Judgment :- K. Narayana Kurup, J. The petitioners in CMP No. 7017/95 in O.P. 5879/93 are the appellants. They figure as respondents 1 to 4 in the Original Petition which was one filed for a direction for police protection to enable the respondents herein/ petitioners in the Original Petition to carry on their business of manufacture of hollow bricks peacefully and without being obstructed by anyone and in particular, respondents 5 to 22 in the Original Petition. The respondents herein filed the aforesaid Original Petition for directing the appellants herein viz. the police to afford adequate police protection to their life and property and also for transporting the materials into and finished products outside their industrial unit, viz., St. Mary's Hollow Bricks without being obstructed by anybody. This Court by judgment dated 15.6.1993 in O.P. No. 5879/93 directed the appellants herein to afford adequate police protection to the respondents/ petitioners for their life and property and for their industrial unit so as to enable them to transport the bricks into and out of the premises of the said industrial unit. The appellants were also directed to give necessary protection to ensure that materials from the factory reach their destination without obstruction from respondents 5 to 22 in the Original Petition. As per the said direction police protection was granted to the respondents herein from 15.6.1993 onwards. In these circumstances, the appellants filed CMP No. 7017/95 in the Original Petition praying for a direction to the respondents herein who are the petitioners in the Original Petition to pay charges to the Government for the police protection afforded to them from 15.6.1993 and for continuous protection. A learned Single Judge as per the order impugned in this Writ Appeal, dismissed the CMP observing that: 1. While disposing the OP no claim was pressed by the respondents 1 to 4 in the OP regarding cost of police protection. 2. The order for protection was passed when the High Court found that the police has failed in their duties to maintain law and order and preventing commission of crime. 3. It was after finding that it is highly necessary to issue an order for protection that the Court granted the order and the Court has never thought of making the petitioners liable for the cost of granting police protection. 4. 3. It was after finding that it is highly necessary to issue an order for protection that the Court granted the order and the Court has never thought of making the petitioners liable for the cost of granting police protection. 4. The orders granting cost for police protection in OP No. 16731/94 and C. A. 72/92 cannot be followed here as there were specific order for cost in the judgment itself whereas such directions are absent in the instant case." The learned Single Judge also observed that the State is not entitled to claim cost of police protection extended to individuals on the basis of orders of the Court. 2. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the learned Single Judge the appellants have moved this Writ Appeal. Having heard learned counsel on both sides, we are not persuaded to interfere with the order under challenge. As already observed, O.P. No. 5879/93 was disposed of as per judgment dated 15.6.1993 directing the appellants to afford police protection to the respondents herein to run their industrial undertaking and also to their life. About 21 months thereafter, CMP No. 7017/95 was filed in the Original Petition supported by an affidavit by the Sub Inspector of Police praying for a direction to the respondents herein to pay what they call as "due charges" to the Government for the protection already afforded from 15.6.1993 and for the continuous protection being provided to the respondents until police protection is altogether stopped. 1n our considered opinion, the claim now made by the appellants is thoroughly misconceived. The direction in the judgment dated 15.6.1993 was a writ of mandamus to the police officials to discharge their duties which they are expected to do. It was found after elaborate consideration of the respective contentions of the parties that there has been a dereliction of duty on the part of the police officials; that the very life of the petitioners/ respondents herein was in danger and jeopardy on several occasions; that it is necessary to direct the police officials to give protection to the respondents to ensure that materials loaded from the factory reach their destination without being obstructed by respondents 5 to 22 in the Original Petition or their associates. This Court on a consideration of the materials brought on record found that the apprehension voiced by the respondents herein regarding serious obstruction be ing caused by respondents 5 to 22 in the O.P. is justified and correct; that the obstruction caused by respondents 5 to 22 was an unlawful obstruction; that the police officials were not quite diligent in discharging their duties; that there is an obligation on the part of the police officials to render adequate protection to a citizen to enable him to carry On his lawful activities without being obstructed, intimidated, threatened or prevented by obstructionists who do not have a semblance or vestige of right to interfere with such activities. Barring exceptional circumstances, we are of the opinion that the State would not be justified in claiming charges from citizens for affording police protection to remove or prevent obstruction to a lawful activity carried on by a citizen in exercise of his constitutional right. Thus, it is an integral part of the functions of the police who are repositories of statutory power to maintain law and order in a locality, which is a sovereign function incapable of being delegated. Such functions are to be exercised by the State themselves. If, therefore, maintenance of law and order is. a sovereign function which belongs to the exclusive realm of the State, we fail to comprehend how the expenditure incurred by the State for discharge of such a sovereign function could be realised from a citizen for no fault of the latter. When direction is issued to the police officials to afford protection to a citizen such protection is granted by a Court only after satisfaction of certain vital circumstances viz: 1.The person who approaches the Court praying for a direction to the police to afford protection has a right in law which is sought to be protected. 2. He seeks such protection for the continuance of a lawful activity or generally because his life is in jeopardy. 3. There is interference with the exercise of his lawful right by persons who have no right to do so. 4. The citizen concerned has approached the police officials with a request to afford him protection. 5. Police officials have failed to respond to the legitimate request made by the citizen either fully or in an appropriate manner. 