although a valid title and possession in respect of the land in dispute had been conferred on the petitioner, in any case, if the land was found to be essential for implementation of the housing scheme of the Housing Board, it would be open to the Housing Board to acquire the land in accordance with the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Grih Nirman Mandal Adhiniyam and the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, provided there existed a public purpose and the provisions of law permit such a course. The learned Single Judge had allowed both the writ petitions quashing the communication Annexure-P/13 dated 27-8-1991, referred to hereinabove, as well as the order passed by the Board of Revenue dated 11-5-1994, a true copy of which has been filed as Annexure P/1 in Writ Petition No. 1289/94. The quashing of the aforesaid order obviously was subject to the observations made in para 14 of the judgment, leaving it open to the Housing Board to acquire the land in dispute in accordance with the law. The quashing of the aforesaid order obviously was subject to the observations made in para 14 of the judgment, leaving it open to the Housing Board to acquire the land in dispute in accordance with the law. The learned Counsel for the present respondent No. 1 /petitioner has raised a preliminary objection strenuously urging that these appeals are not maintainable as they are directed against the order passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of the jurisdiction envisaged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The learned Counsel for the appellants has however urged that in the present case the writ petition itself had been filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India indicating thereby that the petitioner had invoked this Court's jurisdiction as envisaged not only under Article 226 of the Constitution but also as envisaged under Article 227 of the Constitution. It has been strenuously contended that the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment has nowhere even indicated that he was exercising the jurisdiction as contemplated under Article 227 of the Constitution alone and not under Article 226 of the Constitution. It has further been urged that the mere fact that an order has been passed by a Tribunal is not conclusive or decisive for coming to an irresistible conclusion that the order disposing of a writ petition against an order passed by such a Tribunal necessarily amounted to an order having been passed in exercise of the jurisdiction contemplated under Article 227 of the Constitution only. The learned Counsel for the appellants has laid much emphasis on the fact that in the present case the Board of Revenue had not passed the impugned order in exercise of any revisory or appellate jurisdiction but had passed the same in the exercise of its original jurisdiction as envisaged u/s 51 of the Code. It has further been urged that in any view of the matter taking into consideration the facts and circumstances brought on record as well as the nature of the reliefs claimed and also the reliefs granted by the learned Single Judge, there can be no manner of doubt that the learned Single Judge had exercised the jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution also. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties. This Court in its decision in the case of Smt. Vrinda Devi vs. Noor Jahan and others, reported in 1998 (1) MPU 405 : 1998 (1) JU 210, after considering the implications arising under the ratio of the various decisions of the Apex Court as well as the decisions rendered by Division Benches of this Court, had observed that the provision indicated by the petitioner, under which the petition had been filed, was not quite relevant and that did not debar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction which otherwise it possesses to secure the ends of justice correcting the grave and palpable errors depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, unless there is a special procedure prescribed, prohibiting such an action, which procedure is mandatory. Relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India and others Vs. Giriraj Sharma, , as well as in the case of AIR 1975 1297 (SC) this Court had clarified that the High Court has not only administrative superintendence over the subordinate Courts and Tribunals, but it has also the power of judicial superintendence to be exercised to keep the subordinate Court and Tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting their mere errors. Obviously, therefore, judicial superintendence envisaged under Article 227of the Constitution, has a limited scope of interference confined to those cases where the tribunal's orders sought to be impugned has been passed in excess of the jurisdiction vested in it or stands vitiated on account of any such procedural irregularity which goes to the root of the matter. This Court in its aforesaid decision had observed that there may be a case where in view of statutory provision made in exercise of power under Article 323A of the Constitution, the availability of the jurisdiction contemplated under Article 226 thereof may be absolutely ruled out in which case the writ petition directed against the order of the tribunal has to be treated as one invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution only. The Letters Patent Appeal in such cases cannot be maintained or entertained in view of the implications