Judgment : A. RAMAN, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is the wife of the detenu. ( 2 ) ON 17-8-1998, the first respondent passed an order under Section 3 (1) (i) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, detaining the husband of the petitioner Thiru, Ibrahim Yagub, with a view to preventing him from smuggling goods in future. Challenging the said order of detention, this petition is filed. ( 3 ) ON 8-7-1998, the detenu Ibrahim Yagub arrived from Singapore at Anna International Airport, Meenambakkam, Chennai, by Flight No. SQ-410. The detenu was carrying one camera green colour zipper bag bearing tag No. SQ-145018, one plastic jumbo bag bearing preprinted tag No. SQ145022, one cardboard carton box bearing preprinted tag No. SQ-145023, one Singapore duty free shop plastic bag and a small TDe Paoki green colour zipper bag. He was intercepted by the Intelligence Officer, attached to the air Intelligence Unit Room, situated in the arrival hall. The detenu had earlier declared the value of the goods at Rs. 50,000/-at Table No. 11, and declared that the he did not carry nor as in a possession of any computer parts. On examination of the bags, one after the other, in the presence of witnesses, 50 nos. of Intel Pentium Chips, Cordless Phones, Portable Video CB players, Photo Cameras, Walkmans, Digital Diaries, Watches, Video Tapes and Audio Tapes were found. The detenu did not declare the Intel Pentium Chips. Further, there was gross mis-declaration of the value of goods. The goods were found in trade quantity. Therefore, they were seized under mahazar in the presence of witnesses. Besides the goods, the travel documents such as customs clearance Card. Singapore Airlines Ticket Boarding pass baggage Claim Tags were also seized. A statement was recorded from the detenu on 8-7-1998. As a follow-up action, the residential premises of the detenu at No. 13 Mariadoss Street, Royapuram. Chennai was searched. The detenu was arrested on 9-7-1998 and produced before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. E. 0. II. Egmore. Chennai who remanded the petitioner to custody till 23-7-1998. A statement was recorded from the detenu on 8-7-1998. As a follow-up action, the residential premises of the detenu at No. 13 Mariadoss Street, Royapuram. Chennai was searched. The detenu was arrested on 9-7-1998 and produced before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. E. 0. II. Egmore. Chennai who remanded the petitioner to custody till 23-7-1998. On the above materials the 1st respondent felt satisfied that the detenu has been indulging in smuggling of goods and therefore with a view to preventing him from smuggling goods he felt it necessary to detain him under the Provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act. The impugned order detaining the detenu thus came to be passed on 17-8-1998. ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner had retracted his statement and the factum of retraction was not placed before the Detaining Authority, nor the same considered by the Detaining Authority and therefore, the order becomes vitiated and is liable to be set aside on this sole ground. In this connection, he referred to some of the decisions of this Court rendered in Abdul Kader Mohamed Ibrahim. v. State and another and Krishnamurthy Chettiar Krishnan v. The Govt. of Tamil Nadu rep. by the Secretary and another. He also referred to a decision of the Apex court reported in K. Satyanarayan Subudhi v. Union of India. Therefore, according to the Counsel for the petitioner the non-placement of the retraction before the Detaining Authority went to the root of the detention order render it invalid and therefore on this short ground the impugned order of detention has to be quashed. ( 5 ) LEARNED Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the Rulings cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner are not applicable to the facts of this case. For he contended that the alleged letter of retraction dated 27-7-1998 sent through the Superintendent of Central Prison was received by the Customs Department only on 11-8-1998, and it had to pass through the process and as the order came to be passed by the Detaining Authority on 17-8-1998. The same could not be placed before the Detaining Authority. He further submitted that the alleged retraction letter dated 27-7-1998, sent through the Superintendent of Central prisons was not the first communication of retraction. The same could not be placed before the Detaining Authority. He further submitted that the alleged retraction letter dated 27-7-1998, sent through the Superintendent of Central prisons was not the first communication of retraction. According to him, through his Lawyer Thiru, Jawad, Advocate, the detenu had sent a detailed retraction on 1-8-1998, which was received by the Customs Department on 5-8-1998 and the customs Department gave a reply to the same on 11-8-1998. According to him the retraction made by the detenu by and through his lawyer and the reply sent thereto by the Department were placed before the Detaining Authority by the Sponsoring Authority and was considered by the Detaining Authority. Hence, in such circumstances the non-placement of the retraction dated 27-7-1998 sent through the central