Judgement SARMA, J. :- The question of law involved in this case is that whether a single Judge can entertain a writ appeal and pass an interlocutory order when a Division Bench is not available in the station/in an outlying Bench in view of the Rule 2(2) of Chapter V-A of the Gauhati High Court Rules. This rule was amended on 19-8-1992. Prior to that this rule reads as follows. "2. Every such application shall be made and heard before the Division Bench except where the Chief Justice otherwise directs : Provided that during the vacation such application may be made before the vacation Judge : Provided further that when or where no Division Bench is sitting or available it shall be competent for a single Judge to pass any interlocutory orders in such application and direct the same to be placed before a Division Court for orders : Provided also that all interlocutory matters including stay and condonation of delay application and substitution petitions shall be dealt with by a single Judge unless otherwise ordered by a Division Bench." 2. After amendment this Rule 2 relevant for the case reads as follows :- "2. An appeal from the Judgment and order of a single Judge disposing of an application shall lie to the Division Bench if preferred within thirty days of the date of such judgment and order. The Division Bench may condone the delay in filing any appeal, if good and sufficient cause is shown." 3. We have not quoted the proviso as it is not relevant for the decision of the question. As bare look at this rule will show that the power which was given earlier to a single Judge by the second proviso quoted above has been deleted and/or wiped out. When a proviso is deleted or wiped out it must be deemed that that power now cannot be exercised by the authority because the legislature or rule making body in its wisdom thought it proper/fit to delete it. In view of rule as it stands today that power is no longer available, in this connection we may have look at Chapter II, Rule 1 of the Gauhati High Court Rules which deals with Civil and other matters as mentioned therein. That is quoted below :- "1. In view of rule as it stands today that power is no longer available, in this connection we may have look at Chapter II, Rule 1 of the Gauhati High Court Rules which deals with Civil and other matters as mentioned therein. That is quoted below :- "1. A Division Court for the hearing of appeals from the decrees or orders of the Subordinate Civil Courts shall consist of two or more Judges as the Chief Justice may think fit. (i) Provided that it shall be competent for one Judge to hear appeals and applications in all matters specified in the sub-joined Schedule except where such appeals, application or matters involve a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India. He may, however, send back any particular case he thinks fit to be disposed of by two Judges : (ii) Provided further that when or where no Division Court is sitting or available it shall be competent for a single Judge to pass any interlocutory orders in any appeals, applications or matters preferable before a Division Court and direct the same for placing before a Division Court for orders : (iii) Provided also that on the requisition of any Division Court, or whenever he thinks fit, the Chief Justice may appoint a special Division Court, to consist of three Judges, for the hearing of any particular appeal, on any particular question or law arising in an appeal, or of any other matter." 4. It will be seen that this power is available only in case of Civil matters and that also with regard to the decrees or orders of the Subordinate Civil Courts and a single Judge cannot be deemed to be subordinate Court and a decision in writ matter cannot be deemed to be a decree or order of a Civil Court. No doubt in the schedule appended to the Rule quoted above in Clauses 7 and 8, it is provided as follows (The schedule is with regard to proviso (i) in Rule 1 of Chapter II with regard to power of a single Judge) : "(6) All applications not being applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court and rules relating to second and miscellaneous appeals. (7) All revenue and bill cases for admission or hearing, as the case may be, except where the dispute involves the determination of any question of custom or usage and in criminal cases where the sentence exceeds imprisonment for a period longer than 7 years. (8) All interlocutory matters including stay and condonation of delay, applications bail and substitution petitions in all Civil criminal and other proceedings even where the admission or final hearing be by a Division Bench unless otherwise ordered by a Division Bench." 5. This clause 8 is stated to be deleted, but nothing was produced before us. In 1991 Edition this clause is there. In the absence of any material we are not expressed any opinion and leave it open for the present. An argument is made that writ appeals will come within other proceedings, but that cannot be accepted in view of the fact that for writ appeals separate provisions have been made and Chapter II does not apply to writ appeals. 6. It should be borne in mind that an appeal is a creature of statute and what is an appeal with regard to that one may look at AIR 1974 SC 1126 (Smt. Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar). (at p 1129 of AIR) :-- "The main controversy before us centres round the question whether that appeal was maintainable. On this question the position seems to us well established. There is a basic distinction between the right of suit and the right of appeal. There is an inherent right in every person to bring a suit of a civil nature and unless the suit is barred by statute one may at ones peril, bring a suit of ones choice. It is no answer to a suit, however frivolous the claim, that the law confers no such right to sue. A suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law and it is enough that no statute bars the suit. But the position in regard to appeals is quite the opposite. The right of appeal inheres in no one and therefore an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law. That explains why the right of appeal is described as a creature of statute. 7. That law is also enunciated in (1997) 4 SCC 452 (Northern Plastics Ltd. v. Hindustan Photo Films Mfg. Co. The right of appeal inheres in no one and therefore an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law. That explains why the right of appeal is described as a creature of statute. 