JUDGMENT Gupta, J. This Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letter Patent is directed against a Judgment dated 21.5.97 by a learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. No. 178 of 1996 whereby the writ application filed by the applicant-writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge. 2. Brief facts leading to the filing of the Appeal are that the appellant was a tenant in respect of a shop room measuring about 1,000 square feet in the building known as “QUEEN MENSION” at No. 12-B/1, Park Street, Calcutta. Originally this building was owned by Prudential Insurance Co. Ltd., the predecessor-in-interest of respondent No. 1, but after the merger of the aforesaid Company with the respondent No. 1, respondent No. 1 became the owner of the building in question. It is undisputed case of the parties that the appellant inducted Bata India Ltd. into a portion of this building. Litigation between the appellant and Bata India Ltd., on the one hand and between the appellant and respondent No. 1 on the other ensued in respect of the aforesaid induction if Bata India Ltd. in a portion of the building. Ultimately, Bata India Ltd. left the premises on 3rd December, 1994 and therefore, in the meanwhile the litigation between the appellant and Bata India Ltd. had come to be disposed of whereby a positive finding was returned by this Court that the appellant had inducted Bata India Ltd. as a Licencee in respect of a portion of the premises in question. It appears that a Notice dated 17th November, 1989 was served by respondent No. 1 upon the appellant whereby the appellant was accused was subletting the premises or a portion thereof the Bata India Ltd. without prior consent in writing of the respondent No. 1. The appellant was accordingly asked to quit, vacate and deliver vacant possession of the property. This was followed by another Notice dated 23.5.91 served on behalf of the respondent No. 1 upon the appellant wherein once again the appellant was accused of granting leave/license to Bata India Ltd, in respect of a part of the premises in question and accordingly, the tenancy of the appellant was terminated. The appellant accordingly was asked to vacate and hand over vacant possession of the premises in question on or before the expiry of the month of June 1991. The appellant accordingly was asked to vacate and hand over vacant possession of the premises in question on or before the expiry of the month of June 1991. In this notice it was mentioned that if the appellant failed to do so, it would be considered as an “unauthorized occupant” of the premises in question and proceedings would be initiated against the appellant in terms of the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 (1971 Act for short). This led the appellant to file writ application, being Matter No. 3643 of 1992 in this Court. Vide judgment dated 11th March, 1994 the writ application was disposed of by a learned Single Judge of this Court by observing that since the Notice had already been issued upon the appellant and proceeding in term of 1971 Act were under way, it was not possible for the Court to interfere with this Case. One of the questioned raised in the said writ application was about the applicability of guidelines issued on 19th February, 1992 by the Government of India, Ministry of Industry, Department of Public Enterprises, vide office Memorandum No. 2(6)/92-IIPE (W.C.) dated February 19, 1992 where under certain parameters were prescribed with regard to taking of action under 1971 Act by the Public Sector Undertaking under the Government of India. A clarification was issued on 21st September, 1992 in respect of these guidelines. The thrust of the argument of the appellant before the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid writ petition (Matter no. 3643 of 1992) was that in terms of the aforesaid guidelines it was not proper for the respondent No. 1 to have initiated proceedings against the appellant under 1971 Act. The thrust of the argument of the appellant before the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid writ petition (Matter no. 3643 of 1992) was that in terms of the aforesaid guidelines it was not proper for the respondent No. 1 to have initiated proceedings against the appellant under 1971 Act. Since, the proceedings were pending before the Estate Office, the learned Single Judge while disposing of the writ application vice Judgment dated 11th March, 1994 (supra) therefore, passed the following directions :- “(a) If the replies of the show cause notice, being Annexure ‘G’, ‘H’ and ‘I’, have not yet been disposed of by the writ petitioner, the writ petitioner is directed to file the same within a month from this date; (b) Since the said application in which the guidelines had been annexed is still pending decision before the Estate Officer, the Estate Officer shall, at the time of final disposal of the proceedings initiated by him on the basis of the show cause notice, being Annexure ‘G’, ‘H’ and ‘I’, consider the said guideline, the eviction proceeding initiated against the writ petitioner should be withdrawn. The Estate Officer shall also consider as to whether the said guideline has any statutory effect or not, (c) The Estate Officer shall dispose of the entire proceedings initiated by him under the Act within three month from the date of communication of this order after giving hearing to the writ respondents No. 3. I also make it clear that I have not gone into the merits of the submission made on behalf of the parties in this writ application. The writ application is thus dispose of” 3. The Estate Officer ultimately passed an order on 11.1.96 directing eviction of the appellant under Section 5(1) of 1971 Act as also for recovery of arrears of rent under Section 7(2) of the 1971 Act. It was against this order that the Appellant filed the second writ application, being writ petition No. 78 of 1996 which was dismissed by judgment dated 21.5.1997 as noted earlier. 