prison will not in any manner affect the, order of detention. Therefore, on facts he would submit that the case on hand is quite different from the cases that were the subject matter of the H. C. P. Nos. 1040, 1056 and 1485 of 1998. ( 6 ) THE detaining authority has referred total the voluntary statement given before the Customs Officer by the detenu. This is found in Paragraph No. 2 of the Detention Order. It is also not disputed that when the detenu was produced before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate E. O. II. Chennai, he did not complain to the Magistrate about any ill-treatment or about involuntary nature of the statement. The detaining authority has referred to in paragraph-8 that in the bail petition filed by the detenu he has mentioned that the statements were obtained under coercion, undue influence and threat and thus it was retracted by him. The detaining authority has also referred to be denial of the allegations by the Customs Department in their counter and the dismissal of the bail applications. In paragraph No. 11, the detaining authority has mentioned about the letter sent by Thiru, Jawad advocate for the detenu and the reply of the Customs Department to the same. Then he has gone on to state that from the above materials, the detaining authority viz, the State Government is satisfied that the petitioner has been indulging in smuggling of goods. Then he has gone on to state that from the above materials, the detaining authority viz, the State Government is satisfied that the petitioner has been indulging in smuggling of goods. In sub-para No. 4 to Para No. 11, it is also specifically mentioned that the State Government took into consideration all the facts and material referred to and relied upon these grounds mentioned above and also the statements and mahazars accompanying thereto, while arriving at a subjective satisfaction. ( 7 ) NOW, it has to be seen whether the letter sent by the Counsel for on behalf of the detenu can be treated as a retraction as contended by the learned Additional Public prosecutor. This letter referred to by the learned Additional Public prosecutor is dated 1-8-1998. It has been sent by the Counsel Thiru, A. J. Jawad and it is addressed to the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu Government of Tamil Nadu. Fort St. George. Chennai. It was on 8-7-1998, when the detenu arrived at the International Airport. Chennai, he was intercepted and the goods were seized from him. He was arrested on 9-7-1998 and was produced before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. E. O. II. Chennai, who remanded him to custody till 23-7-1998. The remand period was subsequently extended from 23-7-1998 to 5-8-1998 and from 5-8-1998 to 18-8-1998. ( 8 ) IT is to be pointed out that on 9-7-1998 an application was filed. seeking bail and in that application the detenu has stated that he did not give any statement and that the statement was not voluntary and that there was threat coercion and undue influence. The allegations made in the bail application were disputed by the Customs Department in their counter dated 13-7-1998. On 15-7-1998, the bail application was dismissed. Again on 24-7-1998, another bail application was filed. It was also objected to by the Customs Department and the said application came to be dismissed on 29-7-1998, while so the letter came to be addressed to the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu on 1-8-1998. This letter very clearly recites that it was sent on the instruction of Ebrahim Yagub who is confined in central Prison. Therefore, it is clear that this letter or representation or communication whatever it be was sent on behalf of the detenu on his instructions and by his Counsel. This letter very clearly recites that it was sent on the instruction of Ebrahim Yagub who is confined in central Prison. Therefore, it is clear that this letter or representation or communication whatever it be was sent on behalf of the detenu on his instructions and by his Counsel. Therefore, it is contended that the detenu cannot be heard to say that he was not aware of the averments made in the representation. ( 9 ) IN this connection, it is to be pointed out that on 9-7-1998, he filed a bail application. Wherein the detenu has specifically raised question about the truth and genuiness of the voluntary statement and contended that it was obtained from him by use of force, threat and undue influence. This allegation made by the petitioner was disputed by the Customs Department in their Counter and the bail application came to be dismissed. When he filed another application on 24-7-1998, the detenu chose to stick to the stand. By that application also, he contended that the goods seized were electronic items and not covered under Section 123 of the Customs Act and as such no offence has been made out under Section 135 (1) (a) (ii) of the Customs Act. It was also pointed out by him in that application, that his permanent residence was searched by the Customs Authorities and they did not find anything incriminating. He also contended that he has also got the permanent residence and as his passport has been seized there is no question of abscondance arising. On these grounds. he moved the Court again on 24-7-1998 for