arising under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent Appeal in such cases cannot be maintained or entertained in view of the implications arising under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. It was further observed that our Constitution is structured with a wealth of influential and choice words, measured phrases and expressions, the real meaning and message of which is sometimes missed or on many occasions are hidden or unforeseen. It was noticed that Article 227 of the Constitution did not in terms provide for the issuance of writs which is provided expressly under Article 226 of the Constitution alone. Further, Article 227, Sub-clauses (1) and (2) when read together clearly indicate the nature and extent of the jurisdiction envisaged under that Article. The fields of operation of both these Articles of the Constitution appear to be overlapping to some extent. However, considering the implications, relevance and significance as well as the spirit and core of the expression used in the aforesaid Articles, the unescapable conclusion is that the jurisdiction envisaged under Article 227 of the Constitution must be deemed to relate to administrative matters with ancillary judicial powers. The power of superintendence is in fact, in addition to the powers conferred or secured in favour of the High Court by Article 226 of the Constitution. It was however indicated that the jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution, cannot be interchanged even if occasionally the ultimate result to be achieved may be the same or similar in nature. It was, however, clarified that if on the facts and circumstances of the case the grievance could be suitably and adequately redressed under Article 227 of the Constitution, the filing of a petition under Article 226of the Constitution will be improper. It was also observed that in a case where there is plurality of the remedies, they continue to be available till elected. The fact that the impugned order had been passed by a tribunal functioning under the superintendence of the High Court is not by itself a decisive factor conclusively indicating that the writ petition was a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, and the jurisdiction envisaged therein alone was invoked. It all depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case which may be of varied nature where the interference by this Court exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction contemplated under Article 226 of the Constitution may or may not be warranted. It all depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case which may be of varied nature where the interference by this Court exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction contemplated under Article 226 of the Constitution may or may not be warranted. If a case is made out warranting an interference, while exercising the jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution expressly providing for the issuance of writs etc., the High Court cannot shirk its responsibility on the ground that the petition is one which has been filed invoking the jurisdiction contemplated under Article 227 of the Constitution. The source of authority to pass the appropriate orders does not depend upon the provision which has been disclosed by the petitioner in the writ petition but has to be traced to the relevant statutory provision which stands attracted to the facts and circumstances proved and established on record. It was further indicated that the power of superintendence granted to the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is not only administrative but also judicial power; but the extent of that judicial power is ancillary to the administrative power. The fields of operation of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution are sometimes overlapping and therefore the question as to whether in a particular case the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution has to be found out from the facts and circumstances brought on record, and the nature of the relief claimed by the petitioner or ultimately granted by the Court. It was also observed in Vrinda Devi's case (supra) that considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of that case as well as the pleadings of the parties in the writ petition and the judgment of the learned Single Judge and the order of the Board of Revenue, challenged in that case, the order disposing of the writ petition was an order under Article 226 of the Constitution, and in that view of the matter, the Letters Patent Appeal was held to be maintainable. It may be noticed that in its decision in the case of Mangalbhai and Others Vs. Dr Radhyshyam Agarwal, , while considering the observations made in its earlier decision the case of Umaji Keshao Meshram and Others Vs. It may be noticed that in its decision in the case of Mangalbhai and Others Vs. Dr Radhyshyam Agarwal, , while considering the observations made in its earlier decision the case of Umaji Keshao Meshram and Others Vs. Radhikabai and Another, , the Apex Court itself had indicated that if the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal, the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226. It may also be noticed at this stage that in its decision in the case of Umaji (supra), the Apex Court had approved of the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Aidal Singh vs. Karan Singh, rendered by a Aidal Singh and Others Vs. Karan