JUDGMENT - R.M.S. KHANDEPARKAR, J.:---By the present petition the petitioners are challenging the Government Circular dated 15-10-1992 by which the respondent No. 2 has ordered the aided secondary schools to recover the alleged overpayment made to the teachers on account of grant of post graduate pay-scales to the teachers, like the petitioners, as also the non-payment of post-graduate scales to the secondary schools teachers by the Government of Goa despite decision to that effect as early as on 20-8-1993. 2.At the outset, a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the petition on the ground of res judicata is sought to be raised on behalf of the respondents. It is the contention of the respondents that in past the petitioner No. 4 had filed two writ petitions, one in his personal capacity and another in the name of All Goa Secondary School Teachers Association, being Writ Petition No. 66/B of 1976 and No. 170/B of 1976, respectively, and the matter in issue in these petitions is also directly and substantially in issue in the petition in hand and both the petitions were dismissed by common judgment dated 23-2-1983. 3.We have heard Shri V.B. Nadkarni, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners, and Shri H.R. Bharne, learned Government Advocate for the respondents, at length. On behalf of the petitioners it is submitted that the earlier petitions were dismissed only on the ground of lack of jurisdiction to issue writ as it was held that the provisions contained in the Grant-in-Aid Code were merely executive instructions which confer no right upon the teachers as they cannot apply for writ of mandamus for enforcement or non-enforcement of those provisions. Being so, the dismissal in the said petitions was on account of lack of jurisdiction to grant the relief and not on merits and, therefore the principle of res judicata has no application to the matter in question. It is also submitted that the Apex Court has already held that the order passed in exercise of powers vested under the provisions of Grant-in-Aid Code is assailable in writ jurisdiction and the writ can go against the schools receiving grant-in-Aid. That apart, even the Apex Court, in a subsequent decision in a case between another teacher and the Government has already granted the relief of the nature prayed for by the petitioner. That apart, even the Apex Court, in a subsequent decision in a case between another teacher and the Government has already granted the relief of the nature prayed for by the petitioner. The submissions are sought to be supported by the decisions of the Apex Court in the matter of (Francis John v. The Director of Education others)1, reported in A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 423, (Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra)2, reported in 1990(1) S.C.C. 193 , (Smt. Pujari Bai v. Madan Gopal)3, reported in A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1764, (Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal others v. Dossibai N.B. Jeyeebhoy)4, reported in A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2355. The learned Advocate for the petitioners also submitted that the petitioners are restricting their claim of arrears for a period of three years prior to the filing of the petition. 4.The fact that the writ petitions as stated by the respondents were filed by the petitioner No. 4 in his individual capacity as well as in the name of the said Association of the teachers and that the same were disposed of by judgment dated 23-2-1983 is not in dispute. The point for consideration in the said petitions was the validity of the withdrawal of the higher scales of pay granted to the teachers having post-graduate qualifications in non-Government Secondary High Schools enjoying grant-in-Aid under the provisions of Grant-in-Aid Code. This Court by the said judgment, placing reliance upon the decisions of the Apex Court in the matter of (The State of Assam another v. Ajit Kumar Sharma others)5, reported in A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1196 and in (Cyril E. Fernandes v. Sr. Myria Lydia others)6, reported in A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2145 held that the petitioners therein being the teachers who were seeking to enforce against the Government the instructions under the Grant-in-Aid Code, had no right to do so and therefore, would not be entitled to the issue of the writ. 5.It is not in dispute that by a Circular dated 3-4-1974, the Government had asked the managements of aided non-Government Secondary Schools to stop appointment of teachers to the post-graduate scale. However, as regards the post-graduate teachers who were already appointed and drawing their scale in the post-graduate scale were allowed to continue to do so pending further communication in that regard by the Government. However, as regards the post-graduate teachers who were already appointed and drawing their scale in the post-graduate scale were allowed to continue to do so pending further communication in that regard by the Government. Further by letter dated 3-7-1976 the Director of Education of Goa Government was informed by the Under Secretary Ministry of Education about disapproval of the pattern of upgradation of 20% of post-graduate teachers as there was no such provision in Goa Grant-in-Aid Code and further that upgradation of 20% already granted by the Director of Education was irregular, the same being against the order of the Government of India. It was pursuant to the communication of the said decision that the petitioner No. 4 had filed the earlier petitions. It is not in dispute that during the period from the date of upgradation of 20% of post-graduate teachers by the order of Director of Education till it was revoked pursuant to the directions of the Government of India, the petitioners who were benefited by the said pattern were paid their salary in post-graduate scale. By the impugned Circular dated 15-10-1992 such excess amount, over and above the salary legally payable to the petitioners, is ordered to be recovered. The challenge to the impugned Circular, therefore, in fact, is challenge to the order of withdrawal of higher scale of pay to the petitioners granted to the teachers with post-graduate qualification in non-Government Secondary High Schools which were enjoying aid under the provisions of the Grant-in-Aid Code. Being so, unless the enforceability of the said instructions issued by the Government of India to withdraw the post-graduate scales is adjudicated upon, the challenge to the Circular dated 15-4-1992 cannot be decided. In the circumstances, therefore, it cannot be disputed that the issue in question in the present petition was directly and substantially in issue in above referred earlier petitions. 