4. It was against this order that the Appellant filed the second writ application, being writ petition No. 78 of 1996 which was dismissed by judgment dated 21.5.1997 as noted earlier. 4. The first and foremost ground of attack against the impugned order of the Estate Officer dated 11.1.96 and against the Judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 21.5.1997, as very vehemently advanced before us by Sri Kapoor, learned Senior Advocate Appearing for the Appellant, is that the guidelines as issue by the Government of India (supra) were binding upon the Respondents, both the Respondents No. 1 and Respondent No. 3 and that in view of such guidelines proceedings under the 1971 Act could not have been initiated against the Appellant. This apart, the Appellant’s contention is that the Respondent No. 1 being an Authority covered by Article 12 of the Constitution, it action a should have been guide by objective criteria based on nationality and public policy, being in conformity with Article 14 of the Constitution and this having not been done in the present case, the order impugned was vitiated. Mr. Kapoor referred to the following decision of the Supreme Court in support of his contention :- (1) Dwarkas Marfatia & Sons v. Board of Trustees, AIR 1989 SC 1642 (2) Ashoka Marketing Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank, AIR 1991 SC 855 (3) Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed, 1993 (1) SCC 71 (4) K.P. Varghese v. I.T.O., AIR 1981 SC 1922 (5) A.S. Sangwan v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 1545 (6) Union of India v. S.L. Dutta, AIR 1991 SC 363 (7) Home Secretary, U.T. of Chandigarh v. Darshjit Singh Grewal, 1993 (4) SCC 25 5. In support of the contention that the guidelines were binding upon the Respondents Mr. Kapoor relied upon Sections 21 and 6 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (1956 Act for short). 6. Section 2(g) of the 1971 Act reads as under :- “(g) “unauthorized occupation”, in relation to any public premises, means the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant of any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises had expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. 7. 7. It is the admitted case of the parties that Bata India Ltd., was inducted as a licencee, if not a sub-tenant by the Appellants and that this was done without the consent of the Respondents. 8. Undisputably, the Appellant was paying a rent of Rs. 529.63p. monthly to the Respondent No. 1 but had itself been charging Rs. 28,000/- per month from Bata India Ltd., whom it had inducted as a licencee and from whom it had also obtained an amount of Rs. 7 lacs at the beginning of this transaction as an interest free sum by way of advance or security. It was on this account that the aforesaid two notices dated 17th November, 1989 and 23rd May, 1991 were issued by the Respondent to the Appellant. It has not been the case of the Appellant at any stage of the proceedings that the Appellant had not inducted Bata India Ltd., as a licencee. It has also not been the case of the Appellant that such induction was done with the consent or permission of the Respondents. On the face of this factual position of the Respondent serving the aforesaid two notice upon the Appellant, the Appellants tenancy stood determined and the occupation of the Appellant become “unauthorised” in terms of Section 2(g) of the 1971 Act. It was based on these facts that the Respondent No. 1 initiated action under the provisions of 1971 Act against the Appellant and such action culminating in the passing of the order dated 11.1.96 by Respondent No. 3 in terms of Section 5 of 1971 Act. In this backdrop, therefore we have to consider and examine whether the argument of Mr. Kapoor about the applicability of the guidelines and the so-called violation of Article 14 of the Constitution holds any ground. Undoubtedly, the Judgments of the Supreme Court as cited by Sri Kapoor delay down that the State has to act fairly and for a public purpose but in a case, like the present one, purely relating to a landlord an tenant dispute, where the tenancy of the tenant has been validly determined by the landlord, and after such determination the tenant has become an “unauthorized occupant”, even if the landlord happens to be an Authority within Article 12 of the Constitution, the principles enunciated by the above referred Judgment of the Supreme Court have no manner of application whatsoever. 9. 9. Coming to the question of the applicability or the binding effect of the guidelines issued by the Government of India, we have to consider whether Section 21 of 1956 Act read with Section 6 of the said Act is applicable in the present case and as to whether the guidelines were issued by the Government of India under Section 21 or any other provision of 1956 Act or in the exercise of the power vested in the Central Government under the said Act. 10. Section 21 of 1956 Act read as under :- “21. Corporation to be guided by the direction of the Central Government-In the discharge of its function under the Act, the Corporation shall be guided by such directions in matters of policy involving public interest as the Central Government may give to it in writing ; and if any question arises whether a direction relates to a matter of policy involving public interest, the decision of the Central Government thereon shall be final.” 