Singh and Others, , and the Punjab High Court in its decision in the case of Raj Kishan Jain Vs. Tulsi Dass etc., , wherein view to the same effect as indicated above had been expressed. In its decision in the case of Aidal Singh (supra), it had been observed that it is more reasonable to hold that an appeal should lie in cases where the judgment of a Single Judge relates to the judgment of a Court or Tribunal than to take a contrary view, and further that in cases where the relief can be given under both, the Court should exercise its power under Article 226 on the principle that where a specific remedy is provided, the general provisions of law should not be resorted to. In any case, if a party is otherwise entitled to a right of appeal against an order under Article 226, the fact that the same relief could be granted under Article 227 is no reason for depriving it of the said right where the party has given the application itself under Article 226, and has claimed its right to relief under the said Article, and the case itself has been entertained and disposed of by the Court under the same Article. In its decision in the case of Raj Kishan (supra), which has been affirmed by the Apex Court, it had been observed that when same facts allowed an aggrieved person to move the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution then in view of the wider scope of Article 226 it must be assumed that the petitioner intended to move the High Court primarily under Article 226 of the Constitution particularly when an order under that article was open to Letters Patent Appeal. It would be unnatural to assume that the aggrieved person would invoke the powers of the High Court under a provision which was less wide in scope than the one with wider scope. In the decision in the case of Sushilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar and others Vs. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shah and others, , while reversing the order passed by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court holding that the order passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing a writ petition summarily without reasons was an order passed under Article 227 of the Constitution, it was indicated by the Apex Court that the grounds taken in the writ petition unmistakably showed that the petition was under Article 226 and the order passed by the learned Single Judge was also under Article 226. The Apex Court in its aforesaid decision considered its earlier decision in the case of Umaji Keshao (supra) in extenso and observed that it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and, the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226, and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. It may further be noticed that in the case of Umaji Keshao (supra) the fact that the order appealed against in the intra-Court appeal had been passed in exercise of the jurisdiction envisaged under Article 227 of the Constitution was not disputed and was not in issue. The Apex Court had clarified this position in para 110 of the judgment observing that admittedly the petition wherein the said order had been passed was under Article 227 of the Constitution. A Division Bench of this Court in its decision reported as Shafmllah vs. M.P.S.R.T.C., Gwalior and others reported in 1990 MPU 515, had rejected a preliminary objection about the maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in a writ petition challenging the decision of the Industrial Tribunal holding that the order had to be taken to be passed in the exercise of jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226of the Constitution. In its another decision in the case of Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd., Bhilai and others vs. State Industrial Court, M.P. and another, reported in 1996 MPU 835 : 1996 MPLSR 118, a Division Bench of this Court had held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article226or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal, the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article and if in deciding the matter in the final order, the Court gives a final direction which may pertain to Article 227 of the Constitution, this may not deprive the parties of the right of Letters Patent Appeal. In our considered opinion, in a case where such a benefit stands extended to the petitioner, there cannot be any justifiable reason to deprive an aggrieved respondent of such a benefit. In our considered opinion, in a case where such a benefit stands extended to the petitioner, there cannot be any justifiable reason to deprive an aggrieved respondent of such a benefit. The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has contended that in a decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Devram vs. Sadoo, reported in 1996 MPU 606 : 1996 (2) VB 216, it had been held that a Letters Patent Appeal directed against an order passed in exercise of the jurisdiction envisaged under Article 227of the Constitution was untenable in law, and tried to draw support from the said decision. We have carefully perused the said decision and are of the considered opinion that its ratio cannot be taken to be attracted in the facts and circumstances of this case by any stretch of imagination. In that case, the Division Bench had come to a definite conclusion that the remedy contemplated under Article 226 of the Constitution was not available to the petitioner in that case and the recourse