6.In the earlier writ petitions, placing reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court on Ajit Kumar's case (supra), this Court had held that the rules under Grant-in-Aid Code were merely executive instructions and they do not confer any enforceable right upon the teachers and, therefore, the petitioners were not entitled for any relief. The refusal to grant relief was not on account of lack of jurisdiction but on account of the fact that the petitioners therein had no enforceable right against the respondents. The refusal to grant relief was not on account of lack of jurisdiction but on account of the fact that the petitioners therein had no enforceable right against the respondents. If the decision in the earlier petition was merely on a question relating to the interpretation of a statute touching the jurisdiction of this Court unrelated to any question of fact or law or mixed question, then certainly the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners would have been justified in his contention about non-applicability of principle of res judicata to the matter in question. In the matter of Sushil Kumar (supra), the Apex Court has held that :--- "The doctrine of res judicata under section 11 C.P.C. is founded on public policy. An issue of fact or law or mixed question of fact and law, which are in issue in an earlier suit or might and ought to be raised between the same parties or persons claiming under them and was adjudicated or allowed uncontested becomes final and binds the parties or persons claiming under them. Thus the decision of a competent Court over the matter in issue may operate as res judicata in subsequent suit or proceedings or in other proceedings between the same parties and those claiming under them. But the question relating to the interpretation of a statute touching the jurisdiction of a Court unrelated to questions of fact or law or mixed questions does not operate as res judicata even between the parties or persons claiming under them. The reason is obvious; a pure question of law unrelated to facts which are the basis or foundation of a right, cannot be deemed to be a matter in issue. The principle of res judicata is a facet of procedure but not of substantive law. The decision on an issue of law founded on fact in issue would operate as res judicata." (emphasis supplied). 7.In the case of Mathura Prasad (supra), the Apex Court has held thus :-- "A decision of a competent Court on a matter in issue may be res judicata in another proceeding between the same parties; the "matter in issue" may be an issue of fact, an issue of law, or one of mixed law and fact. 7.In the case of Mathura Prasad (supra), the Apex Court has held thus :-- "A decision of a competent Court on a matter in issue may be res judicata in another proceeding between the same parties; the "matter in issue" may be an issue of fact, an issue of law, or one of mixed law and fact. An issue of fact or an issue of mixed law and fact decided by a competent Court is finally determined between the parties and cannot be re-opened between them in another proceeding. The previous decision on a matter in issue alone is res judicata; the reasons for the decision are not res judicata. A matter in issue between the parties is the right claimed by one party and denied by the other, and the claim of right from its very nature depends upon proof of facts and application of the relevant law thereto. A pure question of law unrelated to facts which give rise to a right, cannot be deemed to be a matter in issue. When it is said that a previous decision is res judicata, it is meant that the right claimed has been adjudicated upon and cannot again be placed in contest between the same parties. A previous decision of a competent Court on facts which are the foundation of the right and the relevant law applicable, to the determination of the transaction which is the source of the right is res judicata." (emphasis supplied). 8.It was sought to be contended that in view of change in law brought about by the decision of the Apex Court in case of Francis John (supra), the decision in earlier writ petition would not operate as res judicata. In this regard, the law laid down by the Full Bench of High Court of J. K. in (Abdul Salam v. State of Jammu and Kashmir)7, reported in A.I.R. 1981 J. K. 21, is very relevant for the decision in the matter. Dr. A.S. Anand, Ag. Chief Justice (as His Lordship then was), delivering the judgment held thus:--- "12. Undoubtedly Article 141 of the Constitution of India enacts that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. Dr. A.S. Anand, Ag. Chief Justice (as His Lordship then was), delivering the judgment held thus:--- "12. Undoubtedly Article 141 of the Constitution of India enacts that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. But the plaint implication of the article is that when the Supreme Court expresses its view would be binding on all courts in India, irrespective of any contrary view expressed by any other Court earlier and after the declaration by the Supreme Court, the view expressed to the contrary would no longer be treated as good law. It, however, does not mean that the effect of the decision, which had taken a contrary view and had become final between them stands automatically wiped off. The effect of a judgment, inter parties, can only be wiped off by getting that particular judgment reversed in appeal or review. To hold otherwise would offend against the principle of finality of judgments. Moreover, Mr. Thakur is not correct in assuming that the declaration of law by the Supreme Court amounts to an 'alteration' in law so as to