bail. The earliest stand taken by him that there was threat coercion and that the statement was recorded by use of force and therefore. it was involuntary was persisted upon though not predominently in his later application filed by him seeking bail. It is also to be pointed out in that context that when the accused was produced before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. E. O. II, he did not complain about any ill-treatment. ( 10 ) NOW, with the above facts, forming a convenient background, it becomes necessary to scan the representation sent on the instructions of the detenu to the Chief Minister on 1-8-1998. E. O. II, he did not complain about any ill-treatment. ( 10 ) NOW, with the above facts, forming a convenient background, it becomes necessary to scan the representation sent on the instructions of the detenu to the Chief Minister on 1-8-1998. After setting out the facts of his arrest and seizure of certain goods from him at the Air-port, it has been stated by him that the goods were not prohibited goods and they are only electronic goods, which the detenu was free to import as per ITC Rules 1997-2002 and that he has been willing to pay the duty. It was also submitted that he is permitted under the EXIM Policy to import electronic goods without any licence and there is no impediment for the Government to release of the goods on payment of baggage duty without objection. It is also stated that the detenu has been always ready and willing to pay the duty. It is further indicated that the detenu went through the red channel which shows his bonafide and that he had not concealed any goods and therefore, in such circumstances, there was no basis to arrest the detenu. It is further submitted that there was no mis-declaration of goods and that the detenu is the only bread-winner of the family and therefore, lit is necessary that he should be released from detention. ( 11 ) THEREFORE, the question as to whether the letter can be termed as a retraction is the next point that fails for consideration. We have already extract in the previous paragraph the contents of the letter dated 1-8-1998. Thus, this letter is at best a representation made by the detenu. This letter does not contain any reference to the voluntary statement made by him. Nor there is any allegation to the effect that the said statement was obtained by the Customs Authorities by using threat and force. Nor it reads to say that the said statement is disowned by the maker. Therefore by no stretch of imagination, it can be termed as retraction statement. Nor there is any allegation to the effect that the said statement was obtained by the Customs Authorities by using threat and force. Nor it reads to say that the said statement is disowned by the maker. Therefore by no stretch of imagination, it can be termed as retraction statement. ( 12 ) THE learned Additional Public Prosecutor would submit that in the background of the fact that the detenu did not chose to make any representation before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, E. O. II at the time of remand to the effect that he was beaten up, coerced and threatened and that a statement was so obtained from him this letter dated 1-8-1998 is a clear after-thought and even the alleged retraction dated 27-7-1998, has to be rejected as an afterthought and therefore, the non-placed of the retraction before the Detaining Authority would not have in any manner affected the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority, and therefore, the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner cannot be countenanced. He would draw support for his argument from the factual position that though he retracted the statement in the bail applications, the voluntary nature of the statement was emphasised upon and projected by the Department in their counter to the bail applications, and these materials were placed before the Detaining Authority, and therefore the non-placement of the said retraction dated 27-7-1998, is of no consequence at all. ( 13 ) ADVERTING to the above submission, it is to be pointed out, the fact that the retraction statement dated 27-7-1998 was not placed before the Detaining Authority is very much there. From the file we find that this retraction statement made by the detenu was handed over to the Superintendent of Central Prison on the same day. But, we have no materials to show as to when the Superintendent of Central prison forwarded the same to the Customs Department. But, there is evidence available to show that it was received by the Department on 10-8-1998 and was forwarded by the concerned Department viz. , Sponsoring Authority to the Cofeposa Unit on 11-8-1998, as set out in the counter filed to this petition. But, there is evidence available to show that it was received by the Department on 10-8-1998 and was forwarded by the concerned Department viz. , Sponsoring Authority to the Cofeposa Unit on 11-8-1998, as set out in the counter filed to this petition. According to them, the retraction which was forwarded to Cofeposa Unit was in turn sent to Rummaging Section of the Investigating Unit attached to the Department and the Rummaging Section sent the remarks and it was received at the Cofeposa unit, only on 12-8-1998 and the same was