3. There is interference with the exercise of his lawful right by persons who have no right to do so. 4. The citizen concerned has approached the police officials with a request to afford him protection. 5. Police officials have failed to respond to the legitimate request made by the citizen either fully or in an appropriate manner. It cannot be gainsaid that unlawful obstruction to a lawful activity, threat or intimidation or interference with exercise of the right to personal liberty and right to life guaranteed to every citizen under Art.21 of the Constitution of India is also liable to be treated as a breach of the la w and order. 1n that view of the matter, whenever any citizen is driven to the court of law seeking an appropriate direction to the police officials to render him protection and this Court comes to the conclusion that's the request made by the citizen is justified and is therefore liable to be allowed, this Court necessarily has come to the conclusion that direction is to be given to the police officials to maintain the law and order in the locality. It cannot be said that breach of the law and order in any locality occurs only when there is extensive and wide spread disturbance or violence. Where there is a breach of law, it affords adequate justification for the police officials to exercise the statutory powers vested in them. The role of the police in that regard is to prosecute the perpetrators of the offence and to prevent commission of such offence in future. Prosecution of the offenders of law is also part of the exclusive functions of the police officials, which will have to be done in accordance with the law of the land. Prevention of crime is also the official functions of the police. Affording police protection to the continuation of a lawful activity or when the right of a citizen is in j eopardy therefore falls in the latter category. If that be so, it is part of the sovereign functions of the State and it would be unconstitutional in the circumstances to recover from the respondents the expenditure incurred for the police officials exercising its functions which is exclusively vested in it. If that be so, it is part of the sovereign functions of the State and it would be unconstitutional in the circumstances to recover from the respondents the expenditure incurred for the police officials exercising its functions which is exclusively vested in it. It is true that when a direction is given to the police to afford protection either for the life or to enable the continuance of a lawful activity may incur an additional expenditure in the deployment of the police which is hardly a justification for directing the person who seeks protection to pay the charges incurred by the State for deploying the additional police force. In circumstances where a person who has a grievance and whose claim for protection and assistance by the police is found to be justified by a court of law, if payment of the charges demanded by the police is made a condition precedent for affording police protection, then it would be a case where police is given a discretion to discharge their duties on condition that the expenditure incurred by them in that behalf is met by the aggrieved citizen. As a corollary, if the aggrieved citizen whose claim for police protection and assistance is found to be justified by a Court of law, is not in a position to pay the charges demanded by the police, then he could be deprived of the protection and assistance of law which is a fundamental right guaranteed to him under Art.21 of the Constitution of India. The direction issued to the State to discharge its constitutional and statutory functions and to make such direction dependant on the aggrieved citizen meeting the expenditure incurred by the State in that behalf would be inconsistent with and violative of the spirit of the constitution which guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws to all persons. On the contrary, the State would be justified in demanding charges incurred by it for deploying additional police force to effectuate compliance with the directions issued by this Court from the obstructionists and from their assets in as much as the State has been compelled to deploy additional police force to maintain law and order only because of the unlawful obstruction caused by such obstructionists. It can therefore be a case where there is a depletion of the public funds or a situation where additional expenditure is incurred from the public funds on account of an unlawful obstruction caused by certain citizens. In a case where a person or group of persons on account of their unlawful activity constitute depletion of public funds, they themselves should be made liable to make good the loss sustained by the State by way of reparation. When State incurs additional expenditure or suffers loss as a result of unlawful activities committed by a group of persons, it will be open for the State to recover such additional expenditure or damages suffered by it from the property of the persons who are responsible for such loss or expenditure. In this view of the matter, in as much as this Court had hi positive terms directed grant of police protection to the respondents/ petitioners to carry on a lawful activity, the additional expenditure incurred by the police officials to comply with the direction could very well be recovered from the persons responsible for incurring such additional expenditure and not from the respondents/ petitioners who are carrying on their lawful activity. However, levy of a nominal fee may be thought of by the Government for affording special individual assistance to a person unconnected with discharge of any sovereign function or public duty under law. 3. Reliance placed by the appellants on the provisions of the Police Act, in our view, is misconceived. S.10 of the Police Act affords power to recover money payable under Ss.8 and 9 only in circumstances mentioned therein. Where a citizeii has moved and approached this Court for a direction for police protection and where there is a direction to the police officials to afford protection and protection is in fact granted to the person concerned, such protection cannot be in any manner be traced to the power under Ss.8 and 9 of the Police Act and the contention to the contrary is baseless and unsustainable in the eye of law. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the order impugned in this appeal does not suffer from any infirmity and has only to be upheld. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the order impugned in this appeal does not suffer from any infirmity and has only to be upheld. We do so and dismiss this appeal, however, with liberty to the appellants to proceed against those who are responsible for causing obstruction to recover the expenditure, if any, incurred by them. Appeal dismissed.