to Article 226 of the Constitution was totally misplaced, and the Election in question had been challenged before the Single Judge under Article 227 of the Constitution. It is not the position in the case in hand. The Division Bench in its aforesaid decision had observed that in another case where the Letters Patent Appeal directed against an order passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution was dismissed as untenable and the SLP challenging the same had been dismissed, such dismissal of the Special Leave Petition, in our view, was of no consequence so far as the present case is concerned as in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Gopabandhu Biswal Vs. Krishna Chandra Mohanty and Others, , it stands amply clarified that the dismissal of the SLP in effect only amounts to declining to entertain an appeal making the order appealed against final and binding. In its decision in the case of Laxman Marotrao Navakhare Vs. Krishna Chandra Mohanty and Others, , it stands amply clarified that the dismissal of the SLP in effect only amounts to declining to entertain an appeal making the order appealed against final and binding. In its decision in the case of Laxman Marotrao Navakhare Vs. Keshavrao Eknathsa Tapar, , the Apex Court had held that the dismissal of the SLP does not result in the merger observing thus:-- ".......The discretionary power under Article 136 cannot be construed as to confer a right of appeal where none exist, although the power under Article 136(1) is unfettered but it cannot be held that after having entertained a SLP against any final or inter locutory order, this Court converts itself into a Court of appeal for the hearing of the dispute involved and as such when the appeal is dismissed the decree passed by the High Court merges into the decree of this Court...." It was further observed that: ".......This Court while exercising its discretionary power under Article 136 of the Constitution even while dismissing the appeal shall not be deemed to have passed any decree....". Obviously therefore, the fact that a SLP is dismissed does not mean that the reasonings contained in the order impugned are affirmed or the said decision is to be taken as a decision of the Apex Court having binding effect as contemplated under Article 141 of the Constitution. There may be several factors for declining to interfere while dismissing a special leave petition, but this dismissal makes the order impugned final and binding between the parties to that case, so much so that even an application seeking review of the said order against which the SLP is filed moved by any party thereto is not entertainable. The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has placed strong reliance on the observations occurring in the decision of this Court rendered by a Division Bench in the case of Abdul Rahim Khan Vs. M.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Others, , to the effect that: "Therefore, whenever a writ petition is filed against the order passed by the Labour Court or Industrial Court or Board of Revenue or any other Tribunal, then such kind of petitions are under Article 227 of the Constitution only because the High Court exercises the power of superintendence over those Tribunals. Simply because in some cases, additional relief is sought and it is styled under Article 226 of the Constitution, that will not be decisive of the matter, but looking to the nature of petition if it is against the order passed by the Tribunal, then such petition shall be treated to be as petition against Article 227 and the Court shall exercise its superintendence power under Article 227except where vires of any enactment is challenged. (Emphasis supplied). It was further observed that in the frame of the petition, if it is only to challenge the order of the Tribunal irrespective of fact that it is referred to Article 226, this will be a petition under Article 227 and the learned Single Judge will only exercise the power under Article of the Constitution of India. (Emphasis supplied). On the strength of the aforesaid observations it is sought to be urged that the impugned order has to be taken to have been passed in exercise of the jurisdiction envisaged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and not under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has contended that the observations made in the decision in the case of Abdul Rahim Khan (supra), to which a reference has been made hereinabove, cannot be taken to have an effect of a binding precedent being per incurium, as not only the earlier decisions of a Bench of co-ordinate jurisdiction have gone unnoticed but the effect of the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court, to which a reference has been made hereinabove had not been taken notice of while making such observations. Reliance has been placed in this connection on the observations made in the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. vs. M/s. Synthetic & Chemicals Limited, reported in 1991 (JT) 3 SC 268, wherein it has been indicated as under: "Incuria literally means carelessness. In practice per incurium appears to mean per ignoratium. English Courts have developed the principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. The "quotable in law" is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, 'in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority'. (1944 IKB 718, Young vs. Bistol Aeroplane Ltd.). In practice per