exclude the application of the rule of res judicata. Article 141 of the Constitution has a limited purpose and does not confer any legislative functions on the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court only interprets law and neither enacts nor amends the law as laid down by the legislature. Thus, the exception to application of res judicata that if there is 'alteration' of the law since the earlier judgment the rule would not apply, would not be attracted because the interpretation given by the Supreme Court cannot be equated with enactment of new or altered law by the legislature. It is, therefore, immaterial for the application of the principles of res judicata as to whether the Supreme Court subsequently in a different case expresses a view contrary to a decision inter parties in an earlier suit or writ petition. Indeed, the declaration by the Supreme Court would imply that the law has always what the Supreme Court interprets it to mean but this cannot be extended to take away the rights which have become final between the parties in an earlier decision which took contrary view. Indeed, the declaration by the Supreme Court would imply that the law has always what the Supreme Court interprets it to mean but this cannot be extended to take away the rights which have become final between the parties in an earlier decision which took contrary view. The rights which have become final as a result of a judgment delivered by a competent Court cannot be washed away by a subsequent interpretation in a different cause. The correctness or otherwise of the earlier decision is wholly irrelevant where the conditions for the application of the rule of res judicata are satisfied in the latter case." (Emphasis supplied) 9.Undisputedly, by the earlier writ petitions the respondents were sought to be restrained from giving effect to the instructions issued by the Government for the withdrawal of higher pay-scale to the teachers having post-graduate qualifications and teaching in aided non-Government Secondary High Schools. The said petitions were dismissed. The relief sought for in the present petitions is for the grant of the said higher pay-scale to those very teachers -- those having post-graduate qualifications and teaching in aided non-Government Secondary High Schools. The question of grant of such pay-scale cannot be decided without considering the enforceability of the said instructions of the Government whereby such grant was ordered to be withdrawn. The subject-matter of the present petition is the same as that of the said earlier petitions which were dismissed by this Court on 23-2-1983. 10.As already discussed above, the matter in issue in the earlier petitions was relating to right of the parties to continue to draw higher scale of pay granted to the teachers having post-graduate qualifications and working in aided non-Government Secondary High Schools. Same issue arises in the present petition and unless the said issue is adjudicated, challenge to Circular dated 15-10-1992 cannot be determined. The cause of action in the present petition is directly related to the cause of action in the earlier petition. The decision in the matter of Smt. Pujari Bai v. Madan Gopal (supra) is of no help in the case in hand as the same was delivered in totally different set of facts. In the said case it was not disputed that the earlier writ petition filed by the parties thereto against the order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer was dismissed in limine. In the said case it was not disputed that the earlier writ petition filed by the parties thereto against the order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer was dismissed in limine. That order was passed by the Division Bench of Punjab Haryana High Court. It was a one-word order. The Apex Court relying upon the decision in the matter of (Workmen of Cochin Port Trust v. Board of Trustees of Cochin Port Trust)8, reported in A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1283, held that a dismissal of a petition in limine or dismissal thereof on the ground of laches or availability of alternate remedy would not operate as res judicata for subsequent petition. The said decision, therefore, is of no help to the petitioners. 11.In Francis John's case (supra), the Apex Court has held that in a private school which receives aid from the Government under the Grant-in-Aid Code, which is promulgated not merely for the benefit of the Management but also for the benefit of the employees in the school for whose salary and allowances the Government was contributing from the public funds under the Grant-in-Aid Code, cannot escape from the consequences following from the breach of Code and particularly when the Director of Education, who is the instrumentality of the State, is participating in the decision-making process. That was a case where the disciplinary proceedings were started against the headmaster of a school which was recipient of aid as per the Grant-in-Aid Code and the findings of the Dispute and Settlement Committee were approved by the Director of Education Department and he permitted the termination of the services of the headmaster in consequence of which the order of termination was passed. In that context, the Apex Court held that the order of termination being approved by the Director of Education who is the instrumentality of the State, the writ would be maintainable against such order. In any case, a decision of the Apex Court in a different case taking different view than that was in force earlier to the decision of the High Court in a case between the parties, will not enure to the benefit of such parties to reagitate the same issue by filing fresh petition on the same cause of action. The previous decision of this Court for all purposes decides the dispute between the parties and it is not open for the petitioners to re-open the same. The previous decision of this Court for all purposes decides the dispute between the parties and it is not open for the petitioners to re-open the same. 12.In the result, therefore, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed. The rule is discharged with no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. -----