11. As will be seen Section 21 read with Section 6 of the 1956 Act relate only to the issuance of directions by the Central Government upon the Life Insurance Corporation of India with regard of the function of the Corporation under the 1956 Act with regard to matter to policy. Mr. Kapoor drew our attention to Clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 6 of 1956 Act to canvas his point of view that it is under this Clause that the Corporation has the power to acquire, hold and dispose of any property for the purpose of its business, Section 6 of 1956 Act in so far as it relates to the aforesaid Clause is reproduces as hereunder :- “6. Function of the Corporation – (1) Subject to the rules, if any, made by the Central Government in this behalf, it shall be the general duty of the Corporation of carry on life insurance business, whether in or outside India, and the Corporation shall so exercise its power under this Act as to secure that life insurance business is developed to the best advantage of the community. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in sub-section (1) but subject to the other provisions contained in this Act, the Corporation shall have power – ….. ……….. …………. ……….. ……….. ……….. ……….. ………. …… …… ….. ……….. ………….. ………. …………. ………. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in sub-section (1) but subject to the other provisions contained in this Act, the Corporation shall have power – ….. ……….. …………. ……….. ……….. ……….. ……….. ………. …… …… ….. ……….. ………….. ………. …………. ………. ………… ……….. ………. (c) to acquired, hold and dispose of any property for the purpose of its business. …… ……. ……….. ……… ………. ………. ………… ………….. ……….. …… ……. …….. ………. ……….. ………. ……….. …….. ………… ………. ……… 12. Acquiring, holding or disposing of any property as mentioned in Clauses (c) of sub-section (2) is relatable to the purpose of carrying on the business of life insurance by the Corporation under 1956 Act. It is an furtherance of this purpose that under Section 21 of the Act, the Central Government may issue directions with regard to matter of policy involving public interest and the such direction shall have a binding effect upon the Corporation since the Corporation is required to be guided by such directions. We have no doubt in our mind that the guidelines in question were neither issued by the Central Government under section 21 of 1956 Act nor did these guidelines relates to any functioning of the Corporation under 1956 Act or any policy matter involving public interest relating to the business of life insurance as conducted by the corporation. Similarly, we have no doubt that Clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act has no manner of application to the present case since the holding of the property as mentioned in Clause (c) has to be in relation to the purpose of the business of the Corporation. To evict an unauthorized occupant from a shop under 1971 Act is totally alien to the concept of holding, acquiring or disposing of any property under Clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act. These guidelines therefore cannot at all be termed to be relatable to 1956 Act and hence the Corporation cannot be held to be bound by these guidelines on that score as well, particularly when these guidelines have not been issued under 1956 Act. 13. Let us now consider a hypothetical situation where we hold that the guidelines were binding upon the Respondents. 13. Let us now consider a hypothetical situation where we hold that the guidelines were binding upon the Respondents. Even if we assume that the guidelines had a binding effect and that the Respondents were under an obligation to follow the guidelines, and if we apply the parameters laid down in the guidelines, we find that the action initiated by the Respondent under the 1971 Act was justified and came squarely within the scope of the guidelines since the Appellant was declared an unauthorized occupant of the premises in question on the basis of his tenancy having been determined on the ground of his having given on licence a portion of the premises in question to Bata India Ltd. without the consent of the Respondents. The Respondents were thus entitled to invoke the provisions of 1971 Act and initiate proceedings thereunder against the Appellant. Such action of the Respondents cannot be termed as being in derogation of the guidelines. 14. Even through in the judgment of the learned Single Judge only a passing reference has been made, we also do wish to observe that the Appellant filed writ application in this Court without exhausting the alternative remedy of preferring Appeal under Section 9 of 1971 Act against the order passed by the Respondents No. 3. Nothing more is required to be said on this account. 15. On a overall consideration therefore, we are of the firm view that the learned Single Judge was justify in dismissing the writ application. No interference is called for. The appeal accordingly is dismissed, but without any order as to costs. Sen, J. : I agree. Later : After this judgment was pronounced in Court today Mr. Kapoor, learned Advocate appearing for the Appellant made an oral prayer for staying the operation of this judgment. Upon hearing the learned Advocate for the parties, we direct that for a period of one month from today, and no more, dispossession of the Appellant shall remain stayed. Let a xerox signed copy of this judgment, duly countersigned by the Assistant Registrar of this Court, be given to the parties upon their undertaking to apply for and obtain certified copy of the same upon usual undertaking.