forwarded by the Cofeposa Unit to the Detaining Authority, who received it only on 19-8-1998. By that time, the order of detention had been passed and therefore, the non-placement cannot be attributed to any oversight, but is solely on account of the fact that it was not available with the Department on the relevant date. The fact remains that by 11-8-1998 itself, the retraction was available with the Sponsoring Authority. The order of detention was passed on 17-8-1998. Even according to the Customs Department there were two working days on 12-8-1998 and 13-8-1998. Assuming 13-8-1998 to 16-8-1998 were holidays, nothing prevented the Department from placing the retraction before the Detaining Authority immediately on 12-8-1998 or 13-8-1998. At least on 17-8-1998, it could have been sent by them. The Detaining Authority is Secretary to Government, Public (SC) Department. The Sponsoring Authority is the Customs Department. The Customs House and the Secretariat are not situate at far apart. Admittedly, they are situate at easily accessible distance to each other. From the file we find that the Rummaging Section is but a part of the office of the Sponsoring Authority. It may be situate in the Air port, but it being a part of the office of the Customs Department over which the Collector of Customs had control it is not possible to accept the contention that the Sponsoring Authority was not in a position to expedite the matter to obtain para-war remarks at the earliest. For according to the learned Additional Public prosecutor, it was sent to the Rummaging Section for their parawar remarks as allegations of threat and coercion were made. For according to the learned Additional Public prosecutor, it was sent to the Rummaging Section for their parawar remarks as allegations of threat and coercion were made. On facts, the Sponsoring Authority had the necessary information and the parawar remarks were placed before him even on 11-8-1998, which was sent to them in pursuance of the letter sent on behalf of the detenu by his counsel on 1-8-1998. Therefore, to obtain necessary information or remarks about only a particular aspect of the matter viz, about the factum of threat and coercion, it is not necessary for the concerned Section to take their own time. Therefore, the non-placement of the retraction statement is fatal to the order of detention, since it goes to the root of the matter. ( 14 ) LEARNED Additional Public Prosecutor contended that as the detenu did not choose to say that he was coerced and threatened to give a statement at the earliest point of time and as the retraction made in the bail applications was countered by the Department and this fact was considered by the Detaining Authority, the failure to produce the retraction dated 27-7-1998 cannot in any manner affect the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority, for the reason that in the-above background of the facts, it is obvious that the retraction is an after-thought and therefore, the Detaining Authority would have naturally rejected it is an after-thought. ( 15 ) THIS argument, in our opinion, overlooks the fact that the subjective satisfaction requisite on the part of the Detaining Authority, the formation of which is a condition precedent to the passing of the detention order will get vitiated if material or vital facts having a bearing on the issue and which is likely to influence the mind of the Detaining Authority one way or the other are not considered by the Detaining Authority. Therefore, it is for the Detaining Authority to consider whether the retraction was an after-thought or not. We cannot substitute our view on the matter or sit in the arm-chair of the Detaining Authority and assess the materials. Therefore, it is for the Detaining Authority to consider whether the retraction was an after-thought or not. We cannot substitute our view on the matter or sit in the arm-chair of the Detaining Authority and assess the materials. Therefore, as held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in Ashadevi v. K. Shivaraj, the question whether the confessional statements recorded earlier were voluntary statements or were statements, which were obtained from the detenu under duress or whether the subsequent retraction of those statements by the detenu was in the nature of an after-thought were primarily for the Detaining Authority to consider before deciding to issue the Detention Order, but since admittedly the aforesaid vital facts which would have influenced the mind of the Detaining Authority one way or the other were neither placed nor considered by the Detaining Authority. The Apex Court in such circumstances held that there was non-application of the mind to the most material and vital fact vitiating the requisite satisfaction of the detaining Authority thereby rendering the Detention order invalid and illegal. Therefore, it is not for us today whether in the circumstances, the mind of the detaining authority would have been influenced by that or not and whether in the circumstances he would have accepted the retraction or not. Hence, the argument of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor fails to impress us. ( 16 ) THE fact that the retraction statement dated 27-7-1998 has not been placed before the Detaining