incurium appears to mean per ignoratium. English Courts have developed the principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. The "quotable in law" is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, 'in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority'. (1944 IKB 718, Young vs. Bistol Aeroplane Ltd.). Same has been accepted, approved and adopted by this Court while interpreting Article 141 of the Constitution which embodies the doctrine of precedents as a matter of law. In Jaisri Sahu Vs. Rajdewan Dubey and Others, , this Court while pointing out the procedure to be followed when conflicting decisions are placed before a Bench extracted a passage from Halsbury Laws of England incorporating one of the exceptions when the decision of an Appellate Court is not binding." It was further clarified by the Apex Court that: "A decision passed sub-silentio, in the technical sense that has come to be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the Court or present to its mind. (Salmond 12th Edition) In Lancaster Motor Company (London) Ltd. vs. Bremith Ltd, 1941 IKB 675, the Court did not feel bound by earlier decision as it was rendered without any argument, without reference to the crucial words of the rule and without any citation of the authority. It was approved by this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Gurnam Kaur, . The Bench held that precedents sub-silentio and without argument are of no moment. The Courts thus have taken recourse to this principle for relieving from injustice perpetrated by unjust precedents. A decision which is not express and is not founded on reasons nor it proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141. Uniformity and consistency are core of judicial discipline. But that which escapes in the judgment without any occasion is not ratio decidendi. In Shama Rao vs. State of Pondichery AIR 1967 SC 1680, it was observed, "it is trite to say that a decision is binding not because of its conclusions, but in regard to its ratio and the principles, laid down therein. But that which escapes in the judgment without any occasion is not ratio decidendi. In Shama Rao vs. State of Pondichery AIR 1967 SC 1680, it was observed, "it is trite to say that a decision is binding not because of its conclusions, but in regard to its ratio and the principles, laid down therein. Restraint in dissenting or overruling is for sake of stability and uniformity but rigidity beyond reasonable limits is inimical to the growth of law." (Emphasis supplied) It must be emphasised that the doctrine of per incurium only applies where another Division Bench of this Court has reached a decision in the absence of knowledge of a decision binding on it or a statute, and that in either case it has to be shown that had the Court had this material, it must have reached a contrary decision. This is per incurium. This doctrine however cannot be extended to a case where if different arguments had been placed before it or if different material had been placed before it, it might have reached a different conclusion. In its decision in the case of Goodyear India Ltd., Gedore (India) Pvt. Ltd., Kelvinator of India Ltd. and the Food Corporation of India and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Another, , the Apex Court had observed that it is well settled that a precedent is an authority only for what it actually decides and not for what may remotely or even logically follow from it. Further, reiterating its view in its earlier decisions, it was pointed out that a decision on a question which has not been argued cannot be treated as a precedent. It is apparent from a perusal of the decision in the case of Abdul Rahim Khan (supra) that the earlier decisions of a Bench of co-ordinate jurisdiction had gone unnoticed. While earlier decision of a Bench of coordinate jurisdiction constituted a binding precedent, the decisions of the Apex Court, to which a reference has been made hereinabove, had the binding effect as envisaged under Article 141 of the Constitution. While earlier decision of a Bench of coordinate jurisdiction constituted a binding precedent, the decisions of the Apex Court, to which a reference has been made hereinabove, had the binding effect as envisaged under Article 141 of the Constitution. In such a circumstance, the observations made in Abdul Rahim Khan's case (supra) sought to be relied upon in support of the submission in regard to the nonmaintainability of the present appeals, cannot come to the rescue of the respondent as the aforesaid observations in the facts and circumstances as noticed hereinabove could not be taken to have the force of a binding precedent. This Court is bound to follow the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court which clearly stand attracted in the facts and circumstances of this case. Further, taking into consideration the facts and circumstances as brought on record, including the pleadings of the parties as well as the nature of the reliefs claimed by the petitioner/respondent, we have no doubt in our mind that the petitioner had also invoked the jurisdiction of this Court as envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution and the learned Single Judge had also exercised the same while granting the reliefs in question. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the contention in regard to the non-maintainability of the appeals as urged by the contesting respondent is not at all acceptable being absolutely devoid of any merit. In the present case, the record indicates that on the request of the M.P. Housing Board, the respondent No. 3, proceedings were initiated for the acquisition of 12.681 hectares of land situate in village Jaurakhurd within which area the land in dispute in the present case having an area of 11 biswas only of survey plot No. 462 was also situated. The user of this entire area was diverted and was set apart for being utilised for the non-agricultural purposes vide the order passed by the competent authority on 7-2-1978 and thereafter proceedings were initiated for acquiring the aforesaid land on 26-12-1978 for which a request had been made by the Housing Commissioner, M.P. Housing Board, Bhopal. However, in the acquisition proceedings survey plot No. 462 having an area of 11 biswas, which is the land in dispute, was not acquired and was left out. However, in the acquisition proceedings survey plot No. 462 having an area of 11 biswas, which is the land in dispute, was not acquired and was left out. In the counter-affidavit/return, filed by respondent No. 3 on 20-7- 1992, it was admitted that the land in dispute was surrounded by the land acquired by the M.P. Housing Board and was the Nazul land. In fact, it was categorically asserted that the survey plot No. 462 was and is totally surrounded by the land belonging to private persons which had been acquired by the M.P. Housing Board in the year 1981. It is, therefore, obvious that on the relevant date when the Nazul land in dispute had been transferred to the Industries Department and thereafter leased out to the respondent-petitioner, it had ceased to be a land as envisaged under the Zamindari Abolition Act and was not being utilised for agricultural purposes as contemplated under the provisions of M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, which is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to Land Revenue, the powers of Revenue Officer, the rights and liabilities of the holders of the lands from the State Government, agricultural tenures and other matters relating to land and liabilities incidental thereto in Madhya Pradesh. The provisions contained in section 234 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, stipulate preparation of Nistar Patrik embodying scheme of management of all unoccupied land in the village and all matters incidental thereto and more particularly the matters specified in section 235. The State Government has published a Rajasya Pustak Paripatra (Revenue Book Circular) issuing directions on various matters in regard to the management of the land vesting in it. In Rajaysva Pustak Paripatra Khand 4, Kramank 1, it has been clarified that 'Nazul' and 'Milkiyat Sarkar' refer to that land which does not fall within the categories indicated therein. It has been specifically provided that all lands in possession of either the State Government or the Central Government were to be classified in two categories i.e. 'Nazul' or 'Milkiyat Sarkar' and were to be recorded as such. In the present case, not only the appellants but even the respondent No. 2, the M.P. Housing Board, clearly had categorically admitted that the land in dispute was Government land which at the relevant time was not being used for agricultural purposes and was surrounded by buildings. In the present case, not only the appellants but even the respondent No. 2, the M.P. Housing Board, clearly had categorically admitted that the land in dispute was Government land which at the relevant time was not being used for agricultural purposes and was surrounded by buildings. Obviously, it had become a part of the urban land. In the aforesaid view of the matter, it is clear that the title of the State Government and its competence to lease out the land in dispute, which vested in it, is not in controversy. The provisions contained in section 57 of the Code provide that all land belonged to the State Government and all such land, including standing and flowing water, mines, quarries, minerals and forests reserved or not, and all rights in the sub-soil of any land are the property of the State Government, provided that this declaration contained in section 57(1) of the Code shall not be deemed to affect any rights of any person subsisting at the coming into force of this Code in any such property. The Collector, in the present case, had granted permission for diversion of the user of the land in dispute for commercial purposes for setting up of industries on 27-7-1991. This action was sought to be set at naught by the successor in office of the Collector seeking permission to review the said order from the Board of Revenue in the year 1994. The learned Single Judge on cogent reasons has found that the jurisdiction envisaged u/s 51 of the Code could not be taken to have been exercised within a reasonable time. The learned Single Judge drew support for his view from the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of The State of Gujarat Vs. Patil Raghav Natha and Others, . Taking into consideration the relevant factors as brought on record, it was found that the proceedings for exercising the aforesaid jurisdiction were initiated with inordinate delay. We are of the considered opinion that no justifiable ground has been made out requiring interference in the aforesaid finding returned against the appellants. Patil Raghav Natha and Others, . Taking into consideration the relevant factors as brought on record, it was found that the