7. That law is also enunciated in (1997) 4 SCC 452 (Northern Plastics Ltd. v. Hindustan Photo Films Mfg. Co. Ltd.), wherein in para 8, the law has laid down as follows : "8. At the outset it must be kept in view that the appeal is a creature of statute. The right to appeal has to be exercised by persons permitted by the statute to prefer appeals subject to the conditions regarding the filing of such appeals. We may in this connection usefully refer to a decision of four learned Judges of this Court in the case of Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, ( 1975 (2) SCC 175 : AIR 1975 SC 1234 ). In that case Khanna, J., speaking for the Court had to consider the question whether the provision of statutory appeal as per Section 406(2)(e) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 which required the appellant to deposit the disputed amount of tax before the appeal could be entertained could be said to be in any way violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. Repelling the aforesaid challenge to the vires of the said provision the following pertinent observations were made in para 40 of the Report : (SCC Pp 203-203) : (at p 1249 of AIR), (Para 40). "........... The right of appeal is the creature of a statute. Without a statutory provision creating such a right the person aggrieved is not entitled to file an appeal. We fail to understand as to why the Legislature while granting the right of appeal cannot impose conditions for the exercise of such right. In the absence of any special reasons there appears to be no legal or constitutional impediment to the imposition of such conditions. It is permissible for example, to prescribe a condition in criminal cases that unless a convicted person is released on bail, be must surrender to custody before his appeal against the sentence of imprisonment would be entertained. Likewise, it is permissible to enact a law that no appeal shall lie against an order relating to an assessment of tax unless the tax had been paid. Likewise, it is permissible to enact a law that no appeal shall lie against an order relating to an assessment of tax unless the tax had been paid. Such a provision was on the statute-book in Section 30 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The proviso to that section provided that ........ no appeal shall lie against an order under sub-section (1) of Section 46 unless the tax had been paid. Such conditions merely regulate the exercise of the right of appeal so that the same is not abused by a recalcitrant party and there is no difficulty in the enforcement of the order appealed against in case the appeal is ultimately dismissed. It is open to the Legislature to impose an accompanying liability upon a party upon whom legal right is conferred or to prescribe conditions for the exercise of the right. Any requirement for discharge of that liability or the fulfilment of that condition in case the party concerned seeks to avail of the said right is a valid piece of legislation, and who can discern no contravention of Art. 14 in it." 8. That being the position this writ appeal being created by the rule, the procedure has been provided for it and it is that procedure which must be followed and no deviation from it can be made and in view of the matter a single Judge shall not have the power to entertain a writ appeal and pass an interlocutory order as it is not provided in Rule. The order passed by the learned single Judge in a writ appeal can also be looked at from another angle, as pointed out by the Apex Court in AIR 1987 SC 535 , wherein in para 4 the Supreme Court laid down the law as follows : "4. When a matter required to be decided by a Division Bench of the High Court is decided by a learned single Judge, the Judgment would be a nullity, the matter having been heard by a Court which had no competence to hear the matter, it being a matter of total lack of jurisdiction." 9. So as no such power has been given to the learned single Judge the orders passed by the learned single Judge will be deemed to be nullity in view of the position of law as enunciated by the Apex Court in the aforesaid decision. So as no such power has been given to the learned single Judge the orders passed by the learned single Judge will be deemed to be nullity in view of the position of law as enunciated by the Apex Court in the aforesaid decision. We have not decided the power of a Vacation Judge as it was not in issue. 10. When a power is exercised under statute the conditions imposed by the statute must be strictly followed. The legality and validity of an order of a single Judge can be looked at only by the Division Bench and it cannot be scrutinised by another single Judge and a single Judge also will not have the power to pass an interlocutory order in such a matter as that power has been specifically reserved for the Division Bench. A statutory power will be construed no doubt authorising everything which can fairly be regarded as incidental or consequential to the power itself, and this doctrine is not to be applied narrowly, but at the same time when that power is not given to an authority that cannot be exercised at all by applying the doctrine of implied authorisation or the doctrine of necessity. The Rules giving the right to file an appeal specifically provides that the appeal must be filed before the Division Bench and that power certainly cannot be exercised by a single Judge. The non observance of the mandatory condition of the Rule is fatal to the validity of the action. The Rule is not directory but is mandatory and its non observance will entail/bring into existence a chaotic situation. 11. However, before we part with the record we would observe that the Chief Justice may constitute Benches in such a manner in his wisdom in the Outlying Benches so that one Division Bench and one single Bench are available there and that can be done by proper rotation. If that is done this sort of difficulty can easily be avoided. At least this can be done for Imphal Bench and Agartala Bench which are the two busy outlying Stations, otherwise also when there is necessity for such a Division Bench, the Lawyer may make a request to the respective Registrar and the Registrar may contact the principal Seat and necessary constitution may be made easily to avoid such an anomalous situation. 12. With this observation the question is answered. 12. With this observation the question is answered. In view of the Judgment of the Supreme Court as quoted above the orders passed by learned single Judge in the writ appeal is a nullity. The writ appeal be placed before the Division Bench. Order accordingly.