Authority is admitted in un-equivocal terms. It is not the explanation that the said retraction could not be placed owing to any circumstances beyond their control. The retraction dated 27-7-1998 sent from the Central Prison. Chennai has been received by the Customs Department at Chennai on 10-8-1998. Thus, the enormous delay is not accompanied by any explanation. ( 17 ) FROM the counter and the submissions made by the learned Additional Public prosecutor, we find that by 12-8-1998, the Department had the remarks. Yet, they did not choose immediately place the retraction alongwith their remarks before the Detaining Authority inspite of the fact that the order was passed only on 17-8-1998, and there were five intervening days. Even assuming that 14-8-1998 to 16-8-1998 were holidays, the retraction could have been sent by Special Messenger to the Government on, 13-8-1998 or on 17th morning itself. Even assuming that 14-8-1998 to 16-8-1998 were holidays, the retraction could have been sent by Special Messenger to the Government on, 13-8-1998 or on 17th morning itself. After all the customs Department and the Secretariat are close by. When immediate action on the so-called retraction dated 1-8-1998 can be taken and it could be made available to the Detaining Authority such alacrity was not inhibited while dealing with the retraction. There is no plausible excuse. Therefore, the non-placement of the material document and the consequent non-application of mind on the part of the Detaining Authority will definitely affect the passing of the order of detention. ( 18 ) THE Apex Court has held in the decision reported in K. Sathyanarayan Subudhi v. Union of India (supra) that the non-placement of the retraction before the Detaining Authority went to the root of the detention order rendering it invalid. The Supreme Court again held in the decision reported in K. T. M. S. Mohamed v. Union of India that the authority intending to act upon the statement is-obliged to apply its mind to the retraction and reach its subjective satisfaction as regards voluntary nature of the statement. Therefore the failure on the part of the Sponsoring Authority to place the retraction goes to the root of the detention order and vitiated the same. ( 19 ) AFTER relying upon Section 5-A of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, the learned Additional Public prosecutor contended that even if that ground is to be omitted, there are other valid grounds available and hence, the detention order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative, merely because one of the grounds is faulty. But, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has omitted to consider the fact that Section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and prevention of Smuggling Activities Act empowers the Central Government or the State Government or any officer of the Central Government or a State Government to pass an order, detaining a person with a view to preventing him from smuggling goods or abetting the smuggling of goods or engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods or dealing with smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging in transporting or, concealing or keeping smuggled goods or nabouring persons engaged in smuggling goods or abetting the smuggling of goods. Therefore. Therefore. Section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act mentions the grounds upon which an order of detention can be passed by the authority envisaged in the sense. Admittedly, in this case, the order of detention has been made by the Authority concerned only on a single ground under Section 3 (1) (i) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, which deals with smuggling of goods. ( 20 ) LEARNED Additional Public prosecutor relied upon the decision reported in Madan Lal Anand. v. Union of India to contend that from the fact that the retraction has not been placed before the Detaining Authority, it would not lead to an inference that the order of detention would become invalid. But, it is to be pointed out that the Supreme Court has, in the above decision, observed as follows: It is desirable that any retraction made should also be placed before the detaining authority. But, that does not mean that if any such retraction is not placed before the detaining authority, the order of detention would become invalid. Indeed, this question came for consideration before a three Judge Bench of this Court in Prakash Chandra Mehta v. Commissioner And Secretary, Government of Kerala. In that case, a similar contention was made. This Court in overruling the contention has referred to Section 5-A of the Cofeposa Act and has observed as follows: Section 5-A stipulated that when the detention order has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly that if one irrelevant or one inadmissible ground had been taken into consideration that would not make the detention order invalid. In that instant case, even assuming that the ground relating to the confessional statement made by the detenu under Section 108 of the Customs Act was an inadmissible ground as the subsequent retraction of the confessional statement was not considered by the detaining authority, still then that would not make the detention order