proceedings for exercising the aforesaid jurisdiction were initiated with inordinate delay. We are of the considered opinion that no justifiable ground has been made out requiring interference in the aforesaid finding returned against the appellants. In the aforesaid connection, it may be noticed that the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Mohammed Kavi vs. Fatma Bai Ibrahim, C.A. No. 5023 of 1985, decided on 22-8-1997, had indicated that in view of the settled position by several judgments of the Apex Court, where a power is vested in a statutory authority without prescribing any time limit, such power should be exercised within a reasonable time. In that case, the proceedings for exercise of such a jurisdiction to set at naught the order dated 14-2-1973 were initiated in September, 1976. The Apex Court found that since the persons, in whose favour the initial order had been passed, had made investment etc., they were likely to suffer irreparable injury in case the order was set at naught in exercise of such a discretionary jurisdiction. The order dated 29-4-1977 passed in exercise of such a jurisdiction in the aforesaid proceedings was held not to have been passed within a reasonable time. The Apex Court reiterated its earlier view in its decision in the case of The State of Gujarat Vs. Patil Raghav Natha and Others, and in the case of Ram Chand and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , observing that where no time limit is prescribed for exercise of a power under a statute, it does not mean that it can be exercised at any time, and further that such power has to be exercised within a reasonable time. It may be noticed that from the observations made by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of State of Gujrat vs. Patil Raghav Natha (supra), it is apparent that even if there is no period of limitation prescribed for the exercise of jurisdiction which may be exercised even suo motu, yet this power must be exercised within a reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being interfered with. There is yet another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. In the lease executed by the State-appellant in favour of the petitioner respondent, it had been clearly stipulated that in the event of any dispute arising between the parties in respect of the deed or any matter whatsoever connected therewith except in respect of the matters on which decision of the Industries Commissioner has declared under the lease as final and binding on the lessee, the same shall be referred to the arbitration of the local Court concerned whose decision thereon shall be final and binding on the parties. It is, therefore, apparent that in the aforesaid circumstances, there could be no occasion for either taking the action impugned in the writ petition No. 1573/1991 giving rise to L.P.A. No. 315/1996 or taking any action impugned in the writ petition No. 1289/1994 giving rise to L.P.A. No. 296/1996. It may further be noticed that mutation in the revenue records pertaining to a particular survey plot by itself does not create title but it is only the record of acquisition of title for the purposes of mutation. The enquiries in this connection are of a summary nature only, under the scheme of the Code. The declaration of title in respect of that land is the function of the Civil Court. The lease deed in question, which was duly registered, created a civil right. The binding effect of such a deed could be taken away only by a decree passed by a Civil Court. Obviously, therefore, in case in the mutation proceedings of a summary nature the revenue authority takes a decision in regard to a claim for mutation, the aggrieved party may approach the civil Court for the redressal of the grievance. The decision relating to mutation in respect of any land as contemplated under the Revenue Code under the order of a Revenue Authority acting under that Code is always subject to the final order passed by the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. The decision relating to mutation in respect of any land as contemplated under the Revenue Code under the order of a Revenue Authority acting under that Code is always subject to the final order passed by the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. In the present case, as provided u/s 181 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, a person who holds land from the State Government or to whom a right to occupy land is granted by the State Government and he was not entitled to hold the land as a Bhumiswami was to be called a Government lessee in respect of such a land subject to the rights and liabilities as stipulated u/s 182 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code. The Revenue Officer contemplated u/s 182 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code acts on behalf of the State. The State itself had chosen to get its grievance, if any, redressed before the forum stipulated in the deed of lease. It could not by its unilateral action by-pass the same as appears to have been done in the present case. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances as brought on record, we are satisfied that the ultimate order passed by the learned Single Judge disposing of the writ petitions does not require any interference. In view of the aforesaid conclusions, these appeals fail and are hereby dismissed, subject to the observations made hereinabove. There shall however be no order as to costs.