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1999 DIGILAW 469 (PAT)

Md. Faseeh Ahmad @ Mantu v. State Of Bihar

1999-06-07

RAVI NANDAN SAHAY

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Judgment RAVI NANDAN SAHAY, J. 1. The petitioner is the former husband of opposite party No. 2 Ishrat Bano. The petitioner is a resident of Begusarai, while opposite party No. 2 is resident of Biharsharif. 2. The opposite party No. 2 on 23.4.1987 filed a case under Section 3(d) to sub-section (2) of Section 3 of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 for payment of dower debt and also for returning the presentations given to him at the time of the marriage. Opposite party claimed Rs. 15,000/- as her dower debt and valued the presentations at Rs. 25,000/-. 3. The Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate by order dated 24.7.1992 allowed the petition of opposite party No. 2 and ordered the petitioner to pay Rs. 15,000/- to opposite party No. 2. The order was passed ex-parte. It may be mentioned that the petitioner had opposed the claim of the opposite party No. 2 on various grounds but unfortunately his lawyer did not appear when the case was taken up. On 18.8.1992, a petition was filed on behalf of the petitioner for recall of the order dated 24.7.1992. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate by order dated 19.8.1992 rejected the prayer for re-call of the order. The learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate held that the petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to file written statement, which he failed to do. He contended but did not choose to contest on merits of the case. The petitioner then moved revision application before the Sessions Court, Nalanda. 4. The only question before the revisional Court was whether the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate rejecting the prayer for re-call of the order dated 24.7.1992 was fit to be interfered with. 5. It was urged on behalf of the opposite party that the petition to set aside ex-parte order was time-barred. It appears from the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the petitioner filed an application for appointment of a Pleader Commissioner for recovering the evidences of the witnesses of the petitioner. This prayer was allowed by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate. The learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate allowed the prayer of the petitioner to re-call the witnesses examined on behalf of the opposite party and rejected the prayer of the applicant on the point of appointment of Pleader Commissioner. On 20.7.1991, the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate held that Court had jurisdiction to decide the matter. The learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate allowed the prayer of the petitioner to re-call the witnesses examined on behalf of the opposite party and rejected the prayer of the applicant on the point of appointment of Pleader Commissioner. On 20.7.1991, the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate held that Court had jurisdiction to decide the matter. The order was not challenged before the revisional Court. Only point urged before the Additional Sessions Judge that Biharsharif Court had no jurisdiction. Besides the above, the learned Additional Sessions Judge did not find any defect in the order dated 24.7.1992 and order dated 19.8.1992. 6. Shri Shameshwar Dayal, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the claim of the opposite party as allowed by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate was excessive. By order of this Court dated 4.2.1994, the petitioner deposited Rs. 5,000/- in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, which has been withdrawn by opposite party No. 2. Shri Dayal submitted that this amount was adequate and the petitioner should not be directed to deposit Rs. 10,000/-. It is not possible to reduce the dower debt claimed by the opposite party No. 2. Had it been a case of maintenance under Section 125, Cr PC, the legality of quantum of compensation could be considered. But, there is a case of dower debt, so the Court has no power to reduce the amount fixed by the parties at the time of the marriage. 7. I am, therefore, unable to interfere with the impugned order. The application is, therefore, dismissed.