bad, for in the view of this Court, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds. Therefore, even excluding the inadmissible ground, the order of detention can be justified. Therefore, even excluding the inadmissible ground, the order of detention can be justified. Therefore, in Madan Lal Anandts case, the Apex Court has not laid down the proposition that non-placement of retraction statement before the Detaining Authority will not vitiate the Detention order. On the other hand, the Apex Court proceeded to consider that the detention order in that case was made on more than one ground. ( 21 ) THE Learned Additional Public prosecutor again relied upon the decision reported in Kusum Chandrakant Khaushe v. Hmlingliana to contend that at the earliest point of time, when the detenu was produced for remand before the Court, there was no retraction made nor any representation was made to the Magistrate about the exercise of threat and coercion. Therefore, in the light of the above decision, the non-placement and the consequent non-consideration of the said material by the Detaining Authority will not in any manner affect the validity of the detention order. ( 22 ) A careful reading of this Judgment would show that it was a case, where there was no retraction statement as such. There an application was rued by the detenu for reduction of bail amount, wherein in the affidavit rued in support of the same, the following allegation was made: Nothing incriminating has been found from their person or from their residence. The only evidence is their forced statements, which they have been retracted on the first day of their production in the Court. Therefore, while considering this averment made in the application rued for reduction of bail amount, the Apex Court has observed that it was rightly pointed out by the High Court that there was no supporting document, showing that the detenu has retracted even at the earliest point of time when he was produced before Court on the first occasion. Here, it is the case that though at the time when the detenu was produced before the Magistrate, he did not make any complaint; still in the subsequent bail application and letter, by a separate statement of retraction, the detenu had retracted and therefore, the non-placement of the statement of retraction dated 27-7-1998 before the Detaining Authority will definitely go to the root of the matter as to affect the very order of detention. ( 23 ) LEARNED Additional Public Prosecutor again relied upon the decision reported in Noor Salman Makani. ( 23 ) LEARNED Additional Public Prosecutor again relied upon the decision reported in Noor Salman Makani. v. Union of India And Others to contend that the non-placement of the retraction statement before the Detaining Authority will not vitiate the order of detention. But, from a reading of the judgment, we find that it was held by the Apex Court on fact that the retraction was made after the order of detention had been passed. But, here, the order of detention was passed only on 17-8-1998, whereas the retraction was made on 27-7-1998, and was available with the Sponsoring Authority on 10-8-1998 and therefore, on the date when the proposal of detention was made, the document viz. , the statement of retraction, which admittedly, is a relevant material document, was not placed before the Detaining Authority. Therefore, this ruling also will not apply to the facts of this case. ( 24 ) THE decision reported in Raverdy Marc Germain Jules. v. State of Maharashtra, relied upon by the Learned Additional Public Prosecutor, is yet another case, where there was a failure to consider the letter of retraction by the Detaining Authority, But, on facts, it was held in that case that the detenus letter retracting his confession statement was not received by the Detaining Authority at the time of passing of the detention order and therefore in such circumstances, the question of consideration of that document by the Detaining Authority did not at all arise. ( 25 ) THE Additional Public Prosecutor again relied upon a decision of the Delhi High Court, reported in Houssaing Khalaj. v. Union of India and Others to urge that as there were other materials sufficient before the Detaining Authority, the non-placement of the retraction will not affect the order of detention. But, it was a case, where the court held that apart from Section 108 statement, there were other materials before the Detaining Authority, that were sufficient and a statement given under Section 108 of the Customs Act was a ground, according to the Apex Court, and therefore, it will not vitiate the order of detention. ( 26 ) WE have already referred to the decision of the Apex Court reported in 1990 (1) SCC 81 (Cited Supra), where the Apex Court has held that the non-placement of retraction before the Detaining Authority went to the root of the Detention Order, rendering it invalid. ( 26 ) WE have already referred to the decision of the Apex Court reported in 1990 (1) SCC 81 (Cited Supra), where the Apex Court has held that the non-placement of retraction before the Detaining Authority went to the root of the Detention Order, rendering it invalid. That was a case, where the detenu was found to have in his possession 13 pieces of gold biscuits. He made a confessional statement that he purchased the same in Calcutta in order to transport it to his place at Cuttack and sell them. The High Court held that there was other ground viz. , that 13 gold biscuits were found on search from the person of the detenu. So, that ground was available to the Detaining Authority and therefore, still the order of detention can be sustained on that ground. Disagreeing with this view, the Apex Court, has observed as follows:"we have considered the same very minutely and carefully and it appears to us that in fact there were no two grounds but only one ground and the non-placement of the retraction of the confessional statement by the detenu before the detaining authority and the non-consideration of the same while arriving at the subjective satisfaction in making the order of detention goes to root of the order of detention and in considered opinion makes the order of detention invalid. In these circumstances, we do not think that the decisions of this Court in Prakash Chandra Mehta. v. Commissioner And Secretary, Gout. Of Kerala as well as Madan Lal Anand. v. Union of India are applicable to the instant case, we have also considered another aspect of the matter viz. , the detenu is under detention for over eight months and the order of detention is for a period of one year. Considering this aspect also alongwith the other aspects mentioned hereinbefore, we think it just and proper to quash the order of detention. " ( 27 ) NOW, coming to the decision reported in P. C. Mehta. v. Commissioner And Secretary, Gout. Of Kerala11, it was a case, where the Authorities came to the conclusion that the detenus were engaged in smuggling activities for which they relied upon several factors. " ( 27 ) NOW, coming to the decision reported in P. C. Mehta. v. Commissioner And Secretary, Gout. Of Kerala11, it was a case, where the Authorities came to the conclusion that the detenus were engaged in smuggling activities for which they relied upon several factors. Those factors were (i) the search and seizure in detenus room and recovery of gold biscuits, (ii) the detenus failure to explain the importation of those gold biscuits, (iii) the secretive manner in which the gold biscuits were kept, and (iv) the connection with various dealers and the statements of the employees of the dealers that the detenus used to come with gold bars etc. These materials were in addition to the statements and confessions made by the detenus under Section 108 of the Customs Act. Therefore, the Apex Court has held that even if those statements, which were retracted as such could not be taken into consideration there are other facts independent of the confessional statement as mentioned herein before which can reasonably lead to the satisfaction that the authorities have come to. Therefore, in view of Section 5-A of the COFEPOSA Act, there was sufficient material to sustain on other grounds the order of detention even if the retraction of confession was not considered by the authorities. ( 28 ) BUT, here in this case, there are no other facts. In fact, in the grounds it is stated that in his statement the detenu has stated that it is his first offence. It is not stated that the detenu has been habitually indulging in such activities. The detenu went to table No. 12 in Red Channel and declared to the Table Superintendent that the total value of the goods was Rs. 45,000/ -. The detenu did not reply in negative when he was questioned as to when he had any computer parts but, he had only replied that he had cordless phones. Calculators, cameras, Video CB Players, digital diaries, walkman etc. It is stated in the Detention Order that from the materials, the Detaining Authority satisfied that the detenu has indulged in smuggling activities. Thus in reality, there were on two grounds or more than one ground but there was only one ground i. e. smuggling. Relating to which the voluntary statement has been given. There was no other factors excepting a single factor. Thus in reality, there were on two grounds or more than one ground but there was only one ground i. e. smuggling. Relating to which the voluntary statement has been given. There was no other factors excepting a single factor. Therefore, the argument of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that there are other grounds on which the detention order can be sustained cannot be acceptable at all. There was only one ground available to the Detaining Authority and in such circumstances, the non-placement of retraction of confession statement by the Sponsoring Authority before the Detaining Authority and the consequent non-consideration of the same while arriving at the subjective satisfaction in. making the order of detention, thus invalidates the order of detention. Hence, we are of the view that the order of detention has to be set aside on this ground. ( 29 ) IN view of our decision, we find it not necessary to consider the other grounds set out by the detenu. ( 30 ) IN the result, this habeas corpus petition is allowed, quashing the order of detention passed by the 1st respondent by his order dated 17-8-1998. The detenu shall be set at liberty forthwith, unless his detention is required in connection with any other case or cause. Petition